At the time of its entry into serviceKongowas the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament: “Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”
The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries marked a turning point for Japan. Setting a course for the creation of the “Great Eastern Empire,” the Japanese ruling elite developed the country’s armed forces, based on the belief that only a powerful fleet could protect the island state from direct invasion and guarantee its regular supply of necessary raw materials. To defend the islands, the Japanese needed a fleet of battleships, and to protect sea communications, a fleet of cruisers. Thus, the doctrine of the Japanese navy provided for an equal number of battleships and large armored cruisers. Forced to embark on a large-scale ship renewal program (after the advent of dreadnought-type battleships) and with limited financial resources, the Japanese acted with their characteristic pragmatism and decided to build battlecruisers. This decision was based on a sober assessment of the strength of potential opponents: the British and American battle fleets were incomparably stronger, and the Russian one was incomparably weaker than the Japanese naval forces. Battlecruisers allowed Japan both to protect its own communications from Russian cruisers and to cause serious damage to the communications of the British and Americans when they tried to block the Japanese coast (due to the small number of British and American ground forces, as well as the remoteness of Japan, the threat of a landing could be neglected).
Initially, the Japanese tried to develop the project on their own, but quickly realized that due to little experience in creating such ships, they were doing it slower than the British were building new ships. The first Japanese project became obsolete after the British built the battle cruiser Invincible, the second - the cruiser Lion:
Realizing this, the Japanese turned to the British, leading experts in this industry, for help. Projects from Vickers and Armstrong were proposed for consideration by Japanese admirals. Despite the fact that the Armstrong company already had experience in building ships for the Imperial Navy, the Vickers project, developed by Sir George Thurston (later the creator of the British battlecruiser Tiger), won the competition. Thurston's project was an improved version of the British cruiser Lion (translated from English as “lion”).
Performance characteristics
The contract with the Vickers company was signed on October 17, 1910 (some authors erroneously use 1912). In accordance with the agreement, the lead ship was built in England, and the rest in Japan. A total of four battlecruisers were built.
Naval literature mentions two somewhat dubious stories related to the construction of Kongo-class cruisers. According to one of them, a long time interval arose between the signing of the contract with Vickers and the start of construction, caused by disputes over the nomenclature of weapons. In fact, the lead ship was laid down three months after the contract was signed, and it is possible that January 17, 1911 was only the official laying date, and the work itself began even earlier. According to another story, two ships were originally planned, but “the huge super-dreadnought cruiser made such a strong impression on the diminutive Japanese admirals that it was decided to build two more ships of the same type”. Most likely, the Japanese initially planned to build four cruisers, based on a rational calculation (one cruiser is under repair, another one is underway, two are in the patrol zone), and the delay in laying down the ships was caused by preparatory work to localize production at Japanese shipyards (according to According to available data, up to 30% of imported components were used in the construction of Hiei, and Haruna and Kirishima were almost entirely assembled from Japanese materials). The Kongo-class battlecruisers were a landmark for Japanese shipbuilding, as the lead ship of the project was the last large warship built outside of Japan, and the Haruna and Kirishima were the first ships built by private domestic contractors.
Housing design
In accordance with the requirements of the Japanese Maritime Technical Department, the Kongo hull was significantly modified. In particular, the ship received a greater camber of the sides and a clipper-type stem than on the prototype, which had a positive effect on its seaworthiness. As a result of the alterations, the geometric dimensions of Kongo were slightly different from those of the Lion cruiser.
The cruiser retained the tripod foremast and mainmast, as well as three chimneys of different diameters, but changed their location. The smokestacks on Kongo were placed more compactly, and the smaller-diameter chimney, which was the bow one on the Lion cruiser, became medium-sized on the Japanese ship. The foremast and mainmast, located between the bow and middle pipes and behind the stern pipe, were placed, respectively, in front of the bow and between the middle and stern pipes (this somewhat reduced the smoke from the ship's bridge). It should be noted that, unlike Kongo with pipes of the same height, on other cruisers of the same type the bow pipe was initially about two meters higher than the others, which solved the problem of smoke (on Kongo the bow pipe was lengthened only in 1920).
Power plant
The increase in the width of the ship compared to the prototype and the movement of pipes was a consequence of a significant reconstruction of the power plant.
Despite the almost ten percent reduction in the installation's power, Kongo, due to better seaworthiness, even slightly exceeded Lion in maximum speed. High speed cruisers was achieved not least through the use of mixed fuel (oil was used to achieve maximum speed, and coal for sailing at economical speed). At the same time, it is impossible to compare the efficiency of the installations of the two ships: most reference books indicate the cruising range of the Japanese cruiser as 8000 miles at an economical speed of 14 knots, and the English one as 2420 miles at a speed of 24 knots. The location of the engine and boiler rooms inside the ships was also different. On the Lion cruiser, the midship (middle) main-caliber turret divided the power plant into a bow section of two boiler compartments and a stern section consisting of a boiler and engine room, and on Kongo, due to the displacement of the turret behind the stern tube, the bow section of the plant consisted of three boiler compartments, and stern - only from the machine. The statement about the greater efficiency of the Japanese installation is quite controversial, but the refusal to locate the main caliber turret between the chimneys certainly increased its firing angle and protected the superstructure from the effects of powder gases.
Battlecruiser Kongo, June 1914
Source: tsushima.su
Armament
The Japanese have thoroughly revised artillery weapons cruiser Lion (eight 343-mm guns in four twin-gun turrets and sixteen 102-mm guns in armored bow and stern superstructures), increasing the caliber of the main and medium caliber guns and adding anti-mine caliber guns. According to the widespread version, the Kongo was initially supposed to use 305-mm guns as the main caliber artillery. However, having received confidential information from the British that “305-mm guns had lower survivability and rate of fire than 343-mm installations,” The Japanese decided to arm their cruiser with the latest British 356 mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers ( prototype was manufactured and tested at the British training ground in Sheerness in March 1911). As a result, the Japanese ship received main caliber guns, “the firing range of which was limited only by the horizon line”. Typically for Kongo type cruisers early period indicate a firing range of 25,000 m at an elevation angle of 20 degrees, forgetting that the lead ship built in England definitely had an elevation angle of up to 25 degrees (according to some sources, the elevation angle of cruisers built in Japan was 20 degrees, according to others - 25) .
Installation of a 356-mm gun on the battlecruiser Kongo
Source: miday.ru
The main caliber guns were located in four two-gun turrets (on Kongo and Hiei they were made multi-faceted, on Haruna and Kirishima - rounded), located in the center plane of the ship (two - in the bow with an elevation, one (midship) - behind the third chimney, another one is in the stern). The aforementioned transfer of the midship turret behind the pipes made it possible to increase the number of main caliber guns firing aft from two to four. In addition to the numerical advantage, the transfer also provided a qualitative one, since to quickly adjust the fire it was necessary to have at least four guns. For unknown reasons, Japanese cruisers until 1917 did not have a command and rangefinder post, which negatively affected their combat capabilities.
