“Only in Russia and Spain did Napoleon encounter real frenzy among the people. People left their homes, sometimes burned them, stole livestock, just so that the enemy wouldn’t get it,” historian Alexander Valkovich told the newspaper VZGLYAD. In the same time Patriotic War overgrown with myths, its events in Russia and France can be interpreted completely differently. Whose side is the truth on?
On Friday in Russia they celebrate one of the days military glory– Day of the Battle of Borodino. The legendary battle ended exactly 205 years ago, but there are still debates - in whose favor?
Historians also argue about what significance this battle had for the conflict between Russia and France, for Napoleon personally and for the fate of the world as a whole. The VZGLYAD newspaper spoke with the President of the International Military Historical Association, Alexander Valkovich, about the myths accompanying the memory of Borodino, about the opposition to Kutuzov in the Russian army, about the looters and about the popular character of that war.
OPINION: Let's immediately try to debunk the most famous myths about the Battle of Borodino...
Alexander Valkovich: Willingly. Myth number one is that Borodino was a turning point during the Patriotic War of 1812. This is wrong. The real turning point occurred later, on October 12 (24), 1812 at Maloyaroslavets. It was after him that Napoleon was forced to abandon offensive actions and retreat, and the Russian command took the initiative into their own hands. Borodino was the only general battle during that war.
Myth number 2. Regarding the fact that complete unity reigned both in the ranks of the French and in our ranks, all the generals merged in a single impulse. This is wrong. There were serious disagreements both between the Russian generals and between Napoleonic marshals. If we talk about the Russian army, not only Barclay de Tolly was dissatisfied with the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief, which, in principle, is known. Bagration was also against this. It was he who was considered the most promising student and favorite of Suvorov. In short, the Russian army had its own opposition, its own Fronde, and Russian politics had its own “French” and “English” parties.
Finally, the main myth. From school we were convinced that the Russian army was victorious at Borodino. In fact, none of the warring parties achieved their goals. The French were unable to defeat our army, and our army held out, but retreated, maintaining order. On points, to use boxing terminology, Russia lost. The army that leaves the battlefield first is considered the loser. However, the formally victorious French did not solve their problems, were depressed by the outcome of the battle, and soon lost the war altogether. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that at Borodino there was a draw.
OPINION: Is Napoleon’s cold also a myth? Like, if he hadn’t had a runny nose that day, things might have gone differently?
A.V.: Napoleon was really unwell. But his cold could no longer affect either the disposition he had drawn up earlier, or other key parameters of the battle. He determined the direction of the main attack of the French army in advance. Having “launched the machine,” the French emperor could no longer significantly influence its movement; his marshals, generals, and corps commanders were largely responsible for the outcome of the battle.
VZGLYAD: That is, he was responsible for the strategy. Didn’t he already influence tactical issues?
A.V.: It did, but only partly. Napoleon's only decision on the battlefield, which theoretically could have significantly changed the course of the battle, was to use or not to use his Old Guard, his most elite unit. The marshals asked him about this, but he did not agree. If Napoleon had broken through the Russian defense line with the help of the Old Guard, yes, the outcome could have been different. But we can talk about this only in the subjunctive mood.
In addition, the decision to leave the Old Guard in reserve from the point of view of Napoleon himself was correct. After all, it was this elite unit that later saved his life, saved the remnants of his retreating army in the battle of Krasnoye.
OPINION: What other mistakes did Napoleon make? Or did he do everything right, but was unlucky?
A.V.: From the height of our current knowledge, Napoleon’s decision to start a war with Russia could be called a fatal mistake. And at Borodino, he acted head-on, although, for example, Marshal Davout suggested that he go to the Russian left flank, where our most vulnerable position was.
OPINION: Is “General Frost” a myth or not a myth?
A.V.: Mostly a myth. If you look at it objectively, the French left Moscow in mid-October, when the weather was beautiful in autumn. And only at the end of November - December it became really cold.
At the same time, the French themselves are largely to blame for their problems, who, while in Moscow, did not take sufficient measures and did not prepare supplies of warm clothing. For example, the more prudent Poles, who also sided with Napoleon, took care of this in advance, dressed warmly and shod their horses. During the retreat, when the roads became icy, unshod French horses slipped and fell en masse.
OPINION: So the French were let down not by the climate, but by their own lack of foresight?
