At the time of its entry into serviceKongowas the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament: “Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”
The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries marked a turning point for Japan. Setting a course for the creation of the “Great Eastern Empire,” the Japanese ruling elite developed the country’s armed forces, based on the belief that only a powerful fleet could protect the island state from direct invasion and guarantee its regular supply of necessary raw materials. To defend the islands, the Japanese needed a fleet of battleships, and to protect sea communications, a fleet of cruisers. Thus, the doctrine of the Japanese navy provided for an equal number of battleships and large armored cruisers. Forced to embark on a large-scale ship renewal program (after the advent of dreadnought-type battleships) and with limited financial resources, the Japanese acted with their characteristic pragmatism and decided to build battlecruisers. This decision was based on a sober assessment of the strength of potential opponents: the British and American battle fleets were incomparably stronger, and the Russian one was incomparably weaker than the Japanese naval forces. Battlecruisers allowed Japan both to protect its own communications from Russian cruisers and to cause serious damage to the communications of the British and Americans when they tried to block the Japanese coast (due to the small number of British and American ground forces, as well as the remoteness of Japan, the threat of a landing could be neglected).
Initially, the Japanese tried to develop the project on their own, but quickly realized that due to little experience in creating such ships, they were doing it slower than the British were building new ships. The first Japanese project became obsolete after the British built the battle cruiser Invincible, the second - the cruiser Lion:
Realizing this, the Japanese turned to the British, leading experts in this industry, for help. Projects from Vickers and Armstrong were proposed for consideration by Japanese admirals. Despite the fact that the Armstrong company already had experience in building ships for the Imperial Navy, the Vickers project, developed by Sir George Thurston (later the creator of the British battlecruiser Tiger), won the competition. Thurston's project was an improved version of the British cruiser Lion (translated from English as “lion”).
Performance characteristics
The contract with the Vickers company was signed on October 17, 1910 (some authors erroneously use 1912). In accordance with the agreement, the lead ship was built in England, and the rest in Japan. A total of four battlecruisers were built.
Naval literature mentions two somewhat dubious stories related to the construction of Kongo-class cruisers. According to one of them, a long time interval arose between the signing of the contract with Vickers and the start of construction, caused by disputes over the nomenclature of weapons. In fact, the lead ship was laid down three months after the contract was signed, and it is possible that January 17, 1911 was only the official laying date, and the work itself began even earlier. According to another story, two ships were originally planned, but “the huge super-dreadnought cruiser made such a strong impression on the diminutive Japanese admirals that it was decided to build two more ships of the same type”. Most likely, the Japanese initially planned to build four cruisers, based on a rational calculation (one cruiser is under repair, another one is underway, two are in the patrol zone), and the delay in laying down the ships was caused by preparatory work to localize production at Japanese shipyards (according to According to available data, up to 30% of imported components were used in the construction of Hiei, and Haruna and Kirishima were almost entirely assembled from Japanese materials). The Kongo-class battlecruisers were a landmark for Japanese shipbuilding, as the lead ship of the project was the last large warship built outside of Japan, and the Haruna and Kirishima were the first ships built by private domestic contractors.
Housing design
In accordance with the requirements of the Japanese Maritime Technical Department, the Kongo hull was significantly modified. In particular, the ship received a greater camber of the sides and a clipper-type stem than on the prototype, which had a positive effect on its seaworthiness. As a result of the alterations, the geometric dimensions of Kongo were slightly different from those of the Lion cruiser.
The cruiser retained the tripod foremast and mainmast, as well as three chimneys of different diameters, but changed their location. The smokestacks on Kongo were placed more compactly, and the smaller-diameter chimney, which was the bow one on the Lion cruiser, became medium-sized on the Japanese ship. The foremast and mainmast, located between the bow and middle pipes and behind the stern pipe, were placed, respectively, in front of the bow and between the middle and stern pipes (this somewhat reduced the smoke from the ship's bridge). It should be noted that, unlike Kongo with pipes of the same height, on other cruisers of the same type the bow pipe was initially about two meters higher than the others, which solved the problem of smoke (on Kongo the bow pipe was lengthened only in 1920).
Power plant
The increase in the width of the ship compared to the prototype and the movement of pipes was a consequence of a significant reconstruction of the power plant.
Despite the almost ten percent reduction in the installation's power, Kongo, due to better seaworthiness, even slightly exceeded Lion in maximum speed. High speed cruisers was achieved not least through the use of mixed fuel (oil was used to achieve maximum speed, and coal for sailing at economical speed). At the same time, it is impossible to compare the efficiency of the installations of the two ships: most reference books indicate the cruising range of the Japanese cruiser as 8000 miles at an economical speed of 14 knots, and the English one as 2420 miles at a speed of 24 knots. The location of the engine and boiler rooms inside the ships was also different. On the Lion cruiser, the midship (middle) main-caliber turret divided the power plant into a bow section of two boiler compartments and a stern section consisting of a boiler and engine room, and on Kongo, due to the displacement of the turret behind the stern tube, the bow section of the plant consisted of three boiler compartments, and stern - only from the machine. The statement about the greater efficiency of the Japanese installation is quite controversial, but the refusal to locate the main caliber turret between the chimneys certainly increased its firing angle and protected the superstructure from the effects of powder gases.
Battlecruiser Kongo, June 1914
Source: tsushima.su
Armament
The Japanese thoroughly revised the artillery armament of the cruiser Lion (eight 343 mm guns in four twin turrets and sixteen 102 mm guns in the armored bow and stern superstructures), increasing the caliber of the main and medium caliber guns and adding anti-mine caliber guns. According to the widespread version, the Kongo was initially supposed to use 305-mm guns as the main caliber artillery. However, having received confidential information from the British that “305-mm guns had lower survivability and rate of fire than 343-mm installations,” The Japanese decided to arm their cruiser with the latest British 356 mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers ( prototype was manufactured and tested at the British training ground in Sheerness in March 1911). As a result, the Japanese ship received main caliber guns, “the firing range of which was limited only by the horizon line”. Typically for Kongo type cruisers early period indicate a firing range of 25,000 m at an elevation angle of 20 degrees, forgetting that the lead ship built in England definitely had an elevation angle of up to 25 degrees (according to some sources, the elevation angle of cruisers built in Japan was 20 degrees, according to others - 25) .
Installation of a 356-mm gun on the battlecruiser Kongo
Source: miday.ru
The main caliber guns were located in four two-gun turrets (on Kongo and Hiei they were made multi-faceted, on Haruna and Kirishima - rounded), located in the center plane of the ship (two - in the bow with an elevation, one (midship) - behind the third chimney, another one is in the stern). The aforementioned transfer of the midship turret behind the pipes made it possible to increase the number of main caliber guns firing aft from two to four. In addition to the numerical advantage, the transfer also provided a qualitative one, since to quickly adjust the fire it was necessary to have at least four guns. For unknown reasons, Japanese cruisers until 1917 did not have a command and rangefinder post, which negatively affected their combat capabilities.
The medium-caliber artillery of the Kongo-class cruisers consisted of sixteen 152-mm guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers housed in single-gun casemates. Eight guns were installed on each side with a horizontal firing sector of 130 degrees and a maximum elevation of 15 degrees (mass of a high-explosive projectile - 45.36 kg, firing range - 21,000 m, combat rate of fire - 4-6 rounds per minute). Most authors explain the increase in caliber by the experience gained by the Japanese fleet during the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, the question of why the Japanese armed their cruisers with absolutely useless 76 mm guns remains unanswered. Kongo's anti-mine artillery consisted of sixteen 76-mm guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers (eight guns were installed on each main-caliber turret (two), another eight were mounted on the side of the ship in the middle part of the ship on the open deck on top of the battery), as well as seven machine guns. Probably, the Japanese themselves initially had doubts about the need for such guns (on the three subsequent ships they limited themselves to installing eight guns on the open deck), but the 76-mm guns and machine guns were finally dismantled only in 1918. The Japanese were in no hurry to install anti-aircraft weapons: four 80-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on cruisers only in 1923. Another mystery of the Kongo-class cruisers, which does not have a clear answer, is the installation on them of eight 533-mm underwater torpedo tubes (the British cruiser Lion had only two tubes).
Booking
The Kongo cruiser retained the armor design of its British prototype.
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King George V |
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Ship type |
Battle cruiser |
Battle cruiser |
Battleship |
Armored cruiser |
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Great Britain |
Great Britain |
Germany |
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Main weapons |
eight 356 mm guns |
eight 343 mm guns |
ten 343 mm guns |
twelve 210 mm guns |
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Armor thickness, mm |
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Main belt |
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Upper belt |
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Casemates |
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The main element of the cruiser's vertical protection was the main armor belt (thickness in the middle part - 229 mm). The main belt was closed in the bow by a traverse (thickness - 127-152 mm), and in the stern - by bulkheads that closed behind the stern barbette (thickness - 152-203 mm). Above the main one was the upper armor belt, which covered the middle part of the hull and reached the upper deck (thickness in the middle part - 203 mm). The upper belt was closed by traverses near the barbette of the main tower (thickness - 152-254 mm) and behind the barbette of the third (midship) tower (thickness - 152 mm). The armor thickness of the casemates was 152 mm, that of the barbettes was 254 mm, and that of the main caliber turrets was 229 mm. The thickness of the armor on the forward conning tower was 254 mm, on the aft conning tower – 152 mm. It is easy to notice that the cruisers received greater protection from longitudinal fire from the bow than from the stern, which indicates plans to use the ships for attacking operations. The vertical protection of the battlecruisers Kongo and Lion was weaker than that of battleships, but gave them a chance to survive even in a battle with enemy dreadnoughts. Thus, during the Battle of Jutland, Lion retained buoyancy after being hit by thirteen 305-mm shells and an explosion in the middle turret, and losses on the same type Princess Royal after being hit by thirteen "heavy shells" There were 22 killed and 81 wounded.
Much more criticism is caused by the horizontal armor, which the English sailors nicknamed “cardboard” with bitter irony. On Kongo, the thickness of the armored deck was only 38-51 mm, which was significantly less than, for example, that of the German armored cruiser Blucher. The lack of horizontal protection cost the British dearly during the Battle of Jutland: the battlecruiser Queen Mary (Lion class) sank as a result of a shell hitting the cellar of the bow towers through the deck (as a result of an explosion of ammunition, it broke into two parts and sank almost instantly).
There is no exact data on the mine protection of cruisers, but it is known that the cruiser Haruna, which was hit by a German mine, was seriously damaged, although it remained afloat and did not even lose speed. In general, the armor of Kongo-class cruisers was typical of battlecruisers - excessive for combat with enemy cruisers and insufficient for combat with battleships.
At the time of its entry into service, Kongo was the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament:
“Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”
I would like to start the story about the Russo-Japanese War with a revolutionary proposal. Or maybe stop clinging to the old style dating of events? In the end, aren’t you tired of putting “not ours” in parentheses behind the “true” date? The whole world knows that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place on August 10, 1904, and only in Russia they claim that the battle at Shantung took place on July 28 of the same year. But such a change would avoid a lot of confusion, because the Julian style is not used anywhere else. Of course, Patriarch Alexy II declared the Gregorian calendar “a devilish invention, invented to harm true Christians,” but we still live according to it. So, most likely, we will be forgiven for the minor sin of dating events of the distant past.
Well, okay, let's get back to the subject of conversation. The first big war, in which not only the ideas of naval warfare theorists, but also the plans of shipbuilding engineers were tested, was the Russo-Japanese War. In front of everyone interesting facts and the conclusions of the Japanese-Chinese and Spanish-American wars, they were still minor local conflicts, although the second was formally fought on two oceans. But remember: Admiral Dewey's squadron first stood peacefully in Chinese ports, then reached Manila, defeated the Spanish squadron and anchored again until the end of the war. The Spaniards' attempts to send Admiral Camarra's squadron to the Philippines and launch a cruising war in the Atlantic ended in nothing. And only the Russo-Japanese War forced admirals and engineers to think seriously about many things. In particular, about the role of cruisers.
