In the dynamics of scientific knowledge, a special role is played by the stages of development associated with the restructuring of research strategies set by the foundations of science. These stages are called scientific revolutions. The foundations of science ensure the growth of knowledge as long as the general features of the systemic organization of the objects being studied are taken into account in the picture of the world, and the methods of mastering these objects correspond to the established ideals and norms of research. But as science develops, it may encounter fundamentally new types of objects that require a different vision of reality compared to the one assumed by the existing picture of the world. New objects may also require changes in the scheme of the method of cognitive activity, represented by a system of ideals and norms of research. In this situation, the growth of scientific knowledge presupposes a restructuring of the foundations of science. The latter can be carried out in two varieties: a) as a revolution associated with the transformation of a special picture of the world without significant changes in the ideals and norms of research; b) as a revolution, during which, along with the picture of the world, the ideals and norms of science radically change.
Most common types scientific revolutions in the history of science:
1) Intradisciplinary scientific revolutions - occurring within individual scientific disciplines. The reasons for such revolutions are most often transitions to the study of new objects and the use of new research methods.
2) Interdisciplinary scientific revolutions - occurring as a result of interaction and exchange of scientific ideas between various scientific disciplines. In the early stages of the history of science, such interaction was carried out by transferring the scientific picture of the world of the most developed scientific discipline to new, still emerging disciplines. In modern science, interdisciplinary interaction is carried out differently. Now each science has an independent picture of the world, so interdisciplinary interaction occurs when analyzing the common features and characteristics of previous theories and concepts.
3) Global scientific revolutions - the most famous of which are revolutions in natural science, leading to a change in scientific rationality.
First revolution
XVII - first half of the XVIII century - the formation of classical natural science. Main characteristics: mechanistic picture of the world as a general scientific picture of reality; an object - small system as a mechanical device with strictly determined connections, the properties of the whole are completely determined by the properties of the parts; the subject and the procedures of his cognitive activity are completely excluded from knowledge in order to achieve its objectivity; explanation as a search for mechanical causes and essences, reducing knowledge about nature to the principles and concepts of mechanics.
Second revolution
The end of the 18th - first half of the 19th century, the transition of natural science into a disciplinary organized science. Main characteristics: the mechanical picture of the world ceases to be general scientific, biological, chemical and other pictures of reality are formed that are not reducible to the mechanical picture of the world; the object is understood in accordance with the scientific discipline not only in terms of mechanics, but also such as “thing”, “state”, “process”, which involve the development and change of the object; the subject must be eliminated from the results of cognition; the problem of diversity of methods, unity and synthesis of knowledge, classification of sciences arises; the general cognitive attitudes of classical science and its style of thinking are preserved.
Third revolution
The end of the 19th - mid-20th century, the transformation of the parameters of classical science, the formation of non-classical natural science. Significant revolutionizing events: the emergence of relativistic and quantum theories in physics, the formation of genetics, quantum chemistry, the concept of a non-stationary Universe, cybernetics and systems theory emerge. Main characteristics: HKM - developing, relatively true knowledge; integration of private scientific pictures of reality based on an understanding of nature as a complex dynamic system; an object is not so much a “self-identical thing” as a process with stable states; correlation of the object with the means and operations of the activity; a complex, developing dynamic system, the state of the whole is not reducible to the sum of the states of its parts; probabilistic causality instead of a rigid, unambiguous connection; a new understanding of the subject as being inside, and not outside, the observed world - the need to fix the conditions and means of observation, taking into account the way of asking questions and methods of cognition, dependence on this understanding of truth, objectivity, fact, explanation; instead of the only true theory, several theoretical descriptions of the same empirical basis containing elements of objectivity are allowed.
Fourth revolution
The end of the 20th - the beginning of the 21st century, radical changes in the foundations of scientific knowledge and activity - the birth of a new post-non-classical science. Events - computerization of science, increasing complexity of instrument systems, increasing interdisciplinary research, complex programs, merging empirical and theoretical, applied and fundamental research, developing ideas of synergetics. Main characteristics: NCM - interaction of different pictures of reality; turning them into fragments of a general picture of the world, interaction through “paradigmatic grafting” of ideas from other sciences, erasing rigid dividing lines; unique systems come to the fore - objects characterized by openness and self-development, historically developing and evolutionarily transforming objects, “human-sized” complexes; knowledge about an object correlates not only with means, but also with value-goal structures of activity; the need for the presence of a subject is realized, this is expressed, first of all, in the fact that axiological factors are included in explanations, and scientific knowledge is necessarily considered in the context of social life, culture, history as inseparable from values and ideological attitudes, which in general brings the sciences of nature closer together and cultural sciences. Types of scientific rationality: classical rationality (corresponding to classical science in its two states - pre-disciplinary and disciplinary organized); non-classical rationality (corresponding to non-classical science) and post-non-classical rationality. Between them, as stages in the development of science, there are peculiar “overlaps”, and the emergence of each new type of rationality did not discard the previous one, but only limited the scope of its action, determining its applicability only to certain types of problems and tasks. Each stage is characterized by a special state scientific activity aimed at the constant growth of objectively true knowledge. If we schematically represent this activity as a “subject-means-object” relationship (including in the subject’s understanding the value-goal structures of the activity, knowledge and skills in using methods and means), then the described stages of the evolution of science, acting as different types scientific rationality are characterized by varying depths of reflection in relation to scientific activity itself.
Classical rationality С-Ср-(О)
The classical type of scientific rationality, focusing attention on the object, strives in theoretical explanation and description to separate everything that relates to the subject, the means and operations of its activity. Such separation (elimination) is considered as a necessary condition for obtaining objectively true knowledge about the world. The goals and values of science, which determine research strategies and ways of fragmenting the world, at this stage, as at all others, are determined by the dominant ideological attitudes and attitudes in the culture. value orientations. But classical science does not comprehend these determinations.
Non-classical scientific rationality С-(Ср-О)
The non-classical type of scientific rationality takes into account the connections between knowledge about the object and the nature of the means and operations of the activity. The explication of these connections is considered as conditions for an objectively true description and explanation of the world. But the connections between intrascientific and social values and goals are still not the subject of scientific reflection. Non-classical scientific rationality undertakes to take into account the relationship between the nature of an object and the means and methods of its research. It is no longer the exclusion of all interference, accompanying factors and means of knowledge, but the clarification of their role and influence that becomes an important condition in achieving the truth. These forms of rational consciousness are characterized by the pathos of maximum attention to reality. If, from the point of view of the classical picture of the world, the objectivity of rationality is, first of all, the objectivity of an object given to the subject in the form of a completed, become reality, then the objectivity of non-classical rationality is a plastic, dynamic relationship of a person to the reality in which his activity takes place.
Post-non-classical scientific rationality (S-Sr-O)
The post-non-classical type of scientific rationality expands the field of reflection on activity. It takes into account the correlation of the acquired knowledge about an object not only with the characteristics of the means and operations of the activity, but also with value-goal structures. The post-non-classical image of rationality shows that the concept of rationality is broader than the concept of scientific rationality, since it includes not only logical and methodological standards, but also an analysis of target actions and human behavior. The new post-non-classical type of rationality actively uses new orientations: non-linearity, irreversibility, nonequilibrium, chaos. The new, expanded scope of the concept of rationality includes intuition, uncertainty, heuristics and other pragmatic characteristics that are not traditional for classical rationalism. In the new rationality, the object sphere is expanded by including systems like: artificial intelligence, virtual reality, which themselves are products of scientific and technological progress. Such a radical expansion of the object sphere goes in parallel with its radical humanization. Therefore, post-non-classical rationality is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Sociocultural content also penetrates here. The categories of subject and object form a system, the elements of which acquire meaning only in their mutual dependence on each other and on the system as a whole.
Representatives: T. Kuhn, coined the term “scientific revolution”
Scientific revolutions- these are fundamental changes in scientific knowledge, radically changing the previous vision of the world.
There are 2 types of scientific revolution:
1. ideals and norms scientific research remain unchanged, but the picture of the world is revised;
2. simultaneously with the picture of the world, not only the ideals and norms of science, but also its philosophical foundations change radically.
T. Kuhn (1922-1996) scientific knowledge develops spasmodically, through scientific revolutions. Any criterion makes sense only within the framework of a certain paradigm, a historically established system of views. A scientific revolution is a change in explanatory paradigms by the scientific community.
The progress of the scientific revolution according to Kuhn:
1.normal science- every new discovery can be explained from the standpoint of the prevailing theory;
2.extraordinary science. Crisis in science. The appearance of anomalies - inexplicable facts. An increase in the number of anomalies leads to the emergence of alternative theories. In science, many opposing scientific schools coexist;
3.scientific revolution- formation of a new paradigm.
