Sovereign's treasures. Where did the kings' gold reserves go? Missing royal gold Where did the royal gold go after the revolution

Tsar's Gold Kurnosov Valery Viktorovich

"We are on the right track"

"We are on the right track"

The next day, representatives of an international treasure-hunting expedition discovered several signs of the presence of treasure in the surrounding forest. This is evidenced by information from the next joint document of the expedition.

"Protocol No. 4

This protocol was drawn up on October 5, 1929. Alaty, which is 52 kilos. from Kazan by representatives of the house of R. de Luberzak: Messrs. V. Bersay, R. Gariel, Sh.(as in the text. - V.K.) Tomitsky and V. Bronitsky and representatives of the State Bank of the USSR B. Bolshemennikov and G. Erman.

The listed representatives of both sides left in the same cars at 8 o'clock. morning from the village of Srednie Alaty (Kurmanaevo), which is 63 km from Kazan, where they spent the night, they continued the route that had been suspended the day before passing through Alaty. They telephoned to Kazan and then continued on their way forward to the north. And having passed 2 kilo from Middle Alata (crossed out in brackets “(Kurmanaevo)”. - V.K), they left with right side (crossed out: “Potanikha village.” - V.K.) in (the word is illegible. - V.K.) kilometers from a country road, (crossed out: “where we turned.” - VC.). Then we crossed the bridge and turned northwest (crossed out: “we passed the bridge to the side.” - VC.). Then crossed (crossed out: “the village of Gar and entered.” - V.K.) into a small forest, then a clearing and again entered the forest and (further crossed out: “we drove through one section of the forest, followed by a clearing for about one kilometer and entered the second forest and.” - V.K.) and stopped in the forest near a stream, at a distance of 11 kilometers from (crossed out: “Average”. - V.K.) Alati (crossed out: “Kurmanaevo.” - V.K.), which is 63 kilometers from the city of Kazan.

At this place, to the right, going up the hill, representatives of the house of R. de Luberzak discovered conventional signs on one tree, the field side of the path . Counting along the path leading to the right from the designated tree, (hereinafter crossed out: “and having counted.” - V.K.) 500 (crossed out: “we are fathoms.” - V.K.) steps they found themselves in a clearing. After looking around this clearing (crossed out: “representatives.” - V.K.) at home R. de (crossed out: “Lyuberzak, listed.” - V.K.) above, they found many signs corresponding to what they are looking for in that place (hereinafter crossed out: “where is the treasure of discovery.” - V.K.) of the deposited treasure. But representatives of the house of R. de Luberzac did not come to a final conclusion (hereinafter crossed out: “conclusions that convince them of the correctness of the assumption” . - V.K.), since in this clearing there is (crossed out: “old.” - V.K.) house (the time of construction of which we could not determine). In addition, there are several dozen hives in this clearing, which does not completely convince them that they are there. In this connection, they decided to seek additional data from Warsaw, sending their representative Sh.(as in the text. - V.K.) Tomitsky and, as a result, before. home of R. de Lub. (The following words are crossed out in blue ink: “For our part, we decided not to demand this.” - VC.) (The following words are in black ink: “and they demanded.” - V.K.) from representatives of the State Bank (hereinafter crossed out: “police protection, for.” - VC.) V.K.) protection of the place, (hereinafter inserted in black ink - “neither”. - V.K.) workers for excavations.

At the suggestion of the representative of the house of R. de Luberzac, Mr. V. Bersey, all present representatives of both sides returned to Alati, where they arrived at 14:00. day. At 15 o'clock. days Tomitsky, R. Gariel and Comrade Yerman drove to Kazan in two cars...”

Returning to the capital of Tatar Autonomous Republic, an employee of the Moscow office of the State Bank G. Yerman compiled a secret memo to his management about the progress of the search. Below is its text.

“Dear Andrey Vasilievich.

I also consider it necessary, on my part, to report something on the matter. We spent the last two days in the Kazan region, 50 kilometers from here, and from where I returned to Kazan today at 9 o’clock in the evening to inform Comrade. Prasolov about the state of affairs. Today at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, all of us who left Moscow seemed to have come across the site of our goal. I say as if, because a number of data according to the plan of the gr. Bersey says that we are at the goal, but at the same time there are a lot of significant details that are completely not provided for by Bersey’s plan. One of the significant facts should be considered that there is one dilapidated hut in the clearing. We have not yet been able to establish how long the mentioned hut has been in place.

In this hut lives a woman of 32–33 years old and, apparently, she is a former nun, which assumption was caused by the presence in one cell fenced off in the hut, a knocked together pulpit, on it a psalter in a silver binding and a silver cross, in front of the pulpit on a shelf icon. The hymnal is carefully covered with a clean towel. All our careful attempts to find out some details about the time the hut was built and who the owner is, we have not yet been able to find out, since this woman tells us that she has been living here for a year. When we asked her if she was a nun, the latter was extremely embarrassed. Her behavior was strange and I personally had a suspicion that someone here knew about the existence of the place... Since this letter will go out as usual, I am refraining from some details and indicating the area. 7–8 kilometers from the place of interest to us, we stopped in a village. In these places, a car (car) passes very rarely. When we stopped, we were surrounded by many peasants and their children, who examined our two cars with great curiosity. We asked how long ago they had seen the car and they told us that about ten years ago, trucks with heavy loads passed along this road, they were accompanied by a battery from the advancing whites. I want to say that obviously we are on the right track.

In general, it must be said that the behavior of our guests does not raise any doubt that their arrival is connected precisely with what is set out in the agreement (contract).

After what was clarified this afternoon, we tried to contact Comrade Prasolov in Kazan by telephone in order to call a small guard and place one on the spot, but we were unsuccessful, although our guests said that there was no need for this yet, since they had not stopped completely on it, which will be noted in our protocol tomorrow, but now Comrade Prasolov has already taken the necessary measures, and tomorrow at dawn there will be security at the place where Bersey, Bronitsky, Gariel and Bolshemennikov are located. They are in a village not far from this place. The other side has not yet invited us to begin work, precisely for the reasons that a number of points that are contradictory to the plan do not coincide, and tomorrow they are also planning to study other nearby areas.

At the same time, one of them, namely Mr. Tomitsky, is leaving for Moscow tomorrow (he came to the city with me) to travel to Warsaw in order to obtain some additional data. Nikolai Mikhailovich writes to you about this. It must be said that the agreement was drawn up in many places rather unclearly and, in any case, not everything was in our favor. In particular, regarding paragraph 5 of the agreement, I expressed my thoughts to Nikolai Mikhailovich that we should interpret paragraph 5 of the agreement in the sense that as soon as the other party proposes to begin work, we, according to the agreement, carry out this work in accordance with the contract, but precisely from the moment when Mr. Bersey showed us the place and offered to start work. It must be assumed that if these works did not lead to results, we should not carry out any further searches or new work in a new place. I mean - in another place, precisely in a completely new area, even if even these works were carried out within 10 days, with which Bersey completely agrees, but all other members of the other side believe that within 10 days they can carry out reconnaissance work and in other areas.