A.V.: Yes. But that's not even the main thing. The main thing is the demoralization of the army, which began in Moscow. And the result is complete disorganization. The French had collected large supplies of food in Smolensk, but they were never able to organize its distribution during the retreat. Most of the supplies were simply plundered. And no actions of Napoleon - even the shooting of marauders - could improve his situation.
In addition, the factor of the “people's” war seriously played against Napoleon. Just as in Spain, in Russia he encountered real frenzy of the people. Only in these two countries did people leave their homes, sometimes burnt them, stole livestock, just so that the enemy would not get it.
OPINION: If there was a draw at Borodino and Borodino was not a battle that determined the course of the war, why do we single it out? They could have done something different, definitely victorious.
A.V.: Firstly, because it was the largest battle of that campaign. And, secondly, as Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy correctly put it, at Borodino the Russians won a moral victory. Our troops showed massive heroism. Without hesitation, they sacrificed themselves. From soldier to general, everyone had one thought: the enemy should not end up in the heart of our Motherland, in Moscow. And although Moscow was later abandoned for a short time, Borodino, in fact, is a monument to the dedication, perseverance and courage of the Russians.
Borodino has long been considered a turning point battle for other reasons. In addition to the large loss of life, the real disaster for Napoleon was the loss of a significant part of the cavalry. The Borodino field is called the grave of the French cavalry. And the cavalry is called upon to go in the vanguard, illuminate the march of its army, carry out reconnaissance, and ensure maneuvering. The French were unable to make up for the loss of horsepower. Therefore, the rest of the time Napoleon acted, by and large, blindly. It was not for nothing that the cavalry was called at that time the “eyes and ears” of the army.
OPINION: How many people on both sides took part in the battle, how many losses were there?
A.V.: Over 130 thousand French and, according to the latest data, about 150 thousand Russians, if you count them together with the militia. But usually when comparing regular armies, militia are not taken into account. In general, the forces were approximately equal. In terms of losses, the French lost more than 30 thousand people, ours - 48 thousand killed, wounded and missing.
OPINION: Why did more of ours die?
A.V.: Napoleon was famous for his ability to gather into “one fist” and ensure artillery superiority in the direction of the main attack. Our main losses are connected precisely with this. Much more Russian soldiers died from French artillery fire than the French and their allies from Russian artillery.
OPINION: Can Borodino be called the bloodiest one-day battle at that time?
A.V.: Strictly speaking, Borodino was not a one-day battle. It was preceded by the Shevardinsky battle. With him battle of Borodino lasted two days.
In 1812, this was indeed the most significant and bloody battle. But, if we talk about the entire multi-year war, including the Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army, then in the three-day battle near Leipzig in October 1813, in the so-called “Battle of the Nations” more than 190 thousand people fought on the side of the French, on the side of Russia and its allies - over 350 thousand. As a result, the French lost 60 thousand, and the Allies more than 50 thousand.
OPINION: How big are the discrepancies regarding the assessment of the Battle of Borodino among our and foreign historians? Let's say the French definitely give victory to Napoleon's army?
A.V.: For a long time, for a century and even two after Borodino, the myth of the complete victory of the French was indeed popular abroad. But in recent decades, a lot of critical literature on this issue has appeared in the West and in France. In general, the events at Borodino are now given a much more restrained assessment. Serious historians abroad also talk not only about the formal result of the battle, but also about what this “win” gave the French and what it brought them to later. Increased fame? May be. But they did not solve the problems at all.
OPINION: Why do Russian and French historians have discrepancies even regarding losses at Borodino? The French estimate their losses at a maximum of 28 thousand people, and Russian and British historians at 35 thousand?
A.V.: Because French historians had in mind only the actual losses during French units and did not mention the losses in the troops allied with Napoleon. Don't look for anything else here.
OPINION: How much, in principle, has politics dominated and continues to dominate objective perception? Maybe, French artists they were more willing to paint respectable Napoleonic marshals in the middle of a Moscow fire than retreating and freezing soldiers Great Army. Also, somehow we don’t hear about the French actively recalling the looting of their soldiers in the Moscow Kremlin or the construction of stables in churches.
A.V.: I don’t agree. It seems to me that French battle painters quite often depicted scenes of the retreat of their army in 1812. In my opinion, no one is hiding anything on purpose. We know about victories and defeats, and about the facts of looting that are inherent in almost every war.
It is clear that when crossing the Neman, entering Russia, the soldiers of Napoleon’s army wanted to increase not only fame, but also wealth. It is clear that for the French this was not a war to protect their borders, but a war of conquest. Therefore everything is logical. Russian soldiers during the Foreign Campaign, having entered Paris, also engaged in looting. This was not of a mass nature, but this also happened.
