Airborne operations Airborne troops. Participation of the Airborne Forces in the Afghan War

TO largest airborne operation Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War became Vyazemskaya landing operation, carried out during the offensive phase of the Battle of Moscow in the winter of 1942. Alas, it dragged on for almost two months (from January 4 to February 28) and did not lead to the achievement of the desired results.

By the beginning of January 1942, an extremely difficult situation had developed near Moscow for both sides. The Soviet troops, who had been conducting an active offensive for almost a month, were sufficiently exhausted, while the German troops, who had suffered a serious defeat, were exsanguinated and demoralized. In the conditions of a cold winter, both sides experienced a lack of supplies: parts of the Red Army - due to the fact that they were far removed from established communications and were moving through the territory scorched by the enemy, the Germans - due to the weakness of the railway and road network, which was also constantly exposed to attacks by partisans .

The greatest success in the December battles was achieved by units of the Western Front. In less than a month, they fought from 100 to 300 kilometers, and units of the 10th Army of General Golikov and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of General P. A. Belov were far ahead of their neighbors and, having surrounded the German garrison in Sukhinichi, reached railway Moscow-Bryansk is north of the city.

Golikov Philip Ivanovich Belov Pavel Alekseevich

The advanced units of General Belov's corps were located only 8 kilometers from the Warsaw highway. To the right of them the 50th, 49th and 43rd armies attacked, the latter occupied Maloyaroslavets on January 1, 1942. In the German defense, a 40-kilometer breakthrough was outlined on the Sukhinichi-Babynino line, a real possibility was created for Soviet troops to reach the Yukhnov area on the Warsaw highway and further advance to Vyazma - to the rear of the German 4th and 4th tank armies and to the group’s vital communications armies "Center".

To assist the 43rd and 49th armies, advancing from the northeast on both sides of the Warsaw Highway, the command of the Western Front decided to land an airborne assault. The landing force was supposed to cut the highway from Medyn to Gzhatsk, capture the Myatlevo station and stop traffic from the Kaluga region to Vyazma, as well as prevent the withdrawal of troops of the 57th German Army Corps along the Warsaw highway from Maloyaroslavets and Aleshkovo through Medyn to Yukhnov and cover the approaches to the station Myatlevo from a possible enemy counterattack from the Yukhnov area.

The main landing force was the 250th Airborne Regiment of Major N.L. Soldatov, consisting of 1,300 people, which was supposed to be landed by landing method.

Soldatov Nikolay Lavrentievich

Two parachute detachments were to ensure this landing. One detachment of 202 people was supposed to land at the airfield near Bolshoi Fatyanov (5 km east of Myatlevo, on the western bank of the Shani River, to capture the airfield and prepare it to receive landing troops. The second parachute detachment of 348 people was dropped in the area of the villages of Gusevo, Burdukovo and Gusakovo, 12-15 km northwest of Medyn near the Medyn-Gzhatsk highway, he was supposed to put up a barrier against enemy advance from Gzhatsk, and then go out onto the Warsaw highway and blow up the bridge over the Shanya River (10 km southeast of Medyn) , cover the landing area of the main forces from the enemy advance from Maloyaroslavets.

21 TB-3 and 10 PS-84 aircraft were allocated for the operation.

The entire landing was supposed to be carried out in four flights - paratroopers were transferred first, and then infantrymen and equipment were delivered in three flights. However, plans were later changed, and on the first flight on the night of January 4, only one parachute detachment was sent to capture the Bolshoye Fatyanovo airfield, the number of which was increased to 416 people. The landing party was dropped away from the airfield and captured it in battle only by the end of the day on January 4th.

However, due to the onset of a snowstorm, it was decided to stop the operation and cancel the landing. Subsequently, the paratroopers acted as saboteurs - they captured the Myatlevo station, destroyed two trains with equipment located here, and on January 19 they reached the location of the 49th Army.

7 On January 1942, a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters was signed, defining the tasks of the strategic operation to encircle and defeat the main forces of Army Group Center. The left wing of the Western Front, with the forces of the 43rd, 49th, 50th Armies and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, was supposed to launch a flank attack from the Kaluga and Mosalsk area in the general direction of Yukhnov-Vyazma with a simultaneous frontal attack by the right wing armies on Sychevka and Gzhatsk. At the same time, the right wing of the Kalinin Front, consisting of the 22nd and 39th armies, with the 29th Army in reserve, struck from the north on Rzhev and Sychevka. Both strike groups were to meet in the Vyazma area, completing the final defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center.

On January 8, the strike group of the Kalinin Front broke through the enemy defenses northwest of Rzhev. Already on January 10, the advanced units of the 39th Army cut the Rzhev-Velikie Luki highway and reached the Sychevka area. The headquarters of the 9th German Army, which defended the Rzhev sector of the front, moved to Vyazma to avoid being surrounded.

Walter Model (left) and Wilhelm Guderian

The army commander, Colonel General Strauss, resigned and was replaced by General Walter Model.

In the Yukhnovsky direction, by mid-January there was also success: units of the 49th Army came close to the Myatlevo station, units of the 43rd Army occupied Medyn and continued their attack to the west through the Shansky plant. On January 14, 1942, the commander of the Western Front G.K. Zhukov gave the order: the 49th Army - to reach the Pogoreloye area by January 15, the 43rd Army - to capture Myatlevo no later than January 16, the 50th Army - to take Yukhnov by January 17 , Belov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps - by January 20, break through the enemy’s defenses and reach Vyazma.

cavalrymen P.A. Belova

To ensure these actions, on the night of January 16, a reinforced parachute company from the 1st battalion of the 201st airborne brigade was deployed to help the advancing troops 20 km northwest of Medyn. The paratroopers operated on the escape routes of German troops, and later united with units of the 43rd Army that had arrived here.

Part of the result of the actions of this landing group was the decision of the German command to withdraw its units not to the northwest, but to the west of Medyn. As a result, a gap was formed in the enemy defense, into which the 33rd Army of General M. G. Efremov, advancing to the north, entered, breaking contact between the 4th Tank and 4th combined arms armies enemy.

Efremov Mikhail Grigorievich

The main forces of the 4th German Army, numbering up to 9 divisions near Yukhnov, were under threat of being outflanked from the north. South of Yukhnov, by the 20th of January, units of the right flank of the 10th Army reached the Vyazma-Bryansk railway in the Kirov region, disrupting the line communication between the enemy’s 4th Tank and 4th Combined Arms Armies. However, units of the 50th Army and the corps of General Belov were still standing 10-15 km from the Warsaw Highway, and the main forces of the 10th Army, together with the 16th Army, were busy liquidating the group of General von Gilz (6 infantry battalions) encircled in Sukhinichi. and repelling the counterattack of the German 24th Tank Corps, which on January 16 launched an offensive from the Zhizdra area to Sukhinichi with the goal of releasing the city.

Preparation of the Vyazma airborne operation and the disposition of forces on January 27, 1942.

Under these conditions, the command of the Western Front decided to support the offensive of the 50th Army and Belov's corps by landing an airborne assault force behind enemy lines. The landing site was the area of the village of Znamenka and the village of Zhelanye, 40 km south of Vyazma. The task of the landing was to cut the highway from Vyazma to Yukhnov and the Vyazma-Bryansk railway, intercept enemy communications and assist the troops of the Western Front surrounded by its Yukhnov group. At the same time, by advancing in the direction of the village of Temkino, the landing party was supposed to assist the advancement of the 33rd Army.

The landing group included the same 250th Airborne Regiment, as well as the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 201st Airborne Brigade (from the 5th Airborne Corps). The general landing scheme remained the same as during the failed operation in the Bolshoy Fatyanov area, the landing force was released in three stages - first, a group of paratroopers was supposed to capture the Znamensky airfield, after 2.5 hours the launch team was sent out to equip it and prepare for receiving the landing force, and then in groups of 3-4 aircraft (to avoid the accumulation of a large amount of equipment) infantrymen were transferred to the airfield. 21 PS-84 aircraft were allocated to transport paratroopers, and 3 TB-3 bombers were intended to transport 45-mm anti-tank guns. The starting point of the operation was the Vnukovo airfield near Moscow.

PS-84

Due to a strong snowstorm and low clouds, the landing scheduled for the morning of January 17 was postponed to the next night. On the night of January 18, 1942, in the area of the village of Zhelanye, 16 PS-84 aircraft dropped units of the 201st Airborne Brigade - the 2nd battalion of Captain N.E. Kalashnikov and two companies of the 1st battalion under the command of Captain I.A. Surzhik with a total number of 452 soldiers.

The next night, they managed to land another 190 paratroopers here (of the 10 vehicles that took off, some returned due to bad weather). In total, by 8 o'clock in the morning on January 19, 642 paratroopers had gathered in the Zhelanye area, and Captain Surzhik took overall command over them. The attempt made the day before to capture the Znamensky airfield was unsuccessful, since the approaches to it were heavily fortified. However, one and a half kilometers south of Znamenka, the landing reconnaissance group discovered another airfield, where, after clearing the site at 17.50 on January 18, they managed to receive four PS-84 aircraft with 65 fighters from the launch team. However, lacking ski landing gear, the planes were unable to take off from the site. The next day, the Germans attacked the airfield and destroyed all the vehicles, and the launch team and paratroopers retreated to the Zhelanye area to join the main forces of the detachment.