The medium-caliber artillery of the Kongo-class cruisers consisted of sixteen 152-mm guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers housed in single-gun casemates. Eight guns were installed on each side with a horizontal firing sector of 130 degrees and a maximum elevation of 15 degrees (mass of a high-explosive projectile - 45.36 kg, firing range - 21,000 m, combat rate of fire - 4-6 rounds per minute). Most authors explain the increase in caliber by the experience gained by the Japanese fleet during naval battles Russian-Japanese war. At the same time, the question of why the Japanese armed their cruisers with absolutely useless 76 mm guns remains unanswered. Kongo's anti-mine artillery consisted of sixteen 76-mm guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers (eight guns were installed on each main-caliber turret (two), another eight were mounted on the side of the ship in the middle part of the ship on the open deck on top of the battery), as well as seven machine guns. Probably, the Japanese themselves initially had doubts about the need for such guns (on the three subsequent ships they limited themselves to installing eight guns on the open deck), but the 76-mm guns and machine guns were finally dismantled only in 1918. The Japanese were in no hurry to install anti-aircraft weapons: four 80-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on cruisers only in 1923. Another mystery of the Kongo-class cruisers, which does not have a clear answer, is the installation on them of eight 533-mm underwater torpedo tubes (the British cruiser Lion had only two tubes).
Booking
The Kongo cruiser retained the armor design of its British prototype.
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King George V |
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Ship type |
Battle cruiser |
Battle cruiser |
Armored cruiser |
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Great Britain |
Great Britain |
Germany |
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Main weapons |
eight 356 mm guns |
eight 343 mm guns |
ten 343 mm guns |
twelve 210 mm guns |
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Armor thickness, mm |
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Main belt |
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Upper belt |
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Casemates |
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The main element of the cruiser's vertical protection was the main armor belt (thickness in the middle part - 229 mm). The main belt was closed in the bow by a traverse (thickness - 127-152 mm), and in the stern - by bulkheads that closed behind the stern barbette (thickness - 152-203 mm). Above the main one was the upper armor belt, which covered the middle part of the hull and reached the upper deck (thickness in the middle part - 203 mm). The upper belt was closed by traverses near the barbette of the main tower (thickness - 152-254 mm) and behind the barbette of the third (midship) tower (thickness - 152 mm). The armor thickness of the casemates was 152 mm, that of the barbettes was 254 mm, and that of the main caliber turrets was 229 mm. The thickness of the armor on the forward conning tower was 254 mm, on the aft conning tower – 152 mm. It is easy to notice that the cruisers received greater protection from longitudinal fire from the bow than from the stern, which indicates plans to use the ships for attacking operations. The vertical protection of the battlecruisers Kongo and Lion was weaker than that of battleships, but gave them a chance to survive even in a battle with enemy dreadnoughts. Thus, during the Battle of Jutland, Lion retained buoyancy after being hit by thirteen 305-mm shells and an explosion in the middle turret, and losses on the same type Princess Royal after being hit by thirteen "heavy shells" There were 22 killed and 81 wounded.
Much more criticism is caused by the horizontal armor, which the English sailors nicknamed “cardboard” with bitter irony. On Kongo, the thickness of the armored deck was only 38-51 mm, which was significantly less than, for example, that of the German armored cruiser Blucher. The lack of horizontal protection cost the British dearly during the Battle of Jutland: the battlecruiser Queen Mary (Lion class) sank as a result of a shell hitting the cellar of the bow towers through the deck (as a result of an explosion of ammunition, it broke into two parts and sank almost instantly).
There is no exact data on the mine protection of cruisers, but it is known that the cruiser Haruna, which was hit by a German mine, was seriously damaged, although it remained afloat and did not even lose speed. In general, the armor of Kongo-class cruisers was typical of battlecruisers - excessive for combat with enemy cruisers and insufficient for combat with battleships.
At the time of its entry into service, Kongo was the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament:
“Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”
On August 14 (August 1, Old Style), 1904, a fierce battle took place between the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers and the Japanese squadron, as a result of which the cruiser Rurik died heroically. The feat of the crew of this ship is akin to the feat of the Varyag, and even surpasses it in terms of the intensity of the battle and the tragedy of the situation. However, by the will of chance and fate, it so happened that the name “Varyag” is still heard today, but few people remember or know about “Rurik”. However, as well as about the legendary Vladivostok detachment...
Vladivostok "invisible" squad
After the very first days of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. our squadron was blocked in Port Arthur by the enemy fleet, there was only one formation of Russian ships left in the Pacific Ocean capable of conducting cruising operations on Japanese communications - the Vladivostok detachment consisting of the cruisers "Russia", "Rurik", "Gromoboy", "Bogatyr" and several destroyer “dogs” assigned to him.
80 years later, the famous writer Valentin Pikul dedicated his novel “Cruisers” to the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, and local prose writer Anatoly Ilyin wrote a story called “The Vladivostok Detachment”. It is clear that no one just dedicates stories and novels to ships. The Vladivostok detachment forever entered the annals of history with its daring raids on the shores of Japan, which caused panic among the enemy. At the same time, the cruisers themselves for a long time remained elusive to the Japanese fleet, and therefore the foreign press nicknamed them “ghost ships.”
Cruiser raids
Already in the first days of the war, our cruisers managed to sink several Japanese transports carrying soldiers and fuel. After this attack by Russian cruisers, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was forced to weaken his forces at Port Arthur in order to strengthen Kamimura’s squadron to fight our cruisers. This is what our naval commanders sought: to distract some of the enemy ships besieging Port Arthur.
And soon the cruiser “Bogatyr” (commander Captain 1st Rank A. Stemman) was unlucky: on May 15 (2), 1904, in the Gulf of Posiet, during fog, it sat tightly on the rocks at Cape Bruce. With great difficulty and not immediately, the cruiser was removed from the rocks and escorted to Vladivostok for repairs, where it remained until the end of the war. Having lost their brother in such an absurd way, “Russia”, “Rurik” and “Gromoboy” were left alone. To the entire Sea of Japan and surrounding areas...