Perhaps someone is overly romanticizing the War of 1812. Yes, then there were cases when prisoners were released on their word of honor that they would not fight for some time. But there was blood and looting. War is war.
Over the course of 200 years, the War of 1812 has acquired cliches that have little in common with real events
How are historical myths born? Childish mistakes appear first. And often at the core historical myth lies someone's original mistake. Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was deliberately set by someone.
One of the St. Petersburg channels flashed a story dedicated to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. In the frame is the grave of Ivan Dibich at the Volkovskoye cemetery behind the back of the female correspondent. And the confident face of this girl, telling about the exploits of Colonel Dibich near Yakubov, Klyastitsy, Golovshchina.
For those battles, the officer was awarded the Order of St. George, III degree, a mostly general award. It was only later that Ivan Dibich rose to the rank of Field Marshal, becoming one of 25 people in history to receive the Order of St. George, 1st degree. For success in Russian-Turkish war 1828-1829, by decree of the emperor, the honorary prefix “Zabalkansky” was added to his surname. And really, who in Russia hasn’t heard of Dibich-Zabalkansky?
It turned out that the correspondent had not heard. During the report, she spoke without a shadow of a doubt about some General Dibich-Zabolotsky.
Is this how historical myths are born? No, this is how childhood mistakes appear. But let’s think about whether there is a big difference between an error and a myth. And what lies at the heart of the historical myth. Wasn't that someone's original mistake? Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was deliberately set by someone.
Time passes, and the mistake turns into a myth, and the legend introduced into consciousness becomes a cliche, which most people perceive as historical fact. The War of 1812 did not escape this fate and over the course of 200 years it became overgrown with myths and cliches that have little in common with real events.
Sometimes they are local in nature, without distorting the essence historical process. For example, a stamp associated with the death of Major General Yakov Kulnev near Klyastitsy on August 1, 1812. How can we now convince many people that Kulnev was not at all the first Russian general killed in that war? A few days before the Battle of Klyastitsky there was a battle near Ostrovno, in which the chief of the Rylsky infantry regiment, Major General Okulov, was killed. It is not difficult to find out about this. But people are gullible. And since they write in books and articles that the first general to die was Kulnev, then so be it.
Another fragment. The moral feat of General Nikolai Raevsky in the battle near Saltanovka on July 23, 1812, when, having personally led the frontal attack of the Smolensk infantry regiment, corps commander Raevsky led in the front ranks two sons, the youngest of whom was only 11 years old. When the legend took root among the masses, Raevsky himself refuted this myth. But it was too late. So the three Raevskys are still going on the attack near Saltanovka.
There are cliches-myths that influence perception historical events much more serious. They work on people's subconscious. As a result, they form the national perception of history, deform the people’s self-esteem, and adjust the system of national and universal values.
The most common cliché myths about the War of 1812 are the colossal losses in the Battle of Borodino, the total fire of Moscow, the decisive role of the partisan movement, the no less decisive role of “General Moroz” and the periodization of the war itself.
If we start from the thesis that everything was so, then an involuntary question arises: what, in fact, did the Russian army and commander Kutuzov do if Napoleon was knocked down by fire, peasants with pitchforks and severe Russian cold? And also - why and with whom did Russia fight for another 15 months after the French left our borders, if the war ended on the Berezina in December 1812?
But let's take things in order.
The Battle of Borodino went down in history not at all because it was particularly bloody, and the losses of the parties exceeded all conceivable limits. Long before Borodino, Hannibal destroyed 60 thousand Romans near Cannes, using only edged weapons. Who can argue, blood flowed in torrents on the Borodino field. But when talking about losses, it is worth sticking to proven facts. And they are as follows: the total losses of the Russian side on September 5-7 in the Shevardinsky and Borodino battles, including the wounded and missing - 39 thousand. Of these, 14 thousand were killed, 10 thousand were missing. Our army has been reduced by one third. After all, before the battle it consisted of just over 100 thousand people in regular units, over 8 thousand Cossacks and 10-20 thousand militias.
For the French, everything turned out to be much worse. Of the 130-135 thousand soldiers and officers that Napoleon brought to Borodino, just over half remained in service. The total losses of the Great Army are estimated at 58-60 thousand bayonets and sabers. Bonaparte lost about 2 thousand people by officers alone. It is interesting that modern French researchers are also convinced that the figures for the losses of Napoleon’s army appearing in 19th-century studies are greatly underestimated.
