The Kursk Bulge through the eyes of a German tankman When German troops began their attack on Kursk (Operation Citadel). The 2nd Panzer Division, in which Joachim Scholl served, operated on the southern front of the arc. Scholl commanded the newly received Tiger tank, and on July 10 he and his crew tested the new tank for the first time. Usha and Gert mentioned in the text of the diary are Scholl's fellow soldiers, also commanders of the Tigers. Scholl had a bet with them: who would have the greater combat score by the end of the war. Everyone put 100 marks on the line. Bet with Gert and Usha July 10, 1943 Nothing special happened in my first battle on the Tiger. We were fired upon for several minutes, but the fire was conducted in a somewhat disorganized manner. Several shells hit the armor of my Tiger - I didn’t like it... We advanced about 8 km, the movement was greatly slowed down by minefields and annoying enemy aircraft. I did not see a single enemy tank during the day. Usha chalked up two enemy tanks (...). July 11-12, 1943 Today we hit our first target - a truck. (...) Usha chalked up three more victories. Pig, he's already way ahead of me! He probably got a much better gunner. I heard that we lost four Tigers in minefields today. I became more careful when moving. Prokhorovka: myth or feat? Here the publication of the diary will have to be interrupted. July 12 is the day of the famous battle of Prokhorovka - one of the key events in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, on July 12, 1943, 800 Soviet tanks took part in the Battle of Prokhorovka against 700 German ones. The Germans lost up to 400 vehicles, Soviet losses - about 300 vehicles. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Pavel Rotmistrov, writes in his memoirs that about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units fought on both sides, while “the Nazis outnumbered us in the number of combat vehicles, especially heavy ones.” Headquarters representative Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, who was also near Prokhorovka at that moment, estimated the number of those who took part in the battle German tanks in... two hundred. The confusion is aggravated by the fact that the words “Battle of Prokhorov” sometimes also mean battles that began in this area earlier. On the 7-8th day of the operation, in the offensive zone on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, German troops wedged into the Soviet defense with a kind of trident, and there was a threat of encirclement of several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prokhorovka. The “Steel Hammer” of Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army was supposed to break one of these teeth. The calculation was apparently made for superiority in strength and technology. According to Soviet documents studied by V. Zamulin, deputy director of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Field" for science, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 341 tanks and self-propelled guns that day, which is almost two-thirds of the Soviet armored vehicles that participated in this battle. Losses on our side exceeded 10 thousand people killed, missing and wounded. The Germans, having stopped the Soviet offensive, launched a counterattack on the afternoon of July 12. Our and their losses at Prokhorovka differ, according to researchers, by an order of magnitude. The reasons lie in a series of tactical mistakes by the Soviet command. The offensive began without artillery preparation or air support - German aircraft dominated the skies over the battlefield. Soviet troops met organized enemy defenses with pre-dug tanks and assault guns. But let's return to Joachim Scholl's diary. It also reflects the intensity of events. “The loader vomited twice” July 15, 1943 What a day! I think we knocked out 5 tanks today, but I’m not sure about it because there was so much dust and so many tanks everywhere! It was difficult even to simply find the target. I almost ordered to open fire on our assault gun, thinking that it was Russian. I know for sure that I destroyed a Russian self-propelled gun, since it was only 50 meters in front of me. Pieces of it even reached my Tiger. This is kind of crazy! During training, we were told that we should destroy targets at long distances, but it never occurred to me that they meant such a (!) distance. I think we also destroyed several enemy anti-tank guns, as myself, Gert, and Karl fired high-explosive shells at their positions. July 16, 1943 Another day in hell. We literally shot down an enemy infantry column that was trying to flank our grenadiers. Even inside the Tiger we could hear our soldiers shouting with joy every time another shell landed right in the middle of the Russians. We felt great. Although, to be honest, it didn’t give me pleasure to watch pieces of bodies flying everywhere. Bertie, our loader, vomited twice into the empty shell storage cells. He will clean up himself. Another night, trying to sleep. I don't think it will work. I haven't been able to sleep properly for three days now. “Tigers” and “Mickey Mouse” In Joachim Scholl’s diary there is an entry about another phenomenon, which, for obvious reasons, Soviet sources did not really want to mention. But this is also a detail of the times... Scholl, as you remember, commanded the Tiger. “It seems to me that the Russians are afraid of the Tigers,” writes Scholl, “everyone runs away as soon as we appear. Scholl, alas, is not exaggerating. It was the appearance and generally successful use of new heavy German tanks at the front that largely determined the specifics of the battles. The Tigers effectively hit our tanks from a two-kilometer distance, while the T-34 guns could not penetrate German armor from 300 meters. “Thirty-fours” (the Germans called them “Mickey Mouses” for their resemblance to this funny Disney character when the turret hatches were open) were more maneuverable, but if the battle conditions did not allow this advantage to be realized, then they were also more vulnerable. The natural psychological reaction was “fear of tigers.” In order not to be unfounded, I will quote the recently deceased Vasil Bykov (“The Price of Past Battles”). The writer, who knew the war firsthand, recalled that the attacking Soviet tank crews, realizing that they would not have time to get close to the Tigers within direct shot range, often abandoned their T-34s and returned to their starting line under fire. “By the time they reached it, their cars were already on fire,” writes Bykov. - In the end, having unraveled the seditious trick of the tank crews, the command gave the order to bring to trial in military tribunals the crews that emerged from the fire in full force. Then the tankers resorted to a new trick: they began to drive closer to the enemy and leave their vehicles under machine-gun fire from the tanks. Some of them died or were wounded in the open field, but some managed to get to their own. There was incomparably less chance of getting out of a damaged car that was set on fire.” The “Tigers” spoiled a lot of blood for our tank crews, but