The fact is that in this war all aspects of the combat activity of this class of ships were tested, but the cruisers did not always successfully cope with the assigned tasks. By the beginning of the war, both opponents had a large number of cruisers of various types and sizes - from small scouts like the Novik to ocean raiders like the Thunderbolt. Fast cruisers were supposed to serve as scouts for armored squadrons; the Japanese were forced to use their armored cruisers as “battleships for the poor”; the Russians tried to wage a cruising war; Japanese cruisers conducted surveillance and blockaded Port Arthur; both opponents used cruisers to support their light forces and combat enemy destroyers. Interestingly, the Japanese did not even try to use their cruisers to protect communications and fight Russian raiders. Let's look at everything in order.
The odyssey of the cruiser Novik deserves a separate story. After the battle on August 10, the cruiser, together with Askold, broke through the Japanese fleet, but at night the ships separated. The commander of the Novik, Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz, decided to call at Qingdao to take on additional supplies of coal. The loading took place in a hurry, it was not possible to take in the full supply, but the cruiser managed to slip out of the port before dark and did not meet Japanese squad, sent by Admiral Togo to blockade the port.
Von Schultz decided to try to break through to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan from the ocean. Considering the far from best condition of the cruiser's vehicles, this was the optimal solution. Arguments that we should have rushed straight through the Tsushima Strait are not serious. The cruiser had long since lost its record speed, and such an attempt bordered on suicide. Even during a calm transition, the mechanics had to constantly fight to ensure that the cruiser’s machines did not fail. Fuel consumption jumped to 54 tons per day instead of the norm of 30 tons, so von Schultz decided to go to Sakhalin at the Korsakov post to receive coal, although he first intended to break through the Sangar Strait. But it was there that the Novik was guarded by the Japanese cruisers Chitose and Tsushima, stationed in Hakodate.
However, on August 19, the commander of the Chitose, Captain 1st Rank Takagi, received a telegram reporting that the Novik had been spotted from the Atoi lighthouse, and immediately led his ships north to the La Perouse Strait. However, the Japanese did not find the Russian cruiser there, which caused them serious concern - the Novik could have already slipped into Vladivostok. Takagi remained cruising in the strait, but sent Tsushima to inspect the Korsakov post. The Japanese hoped that the Russians would mistake the three-tube cruiser for the Bogatyr and would be able to take them by surprise. This was naive, because the Arthurian sailors more than once encountered the same type of cruiser Niytaka, so the enemy was identified immediately.
At 16.25 they noticed smoke on the Novik, the cruiser weighed anchor and tried to jump out of the bay, which had become a mousetrap, but the Tsushima crossed it. At 17.10, when the distance was reduced to 40 cables, the Novik opened fire, and the Japanese immediately responded. For the Tsushima it was a combat debut, but the Russian ship took part in many clashes, and its gunners had a lot of experience, so the inequality of forces was smoothed out to a certain extent. However, the superiority of the Japanese, who had 6 152 mm and 10 76 mm guns against 6 120 mm Russian guns, was too much great. The firefight lasted 45 minutes, after which von Schultz turned back to the Korsakov post. The Novik received 3 underwater holes and began to land astern. The Tsushima also developed a leak, but the Japanese were able to deal with it, although they had no desire to continue the battle.
The next morning, Chitose approached the Korsakov post, but found that Novik was lying at the bottom. All attempts by the team to repair the holes were unsuccessful, and Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz ordered the cruiser to be scuttled. It was not possible to detonate it, since the explosive cartridges remained in the flooded steering compartment. The city looked abandoned, so the Japanese began to calmly shoot at the sunken cruiser. Then the Chitose came closer and made sure that the Novik was lying on the ground with a list of 30 degrees to starboard. The brave cruiser's service has ended.
The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers stood out throughout the war for its activity. Yes, his actions were not always successful, and he lost his only battle, but one cannot but agree with the famous historian V. Semenov, who argued that even if Admiral Jessen did not win any high-profile victories, he did not lose the honor of the Russian flag. As expected, Russia appreciated this: when the armored cruisers Gromoboy and Rossiya returned to their homeland after the war, Jessen received a reprimand based on the results of the inspection review and was dismissed that same year. After all, he didn’t sit in dugouts like Admiral Grigorovich, but stood on the bridge under shells, and any fool can do that. On the enemy's sea lanes, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner.
The detachment's first trip to the Sea of Japan began with a replacement of the commander - instead of Admiral Stackelberg, Captain 1st Rank Reitzenstein was appointed. The result was the sinking of a small Japanese steamer. The next campaign was made under the command of Admiral Jessen - to Genzan. Ocean raiders were clearly not required for this, but another Japanese transport became the prey of the cruisers. Unfortunately, in May 1904, the detachment lost the cruiser Bogatyr, which sat on the rocks of Cape Bruce and did not go to sea until the end of the war. The Japanese could well have destroyed it, but the mythical system of total espionage failed. For some reason, the Japanese convinced themselves that the Russian cruiser would remain on the rocks forever.
A new campaign to the Tsushima Strait was carried out under the command of Admiral Bezobrazov. He was appointed head of a detachment of battleships, but never got to Port Arthur. The Japanese official history briefly reports that on June 15 the transports Hitachi Maru and Izumi Maru were sunk, and the transport Sado Maru was damaged. But this is a forced brevity, because otherwise we would have to admit that due to the frivolity of our own admirals, 18 280-mm howitzers, which were sent to Port Arthur, and about 1000 reserve soldiers went to the bottom. guards regiment. The passivity of the Russian fleet led to the fact that the Japanese began to neglect basic security measures and paid for it. At the time of the attack, only the small cruiser Tsushima was near the transports, which, of course, could not do anything. Admiral Kamimura with his armored cruisers was too far away and could not help the transports. However, the Russians also showed frivolity; they did not make sure that the Sado Maru sank, although the Japanese losses were already great. They could only console themselves with the manifestation of the unbending samurai spirit - Colonel Suti, who commanded the battalion, solemnly burned the banner and committed hara-kiri. At least some consolation...
The Russian cruisers listened to Japanese radio communications, and Admiral Bezobrazov correctly decided that Kamimura was not too far away. Since “Rurik” could not develop high speed, he decided to deceive the Japanese and did not go straight to Vladivostok, but leaned towards the shores of Japan. Meanwhile, the weather worsened, and this helped the Russians. Kamimura reached the island of Okinoshima, did not find anyone or anything and stopped the chase.
This raid can be considered very successful in the sense that it delayed the fall of Port Arthur; terrible howitzers appeared there only in the fall. By the way, the Japanese also removed them from the coastal fortifications of Tokyo Bay, and it was not only the Russians who committed strange acts. The next raid to Genzan almost led to a collision with Kamimura, but the meeting took place in the evening, and the Russian cruisers safely avoided the unequal battle.
The Russian cruisers made their next raid into the Pacific Ocean, again under the flag of Jessen. Admiral Bezobrazov doubted the success of the campaign too much, and he had to be replaced by Jessen, who was temporarily suspended after the Bogatyr accident. On July 17, the cruisers went to sea, and on the 19th they passed through the Sangar Strait. The Japanese could not stop them - the entire defense of the strait at that moment consisted of 2 ancient gunboats and 3 tiny destroyers with a displacement of 50 tons. Having broken into the ocean, the Russians began to operate in the coastal waters of Japan. They sank several transports, not only Japanese, but also English, and the steamships Arabia and Calchas were taken as prizes. It seemed like a success, but, on the other hand, the destroyed cargo was not of exceptional value; most often it was railway rails. By the way, this confirms that cruising warfare at that time simply could not be particularly effective, the list of strategic cargoes was too short, and in addition, none of them were vital, like, say, aluminum during the Second World War.
And yet this raid gave the impression of a bomb exploding. Insurance amounts jumped sharply, and shipping decreased. At the same time, one should not take seriously the tale of how outraged Japanese shipowners burned down the house of Admiral Kamimura. I personally read a story about this, and in a book that few people pay attention to - the memoirs of the Belgian envoy to Tokyo, Baron d'Anetan, and I still don’t believe it. Well, do with me what you want, - I do not believe! By the way, where was he, Kamimura, at that time? The admiral’s actions, or rather inaction, during this period are quite difficult to explain. He was hanging out near the southern entrance to the Tsushima Strait and, it seems, expected Jessen to attempt to break through to Port Arthur, although such an action would be completely pointless.
On the way back, the Russian cruisers encountered an unexpected problem. The weather worsened, everything was covered in thick fog, and the squadron simply could not find the entrance to the Sangar Strait. After hanging out in the ocean for some time, the cruisers managed to see the mountains around the strait and squeezed into it. The campaign lasted 16 days, and the ships practically used up their entire supply of coal. Somehow, completely unexpectedly for the admirals, it was discovered that the raiders could no longer act as before. It was previously famous sailing ships like the Alabama, which used a steam engine only as an auxiliary engine, who could not think about coal. Now the organization of cruising had to be approached more thoroughly, and the Germans, preparing for a new war, took this into account by creating their famous system of stages.
No happiness lasts forever, and soon the Vladivostok detachment had to make sure of this. When the Arthurian squadron made a breakthrough, on the evening of August 11, the cruising detachment received an order to meet it. An order is an order, Admiral Jessen led the sailors who barely had time to rest south to the Tsushima Strait. But when the cruisers were already at sea, it turned out that the campaign was useless, the Arthurian squadron was defeated, partially scattered to neutral ports, and partially returned back. That’s when it would be necessary to contact Jessen by radio and bring him back, that’s where those “200 miles of radio communications” would come in handy, if they weren’t pure linden.
At dawn on August 14, the cruisers reached the Fuzana parallel, where they had already been, but this time the Japanese were much better prepared. At 04.50, the detachments of Kamimura and Jessen noticed each other, and the corresponding radiogram from Kamimura was received by all nearby patrol cruisers - 5 units. So, even if Jessen had missed the Japanese armored cruisers, he would probably have run into one of the patrolmen, but if he was unlucky, he was unlucky immediately and thoroughly, because the Japanese were located north of the Russian squadron and blocked its path to Vladivostok. However, in fact, the Japanese were trying to lie in wait for the cruisers Novik and Askold that they had lost.
But then incomprehensible things began to happen, and Russian and Japanese descriptions differ sharply. The Russians claim that the battle began at 05.18, the Japanese - that at 05.23, this is not too significant. But the discrepancy in distances is already more serious, the Russians claim that it exceeded 60 cables, but according to Japanese data, it barely reached 46 cables, which looks much more realistic.
The battle developed according to classical canons - an artillery duel on parallel courses; in this regard, the battle near Ulsan looks like the most “classical” of all naval battles of this war. The Japanese had some superiority in speed and gradually overtook the Russian squadron. And here one of the many incomprehensible moments arises. On paper, the Japanese had a noticeable speed advantage, but it is also well known that their cruisers could only achieve a nominal 20 knots in the most ideal conditions. On the other hand, the vehicles of the Russian cruisers were far from in ideal condition, the Rurik especially suffered from this, and this morning, due to an accident on the Rossiya, 4 boilers failed, so in any case, Kamimura should have had superiority 2 or more node. But every time he needed to catch up with the Russian squadron, it happened painfully slowly.
And yet, by 05.52, the Japanese found themselves exactly abeam the Russians, reducing the distance to 27 cables. Their artillery superiority was beginning to take its toll, and the Japanese were now directly facing the rising sun, which made it difficult for the Russians to aim. Admiral Jessen first turned to the southeast, as if intending to pass through the Tsushima Strait, but at 06.00 he turned sharply to the right, described a loop and went to the northwest, hoping to slip under the stern of the Japanese. Kamimura reacted to this turn late and turned left. The squadrons found themselves on diverging courses, the distance increased to 50 cables, and the Japanese temporarily ceased fire. But it was at this moment that the Iwate, which was at the end, received a hit that could have been fatal. A 203-mm shell exploded in the bow casemate of the upper deck, and at the same time a shell in the gun detonated. The casemate was completely destroyed, part of the armor flew overboard. The casemate on the deck below failed, and the 12-pound gun stationed above simply disappeared along with the crew. Another 152 mm gun failed, killing 32 people and wounding 43.