I think this is completely wrong, because you have to understand that the place... they know, and at Bersey’s direction of the place, we immediately began work, etc. Be that as it may, t.t. Prasolov and Bolshemennikov agree that this issue is competent to resolve by our Board or the Directorate of the INO. It should be said in passing that the search for the place has been going on for four days, and the agreement does not at all stipulate how many days these searches should continue. (See § 5.)

I think that within a few days the issue will obviously be resolved. One way or another, some additional instructions on the issue raised are needed from you.

The fact is that the other side, besides Mr. Bersey, is of the opinion that within the first days they can carry out work in other areas. This question arose in connection with the discovery of the place described above, but in the absence of complete confidence that this is exactly the target location, the question arises about work in other areas during the first five days. This question has been postponed for now, but if it had been raised urgently, we would have immediately communicated with you by telegraph.

As for our relationships with the other side, they are absolutely normal and our work with them is completely coordinated, although our guests, in the first days, showed some suspicion towards us, but now they have completely freed themselves from this and tell us out loud everything that they had previously hidden in fact, and in general, a completely different, trusting attitude towards us is noticeable on their part.

So far we have drawn up three protocols and tomorrow morning I will start printing them, since they are still written by hand, but so far the drafts have already been signed.

Tomorrow the fourth protocol will be drawn up, and by evening I will go back to their village. I'll leave it at that.

With greetings, Yerman."

As you can see, the information collected puzzled the expedition members. Apparently, in their documents the desired clearing was designated as deserted. Therefore, treasure hunters were perplexed: how could the secrecy of the burial be ensured if it turned out that the gold was buried in front of the occupant of the house?

The behavior of the frightened praying mantis, which was strange to a contemporary, was quite understandable for Soviet people 1929. On February 2 (January 19, old style), 1918, Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the Bolsheviks and Soviet power for the armed coup and terror in the country, on July 21, 1918, he condemned the execution of the royal family.

On June 16-19, 1918, security officer Leonid Zakovsky with 60 bayonets launched a raid on the Sviyazhsky and Raifa monasteries, as a result of which the Reds were accused of robbery and on June 17-18, the peasants killed six. August 9

In 1918, 51-year-old Bishop Ambrose (Gudko), rector of the Sviyazhsk Assumption Monastery, was shot. On September 10, 11 monks of the Zilantov Monastery, led by Archimandrite Sergius, were shot in Kazan. On November 12, 1918, the rector of the Pyatnitskaya Church of Kazan, Father Fyodor Gidaspov, was shot in Kazan.

On August 14, 1919, in Moscow, the People's Commissariat of Justice made a decision on the organizational opening of relics in churches, and on August 25, 1920, on the liquidation of relics on an all-Russian scale.

On February 23, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee published a decree on the confiscation of church property in Russia by the Bolsheviks. In January 1920 and April 1922, trials of the “church members” took place in Moscow. In 1928, mass demolition of churches began. NKVD Instruction of October 1, 1929 "ABOUT Rights and Responsibilities of Religious Associations" classified clergymen into the category of disenfranchised - residents of the USSR, deprived of the right to choose and be elected...

Judging by the information in Yerman’s secret letter, the peasants of the village of Gar confirmed that heavily loaded white cars accompanied by artillery drove through their village. And although the document does not mention the year of travel, the circumstances of the Civil War, well known to the Soviet participants in the search, spoke specifically about the events of 1918.

In 1919, a new offensive by the Whites, now led by Admiral Alexander Kolchak, foundered on the distant approaches to Kazan: on March 23, Kolchak’s men captured Menzelinsk, 292 kilometers east of the provincial center. That's all. But by June 1, the Reds had already recaptured Agryz and completely expelled the Whites from the territory of the province to the east.

Knowledge of the circumstances of the war only increased the excitement of the treasure hunters. They understood that even in 1918, there were no Red troops or any strategic communications in the area of ​​​​the search for valuables. And the whites with artillery and heavy loads passed...

The second illogical circumstance of the appearance of enemy vehicles was the place itself. In September 2010, the author talked with one very famous Kazan resident, who, as a hobby, was checking the information of the 1929 expedition on site. In good weather, this area of ​​the forest, which excited the search participants, can today be reached by car in 1 hour and 40 minutes. Or 100 minutes exactly.

But my wealthy interlocutor’s heart bled when he remembered the road along which his expensive car had to be driven. And today, driving to this bearish corner along a forest road is not a test for the faint of heart.

Car enthusiasts who visited the site are surprised by the question: why was it necessary to destroy low-power pre-revolutionary trucks, sending them to such a distance, if the forest could be found closer? Apparently, the wilderness seemed to the organizers of the cache to be a guarantee of reliable protection of the treasures.

By the way, judging by space photography data, today the forest area that became the focus of treasure hunters in 1929 is approximately 193 square kilometers. It is divided by a conditional administrative border between the republics of Tatarstan and Mari El. Most of it is located on the territory of the Vysokogorsky district of Tatarstan and is under the management of the Isleitarsky forestry. And the clearing, which was explored by treasure hunters on October 5, is today located on the territory of the Morkinsky district of the Republic of Mari El...

On October 5, 1929, the seekers of value acted surprisingly confidently and effectively. Having never visited these places, the foreigners, according to the records, quickly found witnesses in the nearest village, and then in the forest - even marks on the trees near the supposed burial site.

But then the question arose: “Who is deceiving?” The Polish owner of the records, who brought them to a clearing where there should be no witnesses, turned out to be a house? Then why did he start all the searches and definitely lead them to this place? Was the former nun, whose behavior aroused Yerman’s suspicion, lying that she knew why the foreigners came to the forest? How was it possible to hide countless treasures next to an old hut that appeared unknown when and it is unclear who its owner was? Or were the treasure hunters deceived by their own eyes?

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By the beginning of the 20th century, Russia's gold reserves were one of the largest in the world. In 1918, the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Alexander Kolchak, became the custodian of 490 tons of gold bullion.

Ural gold rush

In the 18th century in Russia, gold was mined mainly in the traditional way - in specialized mines. However, more and more often reports began to be received about the discovery of alluvial gold, which can be recorded in documents of that era: “On May 21, 1745, in the local Office of the Main Factory Board, the aforementioned schismatic Markov... saw between the Stanovskaya and Pyshminskaya villages of the roads at the top light pebbles, like crystal... Between With these I found a little slab, like a flint, with a mark on one side in the nostril like gold.”