the fact that during those battles several times more Soviet tanks were destroyed than German ones cannot be explained only by the superiority of enemy armored vehicles. Tanks do not fight on their own and only among themselves. Our troops fought without sparing themselves. Turning point After the start of the Soviet offensive, the Germans stopped Operation Citadel and began withdrawing troops to their original positions on July 16. July 19, 1943 This battle is not going too well for us. Apparently there are many more Russians here than expected. I heard that the Tiger tank battalions operating far ahead were suffering heavy losses. This is starting to scare me. Our positions were literally overwhelmed by communist troops. We have requested artillery and air support as our supplies of high explosive shells are running low. With crossfire we managed to drive about 2,000 Russians into the ditch (Apparently, Scholl does not mean an anti-tank ditch, but a ravine. - M.P.). We have already reloaded the belts of our machine guns three times and replenished the ammunition of high-explosive shells. I've never seen so much blood before. I felt bad. Bert laughed at me until he realized what had happened to me. I will never forget this day. July 20, 1943 Today we received an anti-tank shell hit on the side armor. He tore the protective visor over the track. We thought that was the end of it, but Robert, our driver, said the Tiger was still running and handling well. We are still not in Prokhorovka... We are destroying Russian assault guns in large quantities. Usha said they will not count towards our bet. This upset me, because in this case I am already behind him by... 10 victories. July 21, 1943 Can you believe it - our terrible tank has broken down! Robert thinks the problem is with the transmission. We are towed to the location of the repair shops. There are about 8 Tigers from different units in line for repairs. Some of them have a lot of shell marks on their armor, so I guess we're still lucky. (...) The technicians said that we would have to wait three days. We reported to headquarters and asked for a little rest. I need to rest, I still have those mangled bodies in the ravine before my eyes. “Things are going very badly” July 25, 1943 Our Tiger has finally been repaired. The mechanics worked all night - a special order was received: “Urgently return all tanks to the front.” In general, things are going very badly. On the way back, we received an order to tow another damaged Tiger for repairs. Great, because it turned out to be “Tiger” Usha! Now I have a great opportunity to catch up with him. Usha was indignant about the mess that was going on at the front. He said that no one knows who is where, and the Russian troops are coming in a continuous wave. According to him, the Russians are completely oblivious to the number of their dead. We also suffer losses. Usha said that there were only three tanks left in the second company. July 27, 1943 Today I didn’t hit anything. We fired all day, but because of the dust and smoke, I don’t know what we hit there. I feel very tired, as does the whole crew. Robert practically fell asleep on the move twice - and this in such noise! Karl said that we destroyed a couple of guns, one T-34 and a lot of infantry. I cannot confirm any of this, but I will still declare these victories, since I have not yet left this race for 200 marks. July 28, 1943 Today we were ordered to retreat and regroup. This is the first time since the beginning of Operation Citadel that I have seen the entire company assembled. We lost several tanks, mostly due to breakdowns, but some were blown up by mines. Young Gert is seriously wounded and sent to Berlin. Usha said that Gert will lose his right hand, and now the bet remains only between the two of us. I said that Usha won this bet and we will make a new one when Gert returns. Actually, I didn’t really need these 100 marks. We are returning back to Belgorod. On our way we met a group of infantrymen. They looked very tired. I felt guilty and invited them to climb onto the armor. They settled down behind the tower. Robert chatted the whole way until Carl and I got impatient and told him to shut up. I, as an officer, should not have done this. I did not lose control of myself, but after this month of fighting I don’t think that I will ever be the same as before... The fate of Joachim Scholl Literally a month later, a new entry appeared in Joachim Scholl’s diary: It seems that the Russians have endless the number of soldiers and tanks that roll towards us in endless waves. Several hundred T-34s and KVs took part in the battle. I was very scared. This was the first time I thought I was going to die. I don't want to be buried in Russia. Scholl was not buried in Russia. On November 11, 1943, he was seriously wounded near Kiev. Scholl was hospitalized for several months, and in the summer of 1944 he was sent to France to fight against the Anglo-American troops. During the bombing, Scholl was again wounded and captured. For several years, as an SS man, he was held in the Nazi prisoner-of-war camp Comrie in Scotland. Scholl's war diary was seized, translated and published in England without his knowledge. Scholl died in 2001. “We must walk this kilometer” Joachim Scholl’s diary is read by a Russian tankman. On June 22, 1941, tank driver Viktor Kryat was getting ready for a football match. His service was coming to an end, he dreamed of returning to the Odessa Maritime Institute, from the first year of which he was drafted into the army. By the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, he was already deputy commander of a tank company for technical issues. From the first days of the war, Victor kept a diary: he dreamed of being a writer. He carried the notebook in a bag with tools, in a duffel bag. The diary burned in a tank near Budapest. But records from the Prokhorovsky field would still not be found there: on the Kursk Bulge the technicians did not have time to write. Olga TIMOFEEVA Rally before the battle Today, when retired colonel-engineer, leading researcher at the Moscow Research Institute of Civil Defense Viktor Mikhailovich Kryat, Candidate of Military Sciences, who was the first to launch tanks to a five-meter depth under water in 1953, reads the diary of a fascist tank driver, he experiences one feeling - indignation. The photocopy of the diary is scratched out, with short notes in the margins: “Lies!” There were slightly fewer German tanks burned at Prokhorovka than ours. And for the first time the Germans began to retreat not on the 27th, but on the 17th of July. He is a direct eyewitness to those events; his 170th Tank Brigade fought on the front line, covering the 181st, which was coming behind them and, as he himself thinks, more heroic. - On the evening of July 11, we had a rally. They spoke briefly, concisely, explained clearly and truthfully: “Keep in mind, the Germans have new tanks - the Tiger, the Panther and the Ferdinand self-propelled gun, which are equipped with 88, 75 and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns!” With an initial