Meanwhile, the fighters of Captain Surzhik, having united with the partisan detachment of A.A. Petrukhin (about 1000 people), with the help of residents of nearby villages, began preparing a snow airfield near the village of Plesnevo. On the night of January 20, the first group of aircraft was received here, and in total, by January 22, 1,643 paratroopers from the 250th regiment, led by the regiment commander, Major N.L., were delivered. Soldatov, as well as weapons and ammunition. The enemy discovered the airfield and attacked it from the air, resulting in the loss of 3 PS-84 aircraft, as well as 27 people killed and 9 wounded. In total, two 45-mm guns, 34 mortars of 82 and 50 mm caliber, and 11 anti-tank rifles were delivered to the paratroopers.

Already on January 20, the 250th Regiment received an order by radio from General G.K. Zhukova: “ By the morning of January 21, part of the forces should capture Klyuchi and, with a blow to the enemy’s rear in the direction of Lyudinovo, assist Belov’s group and enter into contact with it" A clarifying order soon followed: “ First, do not leave the Znamenka, Zhelanye, Lugi area and hold the area at all costs by occupying Znamenka; second - our units (formations of the 33rd Army) are leaving for the Temkino area on January 22, they are given the task of contacting you; third, to assist Belov with part of his forces, approximately two battalions; fourth - at all costs stop the movement of enemy troops along the Yukhnov-Vyazma highway" By decision of the regiment commander, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 201st Airborne Brigade, under the overall command of Captain Surzhik, were sent to the Klyuchi area for the subsequent attack on Lyudinovo.

Having passed through the enemy's rear, Surzhik's detachment occupied several villages, destroying enemy garrisons in them, and on January 28, in the village of Tynovka, he united with the cavalry of General Belov. Meanwhile, the remaining landing units (the so-called “Soldatov group”), together with the partisans, held the captured area. On January 22 and 23, they tried to attack Znamenka several times, but were repulsed by superior enemy forces. The 1st battalion of the 250th regiment attacked the Ugra station on the Bryansk-Vyazma highway, occupied by units of the 365th German reserve infantry regiment, and in two places destroyed large sections of the railway track. The 3rd battalion of the 250th regiment and part of the 1st battalion of the 201st airborne brigade blocked the Yukhnov-Vyazma highway, preventing the movement of enemy troops. However, Znamenka, which was a major stronghold on this highway, still remained in enemy hands - despite the resumption of fierce attacks on the night of January 29-30.

D To complete the encirclement of the Vyazemsk and Yukhnovsk groupings of German troops, it was decided to send out new airborne assault forces. For this purpose, the 4th Airborne Corps of Major General A.F. was transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the Western Front. Levashova.

Alexey Fedorovich Levashov

The development of the landing plan and the organization of the entire operation was entrusted to the headquarters of the Red Army Airborne Forces. For the landing of the corps, 65 transport aircraft and 30 covering fighters were allocated, but in fact only 80 aircraft were at the disposal of the landing forces: 22 TB-3 aircraft from the 23rd Air Division, 39 PS-84 transport aircraft and 19 fighters - four flights out of 402 1st Air Defense Fighter Regiment and a separate group of Pe-3 twin-engine fighters from the 9th Separate Bomber Regiment (the latter conducted long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the operation).

To accommodate these forces and as the initial area of operation, three airfields were allocated in the Kaluga region, 180-200 km from the landing site.

The decision to carry out the operation was made on January 17; it was originally scheduled for January 21. However, the 4th Airborne Corps, sent to Kaluga by rail, was delayed in the Aleksin area due to the blown-up bridge across the Oka River and did not arrive at the concentration area at the required time. Therefore, the disembarkation date was postponed to January 27.

Meanwhile, General Belov's corps finally broke through the defenses of the enemy's 40th Tank Corps on January 26, crossed the Warsaw Highway the next day, entered the valley of the Popolta and Reseta rivers and moved towards Vyazma. Units of the 33rd Army were advancing here from the east, having found a gap in the German defense, and units of the Kalinin Front were moving from the north. The 29th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, rushing south, were introduced into the breakthrough near Sychevka. Already on January 27, units of the 11th Cavalry Corps reached the Minsk highway and the railway to Smolensk west of Vyazma. A “layer cake” had formed; encirclement threatened the main forces of Army Group Center—the 9th and 4th Tank Armies.

The 4th Airborne Corps had the following tasks:

8th Airborne Brigade - land in the Ozerechnya area, take up defense at the Rebrovo-Gradino-Berezniki line and prevent the enemy from retreating to the west;

9th Airborne Brigade - land in the Goryainovka-Ivanovka-Popovo area, straddle the highway and prevent the enemy from approaching from the west;

214th Airborne Brigade - together with a separate tank battalion and an artillery division, land in the Vysotskoye-Pleshkovo-Uvarovo area and remain in the corps reserve.

Thus, the corps units landed at points far apart from each other and the possibility of quickly establishing communications between them remained very doubtful. For reconnaissance and ensuring the landing at 16:00 on January 27, that is, an hour and a half before the main forces were dropped, 7 sabotage groups of 20-30 paratroopers were landed in the landing areas. In addition, several groups were sent to establish contact with Soldatov’s group (201st Airborne Brigade and 250th Cavalry Division) and the 11th Cavalry Corps.

Due to the small number of transport aircraft, the landing of hull formations was carried out one by one. The first to land was the 2nd battalion of the 8th brigade, which had the task of preparing a snowy airfield for receiving the rest of the brigade. However, due to a pilot error, it was dropped not near Ozerechnya, but 15 km to the south, near the village of Taborye. The drop was carried out in one go, from a great height, so the paratroopers were scattered over a very large area (up to 20-30 km). By the morning of January 28, only 476 of the 638 people dropped had reached the assembly area.

That same night, taking advantage of the weakness of Soviet air defense in the Kaluga area, enemy aircraft with 24 Ju-88 and Me-110 aircraft carried out a raid on one of the landing airfields.

Technical data Ju 88A-5

Crew: 4 people
Maximum take-off weight: 13000 kg
Dimensions length x height x wingspan: 14.36 x 4.85 x 20.08 m
Power plant, number of engines x power: 2 x 1200 l. With.
Maximum flight speed at an altitude of 5500 m: 440 km/h
Rate of climb: 9.2 m/s
Practical ceiling: 8230 m
Flight range: 2730 km
Armament: 4 x 7.92 mm MG-15 machine guns

Technical characteristics of the Bf 110C-4

Crew: 2 people
Maximum take-off weight: 6750 kg
Dimensions: length x height x wingspan: 12.65 x 3.50 x 16.27 m
Power plant, number of engines x power: 2 x 1100 l. With.
Maximum flight speed at an altitude of 7000 m: 560 km/h
Rate of climb: 11 m/s
Service ceiling: 10,000 m
Flight range: 775 km
Armament: 4 x 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 x 20 mm MC 151/20 cannons, 1 x 7.92 mm MC 15 machine gun or coaxial MG 81Z machine gun

7 TB-3 aircraft, one fighter and a fuel depot were destroyed. In the following nights, all the airfields from which the 4th Airborne Corps was supposed to land were raided. Previously, these airfields were used by German aviation, and the Germans knew their location, approaches and defense features very well.

Under such conditions, until February 2, only 2,323 paratroopers from the 8th Airborne Brigade and 34,400 kg of cargo were landed. The paratroopers were dropped over a large area, so only 1,320 people reached the assembly areas, and 1,003 people (43% of those who landed) never came to the brigade.

Not receiving reports from the brigade command, the corps headquarters was forced to establish contact with it by sending Pe-3 reconnaissance aircraft and liaison officers in light U-2 vehicles equipped with a ski chassis. Often, with the help of such aircraft, communication was established between the brigade headquarters (for some time it was located in the village of Androsovo, 12 km south of the village of Alferovo) with other units of the brigade.

U-2 (PO-2)

With the entry of the 8th Airborne Brigade and the Soldatov Group of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps into the area of operations, the paratroopers were transferred to the subordination of General Belov. On February 2, General Belov’s corps approached Vyazma, where the advance units of the 33rd Army advancing from the east had reached the day before. The enemy's Yukhnov grouping, that is, the core of the forces of the 4th German Army, whose commander since January 21 instead of General Kübler was appointed infantry General Heinrici, lost contact not only with the left wing of the army, but also with its rear and was actually surrounded.

Gotthard Heinrici

However, the Soviet shock units no longer had the strength to hold the ring - of the 28,000 people in Belov’s corps on January 10, by February 7 he had no more than 6,000 fighters left. Since January 26, there were continuous battles in the area of the Shan plant - units of the 4th German Army of General Heinrici tried to break through to the north and connect with the 4th Tank Army of General Ruof. In the end, on February 3, they succeeded - three divisions of the 33rd Army (113th, 160th and 138th) were cut off from the main forces of the front and took up a perimeter defense southeast of Vyazma. In the following days, German troops managed to restore the defense line along the Warsaw Highway and Belov’s corps also found itself surrounded.

Under these conditions, the command of the Western Front decided to resume the release of the remaining forces of the 4th Airborne Corps to help units of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the Soldatov group to support the 50th Army in breaking through the enemy front along the Warsaw Highway and the final encirclement of the Yukhnov group. The landing force was to include the remaining two brigades of the corps - the 9th and 214th, as well as the last battalion of the 8th brigade. The landing site was assigned to the area east of the Ugra station - the scene of action of Soldatov’s group and partisan detachment Colonel M.G. Kirillov (by this time numbering about 1,200 people).