People constantly found nuggets or gold dust in the Urals. Meanwhile, the “mounders” were still plundering ancient mounds in search of gold in the old fashioned way. Soon there was no need for this - in early XIX century, a real gold rush began in Russia, and it got to the point that even gold-bearing mines stopped their work - why are they needed when gold lies literally under your feet?

By the middle of the 19th century, half of the world's gold was mined in the country - the scale had increased many times over. The gold reserves of the Russian Empire also increased - by World War I it amounted to 1,311 tons of gold or 1 billion 695 million rubles, and was one of the largest in the world.

Melting gold reserves

The war greatly reduced Russia's gold reserves. 75 million rubles were sent to England to guarantee the payment of war loans. Another 562 million were transported to Canada, then part of the British Empire. Thus, by the time the Bolsheviks seized power and banks, the country's gold reserves amounted to 1 billion 100 million rubles.

However, the Bolsheviks did not get all the money - some of it was prudently evacuated in 1915 from Petrograd to Kazan and other cities in the rear. Thus, half of the total gold reserves were concentrated in Kazan alone.

The Bolsheviks tried to take it out, but managed to take only 100 boxes - in August 1918, Kazan was captured by the Whites and their Czechoslovak allies. Since a month later, in November 1918, Admiral Kolchak was proclaimed the Supreme Ruler of Russia, the gold remaining in Kazan began to be called “Kolchak’s gold.” The Whites took possession of 650 million rubles, which amounted to approximately 490 tons of pure gold in bars and coins: “The trophies cannot be counted, Russia’s gold reserves of 650 million were captured.”

The captured gold was partially transported by steamship to Samara, the capital of the anti-Bolshevik Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. From Samara, the gold moved to Ufa, and then to Omsk, where it came into the direct possession of the Kolchak government.

In 1919, the gold was loaded into wagons and sent across Trans-Siberian Railway, which at that time was controlled by Czech corps, which had lost confidence in the admiral. When the train with gold arrived at the Nizhneudinsk station, representatives of the Entente forced Admiral Kolchas to renounce the rights of the Supreme Ruler and give the gold reserves to the Czechoslovak formations. Kolchak was handed over to the Socialist Revolutionaries, who handed him over to the Bolshevik authorities, who immediately shot the admiral. The Czech corps returned 409 million rubles to the Soviets in exchange for communication to release them from the country.

But what happened to the remaining 236 million?

Where is the gold?

According to one version, that same ill-fated Czechoslovak corps was the thief of the missing millions. When the Czechs were guarding a train with gold going from Omsk to Irkutsk, they took advantage of their position and stole the money.

In confirmation of this, they usually cite the fact that immediately after the return of the corps to their homeland, the largest Legiabank - a bank founded by Czech legionnaires. However, there is no evidence of this; moreover, the missing gold could not be enough to found this institution.

Former deputy Minister of Finance in the Kolchak government, Novitsky accused the Czechs of stealing 63 million rubles, and some German oppositionists claimed that the Czechs stole 36 million - all these figures have no source in real historical documents.

Another argument against the Czechs was the fact that Czechoslovakia helped Russian emigrants after the Civil War - colossal sums were allocated for support, which, according to conspiracy theorists, were previously stolen from Kolchak’s gold. However, according to the most conservative estimates, the amount of subsidies exceeded even the notorious 63 million.

According to another version, Kolchak’s gold was hidden on the orders of the admiral himself. Among the possible places for the treasure, the Maryina Griva lock in the Ob-Yenisei Canal is called, since the burial of five hundred White Guards was found next to it.

Another place of the alleged location of Kolchak’s gold is the Sikhote-Alin mountains, in the caves of which gold bars were allegedly found. There are reports that some of the gold was sunk in the Irtysh, while others believe that the Czech corps pushed some of the wagons with gold into Baikal so that they would not go to the Reds. In 2013, archaeologist Alexey Tivanenko reported that he managed to find Kolchak’s gold by descending in a submersible to the bottom of Lake Baikal: “We found 4 ingots between the rubble. All this lies between the stones, between the sleepers.”

1 part. About Russian gold during the First World War

The history of Russian gold during the First World War reflected many dramatic events in domestic and international life like a drop of water. Russian Empire.

Gold reserves of the Russian Empire on the eve of the war.

By the beginning of the First World War, Russia had a fairly large reserve of gold - 1233 tons in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire. This does not count the approximately 300 tons of “yellow” metal that was in circulation in the form of coins. On the eve of the First World War, Russia was in second place in the world in terms of the volume of centralized gold reserves, second only to the United States. In 1915 (data at the beginning of the year) it continued to maintain its gold reserves, although it lost second place to France.

Official gold reserves of the leading countries of the world in the period 1845-1915. (T)

Total worldwide

Great Britain

Germany

Notes:

Source : Timothy Green. Central Bank Gold Reserves. An historical perspective since 1845. World Gold Council. November 1999.

Russia has been accumulating its gold for several decades, the rate of accumulation was high. In 1865, when Russia had just embarked on the path of capitalist development, the reserve was only 57 tons. In 1895, as a result of targeted government efforts, it grew to almost 700 tons. Gold was necessary for the monetary reform of 1897; as a result of the reform, the golden ruble was born. Over the next two decades, Russia's gold reserves increased another 1.8 times. After all, the coverage of paper money circulation according to the laws of the Russian Empire was the highest among the countries that established the gold standard (almost 100%). True, the Russian gold ruble was expensive. How did the gold reserves grow?

Firstly, due to the extraction of yellow metal within the country. This is perhaps the main source of reserve formation. According to our estimates, for the period 1891-1914. About 1 thousand tons of yellow metal were mined in Russia.

Secondly, due to the export of Russia's main export product - wheat and some other grains. During the country's preparation for monetary reform(transition to the gold standard), the proportion of harvest distribution between domestic consumption and exports changed greatly in favor of the latter. The implementation of the slogan “we’d ​​rather not finish eating, but we’ll take it out” undermined the social foundation of the village, and, therefore, the entire country (its population was predominantly rural).

Thirdly, by attracting gold from abroad in the form of loans. This sharply increased Russia's external debt - primarily to France and Great Britain, and brought it into the category of the main debtor before the First World War. Before World War I, Russia had the largest foreign debt in the world.

Government measures to preserve gold reserves after the start of the war.

First World War made it extremely difficult to support the issue of paper money with a centralized supply of gold. During these years, it was no longer necessary to talk about 100 percent coverage of the issue of credit notes in gold; several times during the war the standards for covering money issues with gold reserves were revised

For 1915-1916 The issuing rights of the State Bank were expanded four times. As a result of this liberalization of the emission policy, the volume of paper money issued during the war years increased almost 4 times, and the purchasing power of the ruble at the beginning of 1917 was less than 1/3 of the level at the beginning of 1914. The backing of paper money with gold by the time of the February Revolution of 1917 was, at best, 13%.