projectile speed of more than 1000 meters per second, they could penetrate our T-34 from one and a half kilometers. And the 76-mm cannon of our tanks could only penetrate the side of a German tank, only with a sub-caliber shell and no further than half a kilometer. They told us: “Comrades, we must build battle formations in such a way as to get to the German tanks and walk this kilometer until we can break through them!” This is amazing, a tank corps is never built in two echelons, but here in three: the 170th, 110th and 181st tank brigades. Our 170th went in the first echelon, and our task was to fly as quickly as possible and shoot aimlessly towards the Germans, covering the brigades behind us. And so the 181st Tank Brigade broke into the German battle formations and began to shoot these tanks... Battle All the tanks in the 170th Brigade were knocked out. The gun commander of driver Kryat was a Belarusian Gavrusenok, and the tank commander was a Ukrainian Prokopchuk. Both of them did not live to see the Victory. When asked why there were few decorated heroes of this battle, veterans will answer: there was no one to represent and there was no one to reward... “Sasha Nikolaev was a tank driver of the 181st Tank Brigade,” says Viktor Mikhailovich. - His tank was knocked out, the company commander was wounded. They pulled him out of the tank and into the hole. Tank is on fire. And here come two Tigers. What to do? Sasha jumped into the burning tank and rushed towards them. From the impact, the Tiger's ammunition detonated and exploded. And there is a German tank nearby too. Sasha Nikolaev’s tank also exploded. His bust now stands on Prokhorovsky Field. This relates to the question of whether our tank crews were afraid of the Tigers. Many such cases are preserved in memory. Fascist planes flew to bomb Soviet tanks. The tanks hid in the plantings, and in the middle of the field there was only one left - standing! He angered the enemy so much that they decided to finish him off. And he spins around on the field: forward, backward, stop - bombs fall past. The Germans threw everything away and flew away. And he plowed the entire field, but did not allow himself to be hit and saved the others from the planes. Rotmistrov pulled out the Order of the Red Banner of Battle and presented it to the crew there. “The battle went on from morning until late evening,” recalls Viktor Mikhailovich. - I have never before or since seen airplanes fly in five or six layers! There are air battles somewhere above, ours are flying, first Ilys, then Petlyakovs, bombers, then German Yu-87, Yu-88, Messers. I had a fear of aviation since 1941, but here I was absolutely indifferent, because this was happening on earth! Continuous noise: cannon shots, anti-tank artillery, ordinary artillery, it is impossible to understand who is hitting whom. Results - It was a tank graveyard. The Churchills especially got it - the hated cars, the English rubbish. We stood for five days, from the 12th to the 17th, opposite each other, not moving forward. We assembled one from two or three tanks. It got to the point that the blanks that the Germans fired were used to fill holes in the armor and scald them with electric welding... During the war, Viktor Mikhailovich went through with his own hands not only all Soviet tanks from T-26 and BT-7 to T-34 and KV, but also allied "Valentines" and "Matildas", M4A2. The deputy technician of the battalion commander of the captured "Panthers" came to victory: - The advantage of our tanks was that they had high speed and, having burst in, maneuvered among the battle formations, and the German vehicles were clumsy, heavy and slow. Only we had armor-piercing shells, which, having pierced the armor of the tank, exploded inside. Not a single army had sub-caliber shells: during the time it passed through the armor, the core heated up and ignited the fuel. By the way, the Germans, surprisingly, had tanks with gasoline engines until the very end of the war. They couldn't create a high-speed diesel engine like we had. And the gasoline ignites instantly. “This Scholl is just a talker,” Viktor Mikhailovich took the diary with him and the next day he wrote an answer on the back of pieces of paper. Apologizing for his handwriting, which had deteriorated after a stroke, he read aloud, making additions as he went. “In general, these notes and the diary do not correspond to the actual state and position of the troops. They are erroneous, even in terms of dates and times they do not coincide with the position of troops and battles. After all, on the Prokhorovsky field, in tactical and operational terms, after the collision of the two armies, there were no winners. But five days later the Germans began to retreat. They no longer had the strength to repel our attacks: during this time we managed to restore combat capability, but they did not.” He looks up from the scribbled piece of paper and peers into the distance: “On the 13th there was still an echo of fighting, and then everything stopped, we stood opposite each other until the 17th.” The Germans could not repair their complex vehicles in the field, but our technicians had already restored about 200 tanks. Realizing this, the Germans began to retreat to the starting line, but could not stop: we grabbed their tail. The retreat only seems systematic at first, but then turns into flight. And so they fled to the Dnieper. “The German “Tigers” and “Panthers” were good only from ambushes, in defense, but they were unsuitable for fulfilling the main purpose of tanks - rapid action in the operational depths of the enemy. They have low speed and maneuverability, so the maneuverability of tank units is extremely insufficient for fast-paced tank battles. With the correct use of tanks, the win was always on our side.” - In 1943, we acted like the Germans in 1941, not paying attention to anything. This tanker is just a talker. They held competitions for a hundred marks - as if they were invulnerable. But he himself shows the horror and fear that he showed in battles. “And where our tanks hit head-on, naturally, we suffered losses. However, it’s exactly the same on the German side. When they tried to attack head-on, using higher armor protection, they also suffered heavy losses and were not successful. Combat is not only about technology, but also about fighting spirit, faith in a just cause, faith in your commanders and comrades, faith in the weapon you own, you know its advantages and disadvantages. Then you go into battle with confidence. And most importantly, faith in yourself, in your strengths, abilities, skills. Faith in your victory: the enemy will die, not me. And one last thing. The discipline of every soldier and officer, the ability to carry out the order of a senior, no matter how difficult and dangerous it may be. Every fighter gets excited before a fight, but as soon as he enters the fight, all feelings go away - only the thirst for victory and achieving success in battle remains.” Viktor Mikhailovich raises his head and searches for words for a long time. “This is my answer to this... fascist,” he finally says.