At the end of May, the cruisers went on another raid. In the Korea Strait they intercepted the military transport Izumo-Maru. Realizing that it would be impossible to escape, the Japanese captain, having landed the crew on boats, sank the ship. Then the Thunderbolt overtook another transport, the Hitatsi-Maru, which had on board 1,100 soldiers, 320 horses and 18 280-mm Krupp siege guns to crush the fortifications of Port Arthur. The captain of the Japanese ship, Englishman J. Campbell, tried to ram our cruiser. Having dodged, the "Thunderbolt" shot the "Hitatsi-Mara" from its guns. Meanwhile, “Russia” and “Rurik” caught up with another large military transport “Sado-Maru”, where there were about 15 thousand construction workers, a railway battalion of soldiers, pontoons, a telegraph park, machines for siege weapons (which sank along with the “Hitatsi-Maru” "), boxes with gold and silver. "Rurik" alternately fired a torpedo into the right and left sides of the ship. The cruisers moved on, believing that the transport sinking under the water would end up on the seabed. But, alas, he did not drown. Haste did not allow our sailors to complete the job...
Enemy ships scoured the entire Sea of Japan, looking for Vladivostok invisibles, but they burned coal in the fireboxes in vain. “We’re just unlucky!” - Japanese admirals lamented. Meanwhile, all of Japan was alarmed by the raids of our cruisers, and newspapers published offensive cartoons about Admiral Kamimura. The foreign press also responded to these events. Thus, one of the English newspapers was forced to note: “The cruising of the Vladivostok detachment is the most daring enterprise of all the Russians. The fact that their ships managed to escape from Kamimura’s squadron aroused public opinion in Japan.”
Things eventually came to the point that on June 19, 1904, embittered representatives of Japanese business, suffering millions in losses due to unpunished attacks by the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers on trade communications, destroyed and set fire to Admiral Kamimura’s apartment. If he had been at home at that moment, the brutal crowd would obviously have torn him to pieces, especially since the police chose not to interfere with what was happening. Japanese newspapers in those days added fuel to the fire, demanding "on behalf of the Japanese people, that the government make the most serious reprimand to Kamimura's squadron."
Meanwhile, our cruisers continued to destroy the enemy’s transport communications, now in the Pacific Ocean, where the Japanese were forced to move the routes of their ships with cargo and troops, thereby hoping to protect them from Russian ghost ships. In a July raid they sank several Japanese transports and schooners. The German steamer Arabia was captured with a cargo of locomotive boilers and rails for Japan. The English steamer Knight Commander with cargo for the Japanese was detained and blown up railway. Then the German steamship "Thea" with a cargo of fish in its holds, traveling from America to Yokohama, was unlucky. He was stopped, removed from command, and then blown up. And the English steamer Calchas with the contraband was taken as a prize.
The world press made noise about the daring attacks of our cruisers. Business circles not only in Japan, but also in England, Germany, and America became worried. Still would! Freight tariffs and insurance rates increased sharply, and contracts for the supply of goods to Japan were broken. Panic reigned in the ports and stock exchanges...
Fight with the Japanese squadron. The death of "Rurik"
At dawn on August 11, 1904, the cruisers “Russia” (commander captain 1st rank A. Andreev), “Rurik” (commander captain 1st rank E. Trusov) and “Gromoboy” (commander captain 1st rank N. Dabich) under the leadership of the detachment commander, Rear Admiral K. Jessen, went to sea in order, in accordance with the received order, to support the breakthrough of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron to Vladivostok. However, the order came too late - the squadron, badly battered in battle, had already returned to Port Arthur, having failed to break through. And “Russia”, “Rurik” and “Thunderbolt” went to Tsushima, not knowing that they had no one to meet...
Early in the morning of August 14, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers in the Korea Strait, 40 miles from the port of Fuzan (Busan), was intercepted by a Japanese squadron and with all its might attacked the Russian ships, cutting off the escape route. "Russia", "Rurik" and "Gromoboy" were trapped. The Japanese were superior in numbers, artillery, speed and armor strength. In the fierce battle, “Rurik”, which was in the rear, had the hardest time of all. It was on it that the Japanese concentrated their main fire. “Russia” and “Gromoboy”, having received injuries themselves, tried to alleviate its fate by covering it with themselves, and then began to retreat to the north, hoping to distract the Japanese from “Rurik”. But the enemy grabbed him with a death grip.
Reference. "Rurik" is the lead ship of a series of ocean-going armored cruiser-raiders. Built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg and entered service in 1895. Unsuitable for squadron combat, because to improve seaworthiness, it had incomplete armor protection for the hull and almost no armor protection for deck guns to protect it from gunnery shrapnel. Displacement 11,690 tons, speed 18 knots. Cruising range 6,700 miles. Armament: 4 guns - 203 mm, 16 - 152 mm, 6 - 120 mm, 6 - 47 mm, 10 - 37 mm guns and 6 torpedo tubes. Crew 763 people.
Tormented during the unequal battle, settling in the sea with its stern, shrouded in steam from broken boilers, the Rurik seemed an easy prey to the Japanese. They hoped to capture him. However, the junior artillery officer, Lieutenant Konstantin Ivanov, who led the cruiser after the death of the commander and senior officers, and the surviving officers and sailors were not going to lower the flag. They fought to the death. When the Rurik's guns failed, the Japanese moved closer. But the crew of the Russian cruiser suddenly made a desperate attempt to ram their nearest ship, and the cruiser Izumo was hit by a torpedo...
Pulling back Japanese ships opened fire again. By the end of the fight there were 14 of them against one. By 10 o'clock. in the morning, after a five-hour (!) battle (“Varyag,” note, only participated in the battle for an hour and did not suffer fatal injuries), “Rurik” was turned into a pile of twisted iron and only miraculously stayed afloat. The Japanese began to approach the stationary cruiser again. To prevent the enemy from getting the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov ordered the seams to be opened. Admiral Kamimura, realizing that there would be no capitulation on the part of the Russians, flew into a rage and ordered a barrage of fire to be brought down on the cruiser. Before the ship was sunk, Lieutenant K. Ivanov ordered everyone to leave the agonizing Rurik and throw the wounded overboard. Such was the dire necessity.
At 10 o'clock 42 min. On August 14, 1904, the armored cruiser of the Russian fleet "Rurik" with the St. Andrew's flag raised and the signal "I am dying, but I am not surrendering!" disappeared under water... On the Rurik, 204 people died and 305 sailors were wounded (on the Varyag, 22 sailors were killed in battle, 12 died from wounds). The fallen Rurikites remained forever where they received their last Stand, - at the bottom of the Korea Strait. “Russia” and “Gromoboy” lost 129 lower ranks and officers in that battle. Historians then wrote: “You need to be iron creatures to withstand such a hellish battle.”
With the death of the Rurik, the legendary raids of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment practically ceased. Until the fall, “Russia” and “Gromoboy” were under repair. Then an order came from the main naval headquarters: “The ships of the Vladivostok cruising squadron should be saved for the second squadron. Cruising operations with the risk of further damage should be avoided." And only our destroyers sometimes raided enemy communications, sinking several more Japanese schooners. On April 25, 1905, “Russia” and “Gromoboy” made their last joint raid, reaching the Sangar Strait, where they sank several Japanese schooners. On April 28 they returned to base. And on May 2, the Thunderbolt, having gone to sea to test a radiotelegraph, hit a mine and was under repair until the end of the war. “Russia” is orphaned.