All this contributed to the transformation of the State Bank into a kind of “emission factory”, completely curtailing operations in the commercial loan market.

Unlike the central banks of other European countries, in Russia the State Bank was under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance, which facilitated the task of transforming it into a body for financing military expenditures.

Despite the policy taken to increase emissions, the monetary authorities did not abandon measures to preserve and centralize the gold reserves in the State Bank. The most important of them were the following.

1. Stop the exchange of paper money (credit notes) for gold.

On June 27, 1914, Emperor Nicholas II approved the Law “On the suspension of the exchange of banknotes for gold.” The cessation of the exchange of paper money for gold at this time was carried out in all leading countries of the gold standard with the exception of the United States.

2. Measures against the diversion of gold abroad through private and commercial channels. Among them are tightening the rules for issuing foreign currency when individuals travel abroad, introducing control over foreign trade contracts, payment for which required foreign currency, etc.

3. Refusal to maintain the ruble exchange rate through gold and foreign exchange interventions.

4. Appeal to the population to make contributions in gold in monetary and non-monetary forms for the needs of the war. “Under the influence of the appeal to the population, patriotic contributions in gold coins and gold products began, both as a gift for the needs of the war and in exchange for credit notes, which ensured an increase in revenues in the gold account of the State Bank in coins, bullion and banknotes.” However, this measure had limited effectiveness, because Most of the gold coins that were in circulation before the war ended up in the hands of the population within a short time and were hoarded.

5. Purchases of gold from mining companies and the population. “Along with gold mining, gold bars were purchased for foreign currency at par with an 8% commission, and a little later a premium of 30% was established for gold supplied to the treasury from gold-alloying laboratories and the Mint.”

6. Attracting foreign loans and domestic loans to finance military expenses, and also partly to build up the position of “gold abroad”

Measures to stabilize monetary circulation in wartime conditions.

During the First World War, Russia's foreign debt continued to increase. New loans received from abroad were used not only to finance military expenses. Part of the foreign loans (primarily received from Great Britain) were “frozen” and represented funds that were deposited in the accounts of foreign banks and remained there without movement. In fact, these were fictitious credit transactions that created the impression of growth in that part of the state gold reserve that was classified as “gold abroad.” This fictitious increase in Russia's gold reserves ultimately pursued the goal of increasing the issue of paper money by the State Bank of Russia against the supposedly increased reserves of gold, which was necessary to finance military expenses within the country.

Thus, the following operations were carried out sequentially:

1) transfer of physical gold from Russia to the UK as collateral;

2) provision by Great Britain of “targeted” loans to Russia, secured by the received gold, to increase the volume of “gold abroad”;

3) the issue by the State Bank of the Russian Empire of an additional amount of paper money supply, taking into account the allegedly increased gold reserves of the country.

These operations were of a fairly secret nature, which made it possible to maintain the illusion, both in Russia and especially abroad, of the reliable backing of the Russian currency with gold. This kind of scheme was imposed on Russia by Great Britain and had such unpleasant consequences as an increase in the country’s external debt, a decrease in the state reserve of physical gold, and a depreciation of the Russian ruble in the domestic money market.

The external depreciation of the ruble occurred much more slowly: the illusion of a significant increase in Russia's gold reserves contributed to maintaining its relatively high exchange rate on international markets.

As a result of the export of physical gold and loans received from the “allies”, the item “gold abroad” in the balance sheet of the State Bank increased and amounted to (million rubles):

As of 07/01/1914 - 143.8

As of 01/01/1915 - 172.5

As of 01/01/1916 - 646.1

As of 01/01/1917 - 2146.7.

According to official data, the amount of the gold reserve of the State Bank for 1914-1916. increased from 1695 to 3617 million rubles, however, if at the beginning of this period “gold abroad” accounted for several percent, then at the end of the period it accounted for about 2/3.

Russian gold begins to flow to the British Isles.

During the years of the First World War (until the beginning of 1917), the gold reserve of the Russian Empire (excluding the position of “gold abroad”) decreased by approximately 462 tons. This decrease is almost exclusively due to the transfer of part of the Russian gold reserve to the Bank of England to form a special guarantee gold reserve , as mentioned above. It is known that at the beginning of the war, Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons were kept in the Bank of England vaults as collateral. In addition, the country's monetary authorities actually lost most of the gold that was in circulation before the war: in the first month of the war, the gold coin disappeared from circulation and was never returned to the treasury. By January 1, 1917, according to the State Bank, there were 436 million rubles worth of gold coins left in the hands of citizens. , which in terms of pure gold is equivalent to 337 tons of metal.

Russia was constantly under pressure from Great Britain and its other “allies,” who demanded additional supplies of Russian gold as a condition for providing military loans at the interstate level. In the first two years of the war, Russia managed to restrain these Western aspirations. Where possible, it resorted to financing military purchases by means that did not require the transfer of precious metal abroad (commercial loans, government loans from the United States and Japan). However, later gold began to leave the treasury outside the country, primarily to Great Britain.

During the war, Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons were kept in the Bank of England vaults as collateral

According to the Soviet historian A.L. Sidorov, gold deliveries to England were carried out in December 1915, June 1916 and February 1917. As S.M. Borisov notes, “in return, interest-free obligations were issued for a period of 3 to 5 years in returning gold after the war. These obligations were credited to the balance sheet of the State Bank as “Gold Abroad,” which made it possible to use them as formal security for the ongoing issue of credit notes. It is interesting to note that the last shipment abroad in February 1917 of about 147 tons of gold was not reflected in the official statistics of the State Bank: on October 23, 1917, the article “Gold in Russia” showed the presence of 1000 tons of metal. Obviously, the sent gold continued to be listed in the “On the way” section, where metal that had already left the country but had not yet arrived was taken into account.”

This is how the authors of the book “Economics of a Sovereign Democracy” describe the “disappearance” of the last batch of “royal” gold sent to the Bank of England: “The gold in transit continued to be listed on Russia’s balance sheet until it was officially confirmed by the Bank of England. The agreed route ran through all of Russia to Vladivostok and further (on Japanese military ships) to Ottawa (Canada) (one of the overseas vaults of the Bank of England was located there - V.K.). The Bank of England double-checked the receipt of gold and gave confirmation to Russia. Only after this did the State Bank transfer the corresponding amount from the “gold in Russia” column to the “gold abroad” column. Gold sent from Vladivostok in November 1916 reached Ottawa in August 1917, but as early as October 8, 1917, gold worth 189.5 million rubles was listed on the balance sheet of the State Bank. It was never capitalized by the Bank of England...And this is just an episode of the usual thievery practice of international bankers.”