The restructuring of the foundations of science leads to a change in the types of scientific rationality. Rationality presupposed a person’s ability to think and make decisions independently.
There are the following types of rationality:
1. The classical type of scientific rationality, focusing attention on the object, strives in theoretical explanation and description to eliminate everything that relates to the subject, the means and operations of its activity. Begins with the Reformation - Luther, Calvin.
2.Non-classical type. It takes into account the connections between knowledge about the object and the nature of the means and operations of the activity.
3. Post-non-classical type. It takes into account the correlation of the acquired knowledge about an object with the characteristics of the means, operations of the activity, and with value-goal structures.
The emergence of each new type of rationality did not discard the previous one, but only limited the scope of its action, determining its applicability only to certain types of problems and tasks.
In the history of science, there are 3 global scientific revolutions : FIRST a rational revolution in culture is associated with the emergence of science in the depths of ancient culture (Aristotle).
SECOND the rational revolution marks the New Age - science defends its right to independent existence in the fight against religion and turns into the leading way of knowing and transforming the world (Copernicus).
THIRD the rational revolution (late 19th – early 20th centuries) is associated with the industrial and technological revolution (Mendel, Einstein).
1. Scientific revolutions and changes in types of rationality. Problems of rationality. Types of scientific rationality
1.1. Scientific revolutions and changes in types of rationality
A scientific revolution is a restructuring of the foundations of science. Possible thanks to:
1. The result of intradisciplinary development
2. Interdisciplinary interaction
Restructuring of foundations leads to a change in types of rationality
Philosophical foundations of science. Ontological foundations of science represent ideas about the picture of the world, types, accepted in a particular science material systems, laws of functioning and development, etc. Epistemological foundations of science- provisions accepted within the framework of a certain science about the nature of the process of scientific knowledge, the relationship between the sensory and the rational, theory and experience, etc. Logical foundations of science- the rules of abstraction, the formation of concepts and statements, etc., accepted in science. Methodological foundations of science represent ideas accepted within the framework of a particular science about methods of discovery and acquisition of knowledge, methods of proof, etc. Value or axiological foundations of science- accepted ideas about the practical and theoretical significance of science as a whole or individual sciences in the general system of science, about the goals of science, scientific progress, etc.
Two types of scientific revolutions. 1) The ideals and norms of scientific research remain unchanged, but the picture of the world is revised. 2) Simultaneously with the picture of the world, not only the ideals and norms of science, but its philosophical foundations change radically.
1st scientific revolution 17th century
Type of rationality: classic type of scientific rationality. The principle of the identity of thinking and being. An ideal plan for the work of thought. Changes: Ancient Cosmos is identified with nature. The human mind lost its cosmic dimension and was endowed with the status of sovereignty (the emergence of Objectivism). The appearance of the experiment. Unambiguity of the content of true knowledge. Refusal to explain the purpose
2nd scientific revolution end of the 18th century - first half of the 19th century
The transition from classical science, focused on the study of mechanical and physical phenomena, to disciplinary organized science (geology, chemistry, biology). Type of rationality: based on the classical scientific type of rationality, elements of a new non-classical type of rationality arise: Introduction subjective factor into the content of scientific knowledge => Weakening the rigidity of the principle of the identity of thinking and being. Concept of goal.
3rd scientific revolution late 19th - mid 20th centuries.
Type of rationality: non-classical type of rationality. Inclusion of the interaction of the object with the device, the connection between knowledge about the object and the nature of the means and operations of the scientist (rejection of objectivism as an ideology). “Opacity” of existence, rejection of ideal models and projects. Recognition of the relative truth of theories and pictures of nature.
The 4th scientific revolution is the last third of the 20th century.
Type of rationality: post-non-classical type of rationality. The use of historical reconstruction as a type of theoretical knowledge in cosmology, astrophysics, and particle physics => changing the picture of the world. The emergence of a new direction in scientific disciplines: Synergetics. The subject of cognition becomes the main participant in ongoing events. Use of computers. Change of value-neutral research.
1.2. Problems of rationality
1.3. Types of scientific rationality
Rationality
1) Logical-mathematical:
2) Natural science:
3) Engineering and technology:
4) Social and humanitarian:
2. Paradigmatic crises in the economy. Structuralism
2.1. Paradigmatic crises in economic theory.
Three aspects of the concept of paradigm:
The most general picture of the rational structure of nature, worldview;
A disciplinary matrix characterizing a set of beliefs, values, technical means etc., which unite specialists in a given scientific community;
A generally accepted pattern, a template for solving puzzle problems
Stages of development of science according to Kuhn:
Normal science - every new discovery can be explained from the standpoint of the prevailing theory;
Extraordinary science - a crisis in science. The appearance of anomalies - inexplicable facts. In science, many opposing scientific schools coexist;
Scientific revolution - the formation of a new paradigm.
General principles Kuhn's theories:
The driving force for the development of science is the people who form the scientific community, and not something inherent in the very logic of the development of science;
The development of knowledge is determined by a change in the dominant paradigms, and not by a simple summation of knowledge, that is, not only (and not so much) quantitative, but also qualitative changes occur in the structure of scientific knowledge;
Science develops according to the principle of alternating periods of “normal” and “revolutionary” science, and not by accumulating knowledge and adding it to existing ones.
But a “pure” paradigm shift can only be considered at a very abstract level. Determining the exact moment of a paradigm shift by changing scientific concepts is very difficult.
Economic theory
The origins of economic thought. The initial concepts of economic thought are contained in the papyri of Dr. Egypt, the laws of Hammurabi, the Arthashastra, but are not distinguished as an independent field of scientific knowledge.
The emergence of economics in the modern sense. Mercantilism is one of the first economic concepts. The dominant role of trade, primarily international. At an early stage, the focus is on accumulating gold and silver. At a later stage - to a positive trade balance.
The Birth of Classical Political Economy(W. Petty, P. Boisguillebert and the physiocrats).
Physiocrats:
Providing complete freedom of production;
Minimizing government intervention;
Agriculture as the only occupation that provides a surplus of gross income over production costs, and therefore the only productive one;
Labor theory of value.
The Rise of Classical Political Economy (Adam Smith)
- “system of natural freedom” (in the form of private property)
- “the invisible hand of the market”
Concepts of "economic man" and "natural order"
The principle of "laissez-faire" (non-interference)
The position of Marxism from the point of view of the theory of paradigmatic crises
Development by Marx labor theory cost
Introduction of the concept of “surplus value”.
The theory of falling rates of profit.
But it cannot be said that his economic views radically contradict the position of classical political economy.
Neoclassical economics (marginalists, Austrian school, Cambridge school)
Marginal utility and marginal productivity theories
General economic equilibrium theory
Keynesian economic theory
The need for government intervention in case of “market failures”
Development of macroeconomic concepts, in particular macroeconomic multipliers.
Neoliberalism and monetarism(M. Friedman)
The amount of money in circulation as a determining factor in economic development
Criticism of the stability of multipliers
Rational Expectations Theory
- “neutrality of money”
Neo-institutionalism
- “institutions matter” (institutions matter)
Transaction Cost Accounting
Accounting for the division of a “bundle of rights” of property
2.2. Structuralism
The main specificity of structuralism- consideration of all phenomena accessible to sensory perception as “epiphenomena,” that is, as an external manifestation (“manifestation”) of internal, deep and therefore “implicit” structures, which they considered their task to reveal.
Central basic concept structuralism is a concept structures- a set of relations that are invariant under various internal and external transformations.
Any structure must meet three necessary conditions: (a) integrity- subordination of elements to the whole and independence of the latter; (b) transformation- orderly transition of one substructure (or level of organization of its elements) to another based on the rules of generation; (V) self-regulation- internal functioning of rules within a given system. Thus, the structure acts not just in the form of a stable “skeleton” of an object, but as a set of rules, following which, it is possible to obtain a second, third, etc. from one object.
Principles of the methodology of structuralism:
Principle immanence, which directs all attention to learning internal structure object, abstracting from its genesis, evolution and external functions and from its dependence on other phenomena.
Principle primacy of synchrony over diachrony, according to which the object under study is taken in a state of this moment, in its synchronic section, rather in statics and balance than in dynamics and development.
- anti-subject orientation. Radically reconsiders the problems of man, understood as a subject of cognition, thinking, creativity and other activities.
Principles pluralism and relativism, according to which in reality a “multiplicity of orders” is postulated, each of which is unique, which excludes the possibility of establishing any hierarchy between them, since they are all equivalent.
In addition, in structural research methods of formalization and mathematization are widely used, with the help of which structures and models are constructed, which allow them to be presented in the form of abstract logical or graphical diagrams, formulas or tables.