On August 23, Russia celebrates the Day military glory. Exactly 74 years ago, in 1943, the victory of the Red Army ended a long and terrible Battle of Kursk, which lasted over a month and a half - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. In this battle, which was forever included in the domestic and world military, Hitler’s army suffered another crushing defeat from the Soviet troops. Kursk and Stalingrad are two of the most important turning point battles of the Great Patriotic War. The world has never known such a grandiose and intense battle of tank armies as took place in 1943 on the Kursk Bulge.
There are still quite serious discrepancies in the assessment of manpower and weapons of the parties in the Battle of Kursk. Thus, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation names the following number of personnel: the Red Army - 1 million 336 thousand military personnel, Nazi Germany - over 900 thousand military personnel. German historians usually talk about a different balance of forces - approximately 1.9 million military personnel of the Red Army and 700 thousand soldiers and officers of the German army. This is understandable - German authors want such an impressive victory to be explained by the very significant numerical superiority of the Soviet troops over the Nazis.
In fact, the victory at Kursk was the result of the superiority of Soviet military leaders over the aces of Hitler's strategic planning. The history of the Wehrmacht's attempted offensive in the Kursk direction began with the fact that Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, who served in 1942-1944. post of chief of general staff ground forces Germany, made a proposal to organize an attack on the “protrusion” of the Red Army, which extended into the positions of German troops near Kursk. Thus the plan of attack was born. Initially, Adolf Hitler did not agree with Zeitzler's opinion, since a number of military generals, including Walter Model, told the Fuhrer about all the difficulties that German troops would face if the project was implemented. But Hitler ultimately accepted Zeitzler's proposal. After the plan was approved by the Fuhrer, the offensive of German troops on the Kursk Bulge became a matter of near future.
The operation plan received the symbolic name “Citadel” - and this is no coincidence, since Hitler wanted to emphasize with this name that on the Kursk line the Wehrmacht was defending the heart of Europe. In Operation Citadel, Hitler saw a chance to seize the initiative and launch a new offensive to the east, “recovering” for Stalingrad and pushing back Soviet troops. The Nazi command approached the organization of the operation very seriously, including in terms of information support. Corresponding instructions were given to the propaganda department, since the idea of an offensive was becoming less and less popular in the army. Goebbels' propagandists were tasked with explaining to the personnel the need for a new offensive. On the other hand, on a more global scale, propaganda support for the operation was supposed to create the appearance of its former power Hitler's troops, which would, in the opinion of Hitler’s staff officers, make it possible to delay the opening of a second front in Europe by Anglo-American troops. 
Hitler's troops that took part in the Battle of Kursk were commanded by military leaders of the Third Reich, famous in battle. In the southern (Prokhorovsky) section of the Kursk Bulge, German troops were commanded by the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein. A talented commander, he had a reputation as the best strategist in the Wehrmacht and enjoyed great confidence from the Fuhrer. Army Group Center was commanded by Field Marshal Hans Gunther von Kluge, also an experienced military leader. However, Kluge showed himself to be an opponent of the Operation Citadel plan, which earned him the displeasure of the command. The Citadel plan was also criticized by Colonel General Walter Model, who commanded the 9th Army. Model insisted that the command give him large quantity armored vehicles, because he perfectly understood that the balance of power was not in favor of the Wehrmacht. The model required the command and replenishment of the infantry divisions subordinate to him.
Against Manstein, Kluge and Model, the Red Army went into battle under the command of famous Soviet military leaders - Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Army General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin, Army General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky. The Battle of Kursk became a clear example of the ultimate superiority of the Russian army and Russian military art. Many outstanding German military leaders were forced to admit this. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who led the development of Operation Citadel, subsequently described it as Germany's last attempt to maintain its position on the Eastern Front. He also recognized that the Battle of Kursk played a decisive role in Germany's war against Soviet Union. Colonel General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, who held the post of inspector general of armored forces during the operation, also emphasized that after the failure of the Citadel, the initiative on the Eastern Front completely passed to the Red Army.
The famous military historian Karl-Heinz Friser, who devoted a lot of time to a detailed study of Operation Citadel, also agrees with the opinion of German generals regarding the events on the Kursk Bulge. According to the historian, the battle can be considered the point after which the defeat of German troops in the war on the Eastern Front began to be perceived by both the generals and ordinary officers and soldiers in a completely different light.
Of course, by the time of the Battle of Kursk the failure of the entire campaign against the Soviet Union was already well known to everyone, but before the Battle of Kursk there was still some hope. Kursk became clear evidence of the approaching end of the Third Reich. After the complete defeat of the German troops at the Kursk Bulge, Adolf Hitler was furious. But, without betraying his character, the Fuhrer immediately laid all the blame for the failure of the operation he personally approved on the field marshals and generals who exercised direct command of the troops.
The consequences of the Battle of Kursk were very large-scale. In fact, it completed a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War, the starting point of which was the great Battle of Stalingrad. As you know, Stalingrad meant the final transition of the Red Army from defense to a strategic offensive against the enemy. At the beginning of 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken, an offensive was launched in the North Caucasus (including the liberation of strategically important Rostov-on-Don), and the liberation of Donbass and then Left-Bank Ukraine began.
The importance of the Battle of Kursk for the overall results of the Second World War is colossal. Thanks to the victory of the Red Army, there was a further and very serious deterioration in the positions of Germany and its allies in all theaters of military operations. Almost immediately after the start of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge, Allied troops landed in Sicily. The situation in Fascist Italy became catastrophic. The success of the Allies in Italy was facilitated by the actions of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army drew upon itself huge forces of Hitler's troops, not giving the German command the opportunity to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to Italy. As a result, in the south of Europe, the Nazi forces were insufficient to successfully resist the impending landing of Anglo-American troops.