According to some reports, 5.5 tons of Nicholas II’s personal gold was also sent to Great Britain at the beginning of 1917 (to the Bering brothers’ bank).

The first shipment of gold to the UK was sent from Arkhangelsk to Liverpool on the Mantua transport. Subsequently, due to the risk of sinking transport by German submarines, gold for Great Britain began to be sent through the Far East (especially since Great Britain determined that the final destination of gold was not the British Isles, but Canada, where it had its own storage facilities). It should be noted that part of the gold intended for Great Britain was Far East“intercepted” (more precisely, captured) by Japan and never reached its destination.

Sending gold from Russia to the UK

Dispatch time

Batch volume (weight and cost indicators)

Notes

October 1914

58.8 t / 8 million f. Art./75 million 120 thousand gold rub.

Gold, in accordance with the secret British-Russian agreement (October 1914), was delivered on the British transport "Mantua" along the route Arkhangelsk - Liverpool to the Bank of England

Late December 1915

73.5 t / 10 million f. Art. / 93 million 897.5 thousand gold. rub.

Mid-June 1916

73.5 t / 10 million f. Art. / 93 million 897.5 thousand gold rub.

Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antanto-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England*

Beginning of November 1916

147 t / 20 million f. Art. / 187 million 795 thousand tons of ash. rub.

Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antanto-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England*

February 1917

147 t / 20 million f. Art. / 187 million 795 thousand gold. rub.

Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antento-Russian financial agreement (February 1917) to the Bank of England*. Didn't reach the destination because...

February 1917

was intercepted by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan)

5.5 t / 8.0 million gold rub.

Personal gold of Nicholas II. Sent via the Far East to the English bank of the Baring brothers (London).* Did not reach its destination, because was intercepted by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan).

505.3 t / about 646 million gold. rub.

352.8 tons reached their destinations; Japan intercepted 152.5 tons * The route of gold - the vaults of the State Bank (European part of Russia), further along railway

through Siberia to Vladivostok, then across the Pacific Ocean on chartered Japanese military ships to Vancouver (Canada) or San Francisco (USA), then to Ottawa (one of the overseas depositories of the Bank of England) or through North America to the east coast, then to Liverpool or London (Bank of England vaults). :

Sources

V. Novitzky. The Russian Gold Reserve before and during the World and Civil Wars (1883-1921). In: “Russian Gold: a collection of articles and statistical data reporting the Russian Gold Reserve and shipments of Soviet Gold.” New York, Amtorg Trading Corporation, Information Department, 1928, p.12-15;

V.A. Sirotkin. Foreign gold of Russia. M.: "Olma-Press", 2000.

To get a more complete picture of the movement of the imperial gold reserves in the period from August 1914 to October 1917, we present a table that was presented by the Russian emigrant S.G. Petrov in his material prepared in the 90s of the last century and in which all indicators are expressed in monetary units - gold rubles and pounds sterling (Table 3). As can be seen from this table, the total value of gold exported abroad during the specified period amounted to 643.36 million gold rubles, which, based on the official gold parity of the Russian currency, is equivalent to 498 tons of pure gold.

Thus, the general estimates of gold exports given in Table 2 are slightly higher than the estimates in Table 3, but there are no fundamental differences in these estimates.

Indicator/operation

Million angry rub.

(A) Balance at the beginning of the First World War

(B) Exported abroad during the First World War

1) sold to Great Britain and sent in October 1914 in order to provide a loan to pay for military supplies of 8 million pounds sterling

2) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese military ships as a loan

December 1915 - 10 million pounds sterling

June 1916 - £10 million

November 1916 - £20 million

Total - £40 million

3) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese military ships under an agreement to provide an additional loan of 20 million pounds sterling

4) Sent to Sweden in October 1917 for the purchase of military supplies

Total exported abroad

643,36

(B) Balance before adjustment: B= A - B

1.051,64

(D) Correction: Added to gold reserves during World War I from gold mines

(D) Balance sheet for November 1917: D = B + G

1.101,69

Source:

Petroff S. Where did Russian gold go? Report on the Russian gold reserves (1914-1929) // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11/30/1999.

Other foreign routes of Russian gold.

“Tsarist” gold as collateral, according to some sources, was also sent from Russia to USA . According to Prof. V. Sirotkina, from the end of 1915 Until the end of 1916, the tsarist government sent several shipments of gold to the United States as collateral for the purchase of weapons and smokeless gunpowder, which were never delivered to Russia (and DuPont Chemical planned to build a plant in Connecticut to supply gunpowder). The main shipment of gold for the United States, according to Sirotkin, was estimated at 40 million pounds. Art., which in terms of weight amounted to more than 500 tons of metal.

We have doubts about the fact of sending gold (especially such a large shipment) to the United States. For example, A.L. Sidorov in his basic research about the financial situation of Russia during the First World War does not mention at all the fact of sending the yellow metal to the USA. According to his version, collateral gold located in Great Britain was used to finance the purchase of gunpowder and weapons in the United States. According to most sources, the US was not the final recipient of the gold, but transit territory, through which gold from Russia was sent to Great Britain (Bank of England). It is possible that part of the gold addressed to Great Britain actually ended up in the accounts of American banks and companies (secondary redistribution of Russian gold). Thus, the information of Prof. V. Sirotkina requires additional verification and clarification.

Let us note once again that, starting from 1915, almost all gold was exported abroad through the Far East, where the Japanese controlled sea communications. According to a number of sources, gold, which was intended for the USA and Great Britain, was intercepted in March 1917 Japan .

“The last “golden train” to the USA and England... was completely captured by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan) on the cruisers “Kashima” and “Katori” as a “trophy of war” (Russia and Japan did not fight in March 1917 "It should be borne in mind that some of the “royal” gold that was sent abroad through the Far East, apparently, was not sent outside Russia before the revolution of 1917 and ended up in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire in its branch in Vladivostok, however, in the end this gold went abroad. This happened already in the years. civil war and interventions.

In addition, it must be borne in mind that even before the start of the war, Russia had in its bank accounts France a significant amount of currency in gold francs and other “gold” currencies (“gold abroad”). Moreover, literally a month before the start of the First World War, Russia managed to transfer its “foreign” gold from German banks to French ones (from Russia’s point of view, the transfer of “foreign” gold to France was a reasonable action, since Paris was considered our main ally in the expected war). After the outbreak of the war, “allied” France introduced a so-called “moratorium” on the use of these currency values, fearing that Russia would not fulfill its obligations to repay and service French loans. In fact, this is exactly what happened: Russia’s “foreign” gold in French banks was used mainly not for the purchase of weapons and equipment so necessary for the Russian army, but for the payment of interest to French rentiers.

After February revolution The Provisional Government also managed to make its contribution to the export of gold abroad: literally on the eve of the October revolution, it sent a shipment of gold to Sweden for the purchase of weapons (in the amount of 4.85 million gold rubles, i.e. about 3.8 tons of metal).

Russia's gold reserves on the eve of the October Revolution of 1917.

A general idea of ​​what place gold exported abroad occupied in Russia’s total gold reserves is given in Table. 4. As can be seen from the table, the share of gold abroad in the total gold reserves of Russia during the war years until the October Revolution of 1917 steadily increased and reached more than 2/3.

Russian gold within the country and abroad during the First World War (million rubles)*

8.10.1917

Gold within the country

Gold abroad

Total gold supply

Share of gold abroad in the total gold reserves, %

* As of January 1 of the corresponding year (except for the last column). The gold reserves include not only metallic gold, but also the currencies of gold standard countries. Such a sharp increase in the volume of “gold abroad” during the period under review is probably explained by the fact that it included the amount of loans received by Russia from the Entente countries in the form of currencies. The share of metallic gold in the total volume of “gold abroad” at the end of the period under review was, apparently, very small.


The book contains information about 17815.147 kg of gold. These tons disappeared from the vault of the Kazan branch of the People's Bank of Russia in August 1918. The valuables have not yet been discovered. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an operational investigative case called “Golden Fleece”; Some information on this topic is kept top secret. Currently, treasure hunters have also joined the search for royal gold. The author presents data from two declassified funds of the National Archives of Tatarstan for the first time. The historical context of the events that unfolded simultaneously with the evacuation of the gold reserves is reproduced on the basis of memoirs and works of historians.


17,815.147 KG GOLD (From the author)

This book contains information about 17,815.147 kg of gold that disappeared from the vault of the Kazan branch of the People's (state) Bank of Russia in August 1918. These tons amount to 572,770 troy ounces and are constantly increasing in value. As of January 1, 2011, they were valued on the London Stock Exchange at $813,619,785. At the time of reading these lines, you can find the quote for a troy ounce of gold on the Internet and simply multiply by the number of ounces. You will see how the price of this loss today is inexorably approaching one billion US dollars.

You may know treasures of similar magnitude, but the author has not found any mention of treasures of such value in the entire history of the world. For comparison, the world-famous burial of Tutankhamun contained the golden tomb of the pharaoh weighing 110.4 kg. Naturally, the artifacts of the pharaoh of the 18th dynasty of rulers Ancient Egypt much more valuable in a cultural and historical sense. But in practical terms, the value of gold treasures near Kazan has nothing to compare with...

How real these mysterious tons of yellow metal are, the author leaves it to the reader to judge from declassified documents of the State Bank of the USSR. In fact, clarifying the issue is not so simple. In the depths of the Ministry of Internal Affairs there is an operational-search file “Golden Fleece”, which stores most of the information on this topic under the heading “top secret”.

In the summer of 1918, in the “golden pantry” of the Kazan branch of the People’s Bank, 444 tons, 509 kilograms, 799 grams and 65 milligrams of gold worth 574,127,751.46 royal gold rubles gleamed with yellow sides. At that time the State Bank of Russia was called the People's Bank. Four steel safes and chests of the “gold pantry” of the Kazan branch, as well as seven storage racks were designed to accommodate gold, two racks for silver. The entrance to the pantry was securely locked with steel lattice doors from Arthur Koppel JSC, welded according to the system of the Berlin company Pontzer.

A spiral staircase led upward from the second underground floor, where the “golden storage room” was located. There were seven more safes and chests in the upper storage room - the “money storeroom”, as well as in the change office premises, and another one in the loan office office. In the “upper” vault rested precious jewelry, packs of paper notes, securities, bags of copper coins. And also that part of the gold that was brought in the summer of 1918 and which simply no longer fit in the specialized storeroom.

In total, by August 1918, over 73 percent of Russia's gold reserves were concentrated in Kazan under the control of the Bolsheviks. The strategic reserve restlessly burned through the pockets of representatives new government and attracted their opponents. At this time, the Bolsheviks were negotiating in Berlin on the terms of exporting part of Russia’s gold to Germany as an indemnity under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty on March 3, 1918.

Germany's enemies - the Russian officers who fought against it - could not forgive the Leninists for capitulating to the Kaiser's troops. But besides emotions, the opponents of the Bolsheviks had other reasons for discontent.

On January 22, 1918, Lenin, by his decree, announced the financial insolvency of Russia - default. At that time, it turned out that by the beginning of World War I, Russia's gold reserves were the largest in the world and amounted to 1.695 billion royal gold rubles. IN metric system this figure corresponds to 1312328325 grams of precious metal, in troy ounces - 42192335.39190706. Multiply this figure by the modern rate of the troy ounce, which is available on the Internet. On January 1, 2011, the Tsar's gold reserves of 1914 would be valued at $59,934,212,424.2.

But by the time the Bolsheviks captured the banks, the gold reserves had decreased by more than 1.5 times. While Russia's total public debt exceeded the country's entire remaining gold reserves. Citing bankruptcy and revolution, the Bolsheviks, for the first time in world history, completely refused to pay debts - to foreigners (although there was enough gold to pay external obligations) and to Russian citizens.

It turned out that, in fact, the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty gave loans from England, France and the USA for the war with Germany, Russia transferred to the same Germany to continue the war with Russia’s creditors, and the Bolsheviks showed a revolutionary fig to the Entente itself. Many people could not come to terms with this. Russian and foreign hands reached out to the Kazan gold reserve depository. Both camps of the Civil and World War spoke about patriotism, saving the Motherland, and the honor of the borrower. But they understood them in the opposite way: to export gold to Berlin (Vienna) or London (Paris, Washington). And at the same time leave some within Russia...

Ordinary residents found themselves hostage to circumstances and reminded the patient of two dentists who took turns pulling the same gold tooth.

For a contemporary, that wound has not yet healed. Because part of the gold simply disappeared in the turmoil of the fighting and sits as a restless thorn in the body of the country in an area known to the Russian special services for more than 80 years.

Even for the author of the book, its information remains an unsolved code. Because the documents authoritatively testify that the treasure is real. But why then have they not yet been found by highly qualified representatives of the banking community and intelligence services? Apparently, “the devil is in the details.” You should re-read again and again all the twists and turns of this golden drama, which the author, as an investigative journalist, presents with the greatest possible care and detail. And only after this you understand: what did the gold hunters not think of during all their previous searches? What detail didn't you pay attention to? Where did you turn your feet? In answering these questions and actually searching for real traces of gold, the reader can surpass his predecessors. What the author sincerely wishes for him.

Two more circumstances of the book's appearance are noteworthy. At 12:38 on November 25, 2009 e-mail her manuscript was sent to the editors of Novaya Gazeta. With a proposal from the author of the investigation to select those fragments that she deems necessary for publication on her pages. On January 15, 2010 at 15:37, in an email correspondence, newspaper editor Dmitry Muratov wrote to the author: “I read it. I'm interested". However, later even this publication became shy about publishing fragments of the investigation.

The digest from the book was published in a small edition on the pages of the newspaper “Evening Kazan” in September - November 2010 in twelve articles. The articles lost sharply in circulation, but won in terms of criticism. They were silently “enlightened” and not challenged in court by the press service of the National Bank of the Republic of Tatarstan (successor to the Kazan branch of the State Bank), Tatarstan employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, as well as treasure hunters. They are all interested in not making a fuss about these valuables until the treasure is discovered.

The only remark on the general historical context of the events, which the author took into account, was made by local historians. And also during the publication of newspaper articles, the grateful son of one of the main figures in the history of 1918, the bank secretary Viktor Kalinin, responded. The son's name is German Viktorovich, he enriched the contents of the book with new details and photographs of his father. He was also grateful that I told readers about the parent.

The author was in no hurry to publish the entire contents of the book until blatant distortions of information about the lost gold appeared in the federal media in the fall of 2010. This was done by treasure hunters. In order to take the reader away from the place of searching for tons of gold.

For your information, Article 51 of the Law on Mass Media, in particular, states: “It is not permitted to use the rights of a journalist established by this law for the purpose of concealing or falsifying socially significant information, spreading rumors under the guise of reliable reports...”

Did people who did not even read this article have a desire to comply with other legal norms and legally share unaccounted millions in gold with the state and society? Doubts about this issue forced the author to speed up the publication of the book.

Member of the Public Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Mark Masarsky - about the possible outcome of the exciting detective story that began in 1918

SCHEME "VLADIVOSTOK - YOKOHAMA HURRY BANK"

- This story, Mark Veniaminovich, is more interesting to read than any detective story. Where do we start?

Because until 1917, Russia's gold reserves were determined by an astronomical figure - 1337 tons. No country in the world (except the USA) could even come close to it. When the Germans came almost close to Petrograd, the tsarist government wisely ordered the evacuation of the gold reserves away from the front, dividing it between Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan.

On the night of August 7, 1918, a small detachment of White Guard Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kappel captured all the “Kazan” gold - 507.1 tons worth 651.5 million rubles. And already in November it ends up in Omsk, with Kolchak. His army of almost one hundred thousand was in dire need of weapons, and they could only be purchased abroad. The gold of Tsarist Russia flowed there.

- How?

The scheme was simple and reliable. Kolchak’s “golden” trains were sent to Vladivostok (out of four, three reached the site, one was captured and plundered by Ataman Semenov), where their contents were reloaded into the basements of the local branch of the State Bank. And then, directly or through the Syndicate company, specially created from banks in the USA, England and Japan, an agreement was concluded with a foreign partner on a loan or supply of weapons. To secure the loan, so-called “collateral gold” was transferred to a foreign bank.

Kolchak transferred gold to many countries. But most of the money went to Japan, where the admiral’s main counterparty was Yokohama Hurry Bank, the only Japanese bank at that time that had official permission to operate in foreign currency.

But the Japanese never delivered weapons to Kolchak. And the gold was not returned.

TWO IMMORTAL AGREEMENTS

Back in 1996, from the rostrum of the Russian State Duma, one of its leaders directly said: “We have everything Required documents, to demand the return of our gold from Japan." What documents were we talking about?

These are two Russian-Japanese financial agreements, signed in October 1919, providing a loan to the Kolchak government in Omsk secured by pure gold in two bills of lading, equivalent to 20 million and 30 million yen - about 60 tons of gold. We looked for these documents all over the world, but found them in Moscow, among the unsorted rubble of the Foreign Ministry archives. And the originals! The discoverers were graduate students and students of the Diplomatic Academy, students of Professor Vladlen Sirotkin, who sifted through thousands of unexplored documents.

The findings consisted of two loan agreements between a Japanese banking syndicate led by Yokohama Hurry Bank and the representative of the State Bank of Russia in Tokyo, I.G. Shchekin, speaking on behalf of the Omsk government. Let me emphasize so as not to return to this again: these were legal interstate agreements for the production of weapons by the Japanese military plant for Kolchak’s army.

We looked for these documents all over the world, but found them in Moscow, among the unsorted rubble of the Foreign Ministry archives

In October - November 1919, the Japanese received Russian gold, which was recorded in the preliminary “Information Message of the Bank of Japan” for 1919. Moreover, this information was leaked to the Japanese press. “Yesterday, Russian gold worth 10 million yen arrived in the city of Tsuruga as a loan to the Omsk government in the amount of 30 million yen,” the Toke Niti Niti newspaper notified readers on November 3, 1919.

The total cost of gold received by the Japanese side from the Kolchak administration as collateral for the promised arms supplies amounted to 54,529,880 gold rubles.

- This, as we remember, did not help Kolchak much...

Yes, literally a couple of weeks after the “golden” transfer, a series of defeats for Kolchak’s army followed; it retreated in panic from Omsk. What happened next is well known: the defeat at Irkutsk, the capture of Kolchak and his death. It was here that the Japanese side seized the excellent opportunity not to deliver what was promised “due to the absence of an addressee.” And it’s trivial to appropriate Russian gold. As a result, the loan was sold for only 300 thousand dollars, and the Japanese satellite Ataman Semenov received the weapons.

And this was only the beginning of the plunder of the royal treasury.

BULLONTS "ON YOUR WORD OF HONOR"

I guess that you mean the Japanese robbery of 25 pounds of gold from the Khabarovsk branch of the State Bank of Russia. This was stated in the telegram of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the RSFSR dated November 21, 1918.

Not only this. The biggest "golden jackpot" was hit by the Japanese thanks to the betrayal of Kolchak's general Sergei Rozanov. On the night of January 29-30, 1920, the Japanese cruiser Hizen moored directly opposite the building of the Vladivostok branch of the State Bank standing on a hill. The landing force that landed from it cordoned off the territory, and an assault group burst into the bank - it was led by Rozanov, dressed in the uniform of a Japanese officer. And the operation was commanded by Japanese intelligence colonel Rokuro Izome, the main specialist in Kolchak’s gold in the Far East.

Within two hours, about 55 tons of Russian gold, without any receipts or acts, were moved from bank vaults to holds Japanese cruiser. Of course, the city authorities lodged an official protest with the Japanese government. Of course, a criminal case was opened against General Rozanov for theft on an especially large scale.

But Japan did not even bother to respond to the ultimatums.

There was another side to the medal. White generals carried tons of gold to the east in their convoys. But, pursued by the Bolsheviks and Chinese Honghuz bandits scurrying around Manchuria, they often found themselves faced with a fateful choice: either be captured and say goodbye to the gold, or...

Give it to the preservation of the only “real” power in Manchuria at that time - the Japanese. And escape the chase "lightly".

On November 22, 1920, the chief of logistics of Kolchak’s army, General Petrov, transferred 22 boxes of gold for temporary storage to the head of the occupation Japanese military administration in Transbaikalia and Manchuria, Japanese Colonel Rokuro Izome.

February 13, 1920, military foreman of Ussuri Cossack army Klok hands over to the commander of the 30th Japanese Infantry Regiment, Colonel Servant, for safekeeping two boxes and five bags of gold from the 38 pounds of gold confiscated by the White Guards in the Khabarovsk office of the State Bank.

Let us also remember about the 33 boxes of gold that were transferred to the Japanese side in March 1920 and placed in the Chosen Bank branch in Osaka. This is evidenced by the protocols of the Tokyo District Court dated March 9, 1925.

Let's add 143 boxes of gold, which General Semenov handed over to Japanese Colonel H. Kurosawa in March 1920 in Chita...

And General Istrov gave the Japanese 1 million 270 thousand gold rubles, General Podtyagin - one and a half million gold rubles, financial agent of the Ministry of Finance of the tsarist government Konstantin Miller - 10 million gold rubles...

- Was this gold given to the Japanese against receipt?

Not always. Who and on my word of honor...

SECRET FUND OF THE KWANTUN ARMY

Recently, the Kyodo Tsushin agency reported that representatives of the ruling circles of Japan took an active part in the illegal import of Russian capital...

Yes, the former president of the Japanese Credit Bank, Yoshio Tatai, managed to prove that at least four tons of Russian gold were stolen from Russia on the direct orders of the Japanese government. And Finance Minister Takahashi is personally involved in the secret transportation of 9.1 tons of Russian gold in 186 boxes into the country.

By the way, most of the gold embezzled by the Japanese, as shown by a parliamentary investigation conducted in Japan in March 1925, went to the “secret fund” of the Kwantung Army. This fund was managed by the future prime minister of the country, General Giichi Tanaka, concentrating by the end of 1922 many tons of Russian gold for a huge amount at that time - more than 60 million yen.

Several years will pass, and thanks to Russian gold Kwantung Army will turn into a real “state within a state” in the vastness of Northern China and Korea...

CHANCE TO CLOSE THE "GOLDEN" TOPIC

- Let me pose the question point blank: Has Russia retained the rights to the gold taken from it?

Undoubtedly. Soviet Union was the legal successor of the Russian Empire and all regimes on its territory until the 1920s inclusive. Just as, according to the Paris Convention, the legal successor of the Russian Empire and all regimes on its territory was Russian Federation. Let us remember how foreign counterparties have always treated us: “if you have to, you pay.” And we state that Article 8, fixed in the agreements of October 6 and 19, 1919, has not lost force: “The State Bank of Russia remains the manager of the gold deposit and, upon request, can return it from Osaka to Vladivostok, paying only six percent of the costs for the return transfer".

I repeat once again: Russia has the full and legal right to demand the return of the pledged gold.

- Are our Japanese partners aware?

In fact, they were never particularly secretive. And until 1925 they calmly waited to see if it would require Soviet Russia return of gold deposits under the 1919 agreements. Wouldn't it require recognition of the legality of the signed agreements? Didn't demand it. And in June 1927, Yokohama Hurry Bank converted part of the collateral gold into government assets worth 62 million yen. And then every ten years the Japanese carried out this banking operation, the profit from which went straight to the treasury. Over 90 years, more than six billion US dollars have accumulated, at the lowest percentages.

Approximate cost of building two nuclear power plants.

Russia has the full and legal right to demand the return of pledged gold

- It is logical to demand the return of interest money and collateral gold to Russia...

Not so simple. When this topic was raised in the media in the 90s, the Japanese, in response to a request from the Russian Foreign Ministry, reported: there is no Russian gold in Japan. I will not go deeper into their argumentation - it does not stand up to criticism. The root of the problem is the Japanese mentality, which I have studied well over the years of living in the Far East. The Japanese, it seems to me, will never admit that they stole Russian gold. For them, preserving national honor and their face before the world is much more important than any economic interests.

Let us also pretend to be “politically correct” that Japan did not steal anything from us. And we will do as Indonesia did in its time. After the end of the Japanese occupation, the devastated country did not begin to extort debts from the former aggressor, but agreed with him on multi-billion dollar investments in the Indonesian economy. They not only revived Indonesia, but also brought considerable taxes into the state treasury...

- Instead of political litigation - a business plan?

Exactly. Do the Japanese need electricity? They are in need. Does Russia need to break the economic blockade that the United States (and its ally Japan) are actually putting on us in the Far East? Without any doubt.

Japan owes Russia, according to my calculations, six billion US dollars. Why not ask the Japanese government to act as a guarantor of energy investments and allow the Japanese Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank (successor to Yokohama Urgent Bank, today the largest in the world) to invest these six billion in the construction of two nuclear power plants in the Russian Far East? Their energy can be supplied to the island of Honshu via sea cable (there is a corresponding project developed Russian Institute.) Moreover, it will be supplied at a reduced price until the Russian side reimburses investors for all the money invested in the construction of the stations. After this, Japanese investors withdraw from co-ownership of the nuclear power plant and two modern plants, built using safe, “post-Chernobyl” technology, remain in Russian ownership.

- You don’t believe in the direct return of “Kolchak’s gold”?

There is no real “Kolchak’s gold”. Bullions and Russian coins have long been melted down. But there is a geopolitical and economic reality where the ability to negotiate and compromise is more valuable than any money. In the investment option there will be no losers: Japan receives cheap electricity, Russia returns its gold reserves in the form of two nuclear power plants.

And it closes the topic of “Russian gold in Japan” forever.

- Does this project have a chance of implementation?

I think the time has come for this. The implementation of the “Indonesian option” of investment would be an asymmetric response to American plans for uncontested supplies of overseas shale LNG to the Far Eastern region. And for the Russian economy - the Far Eastern analogue of the South Gas Stream.

A bitter smile from history: “Yokohama Hurry Bank”, and then “Tokyo Ginko”, created on its basis, is the only one in Japan that until the mid-60s worked reliably with foreign currency. And the Land of the Rising Sun should thank its northern neighbor for this. It was Russian gold that took part in the formation of the Japanese “economic miracle”...

Historical gratitude is a perishable product. Russia has experienced this bitter truth more than once

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