Structuralism gives a clear preference to form, structure, system, synchrony, logic, rather than individual events, content or substance, history or diachrony. He refuses to see in man a free, active, strong-willed and conscious being who is the author or subject of his words, actions and deeds. In relation to man, structuralism takes the position of skepticism and nihilism. The vast majority of well-known structuralists are sharply critical of humanism. Of course, while exposing the failure of humanism, structuralism does not become an apology for inhumanity.
2.3. Lévi-Strauss
It's not obligatory. There is no requirement to answer about Lévi-Strausay in the exam question.
French philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is a major figure of structuralism.
The problem of the relationship between nature and culture occupies one of the central places in the work of Lévi-Strauss. He paid the greatest attention to the analysis of mythological consciousness. He showed that in the myths of different peoples who never communicated with each other, there are common structures. The reason for this is that the logical structures of mythological consciousness are a kind of reproduction of the fundamental contradictions in the life of primitive society, which goes through the same stages of development on all continents.
Lévi-Strauss showed that behind the apparent rampant imagination in myths, very logical reasoning is hidden, i.e. elements of the structure of a myth are connected according to the laws of logic, expressed in judgments, enshrined in concepts. Primitive thinking is no less logical than the thinking of a civilized person, that the thinking of both the first and the second is based on universal unconscious structures that determine their behavior, relationships, work activity, customs, traditions, and so on.
Lévi-Strauss seeks to isolate what would be common to all cultures and therefore would be an expression of the objective mechanisms that determine human cultural creativity, the very functioning of the human intellect, in other words, to reveal the “anatomy of the human mind.” He tries to overcome psychologism and subjectivism in understanding man and various phenomena of cultural life, identifying their objective and rational basis - the concept of “super-rationalism”, which seeks to integrate the sensual into the rational, and rationality is recognized as a property of the things themselves.
“Savage thinking,” according to Levi-Strauss, is characterized by a harmony of the sensual and rational, which has been lost by modern civilization. He saw such harmony in the ability of mythological consciousness not just to reflect, but to mediate and resolve the contradictions of human life with the help of “binary oppositions” of thinking and language. Behind these opposites of language are hidden real life contradictions, primarily between man and nature, and these contradictions are not simply reflected in mythological thinking in an “encrypted” form, but the repeated rearrangement and interchange of “binary oppositions” removes the initial severity of these contradictions, and the human world becomes more harmonious.
3. Methods of scientific knowledge. Descartes' method
3.1. Methods of scientific knowledge
Methods of scientific knowledge are usually divided according to the degree of their generality, that is, according to the breadth of applicability in the process of scientific research.
·general methods in the history of knowledge;
general scientific methods;
·methods used in the research of a specific science or phenomenon.
·disciplinary methods;
interdisciplinary research methods
1. General methods.
Universal dialectical method of cognition
Dialectics (Greek dialektika - having a conversation, arguing) is the doctrine of the most general laws of development of nature, society and knowledge, in which various phenomena are considered in the diversity of their connections, the interaction of opposing forces, tendencies, in the process of change and development.
The dialectical method is based on two principles: the principle of comprehensive consideration of the objects being studied and the principle of consideration in interrelation.
The universal method of determinism
Determinism (from the Latin determino - I determine) is a philosophical doctrine about the objective, natural relationship and interdependence of the phenomena of the material and spiritual world.
Principles:
· The principle of learning in development. Only by studying the past of the object we are interested in can we understand its current state, as well as predict its future.
Objectivity
· Concreteness “split of the one” (principle of contradiction)
2. General scientific methods(used in most various areas sciences and have a very wide, interdisciplinary range of applications.
· Methods related to the empirical level of knowledge
The empirical level of scientific knowledge includes all those methods, techniques, methods of cognitive activity, as well as the formulation and consolidation of knowledge that are the content of practice or its immediate result.
Scientific observation
Scientific observation - original method empirical knowledge, allowing you to obtain some primary information about the objects of the surrounding reality.
Features of scientific observation
· focus;
· planfulness;
· researcher activity
Measurement
Measurement is a procedure for comparing two quantities, as a result of which the relationship between the quantity being measured and accepted as a unit (standard) is experimentally established. Measurement refers to quantitative methods, the basis of which are quantitative relationships expressed by number and magnitude
Experiment
Both observation and measurement are included in such empirical method knowledge as an experiment. In contrast to observation, an experiment is characterized by the researcher’s intervention in the position of the objects being studied, as well as the active influence of various instruments and experimental means on the subject of research. Important condition conducting an experiment is that the scientist already has an idea of the result of the experiment.
Abstraction and abstraction
Abstraction is a mental distraction from some less significant properties of the object being studied while simultaneously highlighting one or more essential properties of this object. The result obtained in the process of abstraction is an abstraction.
Induction- a method of moving thought from less general knowledge to more general knowledge
Falsification - a method of proving the falsity of scientific hypotheses using empirical experience.
Extrapolation
Extrapolation is an extensive increase in knowledge by extending the consequences of a hypothesis or theory from one sphere of the described phenomena to other spheres
· Methods related to the theoretical level of knowledge(represent a set of rules, means, techniques of thinking activity for the construction of scientific theories, the development of their content, its justification and use)
Idealization represents the mental introduction of certain changes to the object being studied in accordance with the goals of the research. As a result of such changes, for example, some properties, aspects, or features of objects may be excluded from consideration.
Formalization- a special approach in scientific knowledge, which consists in the use of special symbols, which allows one to escape from the study of real objects and the theoretical positions that describe them and instead operate with a certain set of symbols (signs).
3. Private scientific methods
Methods used only within the framework of research into a specific science or a specific phenomenon.
4. Disciplinary Methods, which are systems of techniques used in a particular discipline that is part of some branch of science or that arose at the intersection of sciences.
5. Interdisciplinary research methods being a set of a number of synthetic, integrative methods (arising as a result of a combination of elements of various levels of methodology), aimed mainly at the interfaces of scientific disciplines.
3.2. Descartes' method of radical doubt
The starting point of reasoning is “doubt in everything”
He sought the highest absolute principle of knowledge in the immediate self-consciousness of man; it was not about some mystical revelation of the basis of things, but about a clear, analytical disclosure of a general, logically irrefutable truth.
Its discovery was for Descartes a condition for overcoming the doubts with which his mind struggled.
We have no other criterion other than the psychological, internal criterion of clarity and separateness of representation. It is not experience that convinces us of our existence as a thinking being, but only the distinct decomposition of the immediate fact of self-consciousness into two equally inevitable and clear representations or ideas - thinking and being.
Proof of God's Existence
The source of the very idea about him is psychological evidence
An object, the properties of which necessarily include reality, is an ontological proof, that is, moving from the idea of being to the affirmation of the very existence of a conceivable being.
4. Subject and object. The principle of activity in social and humanitarian knowledge
4.1. Subject and object
Subject is one of the main categories of philosophy, denoting a person who acts, knows, thinks in abstraction from his specific individual characteristics. It has a correlative category “object” - a fragment of reality - material or ideal - towards which the subject’s activity is directed. The subject-object vision of cognitive activity was fully formed only in the 17th-18th centuries. Firstly, in connection with the development of science, the objective understanding of reality has strengthened as a consequence of the natural science tradition; secondly, the idea of the subject as a “thinking thing” (R. Descartes) opposing the material world was formed. The historicism of the development of the subject-object problem was manifested in the fact that the interpretation of the content of these categories and the nature of their interaction changed. Thus, the materialist direction is characterized by an understanding of the “subject-object” relationship as the interaction of two natural systems. This is, first of all, a causal concept of cognition, when knowledge is understood as a result, a consequence of the impact of an object on the subject, the physical impact of an object on the senses, leaving “traces” - imprints. In this case, activity is recognized only on the side of the object and the passive-contemplative position of the subject. Here lies the concept of “cognition is reflection,” which deepens the understanding of the subject’s activity. Cognition as a whole is considered in the unity of reflection, objective-practical activity and communications, and the activity of the subject appears to be determined not so much by its sociocultural nature.
A fundamentally different approach is presented in concepts where cognition is interpreted as determined by the structure of consciousness itself. The central problem here is the substantiation of knowledge, the identification of standards, standards that allow us to separate knowledge from ignorance, true from false. In the classical form, the problem of justification of knowledge was first posed by Descartes; later it was transformed into a method of justification involving the concept of “transcendental subject.” They identify, as it were, two “layers” of the subject: individual empirical and transcendental, while proceeding from the fact that the structure of experience, its standards and criteria are rooted in the characteristics of the transcendental subject. The latter is understood as independent of the empirical bodily individual and the community of other “I”s, as a supra-individual structure that provides generally valid objective knowledge. One of the significant consequences of this concept is the idea of high spiritual activity of the subject, his fundamental role in the process of cognition. However, there remains a feeling of incompleteness, due to the excessive abstraction of the subject as “partial”, reduced to a cognitive function, “observing consciousness” in general.