After the landing, the landing party was supposed to advance to the southeast, reach the area of the village of Pesochnya, occupying the Kurakino-Borodino-Podsosonki and Klyuchi-Tynovka-Leonova lines. Subsequently, he was instructed to strike the enemy from the rear, reach the Warsaw Highway and connect with the advancing units of the 50th Army.

The leadership of the landing was entrusted to the commander of the Red Army Airborne Forces - V.A. Glazunov.

Vasily Afanasyevich Glazunov

The initial area of the operation was designated as the Moscow airfield junction, well covered by air defense forces; the landing site was 300 km away from it. 23 TB-3 aircraft and 41 PS-84 aircraft took part in the operation. Due to the small number of vehicles, the landing was again carried out in groups over several nights. At the same time, from the first group of 20 TB-3 aircraft, which took off on the night of February 17 with the battalion of the 214th Airborne Brigade, 19 aircraft did not find the landing area and returned back. One plane dropped troops, but these paratroopers and the brigade subsequently never connected and there was no further information about them. The next night, 293 people and 32 bales of weapons were thrown out of 12 PS-84 vehicles in the same area.

Parachutist equipment

The parachutist gunner's equipment when making jumps in summer and winter conditions consisted of:

1. Shoulder strap. 2. Waist belt. 3. Belt cartridge double-slot bag.

4. Belt spare cartridge bag (for explosives - 400 g and gun accessories).

5. Flasks with a cover. 6. Grocery bags.

7. Two unified cases - for a small shovel (small ax) and for hand grenades.

8. Pouch for SVT magazines (for two magazines). 9. Raincoat tents (taken only in summer).

Over the next week, units of the 4th Airborne Corps were dropped every night. On the night of February 19, all PS-84 transport aircraft and TB-3 heavy bombers carried out 89 sorties, dropping 538 people and 96 bales of cargo. On the night of February 20, the landing was especially massive - 2,551 people landed behind enemy lines. The next night, the landing force was limited due to deteriorating weather (fog, cloud height 300-400 m). Despite this, 37 crews made sorties, 476 people and 73 bales of weapons were dropped. On the night of February 22, the landing was again massive - 1,676 people were landed. On February 23, 1,367 people landed, on February 24, 38 sorties were flown and 179 paratroopers were dropped. This completed the landing of the corps.

In total, from February 17 to 24, 612 sorties were carried out to drop airborne troops, of which 443 were successful; 3 crews did not return from the combat mission. During this time, 7,373 people and 1,524 bales of ammunition, weapons, food and various property were landed and thrown out.

However, due to the scattering over a large area, the collection of the corps proceeded slowly. In the first days, only half of the corps personnel gathered, and 30% of the paratroopers never joined up with their units - some of them went missing, some acted as partisans. During the landing, enemy aircraft provided strong opposition. On February 23, during an attack by a German Me-110 fighter on a TB-3 aircraft with a corps headquarters, the commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, Major General A.F., was killed. Levashov. However, the pilot managed to land the heavily damaged vehicle in the snow and save the rest of the paratroopers. Chief of Staff Colonel A.F. took command of the corps. Kazankin.

The situation in the Yukhnovsko-Vyazma direction by February 18, 1942and tasks of the 4th Airborne Forces

Only by February 24 did the corps begin to fulfill its task. However, the offensive was carried out slowly - the enemy managed to pull up its reserves to the landing site and equip defensive positions. Only on February 27 did corps units manage to capture the village of Klyuchi, 10 km north of the Warsaw Highway, and the next day they reached the line designated to meet with the 50th Army.

However, units of the 50th Army had virtually no success and never reached the Warsaw Highway. The front line in this area stabilized until the spring of 1943, when the Germans abandoned the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. The 4th Airborne Corps, having united with the corps of General Belov and the remnants of the 33rd Army, continued to operate behind enemy lines along the Vyazma-Bryansk and Sukhinichi-Smolensk railways until the summer. On June 24, 1942, the remnants of the corps, numbering 2,800 people, reached the 10th Army of the Western Front.

A.F. Kazankin with paratroopers

ABOUT At the same time as the Vyazemsky landing, there was a private use of airborne units in the Rzhev area. During the breakthrough of the German group from the 9th Army encircled near Olenino, part of the forces of the 29th Army of the Kalinin Front was in turn surrounded. To assist them, it was decided to land an airborne assault force in this area, consisting of one battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade, consisting of 425 people under the command of Lieutenant P.N. Belotserkovsky. The starting point of the landing was one of the airfields of the Kalinin air hub; the landing site was designated the area of the villages of Monchalovo and Okorokovo, where units of the 29th Army held the defense.

The drop of paratroopers and cargo was carried out on the night of February 17 from TB-3 aircraft. However, due to the fact that the encirclement area did not exceed 4 km in diameter, a significant part of the paratroopers landed outside it. In total, 312 paratroopers were dropped in the indicated area, another 38 people mistakenly landed in their rear (near Staritsa), and 75 soldiers did not make the jump and were brought back. Of those who successfully landed, only 166 people made it to the location of the 29th Army, while one of the groups of paratroopers managed to destroy an enemy artillery battery. A week later, on the night of February 24, units of the 29th Army broke through in a southwestern direction and linked up with units of the 39th Army.

monument at the landing headquarters

On January 7, 1988, the heroic battle of the ninth company of the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment began in Afghanistan at height 3234. This battle is known to the public thanks to feature film Bondarchuk "9th company". Today we will remember the stories when the landing troops of the USSR and Russia played a decisive role in hostilities.

Battle at Height 3234. Ninth Company

For two days - from January 7 to January 8, 1988 - Hill 3234 was defended by the ninth parachute company of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment with a total number of 39 people, with the support of regimental artillery.

The enemy of the Soviet troops were special rebel units trained in Pakistan. As a result of a twelve-hour battle, from 200 to 400 rebels with 39 paratroopers failed to capture the heights; after suffering heavy losses, the Mujahideen retreated.

In the ninth company, six paratroopers were killed, twenty-eight were injured, nine of them seriously. Junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov and private Andrei Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

From the story of Sergei Sergei Borisov, squad commander: “...During the last attack, junior sergeant Andrei Tsvetkov received a fatal wound to the head. In a state of shock, without letting go of the machine gun, he began to fall. But the machine gun continued to shoot and fell silent only when Andrei lay down to the ground".

This episode is shown in the film "9th Company"

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

By the end of December 1941, the only center of resistance fascist troops Sevastopol remained in Crimea. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, pulled most of the available forces to the city, leaving only one to cover the Kerch area infantry division. Headquarters decided to take advantage of this circumstance.

This was the first such large-scale landing operation in history. The landing force included 82,500 people and several hundred guns, mortars, and tanks. To support the ongoing operation, over 250 ships and vessels were involved, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats.

Despite the initial success, the operation ended in major failure: three soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as the loss of a significant number of heavy weapons.

Vyazma airborne operation

On January 18, 1942, the Vyazma airborne operation began, aimed at helping the armies of Kalinin and Western fronts who were surrounded by the forces of the German Army Group Center

At first, the Red Army was successful. As a result of the offensive of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, the German defense was broken through in several areas. To assist the advancing troops, the Soviet command decided to send troops south of Vyazma with the task of cutting the Vyazma-Yukhnov highway and the Vyazma-Bryansk railway. The first group of paratroopers, consisting of the 201st Airborne Brigade and the 250th Infantry Regiment, was landed behind German troops south of Vyazma between January 18 and 22.

The landing took place at night, and the 250th Infantry Regiment was landed using the landing method - the paratroopers jumped without parachutes, from low-flying aircraft. Having intercepted enemy communications, the paratroopers contributed to the offensive of the 33rd Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Dnieper airborne operation

It was carried out from September 24 to November 28, 1943 with the aim of assisting the troops of the Voronezh Front in crossing the Dnieper. On the part of the Red Army, about 10 thousand people and about 1000 anti-tank guns and machine guns took part in it.

The operation did not achieve its goals - the ejected paratroopers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation - in small groups and individually they were in a zone densely saturated with enemy troops. They fought an unequal battle with an acute lack of ammunition, using only light small arms, not knowing the terrain and the situation.

Numerous errors and shortcomings in the preparation of the plan derailed the operation. Despite the ill-conceived plan, imprecise landing and numerical superiority of the enemy, the paratroopers with active actions drew back large enemy forces and inflicted significant losses on him in manpower and equipment. According to Soviet data, up to 3,000 German soldiers were killed, 15 trains, 52 tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 18 tractors and 227 vehicles were destroyed.

Moonsund landing operation

On September 29, 1944, an advanced landing force of 1,150 people was landed on Muhu Island in Kuivastu. They cleared the area, thereby ensuring the safety of the entire landing group. During September 30, torpedo boats made 181 trips and transported over 5,600 people of the 249th Infantry Division to the island.

For a month and a half, the landing of Soviet troops tried to break through the layered defense of the Germans. This was done after a massive artillery and air attack on the fascist positions on November 18. On November 24, the island was completely cleared of the enemy.

The liberation of the Moonsund archipelago was important: the ships of the Baltic Fleet were able to control the Gulf of Finland and Riga, resulting in a direct threat to the left flank of the Nazi troops.

Panjshir operation

The operation took place in May-June 1982, during which the first mass landing was carried out in Afghanistan: during the first three days alone, over 4,000 people were landed from helicopters. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various military branches took part in this operation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 kilometers of the gorge. As a result, most of the Panjshir Gorge was taken under control.