However, despite the obvious victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk and the consequences that it led not only to the war on the Eastern Front, but to the entire Second World War as a whole, today there is a large number of falsifiers of history, whose goal is to downplay and distort the contribution of the Soviet Union and the Red Army to the victory over Nazi Germany. The first line of falsification came from those German generals, officers and military historians who explained the defeat on the Kursk Bulge as a pure accident. In fact, the falsifiers were not far from Adolf Hitler, who was confident that if other generals had commanded the armies, the Wehrmacht would have won.
The defeat of the Nazis in the Battle of Kursk was determined not only and not so much human factor, miscalculations of the command, as well as the whole set of circumstances that had developed by this period of the war. An important role was also played by the heroism of Soviet soldiers and officers, with whom the Wehrmacht military personnel, for all their military professionalism and developed sense of duty, could not win. Our people fought on their land, for their people and their Motherland - and this was the main explanation for the fact that they were ready to fight the enemy to the last. Moreover, after the atrocities that the Nazis committed in the occupied territories over the course of two years of ongoing war.
The second line of falsification, very common in Lately- attribute the victory of the Red Army on the Kursk Bulge to the successes of the Anglo-American troops that landed in Sicily. They say that the Allies, by organizing the landing of their divisions in Italy, diverted attention Hitler's command and Wehrmacht forces from the Eastern Front. One of the fairly common statements of history falsifiers is the myth that exactly those Nazi divisions fought in Italy that were not enough to win the Battle of Kursk.
In fact, despite Hitler's initial plans to send three SS divisions to Italy from the Eastern Front, in the end only the Leibstandarte SS division went to the Apennines. Moreover, the division's armored vehicles remained on the Eastern Front - at the disposal of the Das Reich division. It is unlikely that the presence of only the foot personnel of the SS division could have brought about a radical turning point in the Battle of Kursk and the Nazis would have emerged victorious.
Compared to the intensity of the situation on the Eastern Front, including the Battle of Kursk, the battles in Sicily look very modest. 13 divisions, 3 tank brigades, as well as Allied special forces troops landed there. The total number of allied troops that landed was no more than 470 thousand people. They were opposed by 40 thousand German soldiers and about 300 thousand Italian troops, who were very unreliable and ineffective. Thus, the Allied troops were almost 10 times larger than the number of Nazi troops and relatively combat-ready Italian units. A completely different situation developed at the Kursk Bulge, where, according to the Russian military department, 1.3 million Soviet soldiers fought against 900 thousand German soldiers.
This myth benefits those who are interested in “expropriating” the victory in World War II from the Soviet Union. Discussions about the Battle of Kursk, in which “if only” the Nazis could have won, fit perfectly into the rest storyline falsification of the history of World War II. An attempt to push the Soviet Union and the Red Army away from the position of the real winner in World War II plays into the hands of the United States and Great Britain, who, in the writings of history falsifiers, appear as the main fighters against Nazism, without whom there would have been no victory over Hitler's Germany. Of course, both the USA and Great Britain also made a huge contribution to the victory over Germany and its allies. It is especially large-scale in the Asia-Pacific region, where Anglo-American troops resisted the full might of the Japanese Empire, as well as in Africa, where the Allies waged war against Germany and Italy. But why take credit for someone else's victory?
Of course, for the Soviet Union, the victory in the Battle of Kursk was very difficult. Both sides suffered colossal losses of life, the number of which also remains subject to numerous discrepancies. The losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk amounted to 254,470 people killed, missing and captured by the Germans. Another 608,833 people were wounded and sick. Let us recall that, according to the Ministry of Defense, 1.3 million people took part in the battle, of which more than 860 thousand people were killed, captured, missing, sick and wounded. A minority of participants in the Battle of Kursk remained “in service.” But at the cost of such colossal losses, the Red Army still managed to stop the advance of the Nazis. The Nazis had approximately the same ratio. Of the 900 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht and SS, the total losses, according to the Soviet side, amounted to approximately 500 thousand people.
On March 13, 1995, in accordance with the federal law “On the Days of Military Glory (Victory Days) of Russia,” the Day of Military Glory of Russia was established - the Day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Remember everyone on this memorable date Soviet soldiers- one of the few modest things we can do today, 74 years after those dramatic events. People born back in 1943 have long since retired, but the memory of those dramatic events is still alive.
Episode 2. Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality
The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, effectively decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Presumably, the leading edge of the entire course of the Second World War was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and railway station Prokhorovka near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a limited space. From the Soviet point of view, this represented a collision of two moving avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle " swan song German tank forces."
The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the heaviest losses of its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he composed a legend about the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.
Commander-5th Guards TA Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov
“By chance, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the confusion, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at a short distance on the sides or rear, where ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive at Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on July 12. The Battle of Kursk tore out the heart of German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success in the entire war.”
In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In “the largest tank battle in history,” “two armored formations with a very complex structure faced each other in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.
What the Battle of Prokhorovka was like in reality.
Firstly, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not have lost 300 or (like Rotmistrov) 400 tanks;
In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly evident from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops on equal terms, even without losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;
In addition, Rotmistrov’s statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five saw action in the Prokhorovka area. In total, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, had a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, and 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" was advancing to the north on that day - above the Psel River, the 5th Guards Tank Army had to be confronted by 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 tank destroyers, as well as another 186 combat vehicles.
Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12 and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps into reserve and gave it about 100 tanks to protect his left flank from the forces of the Wehrmacht 3rd Tank Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. Rotmistrov’s operational plan can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:
The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS panzergrenadier division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left for maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th Tank Corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th Tank Corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The Russian superiority was approximately fivefold.
At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the German flank at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to go against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.
In addition, we should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army, for example, the 9th Guards Parachute Division, also operated. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only sporadically count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.