The theory of knowledge requires such a category of the subject when it is understood in its integrity, containing not only cognitive, logical-epistemological, but also existential, cultural-historical and social qualities involved in cognition. In Hegelian philosophy, the individual was sacrificed to the system, dissolved in absolute knowledge, in the universal, which caused a sharp protest, expressed, in particular, in the emergence of the “philosophy of the subject” - existentialism, which affirms the unconditional value of the individual.
The concepts of man (subject of knowledge, personality) are given special importance in personalism. Personalism is not afraid of accusations of psychologism and relativism, since it does not reduce the human to the psychological and considers it a mistake, on the one hand, to “severe” logical and transcendental consciousness from a person, and on the other hand, to replace the activity of man in his integrity with the activity of a transcendental subject. Man must return to knowledge.
This idea was also substantiated by N.A. Berdyaev, who believed that “there was great truth in the transition from the philosophy of Hegel to the philosophy of Feuerbach, to anthropological philosophy” - the inevitable transition from the universal, general spirit to man.
It is this tendency that serves as the common basis and prerequisite for the convergence of the ideas of hermeneutics, existentialism, personalism and, to a certain extent, “living Marxism” in the understanding of the subject as a person who knows. Anthropologism as a common idea for them is clarified by the recognition of the social and cultural-historical conditionality of cognition and the subject. Recognition of these fundamental ideas is quite sufficient to unite the directions of the existential-anthropological approach to knowledge.
The epistemological system “subject-object” is specified as “researcher-object of research”. The subject of scientific activity functions in modern society at three interacting levels - individual, collective and social.
The object of scientific activity becomes such only as a result of the active material, practical and theoretical activity of the researcher. A fragment of reality, having become an object of cognition, is subjected to object-instrumental influence, for example, during a physical experiment; in order for it to become an object of theoretical thinking, it is “transformed” into an ideal object by superimposing on it a network of scientific concepts, a specially created system of scientific abstractions. The same object of knowledge can become the basis for the formation of the subject of a number of sciences; for example, man has become the subject of research in several hundred sciences, natural, social and humanities.
4.2. The principle of activity in social and humanitarian knowledge
Activity - adaptively adapting expedient human activity; it is fundamentally purposeful and expedient; Moreover, it is fundamentally productive. Everything that a person touches either becomes societal or in one way or another comes into contact with activity.
Activity can be actual and objectified.
There are 4 main spheres of human activity, which are, in fact, products of human activity:
Political sphere - organizational and managerial activities;
Social sphere - social activities;
Spiritual sphere - spiritual activity;
Material sphere - material production.
Each subsystem is functionally defined by society (the wider system) - i.e. it is a functional system. But there are also substantial systems to which one cannot ask a question - for example, ethnic groups. Society in this sense is substantial; its functions are not given from the outside.
Structure:
1. areas of activity;
2. components;
3. elements (indivisible).
Accordingly, 3 is included in 2, 2 in 1, and 1 in society.
The elements are:
1. subjects - persons (group of persons) implementing own program;
2. objects - what the subject’s purposeful activity is aimed at;
3. organizational connections.
The subject is always a person; the converse is generally not true. Objectification - when the subject cannot fulfill his target program. The subject needs and cares about the results of his activity. Required condition activity of the subject - freedom of action.
Each action can cross a set of activity series, since goal setting is based on value. In addition to values, activity includes motivations - needs and interests - this is the assumption of what is missing as necessary.
Returning to the areas of activity:
Social: “supplier” of subjects (and partially objects);
Material: things;
Spiritual: symbols;
Political: communication and management (administrative and political).
The object of activity can be an object (thing or symbol) or a person.
Administrative management - management of the local subsystem, political management - coordination of the local subsystem with other systems.
The spiritual sphere of activity is actually engaged in the creation of symbols containing objectified information.
Products of a joint spiritual type of activity:
Products of project consciousness are knowledge that helps change the world (religion, art, technology); project consciousness forms norms (technical, social, generally binding, special), and then uses them;
Products of cognitive consciousness - provide knowledge about the world around us; there are reflexive (relatively objective knowledge; there are ordinary - spontaneously arising and scientific - the results of science as a specialized activity of people) and value-based.
5. Scientific rationality and the problem of interaction between cultures
Scientifically rational is that activity that is aimed at obtaining, developing, improving and clarifying theories that are recognized as true at the present time. Accordingly, irrational from the point of view will be those activities that are not related to the development of theories that have received recognition in society.
Rationality(Lebedev: p. 169) is a type of thinking that has the following properties: discursiveness (linguistic expressibility), certainty of concepts (terms), systematicity, validity, reflexivity.
Everyone identifies 4 types of scientific rationality (according to Lebedev, p. 153):
1) Logical-mathematical: ideal objectivity, constructive unambiguity, formality, evidence.
2) Natural science: empirical subjectivity, experimental verifiability.
3) Engineering and technology: material objectivity, practical efficiency, constructive consistency.
4) Social and humanitarian: social objectivity, reflexivity, cultural validity.
When we point directly to modern knowledge as the basis of our assessments and standards, then the illusion of their eternity and universality does not arise. The relativity of all norms, rules, assessments of scientific rationality is completely obvious. A scientist of any era, obtaining a result of which he is convinced of the truth, acts rationally from the point of view of science. The problem is that the researcher is influenced by the type of society in which he lives. Philosophical and historical scientific research always has a certain practical orientation. By comprehending the past, we strive to understand the present and determine development trends modern society. In this sense, the solution to the question of the relationship between Western and Eastern cultures and civilizations and the dialogue between these cultures is of particular importance for science. There are two main types of culture - Western and Eastern.
Types of crops. West and East are considered as geosociocultural concepts. The West is a special type of civilizational and cultural development that was formed in Europe in the 15th-17th centuries. A civilization of this type can be called technogenic. Her character traits- is the rapid change in technology and technology, thanks to the application of science. The prerequisites for Western culture were laid in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The Age of Enlightenment saw the completion of the formation of worldviews that determined the subsequent development of technogenic civilization. Socially, Western civilization is identified with the era of the formation of capitalist production relations, bourgeois democratic forms of government, the formation of civil society and the rule of law. In technological terms - with industrial and post-industrial society. Philosophers and sociologists consider the ideological, social and technological aspects of culture as a single whole. Values of Western culture: 1) dynamism, focus on novelty, 2) affirmation of dignity and respect for the human person, 3) individualism, orientation towards personal autonomy, 4) rationality, 5) ideals of freedom, equality and tolerance, 6) respect for private property .
The Western type of culture in philosophy is opposed by the Eastern type, called “traditional society”. Geopolitically, the East is associated with cultures Ancient India, Babylon, Ancient Egypt, national-state entities Muslim world. These cultures were original, but also had common features: an orientation towards the reproduction of established social structures, stabilization of an established way of life. Traditional behavior that accumulates the experience of ancestors is the highest value. In the spiritual sphere, religious and mythological ideas dominated; scientific rationality was opposed to a moral and volitional attitude toward contemplation, serenity, and intuitive-mystical fusion with existence. Autonomy, freedom and dignity of the human person are alien to the spirit of Eastern culture. Human life is predetermined. This is where the political and economic models of how Eastern people live their lives. The spirit of democracy and civil society is alien to Eastern people.
There is a special kind of question regarding Russia; questions have arisen: how do Western and Eastern correlate in Russian culture? Is an original path of development for Russia possible and necessary? In this regard, in Russia in the 19th century. The ideologies of Westernism (Chaadaev, Stankevich, Belinsky, Herzen) and Slavophilism (Kireevsky, Khomyakov, Samarin) were formed. This question about the identity of Russia acquired great importance for emigrant philosophers after the revolution (Berdyaev and others). Berdyaev believes that Russian folk identity is polarized and contradictory; Russia unites both the West and the East. Two opposing principles formed the basis of the Russian soul: the pagan Dionistic element and ascetic-monastic Orthodoxy. Eurasian movement (P.A. Karsavin, N.S. Trubetskoy) 20-30 of the twentieth century. The emigrant movement viewed Russia as Eurasia - a special ethnographic world occupying the middle space of Asia and Europe, with its own distinctive culture.
Thus, in modern conditions One of the main problems of scientific activity is the development of the problem of dialogue between different cultures. Initially different conditions, the relativity of all norms, rules, assessments of rationality accepted in a given society, often lead to the impossibility of dialogue between various types cultures, which is unacceptable in the context of globalization and the growing policy of power pursued by Western society towards Muslim countries. Currently, the real threat of unification is becoming obvious oriental cultures in the face of Western expansion in order to preserve its identity. This will only worsen the geopolitical situation in the world. That is why it is so important to look for ways of dialogue between different types of cultures. Science needs to solve this problem.