The debate can go on forever. There are cliches on the theme of the terrible losses of the Russians, which prompted Kutuzov to surrender Moscow and which testify to the absolute superiority of Napoleonic genius. And there are scientific methods and historical documents, with the help of which only the truth can be found.
General Caulaincourt recalled how, while walking around the battlefield, Napoleon stopped at Raevsky’s battery and saw an officer with eighty infantrymen. The emperor invited the officer to join his regiment. To which he, waving his hand towards the redoubt, replied: “My regiment is here.” Napoleon repeated the order, but the officer again pointed to the ramparts. And only then it became clear that 80 soldiers were all that remained of a regiment of several thousand.
“Moscow, burned by fire...” - Lermontov’s brilliant lines are not at all the basis for purely historical conclusions. The poet has the right to exaggerate. In fact, the Moscow fire of 1812 did not burn down the entire capital. A third of the civil buildings and two thirds of the temples survived. Therefore, radical hysterical assessments and comparisons with Stalingrad in 1943 are inappropriate. More than 70% of the inhabitants remained in the city during the occupation by the Grand Army. The fact remains that the French behaved in Moscow, to put it mildly, barbarically: it was looted, many churches were desecrated, executions of civilians were recorded.
Leo Tolstoy's catchphrase about the club people's war allowed in Soviet time to create a stamp about the colossal influence on the results of the 1812 campaign of peasant partisan detachments, which destroyed the rear communications of the French, captured the enemy in thousands, deprived them of food and supplies. They also distorted the role of regular partisan formations, which allegedly arose on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment Denis Davydov. The first army flying group in the Moscow direction appeared in August on the orders of Barclay de Tolly, and was commanded by General Wintzingerode. But even earlier, the initiative was shown by the commander of the 3rd Observation Army, General Tormasov, who defended the south of the country.
From the ranks of the army, eight cavalry, five infantry regiments, and 13 regiments of Cossack irregular cavalry were sent to flying detachments. I would call these units airborne sabotage units, not partisan units. Davydov, Figner, Dorokhov, Seslavin remained career officers and did not at all turn into people's avengers.
Peasant partisan movement made a worthy contribution to the defeat of the Great Army. But the regular army still played a key role in expelling the enemy. It seems to me that by the cudgel of the people's war, Count Tolstoy did not mean Vasilisa Kozhina or even the 6,000-strong detachment of the peasant Kurin, but the general condition of the entire multi-class Russian people, including professional military men.
The next cliche is the most derogatory for the Russian army: it was not military actions, but frost that killed the Frenchman. In response, it’s easier to quote Napoleon himself: “The main reasons for the unsuccessful enterprise in Russia were attributed to early and excessive cold: This is completely false. How can I think that I don’t know about the timing of this annual phenomenon in Russia? Not only did winter come no earlier than usual, but its arrival on October 26 (November 7 according to the present day - “Trud”) was later than what happens every year.” Further, Bonaparte writes that in November a thaw began, which lasted until the remnants of the army approached the Berezina.
Denis Davydov wrote not only poetry, but also military-historical notes. It is enough to read eyewitness accounts to forget about “General Moroz” forever.
And one last thing. Let's ask ourselves why today we celebrate the victory in the Great Patriotic War not in October, but in May? After all German army removed from the USSR precisely in October 1944. The Russian army waged war with Napoleonic France until the end of March 1814, when it victoriously entered Paris. And to divide this war into the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaigns of 1813-1814 is incorrect from a historical and, most importantly, moral point of view.
By the way, General Ivan Dibich-Zabalkansky also took Paris. I can’t say the same about Dibich-Zabolotsky.
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 is a battle that lasted only one day, but has been preserved in the history of the planet among the most important world events. Napoleon took this blow, hoping to quickly conquer Russian Empire, but his plans were not destined to come true. It is believed that the Battle of Borodino was the first stage in the fall of the famous conqueror. What is known about the battle that he glorified in his famous work Lermontov?
Battle of Borodino 1812: background
This was a time when Bonaparte’s troops had already managed to subjugate almost all of continental Europe, and the emperor’s power even extended to Africa. He himself emphasized in conversations with those close to him that in order to gain world domination, all he had to do was gain control over Russian lands.
To conquer Russian territory, he assembled an army of approximately 600 thousand people. The army rapidly advanced deeper into the state. However, Napoleon's soldiers died one after another under the attack of peasant militias, their health deteriorated due to the unusually difficult climate and poor nutrition. Nevertheless, the advance of the army continued, the French goal being the capital.