An interesting detail. After the war of 1904-1905. The Baltic Fleet included a ship named Rurik II. The name “Varyag” was neither under the king nor in Stalin era was not assigned to any warship...
Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
1st rank cruiser "Askold"
Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he went to the Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWII he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of Allied ground and naval forces against Ottoman Empire, whose goal was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.
before launching
hull "Askold" (left) in the water
at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901
the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901
drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901
sea trials, 1901
additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany
acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag
in the Kiel Canal, 1902
Great Kronstadt raid, 1902
already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902
Dalian Bay, 1903
Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive
on a combat course, 1904
during the Dardanelles operation, 1915
in Toulon, 1916
as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917
note from the magazine "Niva", 1915
blueprints axonometric projection, magazine "Modelist-Constructor". An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position
"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific Ocean
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, Captain 1st Rank, crew commander of the EBR "Emperor Alexander III" Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:
You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.
The squadron reached the Tsushima Strait without losses, and died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And your faithful sailors' family is your centuries-old guard... 1
squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
before launching, 1901
during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard
transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt
in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903
at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904
August 1904
on the Revel roadstead, September 1904
view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away
at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"
The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy
The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". Subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" became a development of this project(initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as “Rurik”). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.
on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast
painting the side in preparation for the show 
on a hike
"Rurik" in black paint
"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896
in the eastern basin of Port Arthur
in the dock of Vladivostok 
Port Arthur
cruiser on a voyage, Far East
the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships
squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.
near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898
"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901
on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsesarevich, Port Arthur, 1904
EDB "Sevastopol" on the march
"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903
ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904
in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"
in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik
after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904
sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard
Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"
Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.
still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902
1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.
"Boyarin" on Far East, 1903 
V Denmark Strait, 1903
in Toulon
Port Arthur, 1904
Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard
1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...
Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken untimely by death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.
Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project" Living history"TRK Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", I could hear this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.
I would like to start the story about the Russo-Japanese War with a revolutionary proposal. Or maybe stop clinging to the old style dating of events? In the end, aren’t you tired of putting “not ours” in parentheses behind the “true” date? The whole world knows that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place on August 10, 1904, and only in Russia they claim that the battle at Shantung took place on July 28 of the same year. But such a change would avoid a lot of confusion, because the Julian style is not used anywhere else. Of course, Patriarch Alexy II declared the Gregorian calendar “a devilish invention, invented to harm true Christians,” but we still live according to it. So, most likely, we will be forgiven for the minor sin of dating events of the distant past.
Well, okay, let's get back to the subject of conversation. The first big war, in which not only the ideas of naval warfare theorists, but also the plans of shipbuilding engineers were tested, was the Russo-Japanese War. In front of everyone interesting facts and the conclusions of the Japanese-Chinese and Spanish-American wars, they were still minor local conflicts, although the second was formally fought on two oceans. But remember: Admiral Dewey's squadron first stood peacefully in Chinese ports, then reached Manila, defeated the Spanish squadron and anchored again until the end of the war. The Spaniards' attempts to send Admiral Camarra's squadron to the Philippines and launch a cruising war in the Atlantic ended in nothing. And only the Russo-Japanese War forced admirals and engineers to think seriously about many things. In particular, about the role of cruisers.
The fact is that in this war all aspects of the combat activity of this class of ships were tested, but the cruisers did not always successfully cope with the assigned tasks. By the beginning of the war, both opponents had a large number of cruisers of various types and sizes - from small scouts like the Novik to ocean raiders like the Thunderbolt. Fast cruisers were supposed to serve as scouts for armored squadrons; the Japanese were forced to use their armored cruisers as “battleships for the poor”; the Russians tried to wage a cruising war; Japanese cruisers conducted surveillance and blockaded Port Arthur; both opponents used cruisers to support their light forces and combat enemy destroyers. Interestingly, the Japanese did not even try to use their cruisers to protect communications and fight Russian raiders. Let's look at everything in order.
The odyssey of the cruiser Novik deserves a separate story. After the battle on August 10, the cruiser, together with Askold, broke through the Japanese fleet, but at night the ships separated. The commander of the Novik, Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz, decided to call at Qingdao to take on additional supplies of coal. The loading took place in a hurry, it was not possible to take in the full supply, but the cruiser managed to slip out of the port before dark and did not meet Japanese squad, sent by Admiral Togo to blockade the port.
Von Schultz decided to try to break through to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan from the ocean. Considering the far from best condition of the cruiser's vehicles, this was the optimal solution. Arguments that we should have rushed straight through the Tsushima Strait are not serious. The cruiser had long since lost its record speed, and such an attempt bordered on suicide. Even during a calm transition, the mechanics had to constantly fight to ensure that the cruiser’s machines did not fail. Fuel consumption jumped to 54 tons per day instead of the norm of 30 tons, so von Schultz decided to go to Sakhalin at the Korsakov post to receive coal, although he first intended to break through the Sangar Strait. But it was there that the Novik was guarded by the Japanese cruisers Chitose and Tsushima, stationed in Hakodate.
However, on August 19, the commander of the Chitose, Captain 1st Rank Takagi, received a telegram reporting that the Novik had been spotted from the Atoi lighthouse, and immediately led his ships north to the La Perouse Strait. However, the Japanese did not find the Russian cruiser there, which caused them serious concern - the Novik could have already slipped into Vladivostok. Takagi remained cruising in the strait, but sent Tsushima to inspect the Korsakov post. The Japanese hoped that the Russians would mistake the three-tube cruiser for the Bogatyr and would be able to take them by surprise. This was naive, because the Arthurian sailors more than once encountered the same type of cruiser Niytaka, so the enemy was identified immediately.
At 16.25 they noticed smoke on the Novik, the cruiser weighed anchor and tried to jump out of the bay, which had become a mousetrap, but the Tsushima crossed it. At 17.10, when the distance was reduced to 40 cables, the Novik opened fire, and the Japanese immediately responded. For the Tsushima it was a combat debut, but the Russian ship took part in many clashes, and its gunners had a lot of experience, so the inequality of forces was smoothed out to a certain extent. However, the superiority of the Japanese, who had 6 152 mm and 10 76 mm guns against 6 120 mm Russian guns, was too much great. The firefight lasted 45 minutes, after which von Schultz turned back to the Korsakov post. The Novik received 3 underwater holes and began to land astern. The Tsushima also developed a leak, but the Japanese were able to deal with it, although they had no desire to continue the battle.