At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately the Rurik received a fatal hit, which damaged the steering, and from that moment on the cruiser kept losing control. In addition, he began to gradually lag behind the lead cruisers. The shooting on both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians try to write. Even official Japanese works admit that Izumo is the flagship! – fired simultaneously at all three Russian cruisers. The fact that all of the Japanese ships were hit indicates that the Russian squadron lacked fire organization.
Further events are not of particular interest. The Russian squadron twice tried to return to the Rurik; apparently, Admiral Jessen hoped that he would be able to cope with his difficulties, but it was in vain. "Rurik" received more and more new hits and soon completely lost its combat effectiveness. But still, he distracted Admiral Kamimura’s attention. The Japanese commander, apparently, decided to destroy at least one of the Russian cruisers for sure and at times almost stopped firing at Jessen’s ships. For example, at about 08.00 he generally ordered all fire to be concentrated on the damaged cruiser, and only the return of “Russia” and “Gromoboy” forced the Japanese to fire at them again.
At 08.20, Admiral Jessen realized the futility of his attempts, moreover, the other two cruisers had received noticeable damage, so he finally turned north to Vladivostok. The Japanese, carried away by finishing off the Rurik, were on its right shell and could not prevent the breakthrough. Kamimura followed him, but he couldn't - or didn't want to? - reduce the distance. As we see, this Japanese admiral showed the same caution as Admiral Togo in the battle in the Yellow Sea, although in this part of the battle he had a double superiority in ships and almost a quadruple superiority in artillery. By 09.45, the Japanese managed to reduce the distance to 27 cables, but then, as if frightened by their own courage, they slowed down, and at 10.00 the distance increased again to 37 cables.
“The battle was protracted (about 5 hours). During the chase, all crews were ordered to shoot slowly and aim their guns carefully. But at 10.00 Admiral Kamimura was informed that the Izumo was running out of ammunition. Seeing that the enemy’s speed was not decreasing at all, although his fire had noticeably weakened, the admiral decided to use the remaining ammunition to sink the Rurik in order to definitely prevent his rescue,” reports the Japanese Confidential History. In fact, by this time the Izumo had expended only half of its ammunition: 2,255 203-mm shells, 1,085 152-mm shells and 910 12-pound shells. Another factor that influenced the Japanese admiral’s decision was that he did not know about the results of the battle of Togo’s squadron and could well have expected a collision with the Arthurian squadron, and in the very near future
All this time, the Rurik tried to finish off the approaching cruisers Naniva and Takatiho, which prudently kept at a distance of 35 cables. But that didn't save them from the couple random hits, although “Rurik”, of course, had it much worse. Both of these cruisers fired a total of more than 650 152 mm shells. At approximately 10.20, the Rurik sank; calm weather allowed the Japanese to save almost all the surviving sailors.
Another proof of the inadequacy of the elder command staff the Russian fleet was the ratio of losses on "Russia" and "Gromoboe". The newer and much better armored Thunderbolt lost twice as much more people simply because Captain 1st Rank Dabich ordered the crews of small-caliber guns, obviously useless under the current conditions, to be at combat posts. Moreover, he ordered those killed to be replaced with new sailors, which entailed new losses.
And one more strange nuance. For a hundred years now, the story has been circulating on the pages of books that on Russian ships, when firing at long distances, deck guns malfunctioned - the teeth of the lifting arcs and gears bent and broke. But no one bothered to compare the actual battle distances with the maximum ones. The battle near Ulsan took place mainly at distances of 30–35 cables, a couple of times the distance was briefly reduced to 25 cables, a couple of times it increased to 45. These values are far from the maximum range of Kane’s 152-mm guns; what maximum elevation angles can we even talk about? But it seems that the assumption that the famous Obukhov plant supplied the navy with outright defects does not suit anyone.
“After the death of the Rurik, the active combat service of the Vladivostok detachment practically ceased,” writes one of the historians sadly. But attempts to wage a cruising war did not stop, although this was now entrusted to auxiliary cruisers. The result was disgusting - without achieving anything serious, these ships, through their actions, managed to ruin Russia’s relations with many European powers. By the way, if you look at the reference books, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese, without officially trying to start a cruising war, nevertheless caught more transports with smuggling than the Russians. The Vladivostok region was especially fruitful for them.
In preparing for the cruising war, the Russian military-political leadership made several serious mistakes. First of all, the Russian command, without suspecting it, let the genie out of the bottle by introducing a fundamentally new interpretation of the concept of “military smuggling” in Order No. 42 of the Maritime Department. Previously, only cargo that had a military purpose was considered such: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, transport (read: horses). The Russians implicitly introduced the concept of “dual-use goods”, which is so fashionable today, that is, goods that can be used for military purposes, although can and not to be. Moreover, the Russian admirals immediately realized that anything could be brought under such a definition. For example, cotton, which accounted for almost a third of Japan's imports, immediately became a forbidden commodity because it could be used to produce nitrocellulose gunpowder and make uniforms.
Moreover, it was decided to start a cruising war in European waters, which obviously could not bring anything but scandals and increased tensions in relations with Great Britain, which in 1905 owned half of the world's merchant fleet. This is not “the breadth and boldness of the strategic plan,” but outright stupidity. Along the way, it turned out that Russia’s preparation for a cruising war turned out to be nothing. The ships of the Voluntary Fleet, specially built for this purpose, turned out to be unsuitable for this; only Petersburg and Moskva were converted into auxiliary cruisers, and the Maritime Department managed to turn even this quite ordinary matter into an international scandal. These two ships were stationed in Sevastopol, where gun platforms were installed and a trial installation of guns was carried out. After this, the guns were lowered into the hold and camouflaged. It was supposed to take them through Black Sea straits under the guise of merchant ships, and already at sea to install guns and raise the St. Andrew's flag. According to the international treaties in force at that time, Russia could not conduct warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, but the Russian admirals hoped to deceive everyone and everything in this way. It would seem that it would be simpler - to prepare everything in the same Sevastopol, since the ports of the Baltic Sea were overloaded with work with the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, bring them to Libau and there officially turn them into auxiliary cruisers. Losing a couple of weeks meant absolutely nothing. But no, the main thing is to create problems for yourself.
These ships were intended for cruising in the Indian Ocean and left Sevastopol in June 1904. Only in the Red Sea, after passing the Suez Canal, did they change the trade flag to a military one and begin operations in the Red Sea. "Petersburg" inspected several ships and detained the English steamer "Malacca" with smuggled cargo for Japan. In mid-July the ships headed to Indian Ocean. At Cape Guardafui, the cruisers separated: “Petersburg” headed towards the communication route north of the island of Madagascar, “Smolensk” - to the south. Having received an order to stop cruising on August 24, both ships arrived at Libau at the end of September. During this time they inspected 19 ships, of which they detained four and started a scandal well-known case steamship Malacca.
Russian and English historians describe these events from directly opposite points of view, and the Russian one looks much less thorough, and it is precisely the “evidence” cited that undermines it. Russia at that time considered it completely natural for itself to violate any international obligations and therefore shouted loudest about others breaking the rules. To begin with, the Russo-Japanese War itself broke out due to the fact that Russia violated every single one multilateral and bilateral treaties relating to China, Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, the “war for Korean firewood” became inevitable.
So, on June 30, 1904, the auxiliary cruiser Petersburg stopped and detained the British steamer Malacca of the Peninsular and Oriental company. under the pretext the presence of military contraband on it. English newspapers of that time depict colorful details of the inspection: the captain of the Malacca nailed the British merchant flag to the flagpole, and the Russian officer, threatening him with a revolver, tore off the flag. Captain 2nd rank Skalsky decided to send him to Libau with a prize team, without spending inspection of cargo based solely on “suspicions that something is fishy.” Information about the allegedly smuggled nature of the cargo “came” from a variety of places that had nothing to do with the voyage of this ship, for example, from the Russian consuls in Malta and Alexandria, where the Malacca did not go.
Already on July 7, a note from the British Ambassador followed, of course, completely unfounded, as all Russian authors have unanimously written for a hundred years in a row. Yes, the Malacca carried military cargo destined for Hong Kong, which the Russians stubbornly did not notice and do not notice today. There were proper documents, the cargo was marked “Property of the Government of the EU”, but if you really wanted to, you could not notice this, but declare that “from a survey of the team” the presence of military contraband was revealed. Indeed, stokers and deck sailors know better than anyone what, where and to whom the ship is carrying.
On June 10, a meeting was held regarding Malacca, at which opinions were sharply divided. Diplomats demanded the release of the ship, citing violations of international law committed by the sailors; the maritime faction, led by “Prince of Tsushima” Alexei Alexandrovich, defended the point of view “I can do whatever I want.” The Grand Duke argued that England was so strongly in defense of Malacca on the grounds that the English king was among the shareholders of P&O. Imagine, as the French say! Two different explanations can be offered for this nonsense. Either the Admiral General was a complete fool and transmitted the rotten Russian experience to other countries, because in the famous scam with Korean firewood the Romanov family was covered up to its ears. One of the leaders of the concession was Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, and the largest block of shares belonged to the “EV cabinet,” that is, simply the tsar. It can be assumed that Alexey Alexandrovich bought into the title “P&O” - “Royal Charter”, but this only means that the king granted the company certain privileges, but not that he receives money for it. And again, this interpretation means that the admiral general was extremely stupid. The second explanation is much shorter - the Grand Duke lied quite deliberately.
And the explanation for the sharp reaction of the British may be quite simple. Since 1841, the P&O company has been the official mail carrier of the British Admiralty, and a little later became the official carrier of the Royal Mail. In fact, in England, people simply hanged people for attacking the Royal Mail without much ado, because it was considered an attack on the guarantees given by the EB.
After some arguing, the ship was released on July 14 and continued its passage. To finally get away with it, the Russians are promoting a campaign of lies, in which the Russian consuls in Shanghai and Hong Kong have begun to play the leading role. Either the Malacca goes to Singapore not for repairs, but to cover up its tracks, then French journalists “reliably established” that the ship is going to Yokohama, but for some reason ends up in Sasebo. Then it suddenly turns out that the cruiser Iwate was equipped with 152-mm guns brought by Malacca, although such guns did not exist in nature. In general, as Dr. Goebbels advised, in order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous.
The reliability of the work of these “sources of information” is well illustrated by the fable about the German transport “Sambia”. The Russian agent in Berlin, Colonel Schebeck, reported that this transport was leaving Hamburg for Japan, carrying 329 guns. The Russian admirals, without hesitation, immediately sent the auxiliary cruiser Ural to catch the smuggler. No one even bothered to think about whether these nonsense could be believed. This is the artillery park of an entire army, the real deal of the century. It would be simply impossible to keep something like this a secret, but there was no other evidence other than the colonel’s tales then, and there is no evidence now. But earlier, and especially today, most historians for some reason consider these tales to be true facts.
Smolensk also caused its own scandal when it detained the German steamer Prince Heinrich. Russian historians bashfully write that they checked his mail and seized two letters containing documents about the shipment of military contraband from Germany to Japan. In fact, everything was much more stupid and vile. Was confiscated from the ship all mail, after which all illustrated and seized the two mentioned letters. All other letters were “sealed and put aside for transfer to the first oncoming mail steamer,” which was done two days later, when the English steamer Persia met. After this, is it any wonder that Russian auxiliary cruisers were treated like pirates of the 18th century that had fallen out in our time?
In general, the actions of the Russian auxiliary cruisers brought nothing but trouble to Russia. Admiral Rozhestvensky dragged the Kuban, Terek, Dnepr, Rion and Ural around the world with him, but they did nothing significant, except that the Ural died ingloriously in the Battle of Tsushima. The only auxiliary cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment, Lena, distinguished itself only by the fact that “due to a machine breakdown that prevented it from continuing cruising,” it reached San Francisco!
Purely for reference, we present data on merchant ships captured by the Japanese fleet. The total number is 64, including 16 Russian, 22 English, 10 German and 5 American. And what do you say after this, who did the British and Americans help?