Battle at Height 776

4 kilometers from Ulus-Kert on February 29, 2000, the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers, supported by a group of 15 soldiers and an artillery division of the 104th parachute regiment - a total of 90 people, entered into an unequal battle with fifteen times superior forces of militants Khattab and Shamil Basayev .

For almost a day, the militants could not escape from the Argun Gorge. At the end of the battle, after the death of Mark Evtyukhin, who commanded the company, Captain Viktor Romanov called fire from the regimental artillery on himself. The height was covered with artillery fire.

The enemy lost up to 700 people killed, but nevertheless broke through from the Argun Gorge. Almost all the hero paratroopers died, and out of 90 soldiers, only six remained alive.

Throw on Pristina

On the night of June 12, 1999, paratroopers of the Russian peacekeeping forces, ahead of NATO troops, entered the territory of Yugoslavia. By forced march from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they occupied the Slatina airfield near Pristina, and a few hours later units of other foreign armies arrived there.

The commander of NATO forces in Europe, American General Wesley Clark, ordered the English General Michael Jackson, who commanded the group in the Balkans, to capture the airfield before the Russians.

Subsequently, the famous British singer James Blunt, who served in the NATO group in 1999, testified about General Clark’s order to recapture the airfield from Russian paratroopers: “About 200 Russians were located at the airfield.... General Wesley Clark’s direct order was to “suppress them.” Clark used unusual for us expressions. For example - “destroy.” To capture the airfield there were political reasons. But the practical consequence would be an attack on the Russians."

Michael Jackson replied that he was not going to fight the Russian paratroopers and thereby start the Third World War.

As a result of the experience of the Second World War, views on the offensive value of large airborne operations began to be characterized by greater realism. “The parachute is no longer a life-saving device, it has become an offensive weapon of the future,” wrote one of the Soviet military commentators in 1930, when the first units of parachute troops were formed in the USSR. For five years, only in the Soviet Union was experimental work carried out on the training and formation of paratroopers. In 1935, the first major maneuvers of airborne troops took place in Kyiv, where military representatives were present foreign countries, in front of which an airborne assault of over 1,000 people with weapons was demonstrated. In the same year, one Soviet division with all its weapons and light tanks was airlifted from Moscow to Vladivostok, a distance of more than 6,400 km. Soon after this spectacular demonstration, the end of the Soviet monopoly came when Goering created the first paratrooper units in Germany from selected soldiers of the Hermann Goering regiment. Other countries were in no hurry to organize airborne troops. The USA, Japan and Italy lagged far behind in this regard. In England, too, this matter moved extremely slowly. Only in June 1940 did Winston Churchill move forward on the issue of airborne troops. "We must have an airborne force of at least 5,000 men...please send me a War Department memorandum on this subject." So he wrote to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, and after about a month the issue was resolved.

By this time, the airborne troops had already had some successes, although they had to deal with a weak and small enemy. Even before the outbreak of World War II, airborne troops were used to capture bridgeheads, important bridges and road junctions. This was in 1939, when Germany occupied part of Czechoslovakia and when the USSR annexed Bessarabia that same year. These operations were only slightly more serious than maneuvers and did not allow testing the combat qualities of the airborne troops. When did the second one start? World War, the airborne troops had their first important tactical success in the Norwegian campaign. The Germans dropped parachute troops near the airfields of Stavanger and Oslo. The purpose of these landings was to capture airfields necessary for the landing of airborne troops and the operations of German Air Force units. This goal was achieved, and within about 24 hours, fuel, air bombs, airfield equipment, and anti-aircraft guns were airlifted to these airfields. German aviation began its operations from both airfields. However, many paratroopers landed outside the drop zones and were injured. During this operation there were great difficulties with the collection of troops on the ground and with the organization of communications; The Germans were simply lucky that the Norwegians in the area offered almost no resistance.

Airborne operations in Norway did not answer basic questions. What is the actual striking force of the airborne troops? What quantity is best to use? How long are they able to resist strong and weak opponents? How decisive can their actions be in attack or offensive? A study of the major airborne operations carried out during the Second World War does not provide a clear answer to all these questions; but it helps to clarify some of the advantages and disadvantages of airborne troops.

When the Germans planned a major airborne landing on the Dutch Walhaven airfield near Rotterdam as a prelude to the attack on Belgium, France and Holland on May 10, 1940, they did not imagine that the Dutch would give up resistance within less than a week, and that the Belgians would follow. For the German Air Force at that time, it was important to capture forward air bases as quickly as possible to ensure the invasion of France, since their close air support aircraft - Messerschmitt 109 fighters and Junkers 87 dive bombers - had a range of only 175 km. This meant that air units had to quickly move forward, following the advance of their tank divisions. What did the above-mentioned paratroopers and airborne troops who landed near Rotterdam achieve in order to capture the Walhaven airfield, which was assigned an important role in the German plan? The 2,000 paratroopers who took part in the operation learned how vulnerable they were to attack by ground forces. At one point, the Dutch infantry managed to recapture this airfield from the Germans. The Germans suffered heavy losses, and although at that time allied forces retreated, more than 100 German prisoners were captured and taken to England for interrogation. Considering this airborne operation as a whole, it is difficult to justify its conduct. If the Allies had resisted to the fullest extent of their strength, the airborne troops would not have been able to keep the airfield in their hands. But Allied ground resistance was so weak that the Germans would have captured the airfield within two or three days anyway.

It is important to note that during the subsequent rapid German advances in France in 1940, in Russia in 1941, or in Africa in 1942, airborne troops were never used to capture airfields located a short distance ahead of the advancing troops. It is quite natural that when the parachute troops were still an experimental branch of the army, such an authoritative figure as General Student, commander of the German paratroopers, wanted to quickly introduce his troops into German army.

It is difficult to imagine how airborne troops would cope in the future with such a task as the capture of Walhaven in May 1940.

Italian airborne troops also launched an unsuccessful attack on an airfield in Libya in 1942, but this was based more on showing off their airborne forces than on using them as an auxiliary force in the overall military plan. The use of airborne troops to capture any island on which there is or can be established an important air base, of course, presents a completely different problem. It may become the main combat mission of airborne troops in the future.

And yet the first major operation This kind, carried out during the Second World War, gave rise to great doubts when its results were analyzed from a military point of view. The German airborne landing on Crete can be seen as a strategic mistake. The German military campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 was lightning fast. If there are air bases on the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, in Italy and Greece on the island. Rhodes and, of course, North Africa Germany's air and naval forces could establish dominance in the Mediterranean without capturing Crete. They lacked the air power, not the air bases, to capture Malta and support Rommel's corps in Africa. Before landing an airborne assault on Crete, the Germans used large forces of glider landing troops for the first time on April 26, 1941 to capture the Isthmus of Corinth and the city of Corinth. Landing and landing troops on gliders were also used for experimental purposes in the summer of 1940 to capture the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. But during the capture of Corinth, as well as later during the capture of Crete, there were many accidents among the landing troops delivered on gliders. It is quite clear that after the summer of 1941 the Germans used gliders only for transporting goods.

Airborne paratroopers on Jim's Island

The airborne landing on Crete did not give the Germans any great advantages strategically. When the Axis countries sent their convoys to support the Cretan operation, the latter were virtually destroyed by the British fleet. Therefore, an airborne landing was necessary to capture the island. But if the Germans had left Crete in the hands of the Allies, wouldn't the British navy and air force have had to carry out additional defense and supply tasks, which would have led to increased losses for England and the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Mediterranean theater of operations? The British Navy would have to fight a difficult battle with large aviation forces based in the Athens area, as was shown by the large losses of the fleet during the operation to capture the island. Crete.

Perhaps the Cretan operation was even more important for the implementation of the “Barbarossa Plan” - the German attack on the USSR. The landing operation on Crete tied down about 500 German transport aircraft for several months, which were essential for transporting troops during the attack on the USSR. Moreover, some transport aviation units suffered heavy losses during the capture of Crete, so that in June 1941 they were understaffed and insufficiently ready for action. This took place precisely at a time when the German Air Force needed maximum mobility. Moreover, the Germans were forced to use about one third of the fighter and bomber aircraft units intended for use against Russia during the capture of Crete. Instead of resting them and preparing them for an attack on Russia, they had to be transferred to air bases in Poland and East Prussia. This happened several weeks before the attack began. Many of the crews involved in the intensive operations to capture Crete were fatigued, and the squadrons had low combat readiness. The operation to capture Crete not only delayed the German attack on the USSR, but significantly reduced the striking power of the German Air Force, which was the vanguard of its armed forces.

If the strategic significance of the airborne operation to capture Crete was dubious, then from an operational point of view, despite the German victory, the operation turned out to be disastrous. Theoretically, the conditions for an airborne operation were almost ideal.

Aviation opposition was suppressed, air defense turned out to be weak, and the defenders had only a few light tanks. They had poor communications and few means of transport. The Germans dropped two or three thousand paratroopers in the areas of three airfields - Maleme, Retimo and Heraklion. In two drop zones, paratroopers were destroyed after landing. Even at Maleme airfield they were nearly defeated by two battalions of New Zealand troops; but they managed to hold on in this area, and since nothing prevented the Germans from delivering reinforcements by air, the victory of the airborne troops was ensured. But the victory was not easy for the Germans: they suffered heavy losses in manpower and aircraft. Germany never again carried out major airborne operations, although there were many moments when the Germans had every opportunity to carry them out. The Germans did not carry out an airborne landing operation on Malta, nor did they use airborne troops against the USSR. There is no doubt that in 1940 and 1941 the Germans realized how inappropriate it was to use large forces of airborne troops, since they were very vulnerable and suffered heavy losses, especially in transport aircraft. Not surprisingly, Hitler wanted to expand production of transport aircraft, even at the expense of reducing fighter production. Since the main goal of German strategy in the spring of 1941 was the defeat of Russia, it is difficult to judge what impact the airborne landing on Crete had on the German successes. The island of Crete was not a decisive stronghold for Axis operations in the Mediterranean, since the British naval forces in this area could be increased to their maximum size.

The strategic background of the Allied airborne landings at Arnhem in September 1944 was, of course, completely different. This time the airborne troops played important role in the Anglo-American military plans, which provided for the end of the war as soon as possible. In August 1944, the German army was retreating to Flanders and through France to the Siegfried Line at a rate that had not been achieved in the summer of 1940.

The task of the Anglo-Americans was to ensure rapid advance to the Meuse and the Rhine, but due to difficulties in delivering fuel, food, ammunition and other supplies from the Normandy landing bridgeheads to the advancing troops, the number of advanced units was reduced, and they turned into small tank patrols. Under these conditions, the rapid crossing of the Rhine could have played an important role. General Montgomery's plan was to seize the crossings across the lower Rhine with the help of airborne troops and, with the help of his northern army group, develop an offensive through the North German Plain to Berlin. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to place at his disposal most of the available vehicles and equipment, and this meant dooming the American troops west of the Rhine to inaction. However, Eisenhower refused to consider this plan. The Allied plan of action for this decisive stage of the war was adopted in Brussels on 10 September. The airborne troops were to capture bridgehead positions on the Meuse, Waal and Rhine rivers, and then, instead of advancing into Germany, Montgomery was to liberate Antwerp by capturing Fr. Walcheren and the destruction of German troops on the banks of the Scheldt.

But even this plan turned out to be too pretentious. The detailed plan developed by the First Allied Airborne Army at Airborne Forces Headquarters was also not very successful. General Brereton's officers hurriedly assembled at headquarters near Ascot Racecourse in southern England. During the first two or three weeks of its existence, the headquarters drew up a plan to drop parachute and landing units on the other side of the Seine and Somme rivers, but this plan was disrupted by the rapid advance of troops. General Eisenhower made a belated decision to support Montgomery's plan to cross the lower Rhine, Meuse and Waal, using bridgeheads captured by airborne troops. There was little time to conduct intensive reconnaissance of the drop zones, nor was there enough time for the detailed planning that is a necessary condition for conducting a major airborne operation. The Germans planned the landing operation on Crete many months in advance. Allied airborne headquarters postponed drawing up detailed plans for last week before starting the operation. In mid-September, three airborne divisions, two American and one British, supported by a Polish brigade, were to be dropped along a line running through Dutch territory from Eindhoven to Arnhem.

On September 17, about 750 transport aircraft and gliders took off, and from the very beginning the landing was a success. The gunner aircraft completed their task almost 100 percent. Anti-aircraft artillery and enemy fighters shot down less than 2 percent of aircraft and gliders. In the Eindhoven area, close to the advancing British troops, an American airborne division dropped out, which a few hours later linked up with the ground forces. It is highly doubtful whether there was any need to drop an entire airborne division into this area. Perhaps one battalion would be enough. It would be more expedient to use the rest of the division to carry out diversionary actions near the German borders in Nijmegen or Arnhem. The Second American Airborne Division occupied a strong bridgehead in Nijmegen, but an important bridge over the river. Baal remained in German hands for two decisive days, which delayed the connection of the landing force with the troops in Arnhem. The plan was not carried out for reasons that are common to all major airborne operations. The reconnaissance was poorly done. Both British and American intelligence underestimated the Germans' ability to reorganize their badly battered tank units in a timely manner. The Allied airborne troops suddenly found themselves in front of the main forces of two tank divisions, which had large quantity tanks than expected. Couldn't this mistake be repeated during major airborne operations? Thus, a small group of enemy tanks can easily destroy the forward echelon of an airborne assault force. It is true that modern transport aircraft can drop heavier tanks and guns than during the Second World War, but the difficulty of supplying ammunition and fuel, as well as organizing radio communications in the first twenty-four hours after a drop, will almost always allow defending tanks to maintain a local tactical advantage. In modern mobile warfare, it will be almost impossible to accurately determine in advance the number of enemy tanks in the areas of drop zones.

Bad weather hampered the delivery of supplies and also delayed the arrival of the Polish brigade in Arnhem for reinforcements. In other areas and at other times of the year, you might be able to pick three or four days of good weather. But good weather favors the actions of enemy artillery and aircraft, exposing them to targets in the landing zones. During the landing at Arnhem the weather was bad; In northwestern Europe in September it is rare to expect good flying weather for three days in a row. A more important issue is the organization of communication. During the decisive period of hostilities, the headquarters of the Allied airborne army, located in southern England, had no contact with the British airborne division dropped near Arnhem. Communications are almost always a weak point in large airborne operations. How can signal units be expected to operate successfully during the initial landing period after the first casualties, when there is general confusion, with men and equipment scattered throughout the drop zones? The Germans encountered this difficulty during the airborne landings on Crete. The Russians, too, as a result of small battalion-sized landings in the Don basin and Crimea in 1943 and 1944, found this problem virtually insoluble.

General Guingan, one of the main participants in drawing up the plan to capture Arnhem, pointed out in his book Operation Victory that due to a lack of aircraft, it was impossible to completely airlift the 1st Airborne Division in less than two days. Therefore, on the first day, the Germans were able to locate the Allies and attack them at a time when only half the landing force had been dropped. It can be doubted that at any time in the future it will be possible to assemble a sufficient number of transport aircraft for a major airborne operation. In the age of atomic and hydrogen bomb Even more transport aircraft and helicopters will be needed than before for anti-submarine warfare, civil defense, army support, and as a reserve vehicle for urgent military transcontinental transport. Sometimes one can read about the huge number of airborne troops in the USSR and in the countries of its allies, determined by many hundreds of thousands of fighters, but the Communists, having vast areas, many of which have an underdeveloped railway network, will apparently never be able to allocate 1000 or even 500 aircraft for a major airborne operation. Most likely they will limit themselves to landing small airborne assault forces of up to a battalion. The Russians will also dump partisans and saboteurs who successfully acted against the Germans on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. The partisans' actions against airfields in the occupied territory were so successful that the German command was forced to strengthen their security. This was at a time when the German army was already short of soldiers. In the event of war, the Communists would be able to carry out similar operations against airfields and possibly against major bomb depots.

In light of the already known vulnerability of the landing force at that time and the uncertainty in the outcome of large airborne operations, the Arnhem operation seems too pretentious. According to the plan, the advance detachment of paratroopers was supposed to hold Arnhem for about three days, until the British second army, advancing from Antwerp through Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen, came into contact with the paratroopers. Three airborne divisions were to capture and hold three important bridges. The troops held out in Arnhem for more than a week, although the failure of the operation was obvious by the end of the third day. Due to communication disruptions, only 10 percent of the supplies dropped from the planes ended up in the hands of friendly troops. Such failures are possible in the future, but not with such a catastrophic outcome.

The reasons for the failure of the airborne operation in Arnhem will be mentioned again and again in military chronicles. They consist of poor intelligence, poor communications, a lack of vehicles and the general vulnerability of the airborne troops. It would be unfair to the Red Devils, who were part of the British airborne forces, to treat the assessment of their exceptional heroism and courage with purely military dogmatism. For nine terrible days after September 17, 1944, they had to endure enemy fire, thirst, hunger and uncertainty. The troops were accompanied by doctors who shared with them all the hardships of front-line life: wounds, death and captivity. The Dutch population did everything possible to feed the paratroopers and provide shelter for the dying. The paratroopers were people capable of carrying out the most daring plan, but too much was demanded of them.

It should be noted that the next major Allied airborne operation in Europe was more modest in scale and carried out more carefully. In the spring of 1945, two airborne divisions were used to cross the Rhine at Wesel. It was on the morning of March 24, 1945. This time, using the British 6th and American 17th Airborne Divisions, Montgomery used new but more conservative tactics. In Normandy and Arnhem, airborne troops were dropped, as usual, before the offensive. During this operation they did the opposite. The night before, the advancing troops crossed the Rhine on special ships, and tanks were transported with them in the first echelons. At 10 a.m. the next day, paratroopers were dropped in an area just outside the firing range of their artillery. Thus, the main forces were able to provide immediate support to the airborne troops before the Germans could bring up their forces. For twenty-four hours, the strip separating the airborne troops from the main forces was impregnable, and all the main objects in the drop zone were captured and held. The operation at Wesel, although significant in scale, turned out to be very modest in tactical terms. The enemy was able to offer only minor resistance in the air, and the airborne troops could quickly link up with the main forces.

A similar general tactical situation developed in almost all airborne operations in the Pacific theater of military operations. In the war between America and Japan there were no airborne operations similar to those in Crete or in the Arnhem area. The geographical location of the Pacific theater of operations and the conditions of logistics there were, of course, completely different, not comparable to the European theater. For example, during the New Guinea campaign in 1943, American airborne forces were successful, but they were used on a limited scale and in the face of very little opposition from Japanese aircraft and ground forces. In September 1943, an American airborne regiment, along with a small detachment of Australian paratroopers, was dropped at Nazdab. They were closely supported by a battalion of Australian ground forces, which had already crossed the Markham River and was within gunshot of the ejected parachute detachment. The latter, with a strength of about 1,700 people, was essentially a reconnaissance landing, since it did not capture any important objects or bridgeheads and was mainly engaged in reconnaissance. On another occasion during the same campaign, some 1,400 American paratroopers participated in part of the plan to capture Salamoa and Lae. The airborne assault had to be dropped on the airfield. This was successful, although many paratroopers were injured; The enemy resistance here was so weak that one battalion of airborne troops, which was planned to be dropped by parachute, landed at the airfield after the plane landed. In both of these 1943 operations in New Guinea, airborne troops were used as local reinforcements rather than as the vanguard of an attack. In the future, such actions may be one of the most important tasks of the airborne forces.

There is no doubt that the airborne troops played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad. In the summer of 1942, the General Staff of the Soviet Army completely incorrectly determined the direction of the main German attack. The Russians believed that the main attack would be directed against Moscow, but instead an attack was launched on Voronezh and Stalingrad. At that time, Soviet airborne divisions were concentrated east of Moscow. At the beginning of 1942, they took part in the battles near Leningrad and Smolensk, as well as in the Donetsk basin. In August 1942, Stalin was forced to radically revise his plan and make organizational changes as the Germans threatened Stalingrad, the city that bore his name. He reorganized the airborne troops into infantry, artillery and armored forces. guards divisions and rushed them south to stop the advancing German army. Large forces of long-range bomber aircraft and as many transport air units as possible participated in the transfer of former airborne troops who still wore their old insignia. They were mercilessly thrown into the battle of Stalingrad, and it brought success; they played a decisive role in the glorious victory, which went down in world history.

Of course, long before Battle of Stalingrad The German high command used the airborne troops of General Student (7th Air Corps) to eliminate the crisis on the Soviet-German front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, General Ramcke's parachute units were busy fighting in North Africa, covering Rommel's withdrawal from El Alamein at the end of 1942. Later, General Ramke's airborne units continued to successfully participate in ground forces in Sicily, Italy and France in 1943 and 1944. It is necessary to note the tenacity of these units during the defense of the Brest fortress in 1944.

After the Battle of Stalingrad a large number of former Soviet airborne troops acted as infantry as part of the ground forces, participating in battles in the north - near Demyansk and Staraya Russa, in the center - near Kursk and Orel and in the south - in major battles of the Soviet Army, during which the Donbass was returned and most of Ukraine. By the end of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front for the use of airborne troops to support the offensive of the Soviet Army was ideal. It was clear to the Soviet high command that the enemy could no longer launch a serious and major counteroffensive. Ahead were rivers and German lines of communication, beckoning Soviet paratroopers. Along the banks of the Volkhov, Lovat and Dnieper, and later the Oder, Prut, Bug, Dniester, Berezina, Vistula and other rivers, German troops held very fragile positions. They removed from their Eastern Front for the defense of Germany more and more fighters and anti-aircraft artillery units that could counter the low-speed transport and landing aircraft and gliders. But almost all of the former airborne troops of the Soviet Army continued to operate as part of the ground forces. In fact, if you look at the complete statistics of the Second World War, you would find that at least 3/4 of all the battles carried out by airborne units of Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, England and America were conventional ground combat and that in most cases airborne troops were not transported to combat areas by air.

However, the Soviet command in the combined landing operation in Crimea in April 1944 used parachute troops in moderate numbers. The use of airborne troops as a forward echelon, with the goal of capturing or holding a bridgehead on the enemy’s coast, will remain in the future the main type of combat operations of airborne troops. Sometimes meteorological conditions make it very difficult to conduct airborne operations; Thus, gliders and airplanes when flying through water can encounter great difficulties due to strong winds. A similar incident occurred in February 1945, during the American airborne landing on the island. Corregidor. About 2,000 American paratroopers were dropped in a small coastal area to support the amphibious landing at San Jose in the Philippines. This operation was extremely risky, as strong winds blew and there were dangerous rocks in the drop zone. However, the losses were only 10 percent, that is, half of the expected losses. Airborne troops bypassed Japanese fortifications at the most crucial moment of the campaign. General MacArthur, pleased with the success of the airborne troops, said: “The operation to capture Fr. Corregidor is clear proof that the days of permanent fortresses are over." This bold statement may have been made in part by the initial successes of American airborne forces in the same Philippine campaign that had great importance personally for General MacArthur. During the American offensive in the southern part of the island. Luzon, a month before the landing on the coast of Corregidor, troops of the US 11th Airborne Division captured an important crossroads. However, this landing was small - up to a regiment in strength. The commander, aware of the difficulties of the operation, did not want his regiment to be thrown more than a day's march from the main forces. His predictions of difficulties came true. The alarm system that ensured the drop was broken, and more than half of the paratroopers landed outside the intended zone. But important objects were nevertheless captured, and this operation contributed to the rapid advance of troops to the capital of the Philippines, Manila.

The airborne landings in Sicily in July 1943 to support an Anglo-American invasion demonstrated that strong high-altitude winds and other unforeseen bad weather conditions could disrupt a major airborne operation involving paratroopers and gliders. The inexperience of tow plane pilots and glider pilots also had an impact bad influence to perform this operation. A strong southeast wind, sometimes turning into a storm, knocked most of the planes and gliders off course. Several gliders unhooked from the towing aircraft ahead of time, and more than 50 gliders sank into the sea five to six kilometers from the coast. Some gliders and paratroopers landed 60 km from the intended drop zone. American and British paratroopers were scattered in small groups between Licata and Noto and were forced to fight almost independently. But despite this, important local success was achieved. A group of paratroopers, delivered on gliders, captured one of the important objects - the Ponte Grande bridge, which was the key to the advance of troops to the port of Syracuse.

Airborne troops on the island. Sicily encountered the usual difficulties characteristic of this type of operation: difficulties in landing, collecting after landing and finding dropped equipment. They suffered not only from the wind and other weather conditions, but also from the fire of their anti-aircraft artillery. Anti-aircraft fire caused casualties in personnel and disabled many aircraft and gliders, which lost their course in the darkness. Shortly before the Allied landings, the Germans also dropped paratroopers in some areas to strengthen their garrisons. This further complicated the situation. In the darkness, unexpected curious collisions occurred between paratroopers of both sides.

The failures of the airborne forces over the dusty olive orchards of Sicily in July 1943, and over the fields of Algeria and Tunisia in November 1942, were not to be repeated on the day of the Normandy invasion in the summer of 1944, when the airborne troops led Operation Overlord. . The lessons of previous failures were taken into account. The troops were transported by plane exactly to the designated areas, losses were insignificant, and all the main tasks assigned to the airborne troops were completed. The glider landing force was especially successful, with the task of capturing bridges across the river. Orne and the Caen Canal. The bridges were captured quickly and without damage and were held for several hours until the landing and arrival of the amphibious forces.

Both British and American airborne forces had great success in helping the troops establish a beachhead in Normandy in the early days of the invasion. They fought against snipers, artillery, tanks and repelled local counterattacks. American airborne troops suffered heavy losses while closing the gap between the two sections of the American beachhead, although losses during the drop itself were very minor. The results achieved on the day of the invasion fully confirmed the feasibility of the massive use of airborne troops in the general plan of the amphibious landing operation. These actions would serve as a model for future airborne assaults. But despite the great success of these operations, after reading the official data on the fighting, it is difficult to escape the feeling that even in this case the chances of success or failure were about the same. Some confusion after an airborne landing seems inevitable, and the strength of enemy resistance in the landing areas cannot be determined in advance.

One of the most original plans for the use of airborne troops was the plan of General Wingate during the military operations in Burma in the spring of 1944. The so-called “long-range penetration groups” had previously operated behind the front line with the aim of disrupting Japanese communications in Burma. But in the spring of 1944, a special air group was formed, which was supposed to carry out the tasks of dropping, supplying and evacuating General Wingate’s paratroopers. This group had over 200 gliders, several helicopters, fighters, medium bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and about 25 transport aircraft. Despite the fact that in the end about 10 thousand selected fighters were airlifted to areas west and north of Mandalay with the task of harassing the Japanese division fighting Chinese and American troops, there was a lot of turmoil and confusion during the operation itself. confusion. Troops, pack mules, artillery pieces, bulldozers, vehicles and other equipment were successfully delivered to the airstrips, figuratively named “Broadway”, “Blackpool” and “Aberdeen”. When landing on one of the sites, it could happen serious incident, if at the last minute it had not been possible to establish with the help of aerial photography that the site was littered with trees. The point was that, in order to ensure the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, General Wingate prohibited aerial reconnaissance over the landing areas and was ready to begin the operation without knowing the condition of the airfields planned for landing. Airborne operations without intensive preliminary reconnaissance are fraught with serious consequences.

As the gliders took off for flight to the Broadway landing pad, the tow ropes of several gliders broke and they made emergency landings, some of them in enemy territory. The gliders that landed in the landing area first damaged their landing gear, as there were ditches and holes filled with water on the landing site. Damaged gliders could not be removed, and gliders that landed later crashed when they collided with them. Almost all the gliders that managed to fly to the Broadway site were crashed or damaged. However, more than 500 soldiers and 300 tons of important cargo were delivered here unharmed; Within 24 hours, one airstrip was put in order, and for the next five days it was used by transport planes, which transferred troops, animals and supplies there. The remaining sites were ready at the end of March. In one month, transport aircraft and gliders carried out over a thousand sorties, which ensured the transfer of about 10 thousand soldiers to carry out harassing operations against the Japanese division from deep in the rear. But this task force did not fully complete its assigned task, namely, it did not completely isolate the 18th Japanese Division. The disruption of the Japanese supply through actions on their communications was compensated by the British warehouses captured by the Japanese during an attack near Imphal, just at the time of the airborne landing of Wingate's group. General Wingate's special forces were evacuated by air in August; Some of the group's personnel participated in the fighting for almost six months. This operation in Burma demonstrated new way the use of airborne troops, suitable for many areas of Asia and Africa, where communications are stretched and defending troops and aircraft are highly dispersed. In such conditions, airborne troops can carry out harassing operations behind enemy lines on a large scale, as well as interact with partisans. In the future, they will even be able to destroy and capture enemy units. Airborne operations in Burma, planned and carried out in accordance with local conditions and in unusual ways, defined a new direction in the use of airborne troops in the future.

The German use of paratroopers during the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 was perhaps the most remarkable use of airborne troops during the Second World War. In addition to performing the usual tasks of capturing bridges and road junctions, units of German paratroopers were tasked with disorganizing the rear of American troops. Prepared for execution special tasks The tank brigade was subordinate to Skorzeny, who led the group of German paratroopers that rescued Mussolini in September 1943. Operating in the Ardennes, these saboteurs and terrorists were dressed in uniforms captured from the Americans; they spoke in English language with a good American accent, knew the organization, regulations and insignia very well American army. However, few of these paratroopers saw action. Of the 106 German aircraft that were allocated to transport these paratrooper saboteurs, only 35 reached the intended drop area. Strong winds contributed significantly to the disruption of aircraft formation, which was already unstable due to Bad quality navigation. Many parachutists were injured during landing, as the terrain in the Ardennes is covered with pine forests. This group of saboteurs traveled in American Jeeps and carried out sabotage missions aimed at disrupting traffic, spreading false rumors about the advance of the Germans and causing disorganization in the rear of the Allied troops. The Americans reacted quickly. They began asking each other questions about things known only to their fellow countrymen - about the composition of baseball and football teams, about the geographical features of certain areas of the United States. The Germans in American uniform could not withstand such a test and were soon captured or killed. Despite the fact that sabotage actions were in conflict with the international laws of war, they introduced a new element into the issue of the use of paratroopers, who aimed not at capturing certain objects, but at creating panic among enemy troops and undermining their morale. It was a kind of guerrilla warfare in the rear, aimed at breaking enemy resistance in the area. It is very likely that such tactics will be used more frequently in the future. If the Anglo-American ground forces in eastern France in the summer of 1944 had been supported by such actions, then perhaps victory in the West would have been won more quickly.

On January 7, 1988, the heroic battle of the ninth company of the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment began in Afghanistan at height 3234. This battle is known to the public thanks to Bondarchuk’s feature film “9th Company.” Today we will remember the stories when the landing troops of the USSR and Russia played a decisive role in hostilities.

Battle at Height 3234. Ninth Company

This episode is shown in the film "9th Company"

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

By the end of December 1941, Sevastopol remained the only center of resistance to fascist troops in Crimea. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, pulled most of his available forces to the city, leaving only one infantry division to cover the Kerch area. Headquarters decided to take advantage of this circumstance.

Despite its initial success, the operation ended in major failure: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as the loss of a significant number of heavy weapons.

Vyazma airborne operation

On January 18, 1942, the Vyazma airborne operation began, aimed at helping the armies of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, which were surrounded by the forces of the German Army Group Center.

Dnieper airborne operation

Moonsund landing operation

Panjshir operation

Battle at Height 776

The enemy lost up to 700 people killed, but nevertheless broke through from the Argun Gorge. Almost all the hero paratroopers died, and out of 90 soldiers, only six remained alive.

Throw on Pristina

Subsequently, the famous British singer James Blunt, who served in the NATO group in 1999, testified about General Clark’s order to recapture the airfield from Russian paratroopers: “About 200 Russians were located at the airfield.... General Wesley Clark’s direct order was to “suppress them.” Clark used unusual for expressions for us. For example, “destroy.” There were political reasons for seizing the airfield. But the practical consequence would be an attack on the Russians.”

Michael Jackson replied that he was not going to fight the Russian paratroopers and thereby start the Third World War.

The Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation are a separate branch of the Russian armed forces, located in the reserve of the Commander-in-Chief of the country and directly subordinate to the Commander of the Airborne Forces. This position is currently held (since October 2016) by Colonel General Serdyukov.

The purpose of the airborne troops is to operate behind enemy lines, carry out deep raids, capture important enemy targets, bridgeheads, disrupt enemy communications and control, and carry out sabotage behind enemy lines. The Airborne Forces were created primarily as effective tool offensive war. To cover the enemy and operate in his rear, the Airborne Forces can use airborne landings - both parachute and landing.

The airborne troops are rightfully considered the elite of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. In order to get into this branch of the military, candidates must meet very high criteria. First of all, this concerns physical health and psychological stability. And this is natural: paratroopers carry out their tasks behind enemy lines, without the support of their main forces, the supply of ammunition and the evacuation of the wounded.

The Soviet Airborne Forces were created in the 30s, the further development of this type of troops was rapid: by the beginning of the war, five airborne corps were deployed in the USSR, with a strength of 10 thousand people each. The USSR Airborne Forces played an important role in the victory over the Nazi invaders. Paratroopers actively participated in the Afghan War. The Russian Airborne Forces were officially created on May 12, 1992, they went through both Chechen campaigns, and participated in the war with Georgia in 2008.

The flag of the Airborne Forces is a blue cloth with a green stripe at the bottom. In its center there is an image of a golden open parachute and two aircraft of the same color. The flag was officially approved in 2004.

In addition to the flag, there is also an emblem of this branch of the military. This is a golden-colored flaming grenade with two wings. There is also a medium and large Airborne Forces emblem. The middle emblem depicts a double-headed eagle with a crown on its head and a shield with St. George the Victorious in the center. In one paw the eagle holds a sword, and in the other - a flaming airborne grenade. In the large emblem, Grenada is placed on a blue heraldic shield framed by an oak wreath. At its top there is a double-headed eagle.

In addition to the emblem and flag of the Airborne Forces, there is also the motto of the Airborne Forces: “Nobody but us.” The paratroopers even have their own heavenly patron - Saint Elijah.

Professional holiday of paratroopers - Airborne Forces Day. It is celebrated on August 2. On this day in 1930, a unit was parachuted for the first time to carry out a combat mission. On August 2, Airborne Forces Day is celebrated not only in Russia, but also in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

The Russian airborne troops are armed with both conventional types military equipment, as well as samples developed specifically for this type of troops, taking into account the specifics of its tasks.

It is difficult to name the exact number of the Russian Airborne Forces; this information is secret. However, according to unofficial data received from the Russian Ministry of Defense, it is about 45 thousand fighters. Foreign estimates of the number of this type of troops are somewhat more modest - 36 thousand people.

History of the creation of the Airborne Forces

The homeland of the Airborne Forces is Soviet Union. It was in the USSR that the first airborne unit was created, this happened in 1930. First, a small detachment appeared, which was part of a regular rifle division. On August 2, the first parachute landing was successfully carried out during exercises at the training ground near Voronezh.

However, the first use of parachute landing in military affairs occurred even earlier, in 1929. During the siege of the Tajik city of Garm by anti-Soviet rebels, a detachment of Red Army soldiers was dropped there by parachute, which allowed as soon as possible release the settlement.

Two years later, a special purpose brigade was formed on the basis of the detachment, and in 1938 it was renamed the 201st Airborne Brigade. In 1932, by decision of the Revolutionary Military Council, special-purpose aviation battalions were created; in 1933, their number reached 29. They were part of the Air Force, and their main task was to disorganize the enemy rear and carry out sabotage.

It should be noted that the development of airborne troops in the Soviet Union was very stormy and rapid. No expense was spared on them. In the 1930s, the country was experiencing a real parachute boom; parachute jumping towers stood at almost every stadium.

During the exercises of the Kyiv Military District in 1935, a mass parachute landing was practiced for the first time. The following year, an even more massive landing was carried out in the Belarusian Military District. Foreign military observers invited to the exercises were amazed by the scale of the landings and the skill of the Soviet paratroopers.

Before the start of the war, airborne corps were created in the USSR, each of them included up to 10 thousand soldiers. In April 1941, by order of the Soviet military leadership, five airborne corps were deployed in the western regions of the country; after the German attack (in August 1941), the formation of another five airborne corps began. A few days before the German invasion (June 12), the Directorate of Airborne Forces was created, and in September 1941, paratrooper units were removed from the subordination of front commanders. Each airborne corps was a very formidable force: in addition to well-trained personnel, it was armed with artillery and light amphibious tanks.

In addition to the landing corps, the Red Army also included mobile landing brigades (five units), reserve airborne regiments (five units) and educational establishments who trained paratroopers.

The Airborne Forces made a significant contribution to the victory over the Nazi invaders. The airborne units played a particularly important role in the initial—the most difficult—period of the war. Despite the fact that airborne troops are designed to conduct offensive operations and have a minimum of heavy weapons (compared to other branches of the military), at the beginning of the war, paratroopers were often used to “patch holes”: in defense, to eliminate sudden German breakthroughs, to releasing the encircled Soviet troops. Because of this practice, paratroopers suffered unreasonably high losses, and the effectiveness of their use decreased. Often, the preparation of landing operations left much to be desired.

Air airborne units took part in the defense of Moscow, as well as in the subsequent counter-offensive. The 4th Airborne Corps was landed during the Vyazemsk landing operation in the winter of 1942. In 1943, during the crossing of the Dnieper, two airborne brigades were thrown behind enemy lines. Another major landing operation was carried out in Manchuria in August 1945. During its course, 4 thousand soldiers were landed by landing.

In October 1944, the Soviet Airborne Forces were transformed into a separate guards unit. airborne army, and in December of the same year - to the 9th Guards Army. Airborne divisions turned into ordinary rifle divisions. At the end of the war, paratroopers took part in the liberation of Budapest, Prague, and Vienna. The 9th Guards Army ended its glorious military journey on the Elbe.

In 1946, airborne units were introduced into the Ground Forces and were subordinate to the country's Minister of Defense.

In 1956, Soviet paratroopers took part in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, and in the mid-60s they played a key role in pacifying another country that wanted to leave the socialist camp - Czechoslovakia.

After the end of the war, the world entered an era of confrontation between two superpowers - the USSR and the USA. The plans of the Soviet leadership were by no means limited only to defense, so the airborne troops developed especially actively during this period. The emphasis was placed on increasing the firepower of the Airborne Forces. For this purpose, a whole range of airborne equipment was developed, including armored vehicles, artillery systems, and motor vehicles. The fleet of military transport aircraft was significantly increased. In the 70s, wide-body heavy-duty transport aircraft were created, making it possible to transport not only personnel, but also heavy military equipment. By the end of the 80s, the state of the USSR military transport aviation was such that it could ensure the parachute drop of almost 75% of the Airborne Forces personnel in one flight.

At the end of the 60s, a new type of divisions included in composition of the Airborne Forces, - air assault units (ASH). They were not much different from the others airborne units, however, they were subordinate to the command of groups of troops, armies or corps. The reason for the creation of the DShCh was a change in the tactical plans that Soviet strategists were preparing in the event of a full-scale war. After the start of the conflict, they planned to “break” the enemy’s defenses with the help of massive landings landed in the immediate rear of the enemy.

In the mid-80s, the USSR Ground Forces included 14 air assault brigades, 20 battalions and 22 separate air assault regiments.

In 1979, the war began in Afghanistan, and the Soviet Airborne Forces took an active part in it. During this conflict, the paratroopers had to engage in counter-guerrilla warfare; of course, there was no talk of any parachute landing. Personnel were delivered to the site of combat operations using armored vehicles or vehicles; landing from helicopters was used less frequently.

Paratroopers were often used to provide security at numerous outposts and checkpoints scattered throughout the country. Typically, airborne units performed tasks more suitable for motorized rifle units.

It should be noted that in Afghanistan, the paratroopers used military equipment of the ground forces, which was more suitable for the harsh conditions of this country than their own. Also, airborne units in Afghanistan were reinforced with additional artillery and tank units.

After the collapse of the USSR, the division of its armed forces began. These processes also affected the paratroopers. They were able to finally divide the Airborne Forces only in 1992, after which the Russian Airborne Forces were created. They included all the units that were located on the territory of the RSFSR, as well as part of the divisions and brigades that were previously located in other republics of the USSR.

In 1993, the Russian Airborne Forces included six divisions, six air assault brigades and two regiments. In 1994, in Kubinka near Moscow, the 45th regiment was created on the basis of two battalions special purpose Airborne Forces (so-called special forces of the Airborne Forces).

The 90s became a serious test for the Russian airborne troops (as well as for the entire army). The number of airborne forces was seriously reduced, some units were disbanded, and the paratroopers became subordinate to the Ground Forces. Army aviation was transferred to the air force, which significantly worsened the mobility of the airborne forces.

The Russian airborne troops took part in both Chechen campaigns; in 2008, paratroopers were involved in the Ossetian conflict. The Airborne Forces have repeatedly taken part in peacekeeping operations (for example, in former Yugoslavia). Airborne units regularly participate in international exercises; they guard Russian military bases abroad (Kyrgyzstan).

Structure and composition of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation

Currently, the Russian Airborne Forces consist of command structures, combat units and units, as well as various institutions that provide them.

Structurally, the Airborne Forces have three main components:

Airborne. It includes all airborne units.
Air assault. Consists of air assault units.
Mountain. It includes air assault units designed to operate in mountainous areas.

Currently, the Russian Airborne Forces include four divisions, as well as separate brigades and shelves. Airborne troops, composition:

76th Guards Air Assault Division, stationed in Pskov.
98th Guards Airborne Division, located in Ivanovo.
7th Guards Air Assault (Mountain) Division, stationed in Novorossiysk.
106th Guards Airborne Division - Tula.

Airborne regiments and brigades:

11th Separate Guards airborne brigade, location is the city of Ulan-Ude.
45th separate guards brigade special purpose (Moscow).
56th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade. Place of deployment - the city of Kamyshin.
31st Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade. Located in Ulyanovsk.
83rd Separate Guards Airborne Brigade. Location: Ussuriysk.
38th separate guards regiment Airborne Forces communications. Located in the Moscow region, in the village of Medvezhye Ozera.

In 2013, the creation of the 345th Air Assault Brigade in Voronezh was officially announced, but then the formation of the unit was postponed to a later date (2017 or 2019). There is information that in 2019, an airborne assault battalion will be deployed on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, and in the future, on its basis, a regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division, which is currently deployed in Novorossiysk, will be formed.

In addition to combat units, the Russian Airborne Forces also include educational institutions that train personnel for the Airborne Forces. The main and most famous of them is the Ryazan Higher Airborne command school, which also trains officers for the Russian Airborne Forces. Also, the structure of this type of troops includes two Suvorov School(in Tula and Ulyanovsk), Omsk Cadet Corps and 242nd The educational center, located in Omsk.

Armament and equipment of the Russian Airborne Forces

The airborne troops of the Russian Federation use both combined arms equipment and models that were created specifically for this type of troops. Most types of weapons and military equipment of the Airborne Forces were developed and manufactured back in Soviet period, but there are also more modern samples created in modern times.

The most popular types of airborne armored vehicles are currently combat vehicles landing BMD-1 (about 100 units) and BMD-2M (about 1 thousand units). Both of these vehicles were produced in the Soviet Union (BMD-1 in 1968, BMD-2 in 1985). They can be used for landing both by landing and by parachute. These are reliable vehicles that have been tested in many armed conflicts, but they are clearly outdated, both morally and physically. Even senior management representatives openly say this. Russian army., which was put into service in 2004. However, its production is slow; today there are 30 BMP-4 units and 12 BMP-4M units in service.

Also in service airborne units there are a small number of armored personnel carriers BTR-82A and BTR-82AM (12 pieces), as well as the Soviet BTR-80. The most numerous armored personnel carrier currently used by the Russian Airborne Forces is the tracked BTR-D (more than 700 units). It was put into service in 1974 and is very outdated. It should be replaced by the BTR-MDM “Shell”, but so far its production is moving very slowly: today there are from 12 to 30 (according to various sources) “Shell” in combat units.

The anti-tank weapons of the Airborne Forces are represented by the 2S25 Sprut-SD self-propelled anti-tank gun (36 units), the BTR-RD Robot self-propelled anti-tank systems (more than 100 units) and a wide range of different ATGMs: Metis, Fagot, Konkurs and "Cornet".

Is on airborne weapons Russian Federation and self-propelled, as well as towed artillery: self-propelled guns "Nona" (250 units and several hundred more units in storage), howitzer D-30 (150 units), as well as mortars "Nona-M1" (50 units) and "Tray" (150 units).

Anti-aircraft weapons airborne defense consist of portable missile systems (various modifications of “Igla” and “Verba”), as well as short-range air defense systems “Strela”. Special attention should be paid to the newest Russian MANPADS “Verba”, which was only recently put into service and is now being put into trial operation in only a few units of the Russian Armed Forces, including the 98th Airborne Division.

The Airborne Forces also operate self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery mounts BTR-ZD "Skrezhet" (150 units) of Soviet production and towed anti-aircraft artillery mounts ZU-23-2.

IN last years The Airborne Forces began to receive new models of automotive equipment, of which the Tiger armored car, the A-1 all-terrain vehicle and the KAMAZ-43501 truck should be noted.

The airborne troops are sufficiently equipped with communication, control and electronic warfare systems. Among them, modern Russian developments should be noted: electronic warfare systems "Leer-2" and "Leer-3", "Infauna", the control system for air defense complexes "Barnaul", automated troop control systems "Andromeda-D" and "Polet-K".

The Airborne Forces are armed with a wide range of small arms, including both Soviet models and newer Russian developments. The latter include the Yarygin pistol, PMM and the PSS silent pistol. The main personal weapon of the fighters remains the Soviet AK-74 assault rifle, but deliveries to the troops of the more advanced AK-74M have already begun. To carry out sabotage missions, paratroopers can use the Russian-made Val Orlan-10 silent assault rifle. The exact number of Orlans in service with the Airborne Forces is unknown.

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