In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps since July 5, soldiers were in continuous combat and experienced serious supply difficulties. Now they found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a famous tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by Russian troops, distinctive feature of which there were avalanche-like massive attacks without taking into account losses. It was not just the overwhelming numerical superiority that caused concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance and did not react to the danger at all. What role vodka played in the fighting on the Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans; Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the mysterious events that occurred at altitude 252.2. For the rest it was a complete surprise. It was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff to quickly and quietly bring an armada of tanks and other vehicles into battle. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march with a length of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not on such a scale.
The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with overcoming the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept over the height of 252.2 like a “giant wave”. Having occupied the heights, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". An even more dangerous situation arose on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.
The commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left), sets a task for the artillery commander of the SS division Totenkopf, SS Brigadeführer Priss
Since the attack of the SS motorized division Death's Head was not in the east, but rather in the north, the striking wedges dispersed. A gap was created, which was monitored by the Leibstandarte intelligence department, but was unlikely to be controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psl could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was tasked with stopping the enemy’s advance.
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the noticeable impact of the entire artillery of the corps, was the attack of the “Totenkopf” division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced scatteredly. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment the 1st SS Motorized Regiment operated; to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS Motorized Regiment operated. The tank regiment redeployed to a bridgehead beyond Height 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of operation of the Das Reich division.
It is necessary to note the following bright point - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army with 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. It is also a legend that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.
According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 (8:30 Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a worthy response, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".
At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Peiper (someday I will finish his biography, he was a damn interesting person), who became known later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).
Joachim Piper
The day before, his formation occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tankman who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)
Rudolf von Ribbentrop
When he looked up at 252.2 that morning, he saw a purple flare that meant "Attention, tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the ditch, he led his company's seven Panzer IV tanks into the attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. “Having walked 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40, and then simply countless numbers of Russian T-34s appeared in front of us. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Vehicle after vehicle, wave after wave, building up "Incredible pressure was coming towards us at maximum speed. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, while the other three tanks escaped."
At this moment, the 29th Tank Corps, led by Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards airborne regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were stationed in the valley and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the kamikaze attack that the Russians were forced to undertake. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, the collapse of the German front would have followed.”
However, in a matter of minutes everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was incredible Soviet carelessness. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of Hill 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: “All the new T-34s were going up the hill, and then picking up speed and falling into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us.” Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented an easy target for encirclement; most of their tanks were shot down. It was a Hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, as well as burning T-34s!” - he wrote.
On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no “shooting at a moving target.” Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, were brought into battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank cemetery. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.
As can be seen from the logistics of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes. According to the latest Russian information, the 29th Tank Corps alone lost 172 of its 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were permanently lost. The casualties in manpower amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.
"Pappa" Hausser. Judging by his profile photo, he has already taken an excursion to the Borodino field
While at height 252.2, the frontal offensive of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its climax. Here, the offensive of units of the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of the Psel River with forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks." Churchill."
Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov
From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the attack was delivered into the previously described gap between the SS motorized divisions "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Tank Corps penetrated almost unhindered into enemy positions. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, and a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle fell apart into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine “who is attacking and who is defending.”
Commander of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch
Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its climax. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the guard battalion commander, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.
Senior lieutenant (captain during the Battle of Kursk) P.A. Skripkin,
commander of the 1st tank battalion 181st brigade 18th tank with his daughter Galya. 1941
This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed and the explosion shook the ground. Soviet tank crews shocked the Germans and they retreated."
Tank driver Alexander Nikolaev
This episode became business card Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on artistic canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The mechanic-driver of the allegedly exploded Tiger, Scharführer Georg Letzsch, describes the events as follows: “In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks "T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning mass of metal, which was coming at me with great speed." The attack by the 18th Tank Corps was repelled with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.
The attack of Soviet troops in the southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcement. They were opposed by the 25th Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 28th Guards Airborne Regiment and part of the formations of the 169th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps.
To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.
The most significant successes were achieved on July 12 by the motorized SS division "Totenkopf", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked north from there. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to knock over the Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area did some infantry units remain, operating as part of the 6th SS Motorized Regiment. They remained on the south bank to provide a reserve.
SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Totenkopf" division
Also incorrect is Rotmistrov’s statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the “Dead Head” positions with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on an offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.
The "Dead Head" division at this time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By mid-day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which made Rotmistrov nervous. He was afraid of losing control of his formations due to the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost attack became the symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and huddled together to defend themselves, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, leaving the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.
Kursk Bulge:186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in the battle. The USSR lost 235 tanks, and the Germans lost three!
74 years ago on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began an offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge. However, it did not turn out to be unexpected - the Red Army had been preparing for defense for several months. Military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Friser, who worked for many years in the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, is considered the best expert on events on the Eastern Front. He studied in detail both German and Russian documents.
Die Welt: The Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 is considered "the largest battle of all time." Is this statement true?
Karl-Heinz Friser: Yes, superlative in this case it is quite appropriate. In the Battle of Kursk in August 1943, four million soldiers, 69 thousand guns, 13 thousand tanks and 12 thousand aircraft took part on both sides.
– Usually the attacking side has numerical superiority. However, near Kursk the situation was different. The Wehrmacht had three times fewer forces than Stalin's army. Why did Hitler decide to attack?
– In the summer of 1943, Germany managed to unite all its forces on the Eastern Front for the last time, because at that time the troops anti-Hitler coalition started their operation in Italy. In addition, the German command feared that the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1943, which was to begin with the Battle of Kursk, would grow like an avalanche. Therefore, a decision was made to launch a preemptive strike while this avalanche had not yet moved.
“Hitler decided a few weeks before the start of this offensive that it would be interrupted if the Allies attacked Italy. Was this a strategically correct or incorrect decision?
