A proposal to recognize the status of war veterans for Soviet participants in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was submitted to the State Duma by three communist deputies. The goal of the “military-strategic operation Danube,” in their opinion, was to suppress the coup in Czechoslovakia, which the Czechoslovak opposition was preparing with the help of Western countries.
The proposal was criticized by representatives of the Czech opposition party TOP 09 due to “distortion of history.” The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not yet commented on this proposal.
Participants in Operation Danube 68 are seeking to ensure that their status is the same as that of Soviet soldiers who fought in the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War, in Afghanistan, Syria and other bloody conflicts. A bill that would provide them not only with respect from the public as having defended their homeland, albeit far beyond its borders, but also with a number of financial benefits, including increased pensions and significant benefits for housing and utilities, has already been submitted to the Russian parliament.
This week it was introduced by communist deputies Nikolai Kolomeytsev, Sergei Reshulsky and Yuri Sinelshchikov. At the same time, not only deputies and politicians, but also the media call the seizure of Czechoslovakia in a variety of terms, but not occupation. For example, the state agency RIA Novosti writes about the military-strategic Operation Danube, the purpose of which was to prevent a coup in Czechoslovakia.
“They showed courage and firmness”
The deputies themselves, the authors of the bill, in justifying the law, state: “We must admit that in the conditions of martial law in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the period from August 21 to November 1968, in the performance of their military duty, they showed courage and firmness, therefore we consider it necessary that in relation to Historical and social justice was established for these people.” They present this justice in the form of changes to the federal law “On Veterans,” which should be expanded to include participants in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
It is unclear whether the bill will pass in the State Duma. On the sidelines, members of other factions expressed fears that this “election campaign” of the Russian Communist Party could cause a negative reaction from Prague and ultimately lead to problems for modern army Russians living in the Czech Republic. As independent deputy Dmitry Gudkov said, this initiative of legislators will not go unnoticed by the Czech Embassy in Moscow and will cause a certain reaction in Prague.
Arguments are a shameful falsification, as Schwarzenberg says
The leadership of the opposition party TOP 09 has already responded to the amendments to the law being prepared in the Russian parliament. “We reject any historical shifts in events associated with 1968. The arguments that Russian deputies give for the bill are a shameful falsification of events. Just like the justification for the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 in general. Like, this operation was supposed to protect Czechoslovakia from a NATO attack,” writes honorary party chairman Karel Schwarzenberg, MEP Jaromir Štetina and first deputy chairman Marek Jenišek.
“As TOP 09 politicians included in Putin’s list of undesirable persons who are prohibited from entering the territory Russian Federation, we call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to invite the Russian Ambassador to the Czech Republic for an explanation. At the same time, we demand that the Czech ambassador in Moscow also take steps on this issue.”
"Counter-revolution orchestrated from Washington"
Military veterans of the occupation forces have been seeking the status of military veterans for several years now. They have united in regional organizations and maintain contact, including through social networks and web pages of veteran organizations.
In 2013, many of them tried to achieve the same thing that the communists are proposing today - to change the law “On Veterans”. The Russian public supported the right of participants in Operation Danube-68 to veteran status, and in the media and in social networks a discussion ensued, from which it follows that the Russians do not make any historical mistakes.
Context
The Czech Republic remembers the anniversary of the occupation
Radio Prague 08/22/2015The police were faster than in 1968
iDNES.cz 08/26/20131968. 2013. Red Square.
Radio Liberty 08/25/2013The prevailing belief remains that Moscow prevented the NATO occupation of Czechoslovakia, and that “the counter-revolution called the Prague Spring was orchestrated from Washington.”
Moscow’s fears in 1968, by the way, are comparable to those expressed by Russian President Vladimir Putin today: it is impossible to allow the troops of a hostile military bloc to concentrate at the borders of Russia, like the USSR then. Therefore, the participants in the invasion of Czechoslovakia perceived and perceive this entire operation as a military one.
Russian soldiers thought they were going to war
“We were all sure that we were going to war. None of us, and I was a twenty-year-old lieutenant then, knew whether we would return home,” Valery Panov wrote three years ago on the Military Revival portal. He and his colleagues convincingly say that the world was threatened by nuclear war, and they, by occupying Czechoslovakia, prevented it. According to Panov, there were hundreds of weapons depots and about three thousand CIA agents throughout Czechoslovakia.
Even today, it is justified by the imaginary resistance of Czech counter-revolutionaries, so that we can talk about real battles and grant their participants the status of combat veterans. General Vladimir Bulgakov, for example, claims that there were battles, but about them, according to political reasons, it was impossible to speak then. “The time has come to admit that we were resisted, although most of the weapons and military equipment remained in warehouses, which were instantly captured by Allied troops. Only thanks to this, the Czech army was not able to launch a large-scale military operation. In 1968, the Czechoslovak army numbered 200 thousand people.”
In connection with the desire to implement the law in Russia, the losses suffered by the Soviets are also emphasized. According to the commander of the 38th Army, General Mayorov, the Czechs set fire to seven infantry fighting vehicles with Molotov cocktails. Some cars allegedly burned along with the crew. More than 300 cars were also destroyed. From August 21 to October 20, 11 soldiers died while performing military duty, according to Mayorov.
Accidents and improper handling of weapons claimed more lives
However, other official data are also interesting: over the same period, 85 Soviet military personnel died in various accidents, due to careless handling of weapons and other non-military reasons. So the awkwardness turned out to be more fatal for the Soviet soldiers.
It is not entirely clear what category of losses to include the victims of the accident that happened on August 21 on the highway between Presov and Poprad in Slovakia. According to Russian media, then women, fooled by “extremists,” came out onto the highway along with children to stop Russian tanks. The driver of the first car in the convoy did not want to run into a group of people and directed the tank into a ditch. Yuri Andreev, Pyotr Kazarin and Evgeny Makhotin burned on the spot. “There is not even a small monument on site,” complains the Russian portal topwar.
There were a number of similar incidents in Prague, and in addition, the Czechoslovaks often “treacherously shot from cover” at soldiers. If General Mayorov in his official report cites 11 victims of fighting in two months, then the participants in the operation themselves claim on their veteran websites that there were many more dead. Thus, according to Lieutenant Panov, 21 people died from August 21 to August 27 alone. In February 1995, the Izvestia newspaper wrote that the total losses were 99 people, without, however, indicating whether most of the soldiers died in accidents or shot themselves.
Europe in the grip of the USA
Emotions are one thing former soldiers, and the other is the position of Russian legislators. According to communist deputies, the law needs to be discussed as soon as possible, because this August will mark 48 years since the events in Czechoslovakia, and their participants are aging. In the commentary to the law, the authors emphasize that in Czechoslovakia, without a doubt, there was a threat of an anti-state coup, which “was prepared by the Czechoslovak opposition, relying on the support of Western countries.”
All this happened because censorship was “weakened.” According to the deputies, not only the Americans, but also “the Nazis and representatives of the reactionary clergy” were preparing for an attack on the socialist bloc. The communists also list the armies that were ready to invade Czechoslovakia if Moscow had not intervened: the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, deputies call these countries “Hitler’s heirs.”
In addition, the authors of the bill regret that the operation was not completed, which would have prevented the growth of influence of the EU and the United States in Central Europe after 1990. “The countries of Eastern Europe have lost their sovereignty, and their economic potential has sharply declined, as well as the standard of living of their citizens,” claim Russian communists.
It's about about money
If the State Duma passes a law with such justification, this will mean that Moscow officially considers the invasion of the Soviet army into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 as friendly assistance to a fraternal people under threat, as well as a legitimate defense of its territorial interests. However, so far the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces has responded to the participants in Operation Danube-68 to a request for changes as follows: “The participation of soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces in the battles in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has not been confirmed.” Allegedly, only isolated violent clashes were noted. And this is not enough to grant veteran status.
But if the participants in Operation Danube-68 had stopped arguing about the ideological background of the operation and focused on money, which is primarily discussed when changing the law, perhaps they would have long ago had the same pensions and benefits that they have fellow Afghan soldiers. Argue new law the fact that “ours prevented the invasion of NATO troops into Czechoslovakia,” according to deputy Oksana Dmitrieva, is tactless. Benefits are available to all participants in foreign operations, regardless of the ideological background of the action.
Next in line is Hungary
However, only those who served in Czechoslovakia from August 21 to the end of November 1968, who are today over 67 years of age, and who need “moral, and partly additional material and social support states." Anyone who arrived in Czechoslovakia after November 30, 1968 will under no circumstances be considered combat veterans.
Today, about 20 thousand military personnel of the occupation forces live in Russia. Many of them already receive various types of benefits either as disabled people or as veterans of labor or veterans military service. There are a huge number of categories in Russia that are eligible for benefits and state assistance, and almost anyone has a chance to enter one or another.
But the four thousand soldiers who occupied Czechoslovakia in August 1968 were allegedly left without any benefits at all. For them, the necessary funds may already be found in the 2017 budget - you just need to vote for the new law. Another initiative of the communists, in their own words, should be to grant the status of combat veterans to participants in the operation in Hungary in 1956.
The arguments of Russian deputies and their justification for the occupation of Czechoslovakia, however, are considered by Czech deputies from TOP 09 to be a “shameful falsification” of events. “We reject any historical displacement of events related to 1968,” the party’s honorary chairman Karel Schwarzenberg, MEP Jaromir Stetina and TOP 09 first deputy chairman Marek Jenišek wrote in a press release.
They also called on Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaoralek (ČSSD) to invite the Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic for an explanation. “At the same time, we demand that the Czech ambassador in Moscow also take steps on this issue,” they said. So far the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic has not commented on the Russian bill, but Irena Valentova from the press service of the department told the ČTK agency that a statement is being prepared.
Operation Danube was a counterattack
Veterans of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 testify.
Exactly 50 years ago, on the night of August 20-21, 1968, the territory Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic Troops from five member states of the Warsaw Pact were brought in: USSR, People's Republic of Belarus, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. Started Operation Danube, the largest after the Second World War and remains in history as a brilliantly planned and executed military-strategic event with the fewest casualties. And although half a century has passed since it was held, the history of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia is more relevant than ever. The turning point of the era, the scale of the events that took place, and the possibility of concentrating extremely significant events in a short period of time are quite in tune with modern times.
It is characteristic that in the former Czechoslovakia what happened is still perceived as a keenly felt modernity. Similar sentiments are observed in the post-Soviet space. Despite a sufficient period of time, which would seem to make it possible to avoid distortions caused by the immediate proximity of events, it has not yet been possible to move away from the direct projection of ideological attitudes...
Almost all researchers, regardless of political orientation and ideological preferences, agree that the Czechoslovak crisis is one of the central episodes of the post-war confrontation.
However, as a rule, they are limited to unity in assessing the scale of events.
Persisting mythology cold war pushes liberal-oriented authors to a superficial, extremely one-sided interpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia, which are still presented as a peaceful “Prague Spring” aimed at “humanizing” socialism, but interrupted as a result of Soviet aggression, although it did not meet an organized military response, but faced with popular resistance to “communist totalitarianism.”
This circumstance most noticeably influences Czech historiography, which places emphasis on the “historical guilt” of the USSR. However, since the late 80s. last century and to the present time in Russian historical literature Numerous compilations claiming to be scientific have also spread widely, essentially only repeating the grievances of Czech and Slovak authors seeking to take ideological revenge for the military-political defeat of 1968. History has been supplanted by lightweight history (in the style of the notorious “Liberator” Rezun-Suvorov) journalism with its characteristic fragmentation of the holistic picture, which makes it easy to propagate pseudoscientific myths.
Contemporary desire for recognition of events in Czechoslovakia one of the first attempts to organize a “color revolution”, encounters fierce resistance from Russophobes. The emotions of Czechs and Slovaks can still be understood. But we also have those for whom the Danube participants are still nothing more than “liquidators of the Prague Spring”, and the operation itself is a continuous chain of political mistakes bordering on crimes. Behind the nervous giggling and outright defamation, one can easily discern not so much the continuation of opposition to the Soviet era, but rather the national discussion being imposed today by the liberal public, at the center of which is the question: should geopolitical activity be curtailed? modern Russia(return Crimea, “drain” Donbass and hand over unfortunate Syria to the final torn apart of “partners”) in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions and the preservation of a liberal political course.
It is possible to resist aggressive ideological expansion only by appealing to the collective memory of veterans. IN modern conditions it should be treated with special care. The living word of a participant and witness can have a stronger impact than endless lists historical facts, volumes of statistics and mountains of grandiose memorials...
Actually, the first memories of “ Danube"appeared shortly after 1968. Initially they were sporadic, but gradually their flow increased. The memoirs of the former commander of the 38th Army, General A.M., became widely known. Mayorova, other materials became available (to varying degrees). A genuine breakthrough associated with the definition historical significance“Danube” and the integration of veterans’ memories into collective memory, was produced by V.P. Suntsev(Ukraine), who managed to organize and systematize the collection and publication of these materials.
The conclusion made by the researcher, according to which the successful implementation of the Danube prevented the impending invasion of the North Atlantic Alliance troops and made it possible to avoid a large-scale (possibly nuclear) war in Europe, became the most important contribution to the study of this military-strategic operation.
The ascetic activity of V.P. Suntseva not only received public recognition, but also became an example for other direct participants in the events. The success of the work done prompted further collection of materials and revision of outdated provisions on the nature of the events of 1968. A regional public organization of internationalist soldiers took shape in Rostov-on-Don. Danube-68”, which launched a search for veterans of the operation and their relatives, collection and publication of memoirs, and identification of documents from personal archives. The most important event in her activities was the publication in 2011 of the voluminous book “ Towards the dawn"(republished in 2013 in an expanded and expanded version), containing memories of veterans of the operation. These efforts were supported by representatives of the scientific community and the general public, and met with a favorable response, both in Rostov region, and throughout the post-Soviet space, intensified the veterans’ movement as a whole. Similar organizations began to emerge in other regions of our country. Today we have the right to talk about a broad social movement of participants in Operation Danube.
The vast majority of Danube veterans act as a cohesive international community, united in their assessments of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and retaining the perception of themselves as the direct heirs of the victorious soldiers of 1945, who were responsible for preserving the post-war world order. They are proud of their personal participation in a great historical test, which they withstood with honor, without tarnishing their banners with the shame of violence and looting. The notorious statement of the Soviet government on December 5, 1989, in which, at the instigation of Gorbachev, despite the obligations under the Warsaw Pact and availability of official appeal asking for help, input decision allied forces to Czechoslovakia is assessed as erroneous and unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, perceived by veterans as the limit of state recklessness, discrediting the significance of Operation Danube for the USSR and provoking increasing reproaches against our country.
In the memory of veterans, the military-strategic Operation Danube forever remained not only one of the most striking events associated with the just struggle to preserve the results of the Second World War, but also a logical link in our country’s centuries-long resistance to Western aggressiveness. Just as Russia’s territorial expansion historically was only a response to an external threat, so during the Cold War, including in 1968, Soviet actions(with all the external radicalism) were essentially defensive in nature. The Hungarian lesson of 1956 was well learned by the developers (headed by the highly experienced General S.M. Shtemenko) and the command of the military-strategic operation, who understood the need for combat activity in order to minimize the number of possible casualties. The Danube, in essence, was only a counterattack caused by the desire to fix the border, which our opponents in the Cold War were not allowed to cross.
Until now, such a fact has not appeared anywhere, say, that the deployment of troops was even somewhat late - into the territory of Czechoslovakia from the side West Germany On August 21, 1968, the leading battalions of the US Army's 1st and 3rd Mechanized Divisions invaded and were immediately driven back by two Soviet tank regiments.
If the conviction is forced, predominantly defensive Since the nature of the actions of the Soviet side is determined by the memory of veterans about the Cold War as a whole, the main marker for participants in the events of 1968 is the recognition of the conduct of hostilities during the operation. This issue has been raised many times, and many participants in the events have spoken out on this issue. The conclusion they reached is clear - combat operations were an integral part of the Danube. Information about the conduct of hostilities permeates the entire content of veterans’ memories. In close connection with them, such aspects as the restoration of the scheme of combat operations, the composition and combat grouping of troops, the list of military units who participated in the operation and clarification of combat losses. Thanks to the memories of veterans, as a result of painstaking teamwork (most of the military documents still classified), from individual elements of the mosaic, ultimately, a complete picture of a grandiose, carefully developed and thought-out military operation is formed.
Who today would dare to deny such signs of hostilities as the creation of the Main Command of Operation Danube (commander-in-chief - General I.G. Pavlovsky), the formation of the Central, Southern and Carpathian fronts? Who would dare to deny combat orders, combat reports, weapons and front-line allowances for all personnel, and keeping combat logs? And, of course, who would dare to deny the awarding of military orders and medals to the participants in the operation, and, moreover, the irretrievable and sanitary losses of military personnel during its implementation?
At the same time, government bodies, in response to numerous appeals from veterans, refuse to acknowledge reality, again and again limiting themselves to a bureaucratic reply about “individual military clashes,” provoking the “Danubians” to a trivial question: would they be recognized as participants in hostilities if the deployment of troops was delayed and it was necessary to forcefully drive out NATO troops, if it had not been possible to successfully block the Czechoslovak army and it had offered armed resistance, if the actions of the troops had been less professional, and the soldiers had succumbed to numerous provocations with unpredictable developments?
Veterans, whose ranks are thinning, are patiently waiting for one of the senior government officials to comment on the situation. Meanwhile, military academies (and not only Russian ones) continue to study Operation Danube as an example of military art.
To correctly assess the nature of the military-strategic operation “Danube”, it is necessary to understand the fact that all participants in the events, without exception, had to act in new, especially difficult conditions. For the first time, elements of the so-called “new generation war” were actively used, associated with influencing the enemy using methods of social manipulation. The most powerful weapon in such a war is not so much the military contingent as the means mass media, imposing ideological cliches on the entire world community. The main features of such a war are: the use of civilians against troops as human shields; the desire to maximize one’s own losses for the sake of creating an “information occasion”; attributing to enemy forces those actions that a real provocateur practices himself.
There are many stories in the memoirs of veterans that illustrate elements of such a war.
The images of numerous protests contained in the memoirs leave no doubt about their thoughtful, provocative organization, pre-prepared support, leadership from a single center, and frankly staged nature. The troops were fully faced with an attempt to turn them into an aggressor, and extremists, posing as the entire population of Czechoslovakia, into people's avengers.
We were not prepared for such a turn, and we had to correct the miscalculations of the political leadership directly during the operation, mainly with the help of ordinary conscript soldiers. We have to admit that this lesson was never fully learned, and today we again risk losing the “war of memory” - the memory of 1968 in our country is preserved mainly only thanks to the personal efforts of veterans and enthusiasts, while in the Czech Republic , Slovakia and other Eastern European countries are attached to this activity special status.
Almost all participants in the events of 1968 emphasize that the population of Czechoslovakia was not united in its attitude towards the invading troops: “The differentiation of views was very noticeable. The position of a citizen was very often determined not by his social background, but by his age. The older generation regarded the presence of foreign troops as an inevitable act, and many gave this event a positive assessment.” However, the same authors admit that this population, with seemingly traditionally peace-loving, often pro-Russian sentiments, allowed extremist-minded youth(at least for a while) impose your will on the entire society. And the question of the reasons for what happened remains open.
Let us pay attention to one more fundamental circumstance. In Czechoslovakia itself, in the second half of the 1960s, the illusions that had survived from the pre-war period and inspired the “Prague Spring” intensified, according to which the country’s role was reduced to a “second Switzerland”, acting as a kind of mediator between the liberal West and the socialist East. A long-cherished idea acquired a new meaning and pleased national pride. The need for ideological justification for the desire for an eclectic combination of antagonistic features of opposing political systems gave rise to such an ideological construct as the notorious “socialism with a human face.”
However, all external forces saw the future of Czechoslovakia fundamentally differently and assigned it a role in their geopolitical plans no more important than a strategic springboard.
Against the background of national neurosis caused by the natural intensification of this contradiction, a wave of aggressiveness grew, which was managed (with the help of overseas patrons) to be saddled outright extremists, like Club 231, which included many outright Nazis. In conditions of bloc confrontation, the desire to Soviet Union strengthen positions in Central Europe by placing a military contingent in Czechoslovakia. In the context of the events of 1968, the military-strategic operation “Danube” turns into the main event of them, but by no means a derivative event from the “Prague Spring”.
Of course, a decisive breakthrough in the study of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the military-strategic operation “Danube” will be associated with the introduction of scientific circulation the entire range of sources. However, it is already possible to develop their history at a level that allows us to overcome the myth-making of the Cold War period. A pessimist may object that the authors brought a lot, so to speak, from themselves, that they might not have known or subjectively interpret the circumstances. Of course they could, but it is this subjectivity that makes memories effective tool impact on public consciousness, turning them, ultimately, into the memory of generations. And the memory of the people is incommensurably higher than any seemingly objectively presented (if this is even possible) history.
Today it is quite obvious that modern Russian society will accept only such historical ideas that will be consistent with its historical memory.
Creation of a non-contradictory modern concept events of 1968 and change historical assessment Operation Danube opens up the opportunity for a new formulation of the question of the status of the participants in the operation and the restoration of historical justice.
It is annoying to realize that the insecurity of the defenders of the Fatherland is a sad tradition of our state, which declares high patriotism and often forgets its own heroes who do not separate their fate from the fate of the Motherland.
Alexey Baylov – candidate historical sciences, Associate Professor of the Southern Federal University, coordinator of the Rostov regional public organization of internationalist soldiers “Danube-68”.
Vladimir Bulgakov - Hero of Russia, Colonel General.
Vitaly Shevchenko – police major general, military historian, chairman of the Rostov regional public organization of internationalist soldiers “Danube-68”.
Czechoslovakia 1968
Czechoslovakia 1968, “The Year of Difficult Trials”, NATO plans failed, the counter-revolution did not pass
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“Prague Spring”, or Military-strategic Operation “Danube”?
V.V. Bulgakov, V.V. Shevchenko, A.V. Baylov
"Prague Spring", or Military-Strategic Operation "Danube"? Towards a new historical assessment of the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and their participants
On the night of August 20-21, 1968, troops from five member states of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia. The military-strategic Operation Danube began - the largest military operation in Europe after the Second World War. As a result of its implementation, it was possible to prevent a revision of the post-war world order and preserve Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Eastern European socialist bloc. An agreement was concluded on the conditions of temporary stay Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet group remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991.
More than 45 years have passed since the Czechoslovak events, but today their history is more topical than ever. The turning point of that time and the scale of the events that took place are quite in tune with the alarming modern times. The year 1968 clearly demonstrates the relativity of historical time, the possibility of concentrating extremely significant events in a short chronological period. This is one of the peaks of geopolitical confrontation, the significance of which is especially acutely realized in the conditions of the “second edition” of the Cold War that we are experiencing today. Our country’s ill-wishers are already using their own interpretation of the Czechoslovak events to substantiate the thesis about its initial hostility to Western civilization and the legitimacy of the latest sanctions as “punishment for Ukraine.” The analysis of Czechoslovak events is also important because the legal status of their participants often becomes the subject of professional activity lawyers who, despite all the fairness of the demands presented to the state, due to the imperfection of the legislation based on the ideological postulates of the late 80s - early 90s, cannot provide proper legal assistance to those who apply. And the fact that the current legislation is hostage to the decadent ideology of the perestroika period thinking man there is no doubt. So is it necessary for the legislator to change his approach both to the analysis of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to the determination of the legal status of their participants?
It is well known that from a military point of view, Operation Danube was carried out brilliantly. An undoubted strategic success was achieved. However, historical assessments of the Czechoslovak events still cannot be considered satisfactory. First of all, the key question has not been resolved: what was decisive in the events of 1968 - the so-called “Prague Spring” with the notorious “socialism with a human face” or the military-strategic operation “Danube” as a historically justified response to an outright challenge to the post-war world order ? The answer to the question is largely determined by the personal civic choice of researchers.
It has long been noticed by us that during periods of Russia’s rise, the public seems to begin to be ashamed of the greatness of its own country. And only after going through a period of catastrophic (crisis) development caused by the fluctuation of state foundations, public opinion begins to incline towards overcoming internal anti-stateism.
At the end of the 1980s, pro-Western liberals managed to instill a sense of historical guilt for 1968 into the public consciousness, presenting the events exclusively as a peaceful “Prague Spring”. Democratic transformations, in their opinion, were interrupted as a result of Soviet aggression, which, although it did not meet with organized military resistance, was faced with popular resistance to communist totalitarianism. Authors who sought to study the Czechoslovak events in the general context of the Cold War, seeking to emphasize the possible negative consequences for the entire world community in the event of the defeat of the USSR and its allies, were then few and unpopular. History has been replaced by lightweight journalism with its characteristic fragmentation, which makes it easy to propagate pseudoscientific myths.
It should be recognized that the widespread dissemination of such assessments was possible largely as a result of the low level of Soviet historical work. Official Soviet historiography, following L. Brezhnev, who voiced the thesis about the “international debt” of socialist countries in November 1968 (the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine”), interpreted the introduction of troops exclusively as a preventive measure aimed at preventing the country from being separated from the socialist camp by those who had made their way to power “revisionists”, artificially emphasizing the ideological component of the Czechoslovak events.
The objective need for a military contingent in Czechoslovakia, which occupies a central position in Europe (which its leaders opposed), was obscured in every possible way in the conditions of bloc confrontation. As a result, for further liberal revaluation, it turned out that only a mechanical replacement of “pros” with “cons” was enough, which happened immediately after the betrayal of the “Danube” by the political leadership of the era of Mikhail Gorbachev. Numerous compilations claiming to be scientific have appeared, only repeating grievances, mainly by Czech and Slovak authors seeking to take ideological revenge for the military-political defeat of 1968.
Modern ideas about the Czechoslovak events of 1968 continue to include many different points of view, historical assessments, and political myths. At the same time, the liberal approach is increasingly revealing its own scientific inconsistency. His textbook poetic expression (“Tanks are walking through Prague / In the woven blood of dawn. / Tanks are walking in the truth / Which is not a newspaper”) is already perceived primarily only as a reason for thinking about the inclination of the creative intelligentsia to national treason. Social interest in the Prague Spring is gradually fading.
Basic liberal dogmas have already been subjected to reasoned criticism. It becomes possible to form truly scientific historical assessments. Probably, 40-50 years is the necessary period that allows us to avoid distortions caused by the immediate proximity of the event, to move away from direct projection onto scientific knowledge ideological attitudes. In this regard, the geopolitical approach that is emerging as an alternative to liberal constructs, with its characteristic emphasis on Operation Danube and the perception of the “Prague Spring” as the first attempt at a “color” revolution, is attracting more and more attention.” The formation and development of this approach is in many ways directly related to the selfless efforts of a number of direct participants in the events of 1968, dissatisfied with the conclusions and assessments of initially Soviet and later liberal historiography.
It is noteworthy that almost all, including ordinary, participants in the Danube remained convinced of the historical justification of this military-strategic operation. Moreover, as they grew socially, the ratings for the operation became higher. Common historical memory led to the rapid formation of a community of like-minded people who focused their activities on restoring historical truth. The first solution to this problem was taken by the legendary participant in the operation and researcher of the Danube Guard, Colonel V.P., who lives today in Ukraine. Suntsev, who published the acclaimed work “Operation Danube: How It Was” and largely contributed to the publication of the collection “The Stinks Stole the World from Europe.” Of course, even before V.P. Suntsev published memoirs of participants in the Czechoslovak events, but it was he who managed to give the work of collecting and publishing historical materials an organized and regular character.
The main conclusion of V.P. Suntsev, according to which the successful implementation of the Danube prevented the impending invasion of the North Atlantic Treaty troops and avoided a large-scale, possibly nuclear, war in Europe, became the most important contribution to the study of the military-strategic operation Danube.
Activities of V.P. Suntseva inspired veterans living throughout the post-Soviet space. Their desire to create their own organizations has intensified.
In Rostov-on-Don arose social movement“Danube-68”, which united the participants in the operation and is today known far beyond the borders of the region. Along with internal organizational work and participation in the patriotic education of youth, the movement set as its goal the preservation of the historical memory of the Danube, the establishment of a fair historical assessment of the operation and its participants. Through personal efforts it was possible not only to preserve and publish a large number of materials that can compensate for still inaccessible archival sources, but also substantiate conclusions that significantly change ideas about the Czechoslovak events of 1968.
It became completely obvious that the “Prague Spring” was nothing more than an ideological cover for another attempt, which began in 1956 in Hungary, to revise the post-war structure of the world by the forces of aggression, which assigned Czechoslovakia only the unenviable role of a springboard. For a correct assessment of the nature of the military-strategic operation, it is fundamentally important to take into account the fact that all participants in the Danube, without exception, had to operate in new, especially difficult, conditions. For the first time, the basic elements of the so-called “new generation war” were actively used.
The characteristic features of such a war are currently no secret. They are associated with influencing the enemy using methods primarily psychological nature, using social manipulation. The most powerful weapon in the “new generation war” is not so much the military contingent as the media. The basic mechanism is simple. It consists, firstly, in the artificial creation of the so-called “overheating point”, secondly - in examining this situation through a “magnifying glass” (multiple replication of one’s own interpretation of the event with the help of the media), thirdly - in the dissemination of this distorted idea throughout the country. The role of the media component is so great that military operations are no longer conducted so much for the sake of victory, but for the so-called PR. Ideological cliches are imposed not only on the local population, but also on the entire world community. The main features of such a war are also associated with this mechanism: the use of civilians against troops as human shields; the desire to maximize one’s own losses; attributing to enemy forces those actions that a real provocateur practices himself. (When you look closely at photographs of Prague in 1968, you involuntarily note the unnatural stage nature of the protests, and images of Libya, Serbia, Syria and other “liberated” or “liberated” countries, taken on a similar principle, come to mind.) Changing the historical assessment of the military-strategic operation “ Danube” opens up the opportunity for a new formulation of the question of the status of the participants in this operation.
It should be recognized that Russia is indebted to veterans: the issue of recognizing this category of military personnel as participants in hostilities has not yet been resolved. Czechoslovakia is not on the corresponding list of states. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. Despite numerous appeals to various authorities, the matter is limited only to official formal replies, the content of which only makes one smile sadly once again. Of course, the issue of veteran status is far from simple, and no one proposes to solve it without taking into account possible international legal consequences. However, we cannot come to terms with the fact that the insecurity of the defenders of the Fatherland is a sad tradition of our state, which declares high patriotism and forgets (and sometimes represses) its own heroes.
However, despite this unfortunate circumstance, we still pay tribute to the veterans who took part in the events back in 1968. Perhaps in the near future the legislator will radically change his position on this issue. However, this must be preceded by a radical change in state ideology, based on an understanding of the real significance of historical events of both the relatively distant and recent past.
Information about authors:
Bulgakov Vladimir Vasilievich - Hero of the Russian Federation, Colonel General, Candidate of Military Sciences.
Shevchenko Vitaly Viktorovich - participant in Operation Danube during his military service, honorary employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, major general of police, chairman of the Rostov public organization of internationalist soldiers "Danube-68".
Bailov Alexey Vladimirovich - Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Sociology, History, Political Science of the Institute of Management in Environmental, Economic and social systems SFU.
Our troops went to Czechoslovakia to fulfill their international duty, but in essence to accept
Baptism of fire. I’ll tell you another story. I had a difficult and unpleasant mission -
this is to accompany to Ukraine to the Chernihiv region of Priluki cargo-200. Staff sergeant
Yevtushenko Grigory Andreevich, born in 1947, during a march, when towards
Czech motorcyclists, cars, and crowds of aggressive people stood in front of the tank column. Seeing this situation, the tank commander gave the command to change the route. He himself stood in the open hatch. Now it is difficult to judge who was to blame, the tank commander or the driver, but the tank overturned and the commander died, the rest of the crew remained alive.
All this happened in the first days. The regiment marched and arrived in the concentration area to carry out further tasks. The command of the regiment was in front of me
set the task: to pick up cargo-200 from the SVG hospital in Legnica and deliver it to
parents’ place of residence. I arrived at the hospital, they took me to the morgue, there were four corpses lying there.
They asked me: “Which one is yours?” I shrugged my shoulders, I have never
I saw and did not know. The sheets were removed from the corpses, and surnames were written on the thigh.
Mortuary workers began preparing them for transportation. The wooden coffins were galvanized,
They left windows for identification. And so we ended up with 4 loads - 200.
We were told that you would be sent to the airfield in Krzyva. Around 6:00 p.m., we were given a car. We loaded 4 coffins and went to the airfield. We arrived in Krzyva at about 20 o'clock. Before the events, the air regiment of the SGV was located here, which departed at Czechoslovakia, place
occupied by a military unit that arrived from the Union. I, as the eldest, went to the command post and asked
senior. They showed me a man who was giving the command to someone to fly to Czechoslovakia.
I introduced myself to him (I didn’t know his rank, he was wearing a jacket without shoulder straps) and said:
We must deliver 4 coffins to the Union. He said: “Wait.” He called a soldier and ordered him to take us to the barracks. At 2 o’clock a soldier came running: “Who’s the eldest here?”
Deliver the coffins to the plane for loading.
We went out, it was dark all around and only 200 meters away we could see the light. We went towards this light. It was the light of a large plane. We began to load our coffins onto the plane, but alas, there were already 17 units of the same cargo and each of them had accompanying. The crew commander asked us: -Where are we going to fly? We answered: -To Brest. There we could get Russian money. Crew commander: -Brest does not accept such an airplane, Lvov can accept it. After some time we flew to
Lvov. At 5 o'clock we landed in Lvov. The financier was waiting for us there and gave us
allowance for us. The crew commander and the airfield management agreed
flight route. And so we fly to Kiev. We landed in Zhulyany. The plane was met
a large group of military men. Seven coffins were unloaded here, the rest were sent to Moscow. A colonel approached and asked who I was accompanying. I answered. He pointed to the helicopter: “Load, fly. They will meet you there.” The soldiers loaded cargo-200 into the helicopter.
I met the helicopter pilots and we flew off. We landed outside the city on a large piece of land covered with grass. No one met us. About 300 meters from the helicopter I saw three army tents and went towards them. A man walked towards me military uniform we met - it was an Air Force lieutenant colonel, commander of the air regiment being formed, but there were no personnel or equipment. There was one headquarters.
After some time, a black Volga arrived at the helicopter and got out A tall man without a hand with a scar on his face. It was the secretary of the district committee. Then I found out that he
fought, was wounded and burned in a tank. Later, the head of the RVC arrived and with him an honor guard. The soldiers loaded the coffin onto the car and we left for the parents’ place of residence, which is somewhere 18-20 kilometers from Priluki. We arrived at the parents’ house.
It was a private house with a large plot of land. The soldiers carried the coffin into the house. Imagine my position and condition - as if I was the culprit in the death of their son. The mother demanded that the coffin be opened. I explained to her that in order to open the coffin it was necessary
permission and the presence of a doctor from the sanitary station. There is a window where you can see your son’s face. In my heart I thought, because she was right. But a lot of time passed, the corpse was decomposing.
The work shift at the plant ended, a large number of people came to say goodbye
with my fellow countryman. I approached my father and asked him for permission to take the coffin into the yard. That’s what they did. People freely approached the coffin and paid their last tribute to the man. They buried the senior sergeant with military honors.
I never wish anyone to carry out such a mission. And I am very sad for all the people who fulfilled their military duty but remained forgotten.
I visited these mothers
And he cried with them.
I couldn't save their children
They went to heaven as saints.
In 1968, the Soviet Army carried out the most ambitious in scale in post-war years military action. More than 20 divisions ground forces in one day and with virtually no losses they occupied an entire country in the center of Europe. Even in Afghan war A much smaller number of troops took part (see the corresponding section of the book).
That year again I had to fight the “counter-revolution” in Eastern Europe - this time in Czechoslovakia. The developments in Czechoslovakia and the Prague Spring have long worried the Soviet leadership. L.I. Brezhnev and his comrades could not allow the fall of the communist regime in this country and were ready to use force at any moment. The “Brezhnev Doctrine,” formulated by this time and carefully hidden from everyone, assumed the use of military power to maintain Soviet influence in the socialist countries of Europe without regard to their sovereignty and international norms.
In January 1968, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), A. Novotny, ceded his post to A. Dubcek, who immediately assured Moscow that he would make every effort to stabilize the situation in the party and society. Being a convinced Marxist, he still considered it necessary to carry out some reforms in economics and politics. Public opinion generally supported Dubcek’s reform aspirations - the existing model for building a socialist society did not allow one to catch up with industrialized countries in terms of living standards Western Europe.
N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev on the podium of the Mausoleum
Dubcek took the initiative to approve a “new model of socialism.” At the next (April) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the so-called Program of Action of the Czechoslovak Communists was adopted. If we consider this document from a modern perspective, then in general it was maintained in the communist spirit, with the exception of two points - the party leadership abandoned the command-administrative system of management and freedom of speech and press was declared.
In the country, including in the official press, heated discussions took place on various socio-political problems. The most frequently voiced theses were the removal of government officials who had compromised themselves from government bodies and the intensification of economic relations with the West. The majority of official circles in the countries of the socialist community perceived the events taking place in Czechoslovakia as nothing other than a “counter-revolution.”
Soviet political leaders showed particular concern, fearing a change in the foreign policy course of Czechoslovakia, which could lead to a reorientation to the West, an alliance with Yugoslavia, and then to withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, as at one time almost happened with the Hungarian People's Republic.
During this period, the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine” was finally formed, which in foreign policy became the cornerstone and connecting link of the entire socialist camp. The doctrine was based on the fact that the withdrawal of any socialist country from the Wars of Internal Affairs or the Comecon, or a departure from the agreed line in foreign policy, would disrupt the existing balance of power in Europe and would inevitably lead to an aggravation of international tension.
One of the main sources of information about the internal situation in Czechoslovakia for the leadership of the USSR were reports from informants and Soviet diplomats. Thus, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia F. Havlicek directly warned about the “inevitable rapprochement of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia and Romania,” which would lead to a weakening of the positions of the socialist bloc.
The train of thought of the Soviet leaders is clearly illustrated by the story of the Soviet “curator” in Czechoslovakia, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee K. T. Mazurov: “Despite the nuances, the general position was the same: it is necessary to intervene. It was difficult to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic (!) would appear on our borders, flooded with Germans from the Federal Republic of Germany, and after them Americans. This did not in any way meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact. During the last week before the entry of troops, members of the Politburo hardly slept and did not go home: according to reports, a counter-revolutionary coup was expected in Czechoslovakia. The Baltic and Belarusian military districts were put on state of readiness number one. On the night of August 20-21, they gathered for a meeting again. Brezhnev said: “We will send in troops...”.
Judging by the recollections of eyewitnesses, in December 1968, Defense Minister Marshal Grechko, discussing the issue, indicated that Brezhnev did not want to send troops for a long time, but Ulbricht, Gomulka, and Zhivkov put pressure on him. And our “hawks” in the Politburo (P. G. Shelest, N. V. Podgorny, K. T. Mazurov, A. N. Shelepin and others) demanded that the problem be solved by force.
The leaders of the countries of the socialist community also viewed the Czechoslovak events as a “dangerous virus” that could spread to other countries. This primarily concerned East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Hungary.
From the point of view of the military (according to the recollections of the former chief of staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, Army General A. Gribkov), the main danger of Czechoslovakia’s independence in matters foreign policy was that it would inevitably lead to the vulnerability of borders with NATO countries and the loss of control over the Czech armed forces. The refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to voluntarily station a group of Soviet troops on their territory seemed, to say the least, illogical and requiring adequate immediate measures.
Preparations for Operation Danube - the entry of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia - began in the spring of 1968 and were initially carried out under the guise of the Šumava maneuvers. On April 8, the commander of the Airborne Forces Margelov, in preparation for the exercises, received a directive from the Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko, which read: “The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, faithful to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, were to send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from danger hanging over her."
At the signal to begin the Šumava exercise, two airborne divisions should be ready to land in Czechoslovakia by parachute and landing methods. At the same time, our paratroopers, who had recently donned at the parade in November 1967, like most units and subunits special purpose all over the world, “speckled” (red) berets, in the summer of 1968 they put on hats blue color.
This “move” of the Airborne Forces commander, Colonel-General Margelov, judging by the stories of eyewitnesses, later, during the “Danube” operation itself, saved more than a dozen lives of our paratroopers - local residents who tried to resist the Soviet troops, at first mistook them for representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces, the so-called “blue helmets”.
The commanders of regiments and divisions that were supposed to be involved in the invasion operation got acquainted with the roads and cities of Czechoslovakia, studying possible routes for moving troops. Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises were held, after which Soviet units lingered on Czechoslovak soil for a long time and left it only after numerous reminders from the Czech leadership.
“Early in the morning of June 18, 1968, the operational group of the field command of the army crossed the state border of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,” described the events of those days, the head of the political department of the 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District, S. M. Zolotev. - Three days later, the main forces of the army, allocated to participate in the exercise, crossed the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.
Already from the first meetings on Czechoslovak soil, it became clear that changes had occurred in the consciousness and behavior of a significant part of the Slovaks and Czechs. We did not feel the brotherly warmth and friendliness that distinguished our Czechoslovak friends before; we became wary. On July 22, a group of senior officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army arrived at the headquarters of our army... On behalf of the Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, they posed questions to us: why, contrary to the promise given by Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky to withdraw Soviet troops by July 21, they are still in the area teachings; for what reasons are we delayed and what are our future plans... We find ourselves in a difficult situation.”
Only in early August, after repeated demands from the Czech government, did units of the 38th Army return to their garrisons. Let us again give the floor to S. M. Zolotov: “Soon I received the command to return to the army command post. There was a lot of work to be done here to familiarize ourselves with new units and formations... In addition to the regular army formations, there were already transferred divisions from other regions here. Together with the commander, I visited these formations and talked with people. Although there was no direct talk about a possible push across the Czechoslovak border, the officers understood why such a powerful group of troops was being created in Transcarpathia. “On August 12, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, arrived in our troops.”
But even earlier, in mid-July, the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary gathered in Warsaw to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. At the meeting, a message was developed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, demanding the adoption of energetic measures to restore “order.” It also said that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private matter of this country only, but the direct duty of all countries of the socialist community.
Consultations and exchanges of views between Soviet leaders and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began in Czerne nad Tisou. As a result, by August 3, when at the Bratislava meeting communist parties a joint communiqué was signed, it was already possible to create a split in the ranks of the leadership of the Czech Communist Party. In Bratislava, it was decided that “the defense of the gains of socialism. is. the international duty of all fraternal parties.”
The Czechs themselves also did not exclude the possibility of using their own armed forces within the country. Thus, Defense Minister Dzur considered the possibility of dispersing demonstrations in front of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the help of army armored personnel carriers, and Dubcek at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on August 12 directly stated: “If I come to the conclusion that we are on the verge of a counter-revolution, then I myself will call in the Soviet troops.”
Analysis of statements Western politicians suggested that the United States and NATO would not interfere in the conflict. The main reason for such optimism was the statement of US Secretary of State D. Rusk that the events in Czechoslovakia are a personal matter, first of all, of the Czechs themselves, as well as other Warsaw Pact countries (a similar statement was made during the Hungarian crisis, then the Americans did not officially intervene) . Thus, the intervention of NATO and US armed forces in the conflict was not expected, at least at the first stage, until serious resistance was put up.
At an extended meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16, a decision was made to send troops. This decision was approved at a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18. The reason was a letter of appeal from a group of Czech party and government officials to the governments of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries to provide “international assistance.” As a result, a decision was made to change the country's political leadership during a short-term military intervention. After completing this mission, the main group of troops was supposed to be immediately withdrawn, leaving only a few units to stabilize the situation.
On the same day, August 18, the entire leadership of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the armies that were destined to go to Czechoslovakia, gathered in the office of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko. The subsequent conversation is known from the words of the commander of the 38th Army, General A. M. Mayorov:
“The assembled marshals and generals waited for a long time for the late minister, already guessing what would be discussed. Czechoslovakia has long been the number one topic around the world. The minister appeared without preamble and announced to the audience:
I just returned from a Politburo meeting. A decision was made to send troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia. This decision will be implemented even if it leads to a third world war.
These words hit those gathered like a hammer. No one imagined that the stakes were so high. Grechko continued:
With the exception of Romania - it does not count - everyone agreed to this action. True, Janos Kadar will present the final decision tomorrow morning, Monday. He has some complications with members of the Politburo. Walter Ulbricht and the GDR Minister of Defense prepared five divisions for entry into Czechoslovakia. Politically this is not yet feasible. It's not 1939 now. If necessary, we will connect them too.
After a short pause, while those present considered what they had heard, the minister demanded a report on the readiness of the troops for the operation and gave the last instructions:
Commander of the first tank!
Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Kozhanov!
Report back.
The army, Comrade Minister, is ready to complete the task.
Fine. The main attention, Comrade Kozhanov, is the rapid advance of the army from north to south. Bring four divisions to the west... Keep two divisions in reserve. KP - Pilsen. Of course, in the forests. The army's area of responsibility is the three northwestern and western regions of Czechoslovakia.
Commander of the Twentieth Army!
Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Velichko.
Report back.
The army is prepared to carry out the task you have assigned.
Fine. Commander, 10–12 hours after “H”, one, or better yet two divisions, you should link up with the airborne division in the area of the Ruzine airfield southwest of Prague.
The commander, excited by the upcoming operation, expressed himself most temperamentally airborne troops Colonel General Margelov:
Comrade Minister, the airborne division is on time... We will smash everything to smithereens."
The direct preparation of the group of Soviet troops for the invasion, already under the personal leadership of Defense Minister Grechko, began on August 17–18. Draft appeals to the people and army of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, a government statement from the five participating countries and a special letter to the leaders of the communist parties of Western countries were prepared. All prepared documents emphasized that the deployment of troops was only a forced measure taken in connection with “the real danger of a counter-revolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia.”
Il-14–30D (according to NATO classification - Crate) was intended to transport 30 paratroopers or 3 tons of cargo
During the direct training of troops, a white stripe was applied to armored vehicles - hallmark Soviet and other “friendly” troops entering. All other armored vehicles were subject to “neutralization” during the operation, preferably without fire damage. In case of resistance, “stripless” tanks and other Combat vehicles were subject, according to the instructions communicated to the troops, to defeat immediately upon opening fire on our troops. When meeting, if something like this happens, with NATO troops, they were ordered to immediately stop and “do not shoot without a command.” Naturally, no “sanction from above” was required to destroy the Czech equipment that opened fire.
The last time the date and time for the start of the operation was clarified and finally approved was August 20, approximately late in the evening. According to the general plan, during the first three days, 20 divisions of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw Forces enter Czechoslovakia, and in the following days, another 10 divisions are introduced. In case the situation worsens, 6 of the 22 military districts of the USSR (which is 85–100 combat-ready divisions) are put on heightened combat readiness. All forces in service had to be brought to a state of full combat readiness nuclear weapon. In Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, an additional 70–80 divisions were deployed to wartime levels to be deployed if necessary.
By August 20, all preparatory activities were completed. Formations of the 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms and 16th Air Armies of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 11th Guards Combined Arms Army of the Baltic Military District, 5th Guards Tank and 28th Combined Arms Armies of the Belarusian Military District, 13 1st, 38th combined arms armies and 28th Army Corps of the Carpathian Military District, 14th Air Army of the Odessa Military District - up to 500 thousand people in total. (of which 250 thousand were in the first echelon) and 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers were ready for action. Army General I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the group of Soviet troops.
However, even on the eve of the deployment of troops, Marshal Grechko informed the Czechoslovakian Defense Minister about the impending action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.
The political and state leadership of the country was “temporarily neutralized,” which was not in the plan approved in advance. But it was necessary to stop possible incidents like the speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Prague radio. A reconnaissance company led by Lieutenant Colonel M. Seregin captured the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at seven o'clock in the morning, disarming the guards and cutting all telephone wires. A few minutes later, the paratroopers already burst into the room where the Czechoslovak leaders were meeting. To the question of one of those present: “Gentlemen, what kind of army has come?” - followed the exhaustive answer:
It was the Soviet army that came to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia. Please remain calm and remain in place until our representatives arrive; security of the building will be ensured.
Fighting on the streets of Prague - the outcome is clearly a foregone conclusion...
Soviet BTR-152 on a city street
At seven o'clock in the afternoon on August 21, the entire Czechoslovak leadership, on two armored personnel carriers, under the escort of paratroopers, was taken to the airport and flown by plane to Legnica (Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. From there they were transported to Transcarpathia, and then to Moscow for negotiations with Soviet leaders.
Column of T-54A with identification stripes “friend or foe”
Some of the paratroopers took up positions along the highway from the airfield to Prague in order to stop possible attempts by the Czechoslovak army to prevent the invasion. But at about four in the morning, instead of Czech cars, blinding the soldiers with headlights, the first column of Soviet tanks from the 20th Guards Army thundered.
A few hours later, the first Soviet tanks with white stripes on the armor appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities so that they could distinguish their vehicles from similar Czech tanks. The roar of tank diesel engines and the roar of caterpillars woke up peacefully sleeping townspeople that morning. On the streets of morning Prague, even the air was infused with tank smoke. Some people, both soldiers and civilians, had an uneasy feeling of war, but in general one can notice that for the most part the Czechs turned out to be passive - the introduction of troops aroused curiosity rather than fear in them.
The main role in the operation to establish control over the situation in the country was given to tank formations and units - the 9th and 11th Guards Tank Divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces K. G. Kozhanov from the GSVG, 13th Guards tank division from Southern group troops, the 15th Guards Tank Division of Major General A. A. Zaitsev from the Belarusian Military District, the 31st Tank Division of Major General A. P. Yurkov from the 38th Combined Arms Army of the Carpathian Military District and tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.
Given the difference in speed of movement, the Soviet command ordered the ground group to cross the border while the paratroopers were still preparing to land. At one in the morning on August 21, 1968, units and formations of the 38th Army of Lieutenant General A. M. Mayorov crossed the state border of Czechoslovakia. There was no resistance from the Czechoslovak side. The advanced motorized rifle division of Major General G. P. Yashkin covered 120 km in 4 hours.
At 4 a.m. the loss account was opened. 200 km from the border, near the small town of Poprad, a Volga stopped in front of a reconnaissance patrol of three T-55 tanks, in which the commander of the 38th Army, General Mayorov, was sitting. Lieutenant Colonel Shevtsov and the head of the Special Department of the Army, Spirin, approached the car, accompanied by KGB special forces (they were assigned to the general on the eve of the invasion, and they controlled his every step). Mayorov ordered Shevtsov:
Lieutenant Colonel, find out why the tanks stopped.
Before the general could finish speaking, one tank rushed towards the Volga. Spirin grabbed Mayorov by the shoulder and pulled him out of the car. The next moment, the Volga crunched under the tank’s tracks. The driver and radio operator sitting in the front seats managed to jump out, and the sergeant sitting next to the general was crushed.
What are you bastards doing?! - the army commander yelled at the tank commander and driver, who jumped to the ground.
We need to go to Trencin... Mayorov ordered,” the tankers made excuses.
So I am Mayorov!
We didn’t recognize you, Comrade General...
The cause of the accident was fatigue of the driver.
Having stopped the car to transfer control to a replacement, he left the tank on the brake without turning off the first gear, and forgot to say about it. The driver started the car and released the brake. The tank jumped onto the Volga standing in front of it. Only a happy accident saved General Mayorov from death, otherwise the whole army could find itself without a commander in the very first hours of its stay on foreign soil.
By the end of August 21, the troops of the 38th Army entered the territory of Slovakia and Northern Moravia. Ordinary citizens began the fight against uninvited guests. In Prague, young people hastily tried to build flimsy barricades, sometimes throwing cobblestones and sticks at the military personnel, and removing signs with street names. The equipment that suffered the most was left unattended, even for a second. During the first three days of our stay in Czechoslovakia, 7 combat vehicles were set on fire in the 38th Army alone. Although there were no hostilities, there were still losses. The most impressive and tragic feat was performed on a mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately sent their tank into the abyss to avoid hitting the children posted there as pickets.
The Soviet BTR-40, despite its obsolescence, again performed very well on paved roads
At five o'clock in the morning, the first Soviet T-55 tank appeared on the right bank of the Vltava. He stopped at the main entrance and turned his gun towards the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He was followed by dozens of other combat vehicles. The commander of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division was appointed commandant of the city. Several thousand tanks appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities, marking the end of the Prague Spring.
T-55 and next to it a German anti-tank gun from the Second World War Pak-37
All power in the country ended up in the hands of the mysterious “General Trofimov,” who for some reason appeared in public wearing a colonel’s uniform. Only a few knew who this man was, who passionately wished to remain anonymous. The role of a simple army general was played by K. T. Mazurov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Sending his comrade-in-arms on a “combat mission,” Brezhnev admonished him:
We need to send one of us to Prague. The military can do such a thing there... Let Mazurov fly.
General I. G. Pavlovsky, who led Operation Danube, described the events of those days as follows: “I received my appointment on August 16 or 17, three to four days before the start of the operation. Initially, it was planned to put Marshal Yakubovsky at the head of the allied forces. He organized all practical training. Suddenly Defense Minister Grechko calls me: “You are being appointed commander of the formations that will enter Czechoslovakia.”
I flew to Legnica (in Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. I found Yakubovsky there. He showed on the map which divisions were leaving from which direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for August 21 at zero one o'clock. Grechko warned: “The team will be from Moscow, your job is to ensure that it is carried out.” At the appointed hour the troops left.
And then Grechko called again: “I just spoke with Dzur (Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) and warned that if the Czechs, God forbid, open fire on our troops, it could end badly. “I asked to give a command to the Czechoslovak units not to move anywhere, not to open fire, so that they would not offer resistance to us.” After the troops left, about an hour later, Grechko called again: “How are you?” I report: such and such divisions are there. In some places people take to the roads and create rubble. Our troops are avoiding obstacles... He warned me not to leave the command post without his permission. And suddenly a new call: “Why are you still there? Fly to Prague immediately!”
We flew up to Prague, made two or three circles over the airfield - not a single person. Not a single voice is heard, not a single plane is visible. We sat down. With Lieutenant General Yamshchikov, who met me, we went from the airfield to the General Headquarters to see Dzur. We immediately agreed with him: that there should be no fights between our soldiers and that no one would think that we had arrived with some tasks to occupy Czechoslovakia. We brought in troops, that's all. So political leadership let him figure it out.
The Soviet embassy recommended meeting with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda. I took with me a Hungarian general, our German one. I said: “Comrade President, you know, troops of the Warsaw Pact member states entered Czechoslovakia. I came to report on this issue. And since you are an army general and I am an army general, we are both military. You understand, the situation forced us to do this.” He replied: “I understand...”.
Two decades later, in 1988, I. G. Pavlovsky admitted the fact that “the attitude of the population towards us was not friendly. Why did we come there? We scattered leaflets from the plane, explaining that we entered with peaceful intentions. But you yourself understand that if I, an uninvited guest, come to your home and start giving orders, you won’t like it very much.”
The Czechoslovak army did not offer resistance, showing its discipline and loyalty to the orders of its superiors. For this reason, large casualties were avoided.
T-55 took a position on the streets of Prague
However, there were still losses: during the deployment of troops from August 21 to October 20, 1968, as a result of hostile actions of individual Czechoslovakian citizens, 11 military personnel, including 1 officer, were killed. During the same period, 87 people were wounded or injured, including 19 officers. On the Czechoslovak side, from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 civilians were killed and 345 were seriously injured.
From a military point of view, it was a brilliantly prepared and executed operation, which came as a complete surprise to the NATO countries.
In total, in the first three days, according to the plan, 20 foreign divisions (Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian) entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and in the next two days - another 10 divisions.
However, despite the military success, it was not possible to immediately achieve political goals. Already on August 21, a statement appeared from the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which condemned the introduction of troops. On the same day, representatives of a number of countries spoke at the Security Council with a demand to bring the “Czechoslovak issue” to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, but consideration of this issue was blocked by the “veto power” of Hungary and the USSR. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from the agenda of the General Assembly.
Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and China condemned the “military intervention of five states.” However, most of these “protests” were purely declarative in nature and could not have a noticeable impact on the situation.
"Striped" T-54
The heads of the main states of Western Europe, and indeed the United States, considered the Prague Spring and the related disagreements within the Eastern Bloc a “domestic squabble of the communists” and avoided such interference in the affairs of Eastern Europe, which could be regarded as a violation of the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Another aspect was the ongoing negotiations on arms limitation, which began to take on real features (in 1972, an ABM treaty would be concluded), and interference in the internal affairs of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War could nullify the entire progress of these negotiations.
But, despite the “non-interference” of the West, there was no quick normalization of the situation. The expectation of receiving broad support from opposition groups also did not materialize. The successful military action, as noted in one of the documents, “was not accompanied by the mobilization of healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.” Moreover, as one of the Czechoslovak reformers M. Miller put it, the “healthy forces” were suppressed and frightened, faced with the unanimous condemnation of the “interventionists” and their assistants from Czechoslovak society.
Finding themselves in a political deadlock on this issue, the Soviet side was forced to return to its previous policy. Since it was not possible to form a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government,” we had to return to attempts to put pressure on A. Dubcek and his colleagues in order to direct his domestic policy towards the right direction. But now the position of the Soviet side was already much stronger - the Czechoslovak leaders brought to Moscow signed a corresponding agreement, and the presence of allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia gave a certain carte blanche.
The new line of “normalization” began to be implemented immediately, during the visit of the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia O. Chernik to Moscow on September 10. The Czech comrades were promised not only significant economic assistance, but also certain political pressure was exerted on them. Demanding Chernik's immediate implementation of the Moscow Agreement, the Politburo insisted that the precondition for the withdrawal or reduction of Allied forces was "a complete cessation of the subversive activities of anti-socialist forces and giving conservative leaders a more active role in political life».
After three weeks, the situation in Prague and other large cities of Czechoslovakia had almost completely stabilized: the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda appointed a new government, which immediately declared the importance of friendship and close cooperation with the socialist countries.
Sometimes the “striped” ones burned
On September 10–12, the main formations and units of the Soviet troops and troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War were withdrawn and headed to their places of permanent deployment. By November 4, 1968, 25 divisions had been withdrawn from the country.
"We're here for a while..."
And the Central Group of Forces stayed on the territory of Czechoslovakia until 1991 Soviet army, which included the 15th Guards and 31st Tank Divisions, the 18th, 30th Guards, and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions. When signing the agreement on the temporary presence of a group of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia (this happened on October 16), it was determined that its strength could not exceed 130 thousand people. This force was quite sufficient to stabilize the situation, taking into account the fact that the Czechoslovak army at that time numbered 200 thousand people. Upon approval for the position of commander, Colonel General A. Mayorov Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev told him as parting words: “The Group’s troops will be stationed temporarily under the agreement. But it’s not without reason that they say: there is nothing more permanent than temporary. We are talking, Alexander Mikhailovich, not about months, but about years.”
The Central Military Command proved its effectiveness already at the end of 1968, when our troops managed to disrupt a major anti-government political strike. Democratic forces have scheduled mass political demonstrations for December 31. However, the day before, in accordance with the previously developed plan of the commander called “Grey Hawk”, in all big cities“to control order” during the demonstration, 20 Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalions were brought in - anti-government demonstrations did not take place. The usual demonstration of equipment was enough; there was no need to use weapons.
The situation in the country began to gradually normalize only in mid-1969, when the reorganization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of Czechoslovakia was completed (that is, when the main “troublemakers” were politically isolated).
Well, the events in Czechoslovakia were then considered for quite a long time in military academies as an example of the clear organization and conduct of a large-scale operation in the European theater of operations to provide “fraternal assistance to friends and allies.”
However, in 1989, the last Soviet leader M. S. Gorbachev officially admitted that the introduction of troops was an unlawful act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, which interrupted the democratic renewal of Czechoslovakia and had long-term negative consequences. In 1991 the shortest possible time The Central Military Command was liquidated, and the troops were withdrawn to their homeland.
A few years later, the “democratic” traditions, so praised by the first and last president of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, finally took over, and the country, which had collapsed into two sovereign states (Czech Republic and Slovakia), entered into the American program of “NATO expansion to the East.”
Notes:
15 developing countries have ballistic missiles in service, and another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 countries.
Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 234–235.
Quote by: Drogovoz I.G. Tank sword of the Soviet country. - M., 2002. P. 216.
USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay.
Quote from: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. P. 154.
Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. P. 314.