Probably the easiest way to deal with the reconnaissance and patrol activities of cruisers. With what words did the Arthurians honor the famous “dogs” of the Japanese fleet! But, what is most interesting, the obviously stronger Askold never tried to drive away the observers who had settled in the outer roadstead. Even in the most tense moments, when the Japanese squadron fired over Liaoteshan, shelling the harbor of Port Arthur, no one tried to interfere with the Japanese cruisers adjusting the fire. These episodes, by the way, prove that the Japanese radio communications were two orders of magnitude better, and the stories about pre-war experiments in communications over a range of 200 miles are not convincing. Why didn’t anyone try to repeat them during the war?!
Another example of an established intelligence service is the organization of patrols in front of the Tsushima Strait. Both amateur and professional historians like to speculate about whether Rozhdestvensky’s squadron could have slipped through the strait undetected by the Japanese. The answer is simple - I couldn’t. Just to get this answer, we had to wait a very long time until the Japanese maps, considered secret for almost 100 years, finally appeared. It turned out that four lines of patrols had been organized, pushed forward almost to the island of Quelpart. Rozhdestvensky was lucky to pass them at night, but what could have happened if he had passed through this area during the day, expecting to end up in the Tsushima Strait at night? The result would be an all-out attack by Japanese destroyers and in the morning finishing off the battered squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo. But what happened happened, in square 203 the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru discovered the Russians...
In 1868, the Meiji Ishin coup took place in Japan, as a result of which the power of the emperor was restored. The country emerged from the rule of feudal clans, the navy also became united. The Ministry of War (whose jurisdiction also initially included the Navy) received a strange set of ships that, with great stretch, could be called combat ships and which clearly did not represent the navy. It included ships of the bakufu - the feudal government, and ships inherited from its defeated opponents, primarily the powerful Satsuma clan. Among them was the only battleship purchased from the rebellious American Confederacy of the southern states, a wooden corvette and a gunboat, as well as several armed steamships and sailing ships. Japan was faced with a dilemma: either restore old ships or renew the fleet. The Japanese took the second path. In 1870, the most powerful fleet in the world, the British, was chosen as a landmark.
Several English instructors arrived in a country that was completely closed from the rest of the world and began training sailors and transferring modern technologies. However, the Japanese were very cautious, and the British operated within many restrictions. But in the years allotted to them, the British managed to do a lot of useful things. In addition to organizing the fleet and training personnel, they established the purchase of warships.
corvette Tsukuba
True, for him the beginning did not look inspiring; among his first acquisitions was, for example, the corvette “Tsukuba” with a displacement of about 1900 tons, built almost 20 years ago in the British colony of Burma and then modernized in the metropolis “Old Man” (which one cannot dare to call a cruiser ) developed in pairs no more than 10 knots. However, the Japanese treated this antiquity, as they did all their warships, with great care and love. The artillery on it was changed twice and, according to some information, in 1892 the Tsukuba even received four 152-mm rapid-fire guns. The veteran finally retired after the Russo-Japanese War. The 1,400-ton corvette Asama, purchased in France, did not shine with its merits either.
corvette "Asama"
However, British specialists did not limit themselves to these obsolete ships. At the shipyards of England, completely modern armored units were created: the frigate Fuso (essentially a small battleship) and the corvettes Hiei and Kongo. The design of the latter was developed by Edward Reed himself, the chief designer of the Admiralty. With a displacement of 2200 tons, they could develop 14 knots and had an iron belt up to 114 mm thick. The Hiei still managed to actively participate in the Sino-Japanese War and received its share of enemy shells in the battle at the mouth of the Yalu River.
frigate "Fuso"
Deciding quite sensibly “not to put all your eggs in one basket,” the War Department abruptly changed the main supplier of ideas and ships. The choice fell on Britain’s main rival. By the early 1880s, Far East French metallurgists and engineers began to arrive. They managed to complete the work of their predecessors and organize the construction of cruisers in Japanese shipyards. It is quite natural that at first everything did not go very smoothly. The wooden corvettes “Kaimon” and “Tenryu” with a displacement of only about 1500 tons took a painfully long time to build, about seven years each, entering service only in 1885 - 1886. However, they turned out to be quite successful and served until the Russo-Japanese War, during which in July 1904, the Kaimon hit a mine in Talienwan Bay and died, and the Tenryu, which successfully survived it, was removed from the lists soon after the end of hostilities.
corvette "Kasuga"
The successful project was modernized, and the following corvettes, Musashi and Katsuragi, were laid down on the vacated stocks in Yokosuka. Another corvette of the same type, Yamato, was built at the second state shipyard in Kobe. The ships had a composite frame with steel frames and wooden plating and carried a full sail rig, removed at the turn of the century, in 1900. Construction also accelerated, although the five-year deadline for fairly simple units still remained insurmountable.
Practical “pieces of wood” were quite suitable for study, but for a serious war larger ships with powerful weapons were required. The Japanese wanted to get the most powerful and at the same time cheap modern cruiser, and the French engineers, who were usually very vigilant about such a characteristic as stability, gave up the slack. Built in Le Havre, the Wenby had all the external features of typical French ships, such as the Sfax, Cecil or Taj, and had a fairly thick armored deck and good speed. However, in an effort to satisfy the customer as much as possible, the designers went too far with the artillery, which consisted of four heavy 240-mm Krupp guns, not counting 150-mm guns and other “trifles.” As a result, the overloaded cruiser, under full sail, heeled dangerously and did not want to return to an even keel. In this state he left Le Havre on a long journey to the Far East. But he never arrived there, disappearing without a trace somewhere between Singapore and Taiwan in October 1887.
The first loud “puncture” was followed by further ones, albeit not so serious and of a completely different nature. The reorientation towards France brought to Japan the ideas of the “young school”, which turned out to be quite consistent with the fighting spirit of the samurai. Small ships attacking armored giants, in addition to being a good opportunity to show the valor of warriors, were also inexpensive, just within the means of a rapidly developing power that had too many wants and needs.
Corvette "Matsushima"
To implement new ideas, “heavy artillery” arrived from Europe; the famous French shipbuilder Emile Bertin signed a three-year contract to stay in Japan. He proposed a super-original project for a trio of cruisers, armed with the heaviest guns and designed as a response to fight even large battleships - ordered for the most powerful Northern squadron of the Chinese fleet, the Matsushima, Hashidate and Itsukushima received the designation "san-keikan" ” - “landscape ships”, since each unit bore the name of one of the three most famous species in Japan - Matsushima Bay in Miyagi Prefecture, Amano Hashidate Sandbank in Miyazu Bay in Kyoto Prefecture, and Ikutsushima Island in Hiroshima Bay.
They were conceived to operate as a single detachment, forming, as it were, one “composite battleship”, in which “Hashidate” and “Itsukushima” were the “bow towers”, and “Matsushima” was the “stern”. Accordingly, the main gun, one of the most powerful 320-mm Kane guns in the world at that time, was located on the first pair in the bow, and on the “last” one in the stern. In addition to the monster gun located in a lightly armored barbette, each of the cruisers carried a substantial battery of 120-mm rapid-fire guns, which had just been “introduced into use.” The rapid fire guns were located in a large battery in the center of the hull, firing through ports on both sides in the manner of ancient frigates. They were in fact the main weapon of the Sankeikan. But the small size of the ship did not allow them to be protected, and therefore they were very vulnerable.
Therefore, neither Bertin’s strange idea nor its implementation can be called successful. The Matsushima failed to develop the already non-sprinting 16.5-knot design speed; their boilers constantly leaked and failed. However, the main drawback was their monstrous 320mm frames, for the installation of which they had to sacrifice too much. The huge guns themselves on such small ships turned out to be practically useless; the 65-ton long barrel, when aimed directly at the side, noticeably tilted the hull, creating additional difficulties for firing, not only its own, but also much more effective rapid fire guns. As a result, even in calm sea conditions, no more than four shots per hour could be fired from the “monster.”
All the shortcomings of the project were fully revealed in battle. Serious troubles awaited the Sankeikan type in the battle with the Chinese at the mouth of the Yalu River. There, in four hours of battle, 320-millimeter fired 14 rounds for the entire trio, but unlike later battles, when the Matsushimas wisely stayed outside the range of effective return fire, they had to experience the effects of enemy shells. And then all the shortcomings of the cramped and unprotected 120-mm battery appeared. One of the few shells that hit from the Chinese battleships exploded among the ammunition on the Matsushima, causing a strong fire in which almost 100 people were injured - about a third of the crew, and half of them died .
Without a doubt, this hit was the most successful in the entire war and showed the extreme vulnerability of the “pseudo-battleship”. During the Russo-Japanese War, the “landscape trinity” participated in both main battles, but neither in the Yellow Sea nor at Tsushima achieved a single hit, firing less than two dozen shells at all. In general, the main benefit from the “landscapes”, perhaps, was the process of “assembling” the “Hashidate” at the shipyard in Yokosuka (the other two units were built in France). Namely “assemblies”, since almost all the mechanisms, equipment, materials and drawings came to Japan from Europe, and the work was supervised by French engineers. Equipment and skills were still clearly insufficient, and the construction of the Hashidate took twice as long. It entered service three years later than its “sisters.” Nevertheless, the experience in creating a modern combat vessel turned out to be very useful.
"Hashidate"
The failure to implement Bertin's extravagant ideas did not go unnoticed by attentive Japanese three years before the Matsushima disaster. In 1892, it was decided not to use the services of the French anymore. The Mikado ministers quickly turned their attention back to their main competitors, the British. And very fortunately, just in the 1890s, the rapid ascent of Armstrong’s company and its designers began along the pyramid of fame. In fact, it was they who largely created the modern Japanese fleet. We have already talked about the Elsvik "Esino", armed exclusively with rapid fire and developing 23 knots, which did so much to defeat the Chinese at Yalu. Under the flag of Admiral Tsuboi, he led a “flying squadron”, consisting of the fastest cruisers, which attacked the enemy from the flank and completely destroyed his formation.
"Akitsushima"
The “flying squadron” included the fastest and most modern cruisers, in addition to the Yoshino, the Elsvik Naniwa and Takachiho, as well as the first modern Japanese-built product, the Akitsushima. It strongly resembled a smaller version of the American "Elswick" - "Baltimore" (which is not surprising, since both projects were compiled by Armstrong's chief designer William White) and was built from materials brought from Britain.
The first cruisers built entirely by Japanese were the pair “Suma” and “Akashi”.
Finally, almost everything was domestic, from the design to the materials, mechanisms and equipment. The exception was artillery, so as not to produce unnecessary types of guns and shells, they were left English, produced by the same Armstrong.
British influence, albeit indirect, remained very strong. Both ships were in many ways similar to the Akitsushima in layout and characteristics. Some step forward was the introduction of triple expansion steam engines with vertical cylinders, but the boilers clearly “pulled back”; the locomotive type had by that time almost completely disappeared from all more or less large warships. They became a real headache for the mechanics and did not allow them to develop the contract speed, which was already quite modest compared to the high-speed Elswicks. Not everything was immediately successful with such qualities as seaworthiness. The Suma, which was the first to enter service, turned out to be insufficiently stable and was heavily flooded by waves, so the completion of the Akashi was delayed, changing the design of the hull, which became smooth-deck. Subsequently, both cruisers had their archaic locomotive boilers replaced with modern water-tube boilers, but during the Russo-Japanese War these ships had to suffer a lot on campaigns, trying to maintain something resembling full speed.
"Takasago"
The construction of domestic cruisers is still too long, from four to five years. At this rate, with only two shipyards capable of producing relatively large ships, the Japanese fleet would be hopelessly behind its ambitious plans. Therefore, the search abroad continued. And not without success, in 1898 Armstrong delivered another beautiful cruiser. With a displacement of just under 4,200 tons, the Takasago had very powerful armament, including a pair of 203 mm, ten 120 mm and twelve 76 mm rapid-fire guns. At the same time, the ship had excellent protection, which, according to its creators, could withstand even 8-inch shells. Thus, the thickness of the deck bevel in the central part reached 114 mm. In addition, the body had a large number of waterproof compartments, the number of which exceeded a hundred. A couple more almost completely similar units were ordered in the United States of America from Crump and Union Iron Works.