6. The principle of historicism in social and humanitarian knowledge
Historicism, the principle of approaching reality as changing over time, developing. The principle of historicism was originally put forward and developed in the philosophical systems of G. Vico, Voltaire, J. J. Rousseau, D. Diderot, G. Fichte, G. Hegel, A. Saint-Simon, A. Herzen's historicism. In the 18th and 1st half of the 19th centuries. its development took place in the form of a philosophy of history, which arose in the fight against meaningless empiricism historical science Middle Ages and providential theology. Philosophy of history of the enlighteners of the 18th century. viewed human society as part of nature; Borrowing from natural science the concept of causality, she put forward the idea of “natural laws” of history, the unity of the historical process (Herder’s historicism), developed a theory of progress as a movement from lower to higher (French materialists), etc. A view of the history of society as internally logical, the necessary process was developed by representatives of German classical idealism. However, they also brought this necessity into history from the outside, from the field of philosophy. A huge role in establishing the principle of Istroism was played by the successes of specific sciences - the science of society (for example, A. Barnave, French historians of the Restoration period) and natural science (Historicism Kant, C. Lyell, C. Darwin).
The main meaning of the philosophical and historical concepts of neo-Kantianism (G. Rickert, W. Windelband), Croceanism (B. Croce), philosophy of life (W. Dilthey), existentialism (K. Jaspers), pragmatism, neopositivism (K. Popper), neo-Hegelianism, as well as the theories of followers of these concepts in the field of specific sciences - the so-called “historical school” in political economy, the “positive school” in history, etc., consists precisely in denying the possibility of approaching objective reality from the point of view of revealing the natural process of its development, in replacing the principle of Historicism with relativism.
Historicism proceeds not simply from the movement of the objective world, not simply from its changeability over time, but precisely from its development. This approach means that the object should be considered, firstly, from the point of view of its internal structure, and not as a mechanical set of individual elements, connections, dependencies, but as an organic combination of these structural components, as an internally connected and functioning whole, as a system; secondly, from the point of view of the process, i.e., the set of historical connections and dependencies of its internal components that follow each other in time; thirdly, from the point of view of identifying and recording qualitative changes in its structure as a whole; finally, from the point of view of revealing the laws of its development, the laws of transition from one historical state of an object, characterized by one structure, to another historical state, characterized by a different structure.
For modern science- natural (biology) and social (sociology, anthropology, linguistics, ethnography), as well as for the philosophical and logical-methodological understanding of the processes occurring in modern scientific knowledge, are characterized by the further development of the principle of Historicism, its convergence with other principles and, above all, such as structural-functional and systematic approaches, enriching its content with elements of the specified principles and methods.
7. Fundamentals of the socialist theory of Marxism
Sociology of Marxism is a theory of social development of society created by K. Marx and F. Engels in the middle - second half of the 19th century. The role in the history of sociological thought - the functioning of society, the consciousness and behavior of the people living in it are analyzed, first of all, through the prism of the material conditions of their life, through contradictions and conflicts in the actually existing mode of production.
Two fundamental considerations:
Ideas are considered in the context of the sociocultural values of the time and space where and when they lived;
Marx and Engels were among the first to use empirical sociological research in their theoretical works- “Questionnaire for workers”, “The situation of the working class in England”, etc.
Marxist sociology- a materialistic understanding of history, developed on the basis of a study of the real content of the historical process, its objective laws. The basic principle of Marxist sociology is “the reduction of the individual to the social.”
One of the fundamental aspects of materialistic understanding is the substantiation of the dialectical interaction of social being and public consciousness. Social existence is the real process of people’s lives, their social practice, the content of which is reflected in the public consciousness.
In Marxism mode of production- the material basis for the existence and development of society, a system-forming principle that links together all manifestations public life.
“The method of production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life in general” (K. Marx and F. Engels). Marxism views the mode of production as the unity of its two sides - productive forces and production relations.
Dialectical-materialist understanding of history. Society from the perspective of Marxism
The fundamental question of paramount importance for sociology is the question of the interaction of material and spiritual values in the life of society.
The starting point for the analysis of all societies for Marx was to clarify the state of the productive forces, scientific and technical knowledge, and material relations between people. Ideas, the subjective aspirations of people, are primarily a reflection of these relationships and therefore cannot act as the main, decisive factor in social change. Marx explains the emergence of certain social structures and relations, political and cultural institutions entirely from the trend of economic development.
Two meanings of the term “society”:
1) material education, isolated from nature and correlated with it, like human society, humanity;
2) a specific individual society, a “social organism” in the unity of its general, special and individual characteristics.
Marxism is the ideology of the liberation movement of the working class, which practically solves the greatest progressive task of eliminating social oppression and building a communist society. The change in socio-economic formations occurs under the influence of economic factors rooted in the method of production, which are associated with other factors, including socio-political, ideological and related to the field of spiritual culture. At its core, this is a revolutionary process during which one type of society is replaced by another. The material prerequisite for the social revolution is the deepening and aggravating discrepancy between outdated economic relations and the progressively developing productive forces of society.
The idea of society as a system
All social relations are divided into material and ideological. Material relations develop and manifest themselves independently of the consciousness and will of people (economic, production and technological relations, material relations to nature). Ideological relations develop consciously (political, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious relations between people).
Interaction between the economic basis of society and the superstructure.
Economic basis- the totality of economic relations - the real economic structure of society. The superstructure is the political, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious and other views of social subjects, as well as the social relations, organizations and institutions that correspond to these views and implement them in practice.
Society - social system, which is an integral social organism, which reflects the unity of economic, political, legal and other social relations. Subjects of public relations: social groups, including class and national, as well as individual individuals.
The objective basis of social relations are:
Social division of labor;
Development various types activities of people.
Spheres of public life:
1) Economic. (the unity of productive forces and production relations, processes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material means of life, etc.) The highest manifestation of necessity.
2) Social. Human society- socially structured. Sustainable public relations between certain people are embodied in the peculiarities of the lifestyle of a given social group, in the unity of needs, etc.
3) Political. Politics is the first ideologically organized social force. A means of resolving pressing social contradictions.
4) Spiritual - spiritual life purposefully organized by society. It is divided into subsystems: ideological, scientific, artistic and aesthetic life, upbringing, education.
Sociology of classes and class struggle
The sociological theory of Marxism includes a systemic analysis of classes, social relations and class struggle. According to Marx, a person’s belonging to a class and his social interests are determined primarily by economic relations. In social polarization, Marx saw the source of class antagonism, the deep cause of class struggle. Classes- these are social groups that are in an unequal position and are fighting among themselves, and in a narrower sense, these are social groups that differ in their attitude to property, primarily to the means of production.
Marx viewed class in terms of ownership of capital and the means of production, dividing the population into property owners and propertyless, into the capitalist class and the proletariat. He viewed classes as real communities and real social forces capable of changing society. Particularly important for the identification of a class is the awareness of belonging to a social unity, the feeling of different interests from the interests of other groups, the presence of the will to joint action.
The difference in class interests stems from their objective position in society and, above all, in the production process. People may not be aware of their class interests and yet be guided by them in their actions.
Sociology of revolution
Marx allowed for different forms of class struggle. He did not deny the importance of peaceful forms of struggle within the trade union movement, but believed that the reformist struggle would not solve the problem of antagonism.
“Revolutions are the locomotives of history” and at the same time his thoughts that revolutionary struggle difficult to regulate.
Marx and Engels emphasized the unity of civil society and the state; they noted that state power itself, its monopoly, will never ensure freedom; freedom is possible only where there is an emancipated civil society capable of dictating its will to the state.
The idea of the “withering away” of the state. A necessary step on the path to stateless self-government is the establishment of the political power of the working class in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. State power is not only an instrument by which the economically dominant class also becomes the politically dominant class, but also a mechanism for carrying out general managerial tasks arising from the nature of any society.
Social development, according to Marx, occurs in accordance with certain laws, by which he understands the “internal and necessary connection” between phenomena. He believed that contradictions, the struggle of opposites, are the source of the driving force of development. He considers the ascent from the abstract to the concrete as a general scientific method of cognition.
With the advent of Marxism, views on the development of society changed radically. Modern sociology considers Marxism as the most developed ideology in the historical context, which, after the collapse of one of its movements - Soviet socialism, questions the existence of any heritage in the aspect historical development and the possibility of further evolution of this ideology in general.