The next morning, Chitose approached the Korsakov post, but found that Novik was lying at the bottom. All attempts by the team to repair the holes were unsuccessful, and Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz ordered the cruiser to be scuttled. It was not possible to detonate it, since the explosive cartridges remained in the flooded steering compartment. The city looked abandoned, so the Japanese began to calmly shoot at the sunken cruiser. Then the Chitose came closer and made sure that the Novik was lying on the ground with a list of 30 degrees to starboard. The brave cruiser's service has ended.
The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers stood out throughout the war for its activity. Yes, his actions were not always successful, and he lost his only battle, but one cannot but agree with the famous historian V. Semenov, who argued that even if Admiral Jessen did not win any high-profile victories, he did not lose the honor of the Russian flag. As expected, Russia appreciated this: when the armored cruisers Gromoboy and Rossiya returned to their homeland after the war, Jessen received a reprimand based on the results of the inspection review and was dismissed that same year. After all, he didn’t sit in dugouts like Admiral Grigorovich, but stood on the bridge under shells, and any fool can do that. On the enemy's sea lanes, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner.
The detachment's first trip to the Sea of Japan began with a replacement of the commander - instead of Admiral Stackelberg, Captain 1st Rank Reitzenstein was appointed. The result was the sinking of a small Japanese steamer. The next campaign was made under the command of Admiral Jessen - to Genzan. Ocean raiders were clearly not required for this, but another Japanese transport became the prey of the cruisers. Unfortunately, in May 1904, the detachment lost the cruiser Bogatyr, which sat on the rocks of Cape Bruce and did not go to sea until the end of the war. The Japanese could well have destroyed it, but the mythical system of total espionage failed. For some reason, the Japanese convinced themselves that the Russian cruiser would remain on the rocks forever.
A new campaign to the Tsushima Strait was carried out under the command of Admiral Bezobrazov. He was appointed head of a detachment of battleships, but never got to Port Arthur. The Japanese official history briefly reports that on June 15 the transports Hitachi Maru and Izumi Maru were sunk, and the transport Sado Maru was damaged. But this is a forced brevity, because otherwise we would have to admit that due to the frivolity of our own admirals, 18 280-mm howitzers, which were sent to Port Arthur, and about 1000 reserve soldiers went to the bottom. guards regiment. The passivity of the Russian fleet led to the fact that the Japanese began to neglect basic security measures and paid for it. At the time of the attack, only the small cruiser Tsushima was near the transports, which, of course, could not do anything. Admiral Kamimura with his armored cruisers was too far away and could not help the transports. However, the Russians also showed frivolity; they did not make sure that the Sado Maru sank, although the Japanese losses were already great. They could only console themselves with the manifestation of the unbending samurai spirit - Colonel Suti, who commanded the battalion, solemnly burned the banner and committed hara-kiri. At least some consolation...
The Russian cruisers listened to Japanese radio communications, and Admiral Bezobrazov correctly decided that Kamimura was not too far away. Since “Rurik” could not develop high speed, he decided to deceive the Japanese and did not go straight to Vladivostok, but leaned towards the shores of Japan. Meanwhile, the weather worsened, and this helped the Russians. Kamimura reached the island of Okinoshima, did not find anyone or anything and stopped the chase.
This raid can be considered very successful in the sense that it delayed the fall of Port Arthur; terrible howitzers appeared there only in the fall. By the way, the Japanese also removed them from the coastal fortifications of Tokyo Bay, and it was not only the Russians who committed strange acts. The next raid to Genzan almost led to a collision with Kamimura, but the meeting took place in the evening, and the Russian cruisers safely avoided the unequal battle.
The Russian cruisers made their next raid into the Pacific Ocean, again under the flag of Jessen. Admiral Bezobrazov doubted the success of the campaign too much, and he had to be replaced by Jessen, who was temporarily suspended after the Bogatyr accident. On July 17, the cruisers went to sea, and on the 19th they passed through the Sangar Strait. The Japanese could not stop them - the entire defense of the strait at that moment consisted of 2 ancient gunboats and 3 tiny destroyers with a displacement of 50 tons. Having broken into the ocean, the Russians began to operate in the coastal waters of Japan. They sank several transports, not only Japanese, but also English, and the steamships Arabia and Calchas were taken as prizes. It seemed like a success, but, on the other hand, the destroyed cargo was not of exceptional value; most often it was railway rails. By the way, this confirms that cruising warfare at that time simply could not be particularly effective, the list of strategic cargoes was too short, and in addition, none of them were vital, like, say, aluminum during the Second World War.
And yet this raid gave the impression of a bomb exploding. Insurance amounts jumped sharply, and shipping decreased. At the same time, one should not take seriously the tale of how outraged Japanese shipowners burned down the house of Admiral Kamimura. I personally read a story about this, and in a book that few people pay attention to - the memoirs of the Belgian envoy to Tokyo, Baron d'Anetan, and I still don’t believe it. Well, do with me what you want, - I do not believe! By the way, where was he, Kamimura, at that time? The admiral’s actions, or rather inaction, during this period are quite difficult to explain. He was hanging out near the southern entrance to the Tsushima Strait and, it seems, expected Jessen to attempt to break through to Port Arthur, although such an action would be completely pointless.
On the way back, the Russian cruisers encountered an unexpected problem. The weather worsened, everything was covered in thick fog, and the squadron simply could not find the entrance to the Sangar Strait. After hanging out in the ocean for some time, the cruisers managed to see the mountains around the strait and squeezed into it. The campaign lasted 16 days, and the ships practically used up their entire supply of coal. Somehow, completely unexpectedly for the admirals, it was discovered that the raiders could no longer act as before. It was previously famous sailing ships like the Alabama, which used a steam engine only as an auxiliary engine, who could not think about coal. Now the organization of cruising had to be approached more thoroughly, and the Germans, preparing for a new war, took this into account by creating their famous system of stages.
No happiness lasts forever, and soon the Vladivostok detachment had to make sure of this. When the Arthurian squadron made a breakthrough, on the evening of August 11, the cruising detachment received an order to meet it. An order is an order, Admiral Jessen led the sailors who barely had time to rest south to the Tsushima Strait. But when the cruisers were already at sea, it turned out that the campaign was useless, the Arthurian squadron was defeated, partially scattered to neutral ports, and partially returned back. That’s when it would be necessary to contact Jessen by radio and bring him back, that’s where those “200 miles of radio communications” would come in handy, if they weren’t pure linden.
At dawn on August 14, the cruisers reached the Fuzana parallel, where they had already been, but this time the Japanese were much better prepared. At 04.50, the detachments of Kamimura and Jessen noticed each other, and the corresponding radiogram from Kamimura was received by all nearby patrol cruisers - 5 units. So, even if Jessen had missed the Japanese armored cruisers, he would probably have run into one of the patrolmen, but if he was unlucky, he was unlucky immediately and thoroughly, because the Japanese were located north of the Russian squadron and blocked its path to Vladivostok. However, in fact, the Japanese were trying to lie in wait for the cruisers Novik and Askold that they had lost.