Since at that time overseas technology still lagged behind the capabilities of the Elsvik “magicians”, “Kasagi” and “Chitose” had slightly larger sizes and displacement with the same weapons and protection. It should be noted that the “English” turned out to be faster, reaching the design 23.5 knots, while the “Americans” had to limit themselves to 22.5. The main disadvantage of these very powerful combat units for their size was caused by their strength. Two and a half dozen guns, protected only by small shields, were placed so closely on the deck that any shell exploding there could cause complete devastation among the crews. There were understandable problems with eight-inch cameras.
It would be difficult for even a hefty grenadier to hold a heavy 113-kilogram projectile on a not-at-all wide swinging deck, and even more so for Japanese sailors who were not at all of a heroic build. Therefore, the designers tried to help the servants as much as possible by equipping the installation and feeding with electric motors. The shells delivered by the elevator from the ammunition magazines were laid out on a special cart, which ran on rails laid on the deck behind the gun. It was, of course, much easier to push a projectile from such a cart into the breech of the gun, but all this “railway equipment” remained highly vulnerable to enemy hits, including fragmentation.
It is clear that such heavily loaded ships had very moderate seaworthiness.
Nevertheless, this trio, together with the proven and equally fast Yoshino, formed the 3rd detachment of cruisers during the Russo-Japanese War, which was very actively used for reconnaissance and targeting its main forces at the enemy. They caused a lot of unpleasant moments for our sailors, who nicknamed them “dogs” for their persistence. However, one of the “mongrels” did not live to see Tsushima, “Takasago” was blown up by a mine in December 1904.
It should be noted that these powerful ships were built surprisingly quickly. Takasago entered service exactly two years after its keel, and its American “ cousins- even faster.
But the Japanese did not stand still. The next pair of domestic cruisers, Tsushima and Niitaka, became much more successful than the long-suffering Suma and Akashi. By increasing the displacement by approximately 700 tons, they received a single armament of six 6-inch guns, supplemented by a dozen 76-mm guns. The ships turned out to be quite seaworthy and had enviable stability. Of course, their 20-knot speed was somewhat lost against the background of foreign records, but it was possible to develop it without special problems. The construction time of the country's main shipyard in Ekosuka also decreased, and the Niitaka was put into operation two years and 20 days after its laying, almost catching up with the leading firms of the main maritime powers. It is interesting that both had capricious boilers of the notorious Niklos type, usually much reviled by our specialists and historians (mainly using the example of the Varyag), but throughout their careers, Japanese sailors did not experience any special problems with them.
But the next Russian-built cruiser, Otova, became the first to also have boilers domestic brand. Unsurprisingly called “Kanpon” (that is, “naval” or “naval”), they had higher steam parameters than the vast majority of Western models (including the same Niklos products) and turned out to be very unpretentious and reliable in operation. The somewhat smaller size of the ships compared to their predecessors forced a return to a mixed armament of 6- and 4.7-inch Akashi-type guns, but the speed was increased to 21 knots.
All Japanese armored cruisers, both high-speed “dogs” and slower units that came off the slipways in Kure and Yokosuka, were actively used in the Russo-Japanese War. They turned out to be literally servants of all trades, carrying out patrols at Port Arthur and carrying out tactical reconnaissance and search in battles. It must be said that the command was afraid of the larger and superior in armament (all but the “dogs”) Russian “6-thousanders” and preferred to keep their light cruisers at a considerable distance from them, and even more so from our battleships. However, the “trifle” took a very active part in searching for and finishing off the defeated 2nd Pacific Squadron, taking advantage of its numerical superiority.
Thus, “Otova” and “Niitaka” easily caught up with the damaged “Svetlana” and sank her after an hour and a half battle. But this immediate military success was rather an exception. The same pair plus Admiral Uriu’s detachment (“Naniwa”, “Takachiho”, “Akashi” and “Tsushima”), six of them, could not cope with the old armored cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, although they seriously damaged it. The speed was not always enough, since the active service thoroughly “planted” the engines and boilers of almost all units, few of which could develop more than 18 knots by the Battle of Tsushima. Thus, Chitose and Akitsushima were unable to catch up with the Emerald, which broke through the enemy ring when the remnants of the squadron surrendered. Nevertheless, the activities of Japanese small cruisers should be recognized as both useful and successful.
Evidence of this is the fact that only four Russian light ships reached Vladivostok.
After the end of the war with Russia, the already very diverse Japanese cruiser fleet was enriched with trophies. As a result, by 1907 a unique situation had arisen. The Mikado fleet now had cruisers produced by literally all the major maritime countries of England, France, the USA, Germany, Russia and Italy. An unimaginable mixture of systems of mechanisms and weapons, various shipbuilding principles and techniques. However, it was the experience of their operation that opened up for Japanese designers the opportunity, inaccessible to engineers of other powers, to choose the best. And this experience was soon embodied in original and powerful ships.
Major General A.I. SOROKIN
In 1904, the armored cruisers Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboy and Bogatyr, which were part of the Russian Pacific Fleet, were based in Vladivostok. According to the war plan, they were intended to divert part of the enemy’s armored fleet from Port Arthur and to operate on the Japan-Korea communication routes against Japanese military transport.
During the design and construction of the cruisers, they were designed for operations on ocean routes. In this regard, to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.
On the night of January 27, 1904, the commander of the cruiser detachment received an order from the governor to begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow possible and damage Japan's communications with Korea. The ships were in combat readiness and went to sea on the same day. During a five-day cruising they sank the steamer Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) and fired at one steamer. A storm broke out and forced the expedition to be interrupted. The ships became icy, and even the guns were covered with a thick crust of ice. After returning and a short stay at the cruiser base, they again went to sea to the Korean shores; but this campaign was also unsuccessful - apart from small coastal ships, the cruisers did not meet anyone. The actions taken, although ineffective, nevertheless alarmed the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against Vladivostok. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored ships and two light cruisers went to the Russian shores and randomly bombarded Vladivostok.
Admiral Makarov, having taken command of the Pacific Fleet, set the main task for the detachment of cruisers: to prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Genzan (Korea) and other points.
The cruisers were able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. A day earlier, on April 9, Admiral Kamimura set out for action against Vladivostok and on the same day called at the Korean port of Genzan for coal and water. The Russians didn't know about this. There was a thick fog on the sea; The cruisers were moving at low speed. On the morning of April 12, the detachment approached Fr. Khalezova. The destroyer sent to Genzan sank the steamer Goyo-Maru, which was in the roadstead, after which the destroyer returned to the cruisers; from Fr. Khalezov’s detachment went north; During the day, the coaster "SHaginura-Maru" was sunk. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22 hours 20 minutes. met the enemy military transport “Kinshu Maru” and sank it. Having learned from the prisoners that Kamimura's squadron was at sea, the Russian cruisers headed to Vladivostok.
On May 30, the cruisers were sent to the eastern passage of the Korean Strait. After noon on June 1 they passed Fr. Dazhelet and the next day approached Fr. Tsushima, where the enemy’s main communication routes passed and where Admiral Kamimura’s maneuver base was located in Ozaki Bay. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, two transports appeared on the horizon: one of them, taking advantage of the low visibility at sea, disappeared, the second, the Izuma-Maru, was sunk by the Thunderbolt. Soon two more large military steamers appeared from the east, sailing unguarded. The Hitachi-Maru transport, which carried 1095 soldiers and officers of the reserve guards regiment, 120 crew members, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers intended for shelling Port Arthur, was also sunk by the Thunderbolt. The second transport, Sado-Maru, had 1,350 soldiers and officers on board. After warning shots from the Rurik, he stopped. The Russians invited the Japanese officers to switch to a cruiser. The Japanese categorically refused. Panic began on the ship: the boats were lowered by the Japanese ineptly and turned over at the side, despite the complete absence of waves and wind. Time passed, Japanese cruisers could appear at the scene, and deliberately prolonged turmoil continued on the Sado-Maru. The commander of the cruiser detachment ordered the transport to be sunk; Two torpedoes fired at it hit the target, after which the cruisers, without waiting for the steamer to submerge, turned into the Sea of Japan. Kamimura was at the base at this time, having four armored and five light cruisers and eight destroyers. Notified by radio telegraph from the cruiser Tsushima, which was on patrol, about the appearance of Vladivostok cruisers, Kamimura went to sea, but all attempts to find the Russians were in vain. On the morning of June 3, he approached Fr. It even flies. Russian cruisers at that time were 150 miles to the northwest, inspecting the detained English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.
On June 6, the Russian cruisers, having successfully completed their campaign, returned to Zolotoy Rog Bay. Kamimura stopped searching and went to his base.
In the second half of June, the cruisers repeated the raid, but less successfully; Having met Kamimura's squadron in the Tsushima area, the Russians, not accepting the battle, retreated. During the voyage, several small steamships and schooners were destroyed and a ship, captured on the way from Japan to Korea with timber for the Fuzan-Seoul-Chemulpo road under construction, was brought to Vladivostok.
The raiding actions of Vladivostok cruisers in the Sea of Japan forced the enemy to send some of the transports with troops and cargo to Korea and Manchuria from their eastern ports through the Yellow Sea. In this regard, the commander of the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers on July 4 received Alekseev’s order to go to sea to operate on the communication routes of the eastern ports of Japan.
Having received coal and ammunition, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait on July 7 and turned south. On the morning of July 9, the cruisers met the large English steamer Arabia; upon inspection it turned out that he was going to Yokohama with smuggled cargo; The ship was sent to Vladivostok. By midnight on July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay; In the morning the Japanese shores appeared. Here the English steamer Knight Commender, sailing from Shanghai to Yokohama and Kobe with smuggled cargo, was met and examined. The steamship was sunk because there was no coal on it to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggled cargo, were destroyed, and by the end of the day the English steamer Calchas was captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. In the evening, the cruisers turned north, since there was only coal left for the return trip.
The commander of the cruiser detachment decided to return to his base again through the Sangar Strait, despite the fact that Kamimura could meet him at the entrance to the Sea of Japan and further all the way to Vladivostok. But the Japanese admiral apparently decided that the Russians, having bypassed Japan from the south, would try to connect with the Port Arthur squadron. He was waiting for them at Cape Shantung in the Yellow Sea.
The fact of the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, shook the whole world. Panic began in trading circles, the world stock exchange actively reacted to the cruisers’ voyage, freight rates increased sharply, some large shipping companies stopped voyages to Japan, etc.
On July 29, a telegram was received in Vladivostok from Admiral Alekseev (who did not yet know about the results of the naval battle on July 28) that the Port Arthur squadron had gone to sea and was fighting the enemy; the cruisers were to immediately enter the Korean Strait. The purpose of the detachment's campaign was to meet Vitgeft's squadron and provide assistance to him. The task for the cruisers was outlined in the instructions, which stated that Vitgeft's intentions were unknown, i.e. It is unclear whether he will go through the Tsushima Strait or around Japan, the exact time of his departure to sea is also unknown, so it is difficult to determine whether the meeting of the cruisers with the squadron will take place and when and where this may happen; if the meeting occurs, it will presumably be north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. Further, the instructions stated that if the cruisers meet Kamimura, they are obliged to retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them: the cruisers should not be distracted by any other tasks.
On the morning of July 30, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” went to sea. On the night of July 31, they sailed at a 12-knot speed in a wake column; during the day, they deployed to the front line at intervals of 30-50 units in order to cover as much space as possible with observation and not to disperse from the Port Arthur squadron. The commander of the detachment, according to his calculations, expected to meet Vitgeft in the middle of the day on July 31, approximately abeam about. It even flies. But his calculations did not come true. Having passed Dazhelet and reached the parallel of Fuzan in the early morning of August 1, the commander of the cruiser detachment, as he was ordered, decided to wait for the Port Arthur ships in this area.