8. Problems of social and humanitarian knowledge
Philosophy of social sciences and humanities- is an integral part of the philosophy of science, which studies the patterns of emergence, formation and development of the social and human sciences as sociocultural phenomena. The philosophy of social sciences and humanities considers social sciences and humanities in three aspects:
as a cognitive activity,
· as a system of disciplinary organized knowledge,
· as a social institution.
The process of formation and development of the philosophy of social sciences and humanities is complex and incomplete, because:
a) social sciences and humanities arose later than natural sciences;
b) the philosophy of certain humanities arose earlier (for example, the philosophy of history), others - later (for example, the philosophy of education),
c) the subject and goals of the philosophy of social sciences and humanities are determined by the basis on which general philosophy or general philosophy of science it functions.
The role and importance of the philosophy of social sciences and humanities will increase in the future due to the growing importance of science in solving global, spiritual problems of humanity.
RIGHT
The main problem is whether the philosophy of law and legal sciences are in a significant connection, and what theoretical and practical consequences follow from its recognition.
The solution to this problem is important theoretical value, since it allows, firstly, to clearly distinguish between the subjects of philosophy of law and legal sciences, secondly, to obtain sufficient grounds for choosing a methodology adequate to them, and thirdly, to distinguish and streamline the semantic apparatus of the philosophy of law and various legal sciences.
The correct answer to the question posed will also have significant practical significance, allowing during vocational education lawyer to significantly expand the horizon of his vision of the essence, purpose and capabilities of law, to form practical value systems that make it possible to overcome the formalism of the current law, its limitation by the authority of existing state power and decide immediate problems legal practice in the context of the deep material, social and spiritual principles of people's lives.
SOCIOLOGY
It is important to emphasize that sociology as an empirical science arose simultaneously with the emergence of the scientific worldview. Just as Comte’s positive philosophy itself turned out to be a manifesto of a scientific worldview, which from now on was almost always associated with positivism, no matter what transformations this philosophical doctrine experienced
The French branch of positivism is most fully expressed in the works of one of the classics of sociology Emile Durkheim. Durkheim adhered to the fundamental attitude towards the scientific nature of sociology and demanded that social facts be considered as things, that is, as external to man and objective phenomena. At the same time, he recognized the existence of society as a set of facts of consciousness. These facts of consciousness are specific ideas that, although prompted by external, social reality, are perceived by people as their own, belonging to their consciousness. Moreover, they are not arbitrary and do not differ from individual to individual, but have the property of obligatory and coercive nature.
P. Feyerabend explicitly formulated a number of concepts that undermine traditional scientific teaching, in particular, the concept of “indeterminability” of a theory by empirical data. Its essence is that empirical data do not unambiguously determine the truth or falsity of a theory. Several theoretical interpretations of the original empirical data are always possible. Another fundamental idea for Feyerabend was the concept of theoretical “load” of empirical data. It assumes that the judgments of a scientific observer are always formulated in a certain theoretical and cultural context, moreover, the observer uses tools and devices built taking into account certain theoretical premises and designed for a certain result.
ECONOMY
The crystallization of ideas about economics as an object of theoretical knowledge proceeded along two lines: one was built around a special subject - material wealth, the other - around a special type of people's behavior motivated solely by their private interests. On this basis, two basic pictures of economic reality, or ontologies, were formed, which, with some convention, can be called, respectively, product and behavioral.
Three main vectors of development of ontological ideas about economics in the postclassical period can be distinguished:
a) short-term modification of the original predominantly product ontology;
b) crystallization of an alternative behavioral picture of economic reality;
c) attempts to put forward a specifically social ontology for economic science.
During the marginalist revolution (70s - 90s of the 19th century), the main attention shifted to the sphere of exchange and focused on the process activities, on the behavior of economic agents, primarily on their decision-making on the distribution and use of resources. Accordingly, various marginalist schools, neoclassical microeconomics, including neo-institutionalism, and a number of new areas of macroeconomics took as a basis behavioral ontology.
Finally, the realization that the behavior of economic agents, in turn, depends on established norms and rules, stimulated the emergence of another basic ontology - institutional. She was adopted historical school, traditional institutionalism and some movements within the framework of new institutionalism. Institutional ontology is aimed at describing historically determined stereotypes and norms of behavior, organizational structures economic activity, the nature of their evolutionary changes.
Institutions exist only to the extent that they act, “live”, and this is possible only with coordinated coexistence:
A) individual thought-active stereotypes;
b) collectively shared beliefs (patterns of behavior);
V) external subject and organizational forms capable of supporting and consolidating these patterns of behavior.
As cultural phenomena, institutions are historically specific and historically “loaded,” that is, they carry the accumulated experience of previous generations.
STORY
The philosophy of history in the joint, corporate context of historical knowledge acts as general theory historical development, substantiating universal models of world history, the dynamics and strategy of their development and knowledge.
Understanding the subject of the philosophy of history, its relationship with historical science allows us to determine our own niche for historical philosophy on uki. The philosophy of historical science, as it were, unites the “historical triad” (history as a real process, history as a science and history as a philosophy of history), forming its own space, its own theoretical and epistemological problems in the areas of intersection.
Philosophical problems in the format of historical science:
1. General approaches to historical knowledge
In the study of history, two directions can be distinguished - ontological and epistemological:
·Representatives ontological directions concentrated attention on the object of history, events, real processes, leaving “overboard” the theoretical-cognitive process itself and the role of the subject of knowledge in it.
Radical supporters epistemological directions, on the contrary, excluded its object from the process of historical knowledge, suggesting that it does not exist as a reality, it has already disappeared along with people and events.
2. History as an ideal model of the past
The subject of natural science disciplines is reality;
·Field of study of historical science - past reality past.
"Three methodological requirements" mandatory for historical knowledge:
1. Localization in space and time;
2. Consistency with each other;
3. Confirmation by evidence from sources.
3. Interpretation as a method of historical science
The need for interpretation is determined by the following:
o The specificity of the object of historical knowledge;
o Constantly changing time and social situation;
o Constant change in the value orientation of subjects of historical knowledge.
·There are various strategies and scenarios for recreating historical reality.
o Reproduction genuine reality;
o Design alternative history, probable events.
4. Search for historical patterns
The problem of the individual and the general in context historical events:
· The uniqueness of historical events is not an illusion, but a reliable fact that does not deny the existence of something common in these events;
· There are objective material, social and spiritual reasons underlying the repetition of events;
· Not the absolute repeatability of any events, but the repeatability of events of a certain class, type, type, for which historical conditions exist.
POLICY
The cross-cutting problem is a combination of the main ways of philosophical understanding of science, including political science.
1. Initial antinomies of philosophy political science:
· reflection of the tension between the rational and the irrational that arises in the process of political cognition;
· the clash between the legitimacy of power and the effectiveness of politics, parliamentarism and discretionary executive power, democracy and authoritarianism;
· understanding the discrepancy between the ideal of social order and the utilitarian nature of the embodied order by the flawed way of implementing the ideal;
· contradictions of internal and external control mechanisms and restrictions of hedonism and deviations.
2. The question of the languages of philosophy and political science is essential. There are areas of the political where philosophical vocabulary, in synthesis with the language of scientific studies, theory of systems and management, general sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies, contributes to the formulation and solution of problems by political science.
3. The question of the compliance of political science with the general criteria of scientificity is very relevant. This is an epistemological and epistemological question: a question of the cognitive “insight” of political science, its rationality, the ability to seek and find the truth, the nature of this truth, the reliability and objectivity of political knowledge. This ability of political science has often been questioned both in philosophy and in political science itself.
4. Great importance has a question about the subjectivity of political science, about the independence and intradisciplinary identity of the categories of political science. It is obvious that it is philosophy that facilitates political scientists’ “torment” of self-identification in the new post-structuralist reality, in the process of explaining the causes and consequences of fundamental changes in the world at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries.
5. The problem of “neutrality/engagement” of a scientist, the specifics of the researcher’s involvement in current politics in the process of describing and assessing political reality, as well as his recommendations. The responsibility of a political scientist for constructing reality is a problem of both philosophical reflection and specific political knowledge.
MANAGEMENT
Term "management" is used both to designate a special sphere of social and practical activity, and a special scientific discipline that sets the task of studying this sphere and developing practical recommendations for its improvement. Features of the approach to the analysis of organization theories is that it is focused on considering their methodological foundations in the context development and change of leading scientific ideals.
The Ideal of Scientificity is a system of cognitive values and norms, the choice, status and interpretation of which depend on a broad cognitive and sociocultural context. Its content consists of the characteristics of scientific knowledge:
Descriptions and explanations;
Construction and organization of knowledge;
Evidence and justification.