– Hitler was very ambivalent about this offensive. The High Command of the Ground Forces was in favor, the High Command of the Wehrmacht was against. In the end, at Kursk it was about tactical and operational goals, and in Italy about strategic goals, namely the prevention of a war on several fronts. Therefore, Hitler decided on a compromise: the offensive was to begin, but be stopped immediately if the situation in Italy became critical.
– The most famous part of Operation Citadel was the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Did two “steel avalanches” really collide then?
– Some people claim that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks took part in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 Wehrmacht tanks were allegedly destroyed, is considered the “graveyard of German tank forces.” However, in reality, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. The Red Army lost 235 tanks, and the German troops lost only three!
- How could this be?
The Soviet generals did everything wrong that could be done, because Stalin, making mistakes in his calculations, was very pressed for the timing of the operation. Thus, the “kamikaze attack” carried out by the 29th Tank Corps ended in an undetected trap set earlier by Soviet troops, behind which there were German tanks. The Russians lost 172 of 219 tanks. 118 of them were completely destroyed. That evening German soldiers They towed their damaged tanks for repairs, and blew up all the damaged Russian tanks.
– Did the Battle of Prokhorovka end in victory for the Soviet or German forces?
– It all depends on which side you look at the situation from. From a tactical point of view, the German troops won, but for the Soviets this battle turned into hell. From an operational point of view, this was a success for the Russians because the German offensive was stopped for the time being. But in fact, the Red Army initially planned to destroy two enemy tank corps. Therefore, strategically, this was also a failure for the Russians, since at Prokhorovka it was planned to deploy the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was subsequently to play a major role in the summer offensive.
– After the landing of British and American troops in Sicily, Hitler recalled the Second SS Panzer Corps from the front, although it was impossible to quickly transfer it to Sicily. From the point of view of combat, this was completely pointless, because the redeployment of tanks to southern Italy would take several weeks. Why did Hitler still do this?
– It was not a military, but a political decision. Hitler feared the collapse of his Italian allies.
– Was the Battle of Kursk really the turning point of World War II?
- Why not?
– Neither Kursk nor Stalingrad became turning points. Everything was decided in the winter of 1941 in the battle of Moscow, which ended in the collapse of the blitzkrieg. In a protracted war, the Third Reich, which was experiencing, in particular, a shortage of fuel, had no chance against the Soviet Union, which also received support from the United States and Great Britain. Even if Germany had won the Battle of Kursk, it would not have been able to prevent its own defeat in the entire war.
– With your research, you have already dispelled several myths about the Battle of Kursk that prevailed in the former Soviet Union. Why were there so many legends about this battle?
– In Soviet historiography, the Battle of Kursk, “the greatest battle of all time,” was initially given a surprisingly minor role. Because the mistakes made by the Soviet command during it were simply shameful, and the losses were terrifying. For this reason, the truth was subsequently replaced by myths.
– How do your Russian colleagues assess the Battle of Kursk today? Do legends about this still dominate in Russia? And has anything changed in the perception of this issue in the Putin era compared to the Yeltsin era?
- IN last years Several critical publications appeared. The author of one of them, Valery Zamulin, confirmed the huge losses of Soviet forces near Prokhorovka. Another author, Boris Sokolov, pointed out that official casualty figures were greatly underestimated. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded, however, that Russian historians create a positive image of the Red Army. Since then, these colleagues, as sources in Moscow told me, have been forced to “split into two” between “truth and honor.”
© Sven Felix Kellerhoff for Die Welt (Germany)
The words of a German journalist that the monument in honor of the victory at Kursk “would have to be demolished” outraged Runet. What do German historians really think about this battle?
An article in the German newspaper Die Welt about the Battle of Kursk, in which, according to the author, the Red Army was defeated, literally blew up the Russian Internet. I was especially outraged by the phrase that the monument in honor of the triumph at Prokhorovka “would have to be demolished.” But apart from this journalist’s assumption, there is nothing sensational in the article for either Russian or German historians. Suffice it to say, for example, that its author refers to the publication of one of them, who wrote about the ambiguous results of the battle... six years ago.
How do they really evaluate the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943 in Germany - one of the largest battles of the Second World War and the most ambitious tank battles in history? This battle lasted for a total of about 50 days. About 3 million soldiers and officers, almost 8 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and at least 4,500 aircraft took part in it. In a conversation with DW, German historians (including the one referred to by the author of the article in Die Welt) assess this battle.
Operation Citadel
In the summer of 1943, the “Third Reich” managed to unite such large forces on the Eastern Front for the last time. This was done in order to strike at the advancing Soviet troops and cut off the Red Army forces concentrated on the Kursk Bulge (a bulge on the front line that was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943), and then destroy them. However, Operation Citadel, as it was called in the plans of the Wehrmacht command, failed. The Germans generally lost the Battle of Kursk.
“The main result of the Battle of Kursk is that after the defeat in it, the Germans no longer had the opportunity to launch large offensive operations. This was the last large-scale offensive of the Wehrmacht on the German-Soviet front during the Second World War, after which Nazi Germany finally lost the initiative on Eastern Front,” emphasizes Jens Wehner, curator of the Bundeswehr Military History Museum in Dresden.
As the Munich historian Roman Töppel explains, “this is why many Wehrmacht generals who advocated the Battle of Kursk later began to claim that the idea to start this battle belonged exclusively to Hitler. However, this is not so. It was Hitler who was initially against the Battle of Kursk "It was the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt, who came up with the idea of carrying out Operation Citadel. And then Hitler was convinced of its necessity."
All responsibility- on Hitler?
Roman Töppel has been studying the history of the Battle of Kursk for many years. He even wrote a book about it called “Kursk 1943. The Greatest Battle World War II" ("Kursk 1943. Die größte Schlacht des zweiten Weltkrieges"). It was published in German in 2017, translated into Spanish, English, French languages, has now appeared in Russian. Archival materials and war diaries were used as sources. Roman Töppel is one of the few historians who gained access to the archive of the German Field Marshal, participant in the First and Second World Wars, Erich von Manstein, who was considered the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht. The archive is kept by Manstein's son.
While working on this book, Töppel did not set himself the goal of describing in detail the course of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Instead, he tried to dispel the numerous misconceptions regarding the Battle of Kursk that still exist today. Thus, some historians and memoirists argue that the Operation Citadel undertaken by the Germans, which was the prologue to the battle of Kursk, could have ended successfully if Hitler had started it earlier. But he wanted to wait for the delivery of new tanks and therefore postponed it to July.
“In a number of military memoirs one has to read that if the Germans had started this operation in May 1943, it would have been successful. But this is completely untrue: it was impossible to start it in May, since the weather conditions on the Eastern Front did not allow it: It rained continuously,” recalls Roman Töppel.
Destroyed German self-propelled artillery mount "Ferdinand"
Hitler really had high hopes for new tank models. “The Germans brought a lot of new equipment to Kursk, for example, about 130 heavy Tiger tanks. More than 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battles,” Jens Wehner lists. It should, however, be noted that these and other figures cited by historians and memoirists sometimes differ noticeably, depending on the sources.
Battle of Prokhorovka: who won?
Be that as it may, success was initially on the side of the Wehrmacht and just during the deployment on July 12, 1943 tank battle near Prokhorovka, which became the most famous part of Operation Citadel. According to military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. And although the German troops failed to take the Prokhorovka station, the losses of the Red Army were very sensitive: it lost 235 tanks, and the Germans lost less than a dozen.
“In the Battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat. However, their command presented the result of the battle as a victory and reported this to Moscow. In light of the final victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, this later looked quite plausible,” says historian Matthias Uhl ).
But how could the Red Army, whose forces significantly exceeded those of the enemy (almost twice as many tanks and 130 thousand soldiers and officers against 70 thousand Germans), lose this battle? According to Karl-Heinz Friser, at the Battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet generals made many mistakes because they were rushed by Stalin. They paid with human lives. Thus, the 29th Tank Corps, sent on the offensive without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance, was met by fire from German tanks hidden in a shelter. And it was almost completely destroyed.
Legend from a warlordErich von Manstein
There are also allegations that the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk due to Hitler’s premature order to stop the offensive in the northern sector and transfer separate tank units from Kursk to Sicily, where British and American troops landed. Roman Töppel and Jens Wehner deny this.
As Töppel explained, “such a myth originally appeared in the memoirs of Erich von Manstein. However, this is just a legend. The generals who blamed the defeat in the Battle of Kursk solely on the “Fuhrer” also argued that as a result of the failure of Operation Citadel, the Germans did not suffer There would have been such heavy losses if in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front they had not gone on the offensive, but remained in defensive positions.
“In fact, this is not so. Let’s start with the fact that Operation Citadel did not cost the Germans that much huge losses. In any case, they did not exceed the losses incurred during defensive battles. And secondly, in 1943, the German side simply did not have the opportunity to remain on the defensive and maintain strength, since the Red Army would have gone on the offensive anyway, and heavy fighting, which would have led to no less losses, would have been unavoidable." , explains Roman Töppel.
Revaluation inRussia, underrated in the West
In Soviet and Russian historiography The Battle of Kursk is considered the final turning point of World War II and the third most important battle after the defense of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad. However, German historians refute this attitude.
“The Battle of Kursk was the largest and one of the bloodiest battles of the Second World War, but by no means decisive. After all, at the latest already in 1942, after the failure of Operation Barbarossa and two unsuccessful German offensive operations on the Eastern Front, as well as with the entry of the United States into the war, after the battle at Midway Atoll, as a result of which the initiative in the Pacific theater of operations passed to the Americans, it became clear: Germany could not win this war,” states Roman Töppel.
But in the West, the Battle of Kursk is underestimated. According to Jens Wehner, people here know more about Battle of Stalingrad and the Allied landings in Normandy, as well as the military confrontation between Anglo-American and Italian-German troops in North Africa. However, those who are truly interested in the history of World War II are well aware of the Battle of Kursk, since it is of great military and historical significance.
Be that as it may, it is too early to put an end to the work on studying the Battle of Kursk, says Matthias Uhl. “To get a true understanding of the realities of this battle, scientists still need to work a lot in Soviet and German archives, study a lot of documents and materials. Now, for example, historians are analyzing German wartime documents, which after World War II for a long time settled in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and then Russia. These papers are currently being digitized, and soon they will all be available on the Internet,” a German historian told DW.
See also:
Longest day in history
“D-Day” is usually called in the West the day of June 6, 1944, when the Western allies of the anti-Hitler coalition landed on the coast of France, in Normandy. During a grandiose operation that cost great sacrifices, the Western Front in Europe, which was very important in World War II.
Longest day in history
Operation Overlord
“Overlord” was the name of this military operation in headquarters documents. It was attended by military, naval and air forces from 14 countries, including the USA, Great Britain, Poland, Canada, France, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Australia. On the first day of the operation alone, about 5,300 ships, boats and barges, 8,000 attack aircraft and bombers, and 170 thousand soldiers were involved.
Longest day in history
Commander in Chief Eisenhower
The commander in chief was General Dwight David Eisenhower, later the 34th President of the United States of America. Before the Normandy operation, in 1942-43, he commanded the Allied forces that defeated Nazi Germany in North Africa, Sicily, and mainland Italy.
Longest day in history
The largest landing operation
Before the start of the operation, heavy rains hit Normandy. With such severe weather conditions landing on the coast was considered impossible. But delay increased the risk of leaking classified information. And the offensive was scheduled only one day later than planned: the assault troops landed in the early morning of June 6, 1944. Thus began the largest amphibious military operation in history.