Cruiser 1st rank "Russia" |
It's starting to get light. At 4:50 a.m. The signalmen on the Rossiya suddenly saw in the darkness the silhouettes of four ships sailing on a parallel course with the detachment. A few minutes later the cruisers Izuma, Tokiwa, Azuma and Iwate were identified. The enemy was about 8 miles to the north, therefore, the Russians were cut off from Vladivostok and the battle could not be avoided. Both sides began to maneuver. The Japanese, having superior strength, 3 knots more speed and better conditions for firing, sought to force a battle.
When the ships approached 60 rooms, the Japanese at about 5 o'clock. 20 minutes. opened fire. Topmast flags flew up on the Russian cruisers, and return fire was opened from the port guns of the Rossiya and Gromoboy. After the first salvos, strong explosions were heard on the Iwata and Azuma. The battle started well for the Russians. Later, it became known from Japanese reports that a heavy shell penetrated the Iwate battery, destroying three 152-mm and one 75-mm guns.
Soon enemy shells covered the Russian ships, and the dead and wounded appeared. At the fourteenth minute of the battle, a strong fire started on the Rurik, the cruiser was out of action, but not for long, the fire was quickly put out. At about 6 o'clock he approached the Japanese light cruiser“Drink.” At this time, the Russian cruisers changed course and went northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.
At 6 o'clock. 28 min. “Rurik,” who was leading the way, raised a signal: “The steering wheel is not working.” For the Russians, this was a serious blow, since the Rurik was the strongest in the detachment in terms of the strength of its broadside salvo. “Russia” and “Gromoboy” turned to help the stricken cruiser. They fought for about two hours to give the Rurik the opportunity to repair the damage, but in vain.
Due to the fact that it was impossible to help the damaged ship, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment turned to Vladivostok, hoping that the Japanese would pursue him and leave the Rurik alone, whose crew, taking advantage of this, would repair the damage . Kamimura actually went after the Russian cruisers, but left the light cruisers Naniva and Takachilo in order to finish off the Rurik. “Russia” and “Gromoboi” went north; Kamimura pursued them, trying to push them to the Korean coast.
The battle ended unexpectedly; at 10 o'clock the enemy's lead cruiser turned sharply and ceased fire, followed by the remaining ships.
Kamimura refused to continue the pursuit due to casualties among personnel, lack of ammunition and damage to ships. The decision to end the battle was certainly influenced by the fact that he, knowing about the battle in the Yellow Sea and not having information about its results, had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or to engage in battle with the Russians who had broken through from Port Arthur ships.
At this time, “Rurik” continued to fight with two Japanese cruisers “Takachiho” and “Naniwa”, but gradually its fire weakened, and in the end the ship fell silent: all its guns were knocked out, almost all the gunners were killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; Almost half of the entire crew was out of action.
When four Kamimura cruisers returning from pursuit approached the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, fearing the ship would be captured, decided to blow it up. This proved impossible to accomplish; Some of the fender cords were lost during the battle, and the other part was located in the steering compartment, which was flooded with water. Then Ivanov ordered the kingstons to be opened.
Before the eyes of the enemy, “Rurik” slowly sank and disappeared under water at half past eleven o’clock. Obsolete and poorly armored, it fought for five hours. The behavior of his team was heroic.
Thus, on August 1, the battle in the Sea of Japan ended. According to the Japanese, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. According to other sources, on the Iwata alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. Kamimura’s flagship ship Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser Azuma received 10 shells, Tokiwa received several shells, etc.
Assessing the actions of the Vladivostok cruisers; it must be said that they had a stronger enemy against them in the theater, but nevertheless inflicted some losses on its merchant fleet and diverted part of the armored cruisers of the enemy fleet from the main theater near Port Arthur. Cruisers, however, were not used for long-term and constant impact on the enemy’s communication routes, against the transport of troops, military materials and supplies. They were not prepared for this and acted without a clearly developed plan and without interaction with the Port Arthur squadron.
The Russo-Japanese War is one of the darkest pages in Russian fleet. This is probably why it still attracts the attention of military historians and simply people interested military history Russia. Yes, it included not only victories, but also the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Fleet, a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80s of the 20th century. So why did this happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to completely defeat its superior Russian fleet without significant losses? Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be discussed in this article. The reader is waiting for a lot of bare figures and facts. Without any tales about “outdated and weak battleships”, “short firing range”, “large armor area Japanese ships"and other, other, other beautiful fairy tales. That allegedly they did not allow such “geniuses of naval thought” as Z.P. Rozhestvensky and V.K. Vitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technology or the people who were entrusted with this technology? The military always first of all blames the unfit, in their opinion, for their failures. military equipment. The people who created this technology, on the contrary, point to the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. This is how it has always been, and this is how it will continue to be. Let us analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.
Fleet compositions
Before moving on to listing the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In that era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapon systems could be counted on one hand:
- Classic artillery guns various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and in their design were not much different from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.
- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and lethality.
- Mines. At that time, this type of sea was already a fully developed and effective means of combating enemy ships.
- Aviation. It was in its infancy at that time. Actually, it can be called aviation with great stretch, because... it was just balloons that were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment over long distances.
In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:
1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. During their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbette battleship, turret battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super-dreadnought and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the period described, squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4,000 tons to 16,000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo weapons. At the same time, they could reach a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable the fleet was.
2. Also to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also have good protection, although not as powerful as that of battleships. Artillery weapons It was also weaker, but such ships could reach a speed of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was the battleships and armored cruisers who had the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops with fire in coastal operations.
3. Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, combat against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks. These are ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons, had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach a speed of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. An example - the famous 1st rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of this type of warship.
4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(destroyers), further torpedo boats And submarines. Destroyers are small ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small guns. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.
The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" took a direct part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The 123 meter long ship is still in good condition. technical condition, though it’s no longer on the move.
5. Also in the fleets of that time there could be balloon carriers, minelayers And transport ships. Balloon carriers, the predecessors of aircraft carriers, were designed to host reconnaissance balloons and were equipped with hangars for storing them. Minelayers were used to lay mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. They could have several small guns or no weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.
After short excursion In the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, we will move on to comparing the forces of both sides.
Russian Imperial Fleet (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat personnel with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:
Table 1
Alexander-II | ||
Nikolai-I | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Navarin | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Sisoy the Great | ||
Sevastopol | ||
Poltava | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Petropavlovsk | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Ushakov | ||
Admiral Sevyanin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Admiral Apraksin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Table 1Oslyabya | Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Peresvet | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Victory | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Retvizan | ||
Tsesarevich | Squadron battleship. Newest. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Prince Suvorov | ||
Alexander-III | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Borodino | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Eagle | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rus | Balloon carrier. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Catherine-II | ||
Sinop | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Chesma | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
St. George the Victorious | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Twelve Apostles | II-class battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Three Saints | Squadron battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Rostislav | II-class battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky | ||
Panteleimon | Squadron battleship. Newest. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Admiral Nakhimov | Armored cruiser. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rurik | Armored cruiser. Old. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Memory of Azov | Armored cruiser. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Russia | ||
Thunderbolt | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Accordion | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Pallas | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Makarov | Armored cruiser. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Peter the Great | Artillery training vessel. Old 1st class battleship. Baltic Fleet. |
The main striking power of the Russian fleet lay precisely in these 38 ships. In total they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 – 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber. Smaller-caliber guns even then belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained important combat significance at that stage of the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Forel", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.
The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power can be felt literally in its appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built using the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War: a high side of an optimal, seaworthy shape, developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the control system at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin tower gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large aiming angles. The very complex, multi-row differentiated armor was very powerful. The ship could see far on the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct targeted fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines and 4 7.62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet were installed on it. The control system of this ship was also first-class.
The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian Navy at the start of the war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates, it was about ~300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a large armored force, even today it would require the involvement of very serious naval missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield and it will not burn and sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agricultural country like Tsarist Russia, creating such a large ocean-going fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest squadron battleship "Tsesarevich". The strike core of the Baltic Fleet were four Borodino-class battleships. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, Slava.
"Eagle" is one of the ships of the "Borodino" series. It was an improved model of the “Tsarevich”. The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype in a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, an improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype, at the time of construction it was considered one of the most powerful and advanced warships of its time.
Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat potential. When building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships with similar characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old I-class battleships: “Chin-Yen” and “Fuso”, of which “Chin-Yen” was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on light armored cruisers such as Matsushima and Takasago, which were poorly suited for this purpose. List of warships Japanese Navy, which carried more or less large calibers on board, it turns out like this:
table 2
Mikasa | Squadron battleship. Newest. Japanese fleet. |
|
Shikishima | ||
Asahi | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hatsuse | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuji | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yashima | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Chin-Yen | 1st class battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuso | Casemate battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Asama | ||
Tokiwa | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Azuma | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yakumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Izumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Iwate | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Matsushima | ||
Itsukushima | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hashidate | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Takasago | ||
Chitose | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Kasagi | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
Thus, the Japanese fleet, along with battleships and light cruisers that were absolutely unsuitable for confrontation, could oppose the might of the Russian fleet: 3 guns of 320mm caliber, 28 of 305mm caliber, 4 – 240mm guns and 30 – 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the others did not leave them any decent chance of survival under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian attack ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered to one degree or another suitable for a general battle. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.
Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, it repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, turret gun mounts of only the main caliber. Relatively low-powered medium-caliber guns were located in on-board casemate installations low above the water. The ship was more optimized for combat on flat water rather than for movement. At the same time, the large size of its body made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the squadron battleship Retvizan.
The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were concentrated like a fist in one theater of operations. Of the ~300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: Nissin and Kassuga.
Results: Without going deep at this stage into all the nuances of manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, choosing commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply laconically noting that “at some stage something went wrong” , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. Data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are shown in Table 3. They only cause a bitter smile.
Table 3
Losses of the Japanese fleet in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB) Light cruisersI-rank (KRL) Light cruisersII-rank (KRL) Gunboats (KL) Destroyers (DES) Troop transports (TR) Torpedo boats (TK) |
Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships. Of these, 13 ships were sunk by mines (54%), 6 ships by artillery (25%), 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), and 1 ship by the combined action of artillery and torpedoes (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.
Table 4
Losses of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB)
Coastal defense battleships (BRBO)
Armored cruisers (ARC)
Armored cruisersI-th rank (KRL)
CruisersII-rank (KRL)
Gunboats (KL)
Minelayers (MZ)
Destroyers (DES)
Troop transports (VT) and auxiliary ships.
Torpedo boats (TK)
|
The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy exceeded the losses of the US Navy during the four years of the Pacific War of 1941-1945. Sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, the Japanese did not manage to sink a single Russian ship with torpedoes alone - 0 (0%), the combined action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed 3 ships (5%), 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Abandoned/sunk/exploded by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire/torpedoes/mines/simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), 5 ships were captured by the enemy (8%), lost as a result of navigational damage 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, lies with very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark. It was in their hands that all the power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made or not made were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be blamed for a lack of courage/will/spirit, but he cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or lack of knowledge of his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his business perfectly and was confident in his weapon. Admiral O.A. Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he was unable to prove himself. We will consider the contribution to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fleet of some of these people below.
Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (he was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsesarevich). The cause of death from one single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked primarily as a citadel, similar to the British and Japanese EDBs. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of the torpedo ammunition occurred, then the barrage mines stored in the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition of the 1st main caliber gun mount. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. A fatal coincidence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.
However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation upside down. His “Holiness,” “Adjutant General” Z.P. Rozhestvensky simply cannot be guilty of anything. It’s all the fault of the outdated and, in their opinion, worthless equipment, as well as the illiterate crews of these “floating galoshes” who know nothing about war. To justify this position, many myths were invented, designed to “shift the needle” of blame for the shameful defeat on civilian specialists, factories, MTC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:
Half-myth No. 1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they say, they died “so quickly.” Here it is necessary to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out current/medium/overhaul repairs, while military specialists operate it, fight with it, and carry out various maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload is the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. Regarding construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was widespread and therefore it could even be called “normal.” Indeed, the Borodino-class battleships were designed to have a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow us to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons, and yet none of the Japanese military complained about the deterioration of stability or other performance characteristics of the "Mikasa". Operational overload – exceeding the ship's carrying capacity. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all battleships were so filled with coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What fighting qualities are there with such a “weight”! No measures were taken to correct the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of the Borodino-class attack ships before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15,275 tons. The proposal of the "Eagle" officers to prepare the ships for battle before the general battle, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected for idiotic reasons: "The "Eagle" officers love to play war too much." This is the fault of the military, namely Z.P. Rozhestvensky.
Myth No. 2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth has a simple explanation. Speed is needed for active actions. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called “to the fullest.” The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was too late) and just to escape, and not to overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of a ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on its specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots, at most 15.5 knots and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRB 1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons it could not develop more than 15.5 knots). The squadron speed of the 1st Pacific Squadron was 14.5-15 knots. The EBR "Sevastopol" did not produce more than 15kt due to a bent propeller blade. The squadron speed of the 2nd Pacific Squadron has not been tested in practice, but theoretically it could have been about 15-15.5 knots because there was no ship in the squadron slower than 15.5 kts (“Nikolai-I” - 15.5 kts, “Navarin” - 15.8 kts, “Sisoy the Great” - 15.6 kts, 2nd type BRBO “Ushakov” all issued 16 kts). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged Orel, the Sevyanin and Apraksin ballistic missile carriers, as well as the II-rank cruiser Izumrud easily supported speed 13-14kt. Conclusion: The squadron speed of Russian attack ships, if at all, was lower than the Japanese, it was not by much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhestvensky trudged along in battle at a speed of 9 knots (only 17 km/h - slower than a river pleasure boat), dragging transports behind him, is his fault, not the low speed capabilities of his warships.
Myth No. 3. Russian ships were inferior in range to Japanese ones. There were figures about the Japanese firing range at 82 cables and even 100(!) cables. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery 100%. Of course, there could be no talk of any targeted shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always only fired back and stopped firing as soon as the enemy stopped firing. All without initiative and sluggishly (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:
1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting shooting at such distances. Have good command of the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is already responsible for this.
Unfortunately, it was the military that turned out to be the “weak link” here. Regarding technical issues. Only one Japanese ship could fire at 100 kbt - the Italian-built armored cruiser Kassuga. And only from one single 254mm cannon. Its 203mm cannon, like its twin brother the Nissin, fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm/L42.5 EBR guns “Fuji” and “Yashima” at a maximum angle of +13.5° could fire at a maximum of 77 kbt. The slightly more powerful 305mm/L42.5 guns of Mikasa, Asahi, Hatsuse and Shikishima had a lower maximum elevation angle - +12.5° and fired at maximum 74kbt. Maximum firing range of 203mm main caliber guns of Japanese armored cruisers such as Asama, Yakumo, etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm medium-caliber gun mounts on Russian ships. Russian experts paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet to the issue of ensuring at least the technical ability to fire at the maximum possible distances. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships was +15°, +25° and even +35°. The squadron battleship Pobeda was considered the longest-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm/L45 guns, which differed from the previous 10-inch guns in increased weight, strength and barrel rigidity. As a result, its 225-kilogram main-caliber projectiles, with an initial speed increased to 777 m/s, flew at 113 kbt. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, “Oslyab” and “Peresvet,” as well as the ballistic missile launcher “Admiral Apraksin,” fired at 91 kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm/L40 guns fired at 80kbt at an angle of +15°. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63 kbt. The firing range of the old squadron battleships was shorter: the Navarin had 54 kbt, the Nikolai-I had 51 kbt for 229mm/L35 and 49 kbt for 305mm/L30 guns.
As for the fire control system, its 4x optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~60 kbt (10-12 km). Russian battleships of new and latest types received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its structure can be judged from the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":
SUAO mod.1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central guidance systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one per side.
Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x. The search for the target and pointing the weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When pointing the VCN at a target, the elevation angle of the target relative to the center plane of the ship was determined on a scale, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 turret guns and batteries of the ship’s 75 mm guns. After this, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the gun was aligned with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called “arrow alignment” principle) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x and a field of view angle changing in accordance with it - 6 - 8 degrees. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, there were two rangefinder stations in the conning tower - one per side. They were equipped with horizontal base rangefinders “Barr and Studd” with a base of 1200 mm.
The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To monitor the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. Sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair on each side), which is why the Eagle's conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye.” Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target - the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, made the necessary calculations manually (on paper) and calculated the necessary corrections for the leads for VN and GN. I also chose the type of gun and the type of shells needed to hit a given target. After this, the senior artillery officer transmitted guidance data to the control unit, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master indicator devices, which transmitted data through 47 cable cores to receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The entire system operated at voltage Uр=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on vertical and horizontal guidance angles and the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected guns installed the guns at specified angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, positioned the handle of the fire indicator device in the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Shot”, “Attack” or “Short alarm”, in accordance with which The guns opened fire. This centralized fire control mode was the most effective. In the event of the failure of the senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, the direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, and the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the gun or battery. This fire mode was less effective. In the event of complete destruction of fire control devices, conning tower personnel and data transmission circuits, all guns switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target and targeting it was carried out by calculating a specific gun using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. The torpedo tubes were aimed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm torpedo tubes or by turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm torpedo tubes. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to simultaneously “drive” two targets - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and gunners of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron have poorly mastered this system. For external communications, the ship had a Slyabi-Arco radio station. It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communications at a distance of 180-200 km.
The third point remains. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet certainly lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and practiced shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complex for ordinary sailors to understand their operation (much less integrate them into a system), fire control and fire control methods were developed, if not the most ideal, but at least the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions. shooting. One of them is the so-called. "the art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the fire control system (measuring the distance only once), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After this, they wait for the target to be covered. All fire adjustments are carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer - further to the target). Despite the enormous consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese targets (that is, our ships) contributed in the best possible way to its success. At the same time, this method of “massive fire” was never used by anyone again. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our artillerymen, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the control system. Not everyone succeeded. If the lower ranks of the artillery were somehow still able to master their subject, then almost no effort was made to this by the higher ranks. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, although belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as a modern fire control system. And it seems that we began to develop measures adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still blissfully unaware of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare practice shootings were carried out at a distance of no further than 20 kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese without any long-range shooting practice at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific Squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2nd Pacific Squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well to fire from the widest possible ranges. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. However, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was essentially the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances of up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for your artillery! In all likelihood, it was its 305mm and 229mm shells that caused heavy damage to the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser “Varyag” was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the newest attack ships; otherwise, even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably have been crushed by the power of the Borodintsev.
Semi myth #4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They allegedly did not penetrate armor well and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model, weighing 331.7 kg. The “10-inch” ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the 1892 model, weighing 225.2 kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing ones. Their comparative characteristics are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed | Thickness of armor penetrated at point-blank range Kruppovskaya | Thickness of pierced armor with 60kbt Kruppovskaya |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Armor-piercing | 331.7kg | 5.3 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s | 381mm/0 ° | 99mm/0 ° |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | Armor-piercing | 385.6kg | 11.9 kg picric acid | 762m/s | 368mm/0 ° | 104mm/0 ° |
Russian 254mm/L45 | Armor-piercing | 225.2kg | 8.3 kg pyroxylin | 693m/s | 343mm/0 ° | 84mm/0 ° |
As can be seen from Table 5, all shells are quite worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships, with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, were nevertheless almost as good as them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both Russian and Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by distance<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.
Table 6
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Fragmentation | 331.7kg | 15.6 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Russian 305mm/L40 | High Explosive | 331.7kg | 25kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | High Explosive | 385.6kg | 48.5 kg picric acid | 762m/s |
At first glance, it seems that Japanese high-explosive shells are completely superior to Russian ones3. This is partly true. Especially if we add to our shells the humidity of pyroxylin increased from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. Firstly, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set to instantaneous action at the slightest touch. This led to a number of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of the Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, for any armored vehicle, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is most dangerous. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the “cosmetics”. Therefore, for combating armored targets, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed-action fuses are primarily good. Japanese NOT-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the Borodintsy, which were armored from head to toe, albeit overloaded. The Japanese themselves understood this very well, which is why, along with landmines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships is, of course, not a myth in the full sense of the word - it is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but its significance should not be exaggerated beyond measure either. The opponents’ shells were not so ideal either.
Myth #5. Small armor area of Russian ships. At that time, there were two main armoring schemes for heavy ships in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and the French one, which was widespread. According to the first, the ship’s high-resistance cores are covered with the thickest possible armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or lack it at all. It was according to this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series, domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the armor of these ships to perfection. The protection of the Tsarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to the battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This provided reliable protection for these ships even from dreadnought “suitcases”. The battle between Slava and the powerful German dreadnoughts König and Kronprinz Wilhelm in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite receiving seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5 kg), three of which hit the underwater part of the hull below the waist, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it weren’t for the watertight door that was not closed due to someone’s carelessness (and if it weren’t for the revolution), then we could have continued to fight. The armor scheme of the battleship "Eagle" is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 8
The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline, approximately 60m long and about 0.8m high, has protection of: 194mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 314mm Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing shells of the time. At the same time, all high-velocity units, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by fairly powerful armor. And the total armor thickness of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - not bad figures even for huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy the Great, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of the Mikasa were clad in Harvey armor. The projectile resistance of Harvey's armor correlates with Krupp's armor as 0.8 to 1, that is, Harvey's armor was inferior in projectile resistance to Krupp's (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Only the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa had truly powerful armor. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower in comparison with squadron battleships.
Half-myth No. 6: Large sizes of sighting slits and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits on the battleship “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series was a huge 380mm. This was a necessary measure because the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the control system of these ships, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all this optics, it was necessary to make slits of this width. The desire of the designers to place the entire control system under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the control system had not yet developed so much and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still made it possible to arrange them in the ballistic missile system - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.
Secondly, the typical combat distances of that time: 30-60 kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits from large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. It is obvious that bulky and poorly protected control towers, sighting guidance posts and other elements of the control system, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection from shells, the conning towers of domestic ships were designed well.
They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the wheelhouse and anti-fragmentation visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically eliminated, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the enormous number of hits suffered by Russian battleships, virtually no cases of shells penetrating into ballistic missiles have been recorded. However, the command staff nevertheless suffered greatly from shrapnel, while being inside the conning towers. But this is primarily due to the gigantic number of hits and the high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is learned by comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection slits in Japanese ships were made in such a way that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower...” With all due respect to Alexey Silych, you need to understand that that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only evaluate the perfection of the design of the conning towers of Japanese ships purely visually. A photograph will help you estimate the size of the sighting slits of Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not be Japanese if they had not decided on a very original step from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, chose not to “get into” the conning towers of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle exposing his chest, covered with epaulettes and medals, to all the winds (and shells) on the upper navigation bridge of the Mikasa. That is, completely openly... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation shell that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Except…. EXCEPT…. Of course, Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the entire battle on the combat top of the mainmast and also remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals survived and did not even receive serious injuries testifies only to the extreme luck that accompanied them and the evil fate that haunted Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also had an impact.
The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slits is also quite decent, although smaller than those of our ships. In addition, this cabin does not have “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so penetration of shells falling at an angle is in principle possible. Admiral Togo stood two floors above throughout the battle...
As for the size of the embrasures... The dimensions of the embrasures in the turrets of the Japanese main battery gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, this should not be forgotten. In addition, the AU GK turrets of Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by 254mm thick Krupp armor, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese main guns of the Fuji and Yashima EBR main guns were much more modestly armored - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to AP shells from Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, which ours actually penetrated through the 152mm armor of the 12” gun mount (thus confirming my logical conclusions), almost exploded because... After this, a fire started and the charges in the tower and supply pipe had already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a broken pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to large (main) caliber artillery. The level of any type of protection for the 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo doesn’t really need any comments, but still:
Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don’t need to have a wild imagination to imagine what would happen to the crews of all these guns if even one more or less decent shell exploded here... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their “embrasures” also seems to hint... A good gate. On Russian Borodino-class battleships, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor on their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the newest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as on the Mikas, was completely destroyed just 20 minutes after the start of the battle.
The obvious conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (with all their shortcomings), and not super invulnerable conning towers, ultra-small embrasures or anything else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not weakly fight back like ours. There is a good phrase from the film “Antikiller”. In this case, of course, it is exaggerated, but it reflects the essence quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work...” Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of attack ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are given in Table 7.
Table 7
TTX | Eagle | Poltava | Oslyabya | Mikasa | Fuji | Asama |
Type | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | KRB23 |
Displacement etc. |
13516 |
11500 |
12674 |
15352 |
12320 |
9900 |
Engine power hp |
15800 |
11255 |
15051 |
16000 |
14000 |
18200 |
Travel speed knots / km/h |
17,8 / 33 |
16,3 / 30,2 |
18,6 / 34,4 |
18,5 / 34,3 |
18,3 / 33,9 |
22,1 / 40,9 |
Large caliber artillery | Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
106,1 |
106,1 |
55 |
112,1 |
105,1 |
34,9 |
Drives
| A3
| A
| A
| A
| A
| A
|
Firing range kbt/km |
80/14,8 |
80/14,8 |
91/16,8 |
74/13,7 |
77/14,3 |
60/11,18 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 50 kbt normal mm |
129/0°
|
129/0°
|
109/0°
|
140/0°
|
n.d. |
56/0°
|
Fire rate
|
90 |
90 |
90 |
75 |
150 |
3011 |
Medium caliber artillery | Kane 6-2x152mm
| Kane
| Kane 11-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
| Amstrong 10-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
13,3 |
13,3 |
13,3 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
Drives
| A
| M-PA5
| M6
| M
| M
| M
|
Firing range kbt/km |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
49/9,1 |
49/9,1 55/10,210 |
49/9,1 55/10,2 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 30 kbt normal mm |
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
Fire rate
|
12 |
10-12 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Torpedo weapons |
4-381mm | 4-381mm
|
5-381mm |
4-457mm |
5-457mm |
5-457mm |
Torpedo launch range km
|
0,9 | 0,9
|
0,9 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Rangefinder stations DS
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
|
Central aiming sights VCN | 2 pcs on sighting posts VP1 4 inside BR |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Bearing guidance | Semi-automatic - central according to the VCN15 tracking system |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Range guidance | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument |
Local |
Local |
Calculation of lead angles VN and GN | Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
|
Transfer of data of lead angles VN and GN to the control unit |
| For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | |||
Transfer of DS and bearing data to the control unit | Machine. according to the tracking system VCN and auto. long range input in the SLA from DS16 |
| Machine. long range input In the MSA from DS | |||
Defense of the citadel and HDV mm | 194/0°+40/30°
|
368/0°=368
| 229/0°+51/30°
| 229/0°+76/45°
|
457/0°=457
| 178/0°+51/30°
|
End protection mm | 145/0°+40/30°
|
76/45°=107
|
83/30°=166
| 102/0°+51/45°
|
No |
89/0°=89
|
Deck protection mm
| 51+40=91
|
51
|
51
| 51
|
64
|
51
|
PTZ mm | 40/0°
| Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom |
Protection AU24 GK mm | 254 tower
| 254 tower
| 229 tower
| 254 tower
| 152
tower
| 152 tower
|
Protection AU SK mm | 152 tower
| 127 tower
|
- |
- |
- |
- |
Protection of the side and casemate guns mm | 51-76
| 75
| 102-127
| 152
| 102-152
| 127-152
|
Note:
|
||||||
Having analyzed all the myths and facts listed, we gradually come to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, they also had sins. The main ones are weak OFS 5 and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the Poltava class.
The rest made do with more modest ones, 381mm caliber. But there is a difference - either approaching the “wounded animal” at 2-3 km, or at 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened the Americans quite a bit with their huge Long Lances (which did not help the Japanese in other respects). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:
1. Admirals Z.P.Rozhestvensky, V.K.Vitgeft, O.V.Stark.
2. The evil fate that has been pursuing our fleet throughout this war.
Let's look at these two main causes of defeat. Point one. Were these three people really clinical idiots who, with their own hands, strangled all the foundations of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the bases, but they still weren’t idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then royal fleet. The fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that victory could only be achieved by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, did not need warriors. And they needed business executives. So that the ships would clearly keep in formation, not be delayed, they would always shine with new paint, the borders on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned over with the bright side up for the visit of “His Majesty”. All three were perfectly suited to carrying out such activities. Well, it’s worth admitting that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet entered the battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of difficult voyage, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km away from its home base has been known for quite some time.
As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we do then? The author of these lines had to read many “alternative” versions of the Battle of Tsushima. They all started with the same thing: “But if only - (Makarov was in command / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / Your version), then OOO………” What followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional from the historical perspective point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and by changing just one fact of history, it is simply unrealistic to radically change the entire subsequent chain of events. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in historical retrospect many years BEFORE a significant date in order to change the very logical chain that precedes it. This simply does not make any sense, as is clear to any schoolchild. The most “tasty” alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is practically impossible to calculate what would be reliably in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in cooperation with ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of Z.P. Rozhestvensky. What could she count on as she exhausted herself into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when the ship's radio stations had already detected the presence of the enemy fleet over the horizon? So let’s try to calculate what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could have done if... No, no - don’t be alarmed. If only she had just been lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he would not have replaced himself with another, equally gifted figure, but would have simply fallen seriously ill and spent the entire battle in the ship's first-aid post, without interfering with anyone's fight. Calculations show that in this case it would have been impossible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could hope for in this case was to reduce the game to a draw.
So. A virtual reality. Morning of May 14th. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhdestvensky is in serious condition in his cabin. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore are not even a little worried. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship “Prince Suvorov”. And so:
“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed a steamer on the right, quickly approaching us. Having approached forty cable lengths, he laid down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning darkness. It had a speed of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify him, but his behavior immediately aroused suspicion - undoubtedly, he was a Japanese intelligence officer. It would be necessary to immediately send two fast cruisers after him. Whether they sank it or not, they would at least clarify an extremely important question: are we discovered by the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship.
"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells undershot or overshot, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov was jubilant. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to drown out the hubbub of the chickens that had not yet calmed down, spoke solemnly:
- But we cleverly butchered him! How asked the streaker! He rushed away from us at full speed.”
In place of the previously sunk cruiser Izumi, there was another similar cruiser. After it turned to the right and, having increased its speed, began to move away, already having a trim on the bow and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh", squeezing all 16-17 knots from its old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand around stupidly watching as he ran away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:
“About eleven o’clock a second destroyer appeared ahead on the right, intending to cross the course of the Loud.” Kern ordered to develop the full speed. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle ahead with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The miner's specialty suggested to the commander that the time had come to discharge the two surviving mine vehicles on the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. “Loud” made a sharp turn and rushed towards the enemy walking behind. As we later learned, it was a Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Shiranui and Loud was quickly closing. The team realized that the decisive moment had arrived. The gunners increased their fire. But at these moments the main role was given to the miners, who stood ready at their devices. Suddenly, near them, with a flash of short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on a dusty road. Something heavy separated from the fire and smoke and flew overboard. Senior Officer Paskin was pushed by the air into the casing near the rear chimney. Having recovered, he rushed to the scene of the explosion. The miners Abramov and Telegin lay dead near the apparatus, and all that remained of the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh was his cap, thrown to the railing post. Lieutenant Paskin assigned miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the devices. The enemy was already approaching the beam. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander ordered to release the mine from apparatus No. 1. But it barely moved out and, touching the side with its tail, fell into the water like a log.
- She drowned, you vile one! – the sharp-eyed signalman Skorodumov screamed on the bridge and cursed loudly. The commander, who was closely monitoring the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him or to clarify for himself what had happened, muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder did not ignite well - it was damp.” The second mine, fired in pursuit of the enemy, went correctly to the target. They were already waiting for an explosion, but she, having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, suddenly turned to the side, thrown back by the seething currents from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of “Loud.”
“Gromky” was lucky and the torpedo turned out to be serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set sail for the Yasukuni Shrine.
“The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were secured in a marching manner.”
The destroyer Gromky launched a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but it managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal damage, lost speed and sank after some time. The destroyer "Gromky" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reaching Vladivostok. 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. A day earlier, the duel between the armored giants continued. The Oslyabya, Suvorov and Alexander III had already been lost (the last two were still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer “Buiny” staged lynching, throwing Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky overboard with the wording “Missing in action.” The commander of the destroyer N.N. Kolomeytsev did not support the idea, but treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigation bridge along with his entire staff. A Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From everyone on the upper navigation bridge, including and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to smack of mild hysteria, which usually happened to them as soon as something began to go against their plan.
The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately dropped so much that the battleship Borodino had enough of its remaining power and survivability to “drag” the battle until dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the battleship "Borodino", controlled only by sailors and having vehicles in full working order, without unnecessary complexes, increased its speed to the maximum possible 17-18 kts (it was of no use in battle anyway), heading N/O-23 °. The Eagle, which received the same amount, tried to keep up with him, but due to the armor plate on the bow at the waterline turned “against the grain,” the speed did not rise above 16.5 knots. The remaining ships with the flagship "Nicholas-I" trailed behind at a speed of about 14 knots. The cruiser "Emerald" walked with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo and his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while Tokyo decided what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy " As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji and Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, preserving such ships as “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Nikolai-I”, “Apraksin”, “Sevyanin”, “Izumrud” and “Gromky”. Purely in terms of the number of ships sunk and destroyed, this is, of course, still a loss, but not so shameful, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese, die in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes that at that time had already engulfed all of Tsarist Russia could count on something more, for example, the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. You might be lucky - once every 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war “didn’t work out” from the very beginning.
Lessons from war
Lesson #1. It is impossible to defeat the enemy with just the presence of even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and master all the techniques of its use perfectly. How are things going with combat training in our fleet today? I'd like to think it's better than 1904. Probably better.
Lesson #2. Military equipment is a very complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or at least limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in the shells, low power of the OFS and overloading of ships beyond the norm with all sorts of nonsense. What is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken cogs” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complex than even the most modern ships of the Borodino type and there are significantly more “cogs” in them.
Lesson #3. The ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with relatively compact sizes and forgave admirals and commanders such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same “command style” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and fleeting than what took place in the Battle of Tsushima. In order not to be unfounded, you can look at the photographs that explain everything.
Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the Battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during an inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 are 305mm shells (386kg), 2 are 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 are 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 are 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 are 76mm (~6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is a hefty 5.3 tons. It contains explosives ranging from half a ton to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.
The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by an AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard and plastic boat completely burned out and sank. If the reader thinks that our Project 956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.
It is difficult to say how the construction of such ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor can be explained. They even have aluminum and magnesium body steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.
The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively redesigned version, with closed dynamic protection armor "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main battery gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35kt), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and anti-aircraft defense systems it would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. These “Eagles” can be built in large numbers and in large numbers. At the same time, such a naval tank will be able to withstand a hit from 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? How many Sheffields do you need to build so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save you from modern powerful anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of a tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are, perhaps, the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-ago war.
Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the “big brothers”, but was 3-4 times smaller in displacement.
3. Given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of the new generation, which were first used in the Battle of Tsushima. High-explosive fragmentation shells of previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike carried out by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for “Suvorov”, “Eagle” and “Slava”. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm Krupp armor normal.
5. OFS – high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memories of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Among them, only one old Chinese “Chin-Yen” was an armadillo. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima class. Each of them carried one heavy and low-velocity 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention battleships. However, in the battleship-less fishiness of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Eagle armor, without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the “semi-heavy” cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis from the heavy artillery of the USSR Navy, as of June 22, 1941, there were only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized Tsarist Marat-class battleships) and 40 B-1-P 180mm caliber guns (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion of formally light cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis in the list is an obvious stretch “for the sake of numbers,” as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. That would not be completely embarrassing. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have any aircraft carriers.
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