The structure of the scientific ideal can, to a first approximation, be presented in the form of a pyramid of cognitive values and the requirements based on them for the results of scientific and cognitive activity. The focus on truth corresponds to the most fundamental interests of the human race and the general trend in the development of scientific knowledge. The base of this pyramid consists of the minimum requirements for scientific character: objectivity, problem situation, validity, intersubjective verifiability, systematicity. But despite the importance of the universal characteristics of scientific character, their demarcation power and heuristic potential are still not high. From a modern point of view, scientific requirements, which occupy a higher level in the general pyramid of norms, are of great importance.
9. Science as a communicative activity. The theory of “communicative action” by J. Habermas
9.1. Science as a communicative activity
There are three main aspects of science: cognitive, communicative and socio-psychological.
Communication: influence (persuasion in the search for truth), interaction (finding mutual understanding among scientists) and connection.
Aspects of the communication aspect: objective (the movement of knowledge) and subjective (the meaning of this knowledge).
Functions of communicative science (Mikeshina):
Formulation of knowledge in the form of an objectivable system of texts;
Use of common language;
Transfer of normative principles;
Transferring ways of seeing the paradigm, i.e. what cannot be recorded in texts, but is important for scientists;
Application of “dialogical” forms of cognitive development.
Open rationality includes all elements and values without prioritizing them.
9.2. The theory of “communicative action” by J. Habermas
J. Habermas is a supporter of the formation of a new rationality. Theory comm. actions. At the center of Habermas's philosophical reflections is the concept of communicative reason. He believes that rationalism has not realized itself and criticizes postmodernism.
The term "communication" in the early 20th century. This:
a) a means of connecting any objects of the material and spiritual world; b) communication, transfer of information from person to person; c) transmission and exchange of information in society with the aim of influencing it. Communication acts as a mediator between individual and socially conscious information. Habermas's rationalism is a process of progressively overcoming systemic communication breakdowns. According to Habermas, communication is the achievement of mutual understanding and the 2nd model of rationality. He highlights cognitive interests:
Technical;
Emancipatory;
Practical.
It separates the system and the lifeworld. The world of life is the sphere of everyday self-understanding, a non-objective pre-theoretical integrity.
There are three types of rationality:
Target - instrumental - helps to understand the system;
Communicative - helps to understand the life world;
Procedural (intersubjective).
According to Habermas, “communicative action” is a kind of continuation, development of “public”, which is a specific social quasi-subject, focused on rational discussion of common problems with the participation of all citizens.
The goal of the theory of communicative action is to study and reconstruct the prerequisites for the rationality of the processes of achieving understanding as universal structures.
The originality of Habermas's philosophical theory lies in the fact that he connected the concept of reason with the empirical theory of social evolution developed by Marx, Weber and Parsons. He rejects philosophical apriorism and concentrates his efforts on developing a post-metaphysical “philosophical project.” This means that the philosophical concept of reason is not independent of empirical observations and must constantly confirm itself in dialogue with specific scientific disciplines that reflect the fact of functional differentiation of society.
Habermas clearly distinguishes between the philosophy of history and the theory of social evolution. Habermas's formulations and concepts have had a significant influence on modern thought.
Habermas's theory of communicative action appears to be a very complex socio-philosophical conceptualization. Although the problem of interactive communication in the communication community has occupied and continues to occupy the minds of many researchers, the first scientist who took an integrated approach to solving this problem was J. Habermas. Modern society, with its increasingly complex communication structures and integration processes, requires a new theory that not only reflects these processes and describes the problems, but also offers possible ways to solve them. This is precisely the theory that J. Habermas created when developing his concept of communicative action. On its basis, systemic and social integration becomes possible.
10. Positivism
First positivism (middleXIX century)
The philosophy of science took shape as an independent direction in the second half of the 19th century. in the activities of representatives of the first positivism.
Representatives: O. Comte, J. S. Mill G. Spencer.
Causes:
Ø Historical conditions: By the middle of the 19th century. reforms in education have established the study as its basis basic sciences. From an activity of individuals or small groups of scientists, science gradually turned into a new social institution, defending its autonomy and specific principles of scientific research
Ø Change social status Sciences: An increasingly intensive application of scientific knowledge in production is planned. Technical sciences emerge as the basis of engineering activity.
O. Comte
Ø Created the concept of positive science, which made it possible to distinguish science from metaphysics.
Ø Formulated the tasks of positive philosophy.
Ø He proposed the law of “three stages” - three stages of humanity in mental development (theological, metaphysical, positive), the law of constant subordination of imagination to observation, an encyclopedic law.
Ø He proposed a classification of sciences: 1) mathematics, 2) astronomy, 3) physics, 4) chemistry, 5) biology (physiology), 6) social physics (sociology), 7) morality.
J. S. Mill
Ø He proposed an inductive method for establishing causal relationships between phenomena. He described in detail 4 methods: the method of similarity, the method of difference, the method of accompanying changes, the method of residuals.
Ø Characterized phenomena as phenomena of sensory experience (sensations), and laws as relations between phenomena.
Ø Increased the role of induction in scientific knowledge. Hypothesis and deduction play a supporting role.
G. Spencer
Ø Allowed the coexistence of science and religion.
Ø Emphasized the universality of the evolutionary development of everything.
Ø Formulated the law of evolution.
Ø He proposed his classification of sciences.
Results of the first positivism:
Ø The emergence of philosophy of science as a direction of modern philosophy.
Ø Distinction between science and metaphysics.
Ø Interpretation of scientific knowledge as the accumulation of experimental facts, their description and prediction, through laws. The role of hypothesis as a tool of cognition
Ø Structure and systematization of scientific knowledge, classification of sciences.
Problems of the first positivism:
Ø Narrow understanding of science, its idealization
o No connection with philosophy and culture
o Abstracts from the historical development of already formed scientific rationality
o Abstracts from the practical-activity nature of scientific knowledge (only the influence of science on practice is considered)
Ø A simplified concept of scientific knowledge (there are no qualitative changes in it)
Second positivism (second halfXIX - beginningXX centuries)
The problems of the first positivism remained, but other problems came to the fore - problems of substantiating the fundamentality of scientific abstractions, concepts, principles and correlating them with reality
Main directions and representatives:
Ø Empirio-criticism - E. Mach, R. Avenarius.
Ø Physical theory - P. Duhem.
Ø Conventionalism - A. Poincaré.
Causes:
Ø fundamental changes in natural science in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. (discovery of the electron, magnetic and electrical phenomena, discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, development of the physiology of vision and hearing, etc.).
E. Mach
Ø Believed that it was necessary to completely abandon metaphysical dogmas
Ø Criticized Newton for the concepts of “absolute space” and “absolute time”
Ø He considered mechanism as one of the varieties of metaphysics, as an “artificial hypothesis”, which turned into a kind of mythology based on “fantastic exaggerations”
Ø Criticized mechanistic ideas about the atom
Ø Proposed the principle of neutrality of the elements of the world
Ø Disagreements between thoughts and facts lead to a problem. The problem can be solved using a hypothesis
R. Avenarius
Ø Considered cognition as an aspect of life, and life as a process of accumulation and expenditure of energy
Ø Proposed the principle of saving thinking
Ø Integral unity of the subjective and objective - the idea of fundamental coordination
Ø He proposed the term introjection - the assimilation of other people’s experience, which is interpreted as a kind of throwing other people’s feelings and perceptions into my soul and body
P. Duhem
Ø Believed that physical theory should be freed from hypothetical metaphysical doctrines
Ø Purpose physical theory- turning yourself into natural classification, the creation between various experimental laws of a certain logical connection, which would be, as it were, a reflected image of the actual order characteristic of realities inaccessible to our perception
A. Poincare
Ø The founder of conventionalism is a direction in the philosophy of science that proclaims agreements (conventions) between scientists as the basis of scientific theories.
Ø Put forward the thesis of incommensurability of theories - successive theories cannot be compared, since they are not logically connected and use different concepts and methods of research and justification
Results of the second positivism:
Ø The emergence of empirio-criticism and conventionalism.
Ø The principle of economy of thinking.
Ø Strengthening the role of the hypothesis.
Ø The “naive” empiricism of the first positivism was transformed into the “radical” empiricism of the second positivism and became the philosophy of pure experience.
Problems of the second positivism:
Ø External factors and the influence of the subject of cognition were not taken into account
Ø Arguing that the only reality is sensory experience (sensations, perceptions), and everything else that exists is a derivative of sensations, empirio-criticism actually aligned itself with the position of subjective idealism. And this position, in turn, leads to contradictions with the achievements of science.
Neopositivism (logical positivism) - first halfXX century
At the third stage of the philosophy of science, there was a transition from the analysis of the fundamental principles of science to the analysis of the language of science.
Representatives:
Vienna Circle: M. Schlick, R. Carnap, O. Neurath, K. Gödel, K. G. Hempel, G. Feigel, Philip Frank, V. Dubislav and others.