The bloody Battle of Borodino in 1812 became part of the tactics used by Russian commanders. They weakened the enemy army with minor battles, biding their time for a decisive blow.
Main stages
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was actually a chain consisting of several clashes with French troops, which resulted in huge losses on both sides. The first was the battle for the village of Borodino, which is located approximately 125 km from Moscow. On the Russian side, de Tolly took part in it, and on the enemy side, the Beauharnais corps.
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was in full swing when the battle took place. It involved 15 divisions of French marshals and two Russians, led by Vorontsov and Neverovsky. At this stage, Bagration received a serious wound, which forced him to entrust command to Konovnitsyn.
By the time the Russian soldiers left the flashes, the Battle of Borodino (1812) had already been going on for about 14 hours. Summary further developments: The Russians are located behind the Semenovsky ravine, where the third battle takes place. Its participants are people who attacked flushes and defended them. The French received reinforcements, which became the cavalry under the leadership of Nansouty. Uvarov's cavalry hastened to help the Russian troops, and the Cossacks under the command of Platov also approached.
Battery Raevsky
Separately, it is worth considering the final stage of such an event as the Battle of Borodino (1812). Summary: battles for what went down in history as the “grave” French cavalry", lasted about 7 hours. This place really became the grave for many of Bonaparte's soldiers.
Historians remain perplexed as to why the Russian army abandoned the Shevadinsky redoubt. It is possible that the commander-in-chief deliberately opened the left flank in order to divert the enemy's attention from the right. His goal was to protect the new Smolensk road, using which Napoleon’s army would quickly approach Moscow.
Many historically important documents have been preserved that shed light on such an event as the war of 1812. The Battle of Borodino is mentioned in a letter that was sent by Kutuzov to the Russian emperor even before it began. The commander informed the king that the terrain features (open fields) would provide Russian troops optimal positions.
Hundred per minute
The Battle of Borodino (1812) is briefly and extensively covered in so many historical sources that one gets the impression that it took a very long time. In reality, the battle, which began on September 7 at half past six in the morning, lasted less than a day. Of course, it turned out to be one of the bloodiest among all the short battles.
It’s no secret how many lives the Battle of Borodino took and its bloody contribution. Historians have not been able to establish the exact number of those killed; they call 80-100 thousand dead on both sides. Calculations show that every minute at least a hundred soldiers were sent to the next world.
Heroes
The Patriotic War of 1812 gave many commanders their well-deserved glory. The Battle of Borodino, of course, immortalized a man like Kutuzov. By the way, Mikhail Illarionovich at that time was not yet a gray-haired old man whose one eye did not open. At the time of the battle, he was still an energetic, albeit aging man, and was not wearing his signature headband.
Of course, Kutuzov was not the only hero who was glorified by Borodino. Together with him, Bagration, Raevsky, and de Tolly entered history. It is interesting that the last of them did not enjoy authority among the troops, although he was the author of the brilliant idea to field partisan forces against the enemy army. If you believe the legend, during the Battle of Borodino, the general lost his horses three times, which died under a barrage of shells and bullets, but he himself remained unharmed.
Who has the victory?
Perhaps this question remains the main intrigue of the bloody battle, since both sides participating in it have own opinion on this score. French historians are convinced that great victory Napoleon's troops won that day. Russian scientists insist on the opposite; their theory was once supported by Alexander the First, who proclaimed the Battle of Borodino an absolute victory for Russia. By the way, it was after him that Kutuzov was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.
It is known that Bonaparte was not satisfied with the reports provided by his military leaders. The number of guns captured from the Russians turned out to be minimal, as was the number of prisoners that the retreating army took with them. It is believed that the conqueror was completely crushed by the morale of the enemy.
The large-scale battle, which began on September 7 near the village of Borodino, has inspired writers, poets, artists, and then directors who covered it in their works for two centuries. You can recall both the painting “The Hussar Ballad” and the famous creation of Lermontov, which is now being taught at school.
What was the Battle of Borodino 1812 really like and how did it turn out for the Russians and French? Buntman and Eidelman are historians who created a laconic and accurate text that covers the bloody battle in detail. Critics praise this work for its impeccable knowledge of the era, vivid images of the heroes of the battle (on both sides), thanks to which all the events are easy to imagine. The book is a must read for those seriously interested in history and military affairs.