But then incomprehensible things began to happen, and Russian and Japanese descriptions differ sharply. The Russians claim that the battle began at 05.18, the Japanese - that at 05.23, this is not too significant. But the discrepancy in distances is already more serious, the Russians claim that it exceeded 60 cables, but according to Japanese data, it barely reached 46 cables, which looks much more realistic.
The battle developed according to classical canons - an artillery duel on parallel courses; in this regard, the battle near Ulsan looks like the most “classical” of all naval battles of this war. The Japanese had some superiority in speed and gradually overtook the Russian squadron. And here one of the many incomprehensible moments arises. On paper, the Japanese had a noticeable speed advantage, but it is also well known that their cruisers could only achieve a nominal 20 knots in the most ideal conditions. On the other hand, the vehicles of the Russian cruisers were far from in ideal condition, the Rurik especially suffered from this, and this morning, due to an accident on the Rossiya, 4 boilers failed, so in any case, Kamimura should have had superiority 2 or more node. But every time he needed to catch up with the Russian squadron, it happened painfully slowly.
And yet, by 05.52, the Japanese found themselves exactly abeam the Russians, reducing the distance to 27 cables. Their artillery superiority was beginning to take its toll, and the Japanese were now directly facing the rising sun, which made it difficult for the Russians to aim. Admiral Jessen first turned to the southeast, as if intending to pass through the Tsushima Strait, but at 06.00 he turned sharply to the right, described a loop and went to the northwest, hoping to slip under the stern of the Japanese. Kamimura reacted to this turn late and turned left. The squadrons found themselves on diverging courses, the distance increased to 50 cables, and the Japanese temporarily ceased fire. But it was at this moment that the Iwate, which was at the end, received a hit that could have been fatal. A 203-mm shell exploded in the bow casemate of the upper deck, and at the same time a shell in the gun detonated. The casemate was completely destroyed, part of the armor flew overboard. The casemate on the deck below failed, and the 12-pound gun stationed above simply disappeared along with the crew. Another 152 mm gun failed, killing 32 people and wounding 43.
At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately the Rurik received a fatal hit, which damaged the steering, and from that moment on the cruiser kept losing control. In addition, he began to gradually lag behind the lead cruisers. The shooting on both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians try to write. Even official Japanese works admit that Izumo is the flagship! – fired simultaneously at all three Russian cruisers. The fact that all of the Japanese ships were hit indicates that the Russian squadron lacked fire organization.
Further events are not of particular interest. The Russian squadron twice tried to return to the Rurik; apparently, Admiral Jessen hoped that he would be able to cope with his difficulties, but it was in vain. "Rurik" received more and more new hits and soon completely lost its combat effectiveness. But still, he distracted Admiral Kamimura’s attention. The Japanese commander, apparently, decided to destroy at least one of the Russian cruisers for sure and at times almost stopped firing at Jessen’s ships. For example, at about 08.00 he generally ordered all fire to be concentrated on the damaged cruiser, and only the return of “Russia” and “Gromoboy” forced the Japanese to fire at them again.
At 08.20, Admiral Jessen realized the futility of his attempts, moreover, the other two cruisers had received noticeable damage, so he finally turned north to Vladivostok. The Japanese, carried away by finishing off the Rurik, were on its right shell and could not prevent the breakthrough. Kamimura followed him, but he couldn't - or didn't want to? - reduce the distance. As we see, this Japanese admiral showed the same caution as Admiral Togo in the battle in the Yellow Sea, although in this part of the battle he had a double superiority in ships and almost a quadruple superiority in artillery. By 09.45, the Japanese managed to reduce the distance to 27 cables, but then, as if frightened by their own courage, they slowed down, and at 10.00 the distance increased again to 37 cables.
“The battle was protracted (about 5 hours). During the chase, all crews were ordered to shoot slowly and aim their guns carefully. But at 10.00 Admiral Kamimura was informed that the Izumo was running out of ammunition. Seeing that the enemy’s speed was not decreasing at all, although his fire had noticeably weakened, the admiral decided to use the remaining ammunition to sink the Rurik in order to definitely prevent his rescue,” reports the Japanese Confidential History. In fact, by this time the Izumo had expended only half of its ammunition: 2,255 203-mm shells, 1,085 152-mm shells and 910 12-pound shells. Another factor that influenced the Japanese admiral’s decision was that he did not know about the results of the battle of Togo’s squadron and could well have expected a collision with the Arthurian squadron, and in the very near future
All this time, the Rurik tried to finish off the approaching cruisers Naniva and Takatiho, which prudently kept at a distance of 35 cables. But that didn't save them from the couple random hits, although “Rurik”, of course, had it much worse. Both of these cruisers fired a total of more than 650 152 mm shells. At approximately 10.20, the Rurik sank; calm weather allowed the Japanese to save almost all the surviving sailors.
Another proof of the inadequacy of the elder command staff the Russian fleet was the ratio of losses on "Russia" and "Gromoboe". The newer and much better armored Thunderbolt lost twice as much more people simply because Captain 1st Rank Dabich ordered the crews of small-caliber guns, obviously useless under the current conditions, to be at combat posts. Moreover, he ordered those killed to be replaced with new sailors, which entailed new losses.
And one more strange nuance. For a hundred years now, the story has been circulating on the pages of books that on Russian ships, when firing at long distances, deck guns malfunctioned - the teeth of the lifting arcs and gears bent and broke. But no one bothered to compare the actual battle distances with the maximum ones. The battle near Ulsan took place mainly at distances of 30–35 cables, a couple of times the distance was briefly reduced to 25 cables, a couple of times it increased to 45. These values are far from the maximum range of Kane’s 152-mm guns; what maximum elevation angles can we even talk about? But it seems that the assumption that the famous Obukhov plant supplied the navy with outright defects does not suit anyone.
“After the death of the Rurik, the active combat service of the Vladivostok detachment practically ceased,” writes one of the historians sadly. But attempts to wage a cruising war did not stop, although this was now entrusted to auxiliary cruisers. The result was disgusting - without achieving anything serious, these ships, through their actions, managed to ruin Russia’s relations with many European powers. By the way, if you look at the reference books, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese, without officially trying to start a cruising war, nevertheless caught more transports with smuggling than the Russians. The Vladivostok region was especially fruitful for them.
In preparing for the cruising war, the Russian military-political leadership made several serious mistakes. First of all, the Russian command, without suspecting it, let the genie out of the bottle by introducing a fundamentally new interpretation of the concept of “military smuggling” in Order No. 42 of the Maritime Department. Previously, only cargo that had a military purpose was considered such: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, transport (read: horses). The Russians implicitly introduced the concept of “dual-use goods”, which is so fashionable today, that is, goods that can be used for military purposes, although can and not to be. Moreover, the Russian admirals immediately realized that anything could be brought under such a definition. For example, cotton, which accounted for almost a third of Japan's imports, immediately became a forbidden commodity because it could be used to produce nitrocellulose gunpowder and make uniforms.
Moreover, it was decided to start a cruising war in European waters, which obviously could not bring anything but scandals and increased tensions in relations with Great Britain, which in 1905 owned half of the world's merchant fleet. This is not “the breadth and boldness of the strategic plan,” but outright stupidity. Along the way, it turned out that Russia’s preparation for a cruising war turned out to be nothing. The ships of the Voluntary Fleet, specially built for this purpose, turned out to be unsuitable for this; only Petersburg and Moskva were converted into auxiliary cruisers, and the Maritime Department managed to turn even this quite ordinary matter into an international scandal. These two ships were stationed in Sevastopol, where gun platforms were installed and a trial installation of guns was carried out. After this, the guns were lowered into the hold and camouflaged. It was supposed to take them through Black Sea straits under the guise of merchant ships, and already at sea to install guns and raise the St. Andrew's flag. According to the international treaties in force at that time, Russia could not conduct warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, but the Russian admirals hoped to deceive everyone and everything in this way. It would seem that it would be simpler - to prepare everything in the same Sevastopol, since the ports of the Baltic Sea were overloaded with work with the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, bring them to Libau and there officially turn them into auxiliary cruisers. Losing a couple of weeks meant absolutely nothing. But no, the main thing is to create problems for yourself.
These ships were intended for cruising in the Indian Ocean and left Sevastopol in June 1904. Only in the Red Sea, after passing the Suez Canal, did they change the trade flag to a military one and begin operations in the Red Sea. "Petersburg" inspected several ships and detained the English steamer "Malacca" with smuggled cargo for Japan. In mid-July the ships headed to Indian Ocean. At Cape Guardafui, the cruisers separated: “Petersburg” headed towards the communication route north of the island of Madagascar, “Smolensk” - to the south. Having received an order to stop cruising on August 24, both ships arrived at Libau at the end of September. During this time they inspected 19 ships, of which they detained four and started a scandal well-known case steamship Malacca.
Russian and English historians describe these events from directly opposite points of view, and the Russian one looks much less thorough, and it is precisely the “evidence” cited that undermines it. Russia at that time considered it completely natural for itself to violate any international obligations and therefore shouted loudest about others breaking the rules. To begin with, the Russo-Japanese War itself broke out due to the fact that Russia violated every single one multilateral and bilateral treaties relating to China, Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, the “war for Korean firewood” became inevitable.
So, on June 30, 1904, the auxiliary cruiser Petersburg stopped and detained the British steamer Malacca of the Peninsular and Oriental company. under the pretext the presence of military contraband on it. English newspapers of that time depict colorful details of the inspection: the captain of the Malacca nailed the British merchant flag to the flagpole, and the Russian officer, threatening him with a revolver, tore off the flag. Captain 2nd rank Skalsky decided to send him to Libau with a prize team, without spending inspection of cargo based solely on “suspicions that something is fishy.” Information about the allegedly smuggled nature of the cargo “came” from a variety of places that had nothing to do with the voyage of this ship, for example, from the Russian consuls in Malta and Alexandria, where the Malacca did not go.
Already on July 7, a note from the British Ambassador followed, of course, completely unfounded, as all Russian authors have unanimously written for a hundred years in a row. Yes, the Malacca carried military cargo destined for Hong Kong, which the Russians stubbornly did not notice and do not notice today. There were proper documents, the cargo was marked “Property of the Government of the EU”, but if you really wanted to, you could not notice this, but declare that “from a survey of the team” the presence of military contraband was revealed. Indeed, stokers and deck sailors know better than anyone what, where and to whom the ship is carrying.
On June 10, a meeting was held regarding Malacca, at which opinions were sharply divided. Diplomats demanded the release of the ship, citing violations of international law committed by the sailors; the maritime faction, led by “Prince of Tsushima” Alexei Alexandrovich, defended the point of view “I can do whatever I want.” The Grand Duke argued that England was so strongly in defense of Malacca on the grounds that the English king was among the shareholders of P&O. Imagine, as the French say! Two different explanations can be offered for this nonsense. Either the Admiral General was a complete fool and broadcast rotten Russian experience to other countries, because in the famous scam with Korean firewood, the Romanov family was covered up to its ears. One of the leaders of the concession was Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, and the largest block of shares belonged to the “EV cabinet,” that is, simply the tsar. It can be assumed that Alexey Alexandrovich bought into the title “P&O” - “Royal Charter”, but this only means that the king granted the company certain privileges, but not that he receives money for it. And again, this interpretation means that the admiral general was extremely stupid. The second explanation is much shorter - the Grand Duke lied quite deliberately.
And the explanation for the sharp reaction of the British may be quite simple. Since 1841, the P&O company has been the official mail carrier of the British Admiralty, and a little later became the official carrier of the Royal Mail. In fact, in England, people simply hanged people for attacking the Royal Mail without much ado, because it was considered an attack on the guarantees given by the EB.
After some arguing, the ship was released on July 14 and continued its passage. To finally get away with it, the Russians are promoting a campaign of lies, in which the Russian consuls in Shanghai and Hong Kong have begun to play the leading role. Either the Malacca goes to Singapore not for repairs, but to cover up its tracks, then French journalists “reliably established” that the ship is going to Yokohama, but for some reason ends up in Sasebo. Then it suddenly turns out that the cruiser Iwate was equipped with 152-mm guns brought by Malacca, although such guns did not exist in nature. In general, as Dr. Goebbels advised, in order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous.
The reliability of the work of these “sources of information” is well illustrated by the fable about the German transport “Sambia”. The Russian agent in Berlin, Colonel Schebeck, reported that this transport was leaving Hamburg for Japan, carrying 329 guns. The Russian admirals, without hesitation, immediately sent the auxiliary cruiser Ural to catch the smuggler. No one even bothered to think about whether these nonsense could be believed. This is the artillery park of an entire army, the real deal of the century. It would be simply impossible to keep something like this a secret, but there was no other evidence other than the colonel’s tales then, and there is no evidence now. But earlier, and especially today, most historians for some reason consider these tales to be true facts.
Smolensk also caused its own scandal when it detained the German steamer Prince Heinrich. Russian historians bashfully write that they checked his mail and seized two letters containing documents about the shipment of military contraband from Germany to Japan. In fact, everything was much more stupid and vile. Was confiscated from the ship all mail, after which all illustrated and seized the two mentioned letters. All other letters were “sealed and put aside for transfer to the first oncoming mail steamer,” which was done two days later, when the English steamer Persia met. After this, is it any wonder that Russian auxiliary cruisers were treated like pirates of the 18th century that had fallen out in our time?
In general, the actions of the Russian auxiliary cruisers brought nothing but trouble to Russia. Admiral Rozhestvensky dragged the Kuban, Terek, Dnepr, Rion and Ural around the world with him, but they did nothing significant, except that the Ural died ingloriously in the Battle of Tsushima. The only auxiliary cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment, Lena, distinguished itself only by the fact that “due to a machine breakdown that prevented it from continuing cruising,” it reached San Francisco!
Purely for reference, we present data on merchant ships captured by the Japanese fleet. The total number is 64, including 16 Russian, 22 English, 10 German and 5 American. And what do you say after this, who did the British and Americans help?
Probably the easiest way to deal with the reconnaissance and patrol activities of cruisers. With what words did the Arthurians honor the famous “dogs” of the Japanese fleet! But, what is most interesting, the obviously stronger Askold never tried to drive away the observers who had settled in the outer roadstead. Even in the most tense moments, when the Japanese squadron fired over Liaoteshan, shelling the harbor of Port Arthur, no one tried to interfere with the Japanese cruisers adjusting the fire. These episodes, by the way, prove that the Japanese radio communications were two orders of magnitude better, and the stories about pre-war experiments in communications over a range of 200 miles are not convincing. Why didn’t anyone try to repeat them during the war?!
Another example of an established intelligence service is the organization of patrols in front of the Tsushima Strait. Both amateur and professional historians like to speculate about whether Rozhdestvensky’s squadron could have slipped through the strait undetected by the Japanese. The answer is simple - I couldn’t. Just to get this answer, we had to wait a very long time until the Japanese maps, considered secret for almost 100 years, finally appeared. It turned out that four lines of patrols had been organized, pushed forward almost to the island of Quelpart. Rozhdestvensky was lucky to pass them at night, but what could have happened if he had passed through this area during the day, expecting to end up in the Tsushima Strait at night? The result would be an all-out attack by Japanese destroyers and in the morning finishing off the battered squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo. But what happened happened, in square 203 the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru discovered the Russians...
Japanese shipbuilders had rather original views on the class of cruisers. Unlike their American classmates, almost every ship in the line was equipped with torpedo tubes in addition to artillery guns. Although they most often played the role of auxiliary weapons, in close-range battles torpedoes can become a strong trump card.
One of the most vulnerable points of the hull of Japanese cruisers of senior levels is the main caliber gun turrets. Unable to provide the installations with reliable protection from large-caliber artillery, the shipbuilders decided to limit themselves to only light anti-fragmentation armor. As a result, players should exercise caution: at close ranges, the main caliber turrets of Japanese cruisers can be penetrated even by medium-sized guns.
Another common drawback of almost all ships in the branch is relatively weak air defense. Only in the late stages of World War II did Japanese engineers manage to copy Bofors anti-aircraft guns and begin industrial production their analogue.
Thanks to this, senior cruisers can already boast relatively good anti-aircraft weapons, although they are still far from the level of American cruisers and battleships.
Evolution of the cruiser
The development branch of cruisers of the Japanese fleet starts from the second level:
Level II -Chikuma
Chikuma is the first Japanese cruiser equipped with a steam turbine unit and an armor belt. The only representative of the branch that does not carry torpedo tubes on board. This is partly compensated by its impressive firepower for its tier: it is equipped with eight 152 mm guns, and the maximum broadside salvo was five of them.
IIIlevel - Tatsuta
According to the original plans, Tatsuta was designed as the leader of destroyers, and therefore can boast of good speed and excellent torpedo armament for its level - two three-tube tubes with a caliber of 533 mm. At the same time, compared to its predecessor, Tatsuta lost in firepower: only four 140-mm guns were installed on board.
IV level -Kuma
Compared to its predecessor, the cruiser Tatsuta, the number of artillery guns on the ship has increased to seven. Thanks to its high rate of fire and good maneuverability, Kuma will become an excellent destroyer hunter, and increased to four is the number torpedo tubes will allow you to repel heavy enemy ships.
Level V - Furutaka
Thanks to its armament of six 203 mm artillery guns, Furutaka can successfully resist not only enemy destroyers, but also most of its classmates. The layout of the cruiser's guns is interesting: the half-turrets are installed in the form of two pyramids on the side and stern of the ship. This arrangement of installations made it possible to save deck space, but reduced the number of guns capable of firing from the bow or stern to two.
VI level -Aoba
The cruiser Aoba became the first ship in the branch to receive main-caliber twin-gun turrets during construction. Two of them were located in the bow of the ship, and one was at the stern. Although the maximum broadside remains the same, the Aoba's bow can fire four guns at once, which greatly helps in destroying retreating destroyers. In addition, the cruiser is equipped with two four-tube torpedo tubes. The installations are located at the rear of the ship, which makes aiming a little difficult during a torpedo attack.
Level VII - Mogami
The cruiser Mogami boasts a fairly powerful torpedo armament: four three-tube torpedo tubes with a caliber of 610 mm, mounted on its side, pose a serious threat to enemy heavy ships. The artillery is not far behind. On board the ship there are 15 rapid-firing 155 mm caliber guns, which allow the cruiser to successfully hit even the most maneuverable and fast destroyers.
During upgrades, the player will be able to further strengthen the ship’s armament by replacing the initial main caliber installations with ten 203 mm guns. In this case, the cruiser will lose its rate of fire, but in return the damage from each salvo will significantly increase.
VIII level -Myōkō
Project heavy cruiser, the displacement of which came very close to the limits of the Washington Treaty - 10 thousand tons. Compared to its predecessors, the cruiser is quite well protected.
The reserved hull area has noticeably increased, and the thickness of the ship's main armor belt has reached 100 mm. The ship's artillery is located in five two-gun turrets and consists of ten 203 mm guns.
IX level -Ibuki
The cruiser Ibuki became a logical continuation of its predecessors in the branch according to the principle “Faster, higher, stronger!” Its armament consists of four onboard torpedo tubes equipped with the famous Long Lance oxygen torpedoes, as well as ten 203 mm guns, which reliably hit destroyers and most classmates.
X level -Senjo (Working title)
An unrealized project of a heavy cruiser from 1941, the armament of which had already increased to 12 guns. Four main caliber installations, each with three barrels, are installed equally at the bow and stern of the ship.
In addition, the cruiser has relatively good air defense. Twelve 100 mm anti-aircraft guns provide reliable protection against attack squadrons and allow active action against enemy aircraft carriers. Unlike artillery, torpedo armament was not strengthened compared to its predecessors, since it was already at a very high level.