Reasons for appearance:
B. Russell suggested using logical analysis language of science to resolve paradoxes in mathematical theory, which, in his opinion, were the result of a bias in language.
Main points:
Ø Science should be nothing more than a combination of sentences representing facts and their various combinations, deals with the truth of these sentences
Ø Everything that claims to go beyond this world of facts must be eliminated from science
Ø To identify and reject such facts, a logical analysis of the language of science is required; this is precisely what should become the main task of philosophy
Epistemological principles:
Ø All knowledge is knowledge of what is given to man in sensory perception.
Ø What is given to us in sensory perception, we can know with absolute certainty.
Ø All functions of knowledge are reduced to description.
Ø The criterion of demarcation (the distinction between science and non-science) is verifiability: a proposal is scientific only if it is verifiable, that is, reducible to protocol sentences, and its truth is established by observation.
Results of neopositivism:
Ø Absolutization of the logical language of science.
Ø Highlighting protocol sentences as the basis of science. Protocol sentences express the sensory experiences of the subject.
Ø Recognition of verifiability as a criterion of demarcation.
Ø A sharp distinction between the empirical and theoretical levels of knowledge.
Ø Neopositivists brought science closer to real science.
Problems of neopositivism:
Ø Recognition of verifiability as a demarcation criterion meant that all scientific terms and sentences relating to the idealized or to the sensually imperceptible turned out to be meaningless. This has made it difficult to clearly distinguish between science and non-science.
Ø Anti-historicism and ignoring development processes as a consequence of sensory perception of the world and the lack of interconnection of facts, no reference to the history of science
Ø Later it was found out that protocol sentences are not the empirical basis of science. The basis is empirical facts, and the formulation of a fact does not always require the language of physics.
Postpositivism (second halfXX century)
Main concepts and representatives:
Ø Naive falsificationism - K. Popper.
Ø Refined falsificationism - I. Lakatos.
Ø The concept of scientific revolutions - T. Kuhn.
Ø The concept of personal knowledge - M. Polanyi.
Ø The concept of the sociology of science - M. Malkay.
Ø Epistimiological anarchism - P. Feyerabend.
Causes:
Ø Decomposition of neopositivism;
Ø The birth of Popper;
Ø Further development of science.
K. Popper
Ø He proposed a new methodological concept - falsificationism, the main principle of which is falsifiability.
Ø He proposed the concept of corroboration - this is a confirmation that does not increase the likelihood of the confirmed theory, without spoiling its falsifiability.
Ø He proposed the principle of fallibilism - the growth of scientific knowledge involves the process of putting forward scientific theoretical hypotheses with their subsequent refutation.
Ø Proposed the concept of “three worlds”: peace physical conditions, the world of states of consciousness, the world of the objective content of thinking. Thus, Popper pushed the boundaries of science.
Ø The main problem was the development of scientific knowledge, which led to an appeal to the history of science.
I. Lakatos
Ø Reformed Popper's critical rationalism. Created the concept of sophisticated falsificationism - a theory is scientific only if it has supported additional empirical content compared to its predecessor (or rival), i.e., if it leads to the discovery of new facts
Ø He proposed the idea of a sequence of theories: a theory from a sequential series (T1, T2, ...) is considered falsified if it is replaced by a theory with a more highly supported content.
Ø Proposed the concept of research programs. (hard core, protective belt, positive heuristics, negative heuristics).
Ø According to Lakatos, the history of science appeared as a competition between various programs
T. Kuhn
Ø The thesis of the paradigmatic nature of scientific knowledge;
Ø Thesis of the monopoly paradigm in every historical period development of science;
Ø Thesis of an instant paradigm shift;
Ø Thesis of incommensurability of paradigms.
M. Polanyi
Ø The meaning of scientific provisions is determined by the implicit context of hidden knowledge, which has an instrumental nature and is determined by the entire bodily organization of a person. In other words, the meaning of scientific statements is inseparable from instrumental knowledge, which remains unarticulated
Ø The meaning of scientific statements is inseparable from personal confidence in the truth, which is embedded in the proclaimed scientific judgment
Ø The role of non-verbalized traditions in the functioning and development of scientific knowledge
M. Mulcahy
Ø Criticized the standard concept of science
Ø Took into account social and cultural factors that influence not only the speed and direction of its development, but also the content of scientific thinking, i.e. its concepts, empirical results and methods of interpretation.
P. Feyerabend
Ø Founder of epistemological anarchism.
Ø The only principle that does not hinder progress is the principle “everything is acceptable.”
Ø No boundaries in science.
Ø Complete freedom of creativity.
Ø It is not the truth that is important, but the development of individual abilities.
Results of postpositivism:
Ø The problems of the historical dynamics of science, the mechanism for the development of scientific knowledge, the role of the individual in knowledge come to the fore, the role of philosophy in science is being revised, social and cultural factors are being taken into account, etc.
11. Marx's economic theory
For Marx, economic theory was never an end in itself. He turned to it as a social philosopher, looking for the reasons for social development in economics. Main works: “Towards a critique of political economy”, “Capital”.
The theory of surplus value. The main thesis of the classics is that wealth is created by labor, and labor is exchanged at an equivalent price, then where does the capitalist’s income come from? Mark solves the problem by introducing a new concept: “commodity labor.” He argues that the worker does not sell labor, but labor power, that is, his ability to work. Like any product, labor power has a use value and value. The cost of this product corresponds to the cost of the means of subsistence necessary for the reproduction of labor power, but the consumer value for the capitalist buyer is determined by the ability of the labor force to produce more. This difference forms surplus value. Consequently, the structure of working time: necessary and surplus labor.
Reproduction theory. Prerequisites: long-term market equilibrium with unchanged technical level of production and consumer preferences. The cost of a product is divided into three parts: where With- costs of constant capital corresponding to the costs of means of production spent in the production of a given product, v- costs of variable capital corresponding to the costs of wages of workers, m- surplus value, which makes up the final income of the capitalists themselves. The economy is divided into two sectors: production of capital goods (Q 1) and production of consumer goods (Q 2). The annual costs of constant and variable capital coincide in size with their reserves at the beginning of the corresponding period. A closed economy and “pure capitalism”, workers use their entire income for consumption. Simple reproduction: a repeating cycle on a constant scale. Expanded reproduction: part of the surplus value is saved and becomes a source of capital accumulation.
Average rate of profit. Each unit of average labor time creates an equal amount of surplus value, regardless of the sphere of production. Market competition leads to averaging of profit rates between industries. This occurs under the influence of the redistribution of surplus value. Marx also put the dynamics of the average rate of profit in direct connection with technical progress. For the capitalist, the introduction of new technology is a means of extracting additional profit, but at the same time it is a factor causing decrease in average rate of profit. Marx identified this general law, but there are factors that counteract it: 1) the growth of the rate of surplus value, as a result of technical progress, which reduces the cost of subsistence, 2) the possibility of capital-economic technical progress.
Theory of economic crises. Crises of overproduction - one of the most striking evidence of the contradictions of capitalism - indicated, in Marx's opinion, that capitalism as a carrier of social progress had exhausted itself. Marx’s position: it is important not only to comprehend the conditions under which supply and demand at the macro level can be maintained in a balanced state (the theory of reproduction), but also to identify those systemic, internal forms and mechanisms inherent in capitalism that impede the movement of the economy along a trajectory of balanced growth. He draws attention to the fact that there is a time gap between selling and buying, and this creates the possibility of an economic crisis. The development of credit further widens this gap. A period of economic recovery is characterized by the presence of incentives for the accumulation of capital and, consequently, a growing demand for labor, which leads to a reduction in unemployment, an increase in wages and lower profit margins. The rise is cut short by a crisis of overproduction, the decline reaches the point where the incentives for capital accumulation cease to operate and investment ceases. The crisis is leading to rising unemployment and falling real wages. This raises the rate of profit and restores the incentive to accumulate capital. Once it begins, such a crisis acquires a recurring character, receiving a material basis in the form of a cycle of capital renewal.
Product. Using the example of the concept of a commodity, Marx identifies three levels of consideration of economic phenomena. The first is physical existence, this is some useful thing, some consumer value, specific technological processes are required for production. The second level is cost. In this case, the individual product no longer appears on its own; it is understood as an integral part of the total product of the labor of society. All goods are comparable in value, regardless of their natural form. The magnitude of their value is determined by the amount of labor spent on their production. According to Marx, both of these levels of consideration of the product are insufficient, since they are applicable to the product of labor in any type of society and do not reflect the specificity of the product as an object of market exchange. His fundamentally different view is a commodity as a production relationship between people.
12. Structure and development of scientific knowledge
1) Structure of scientific knowledge
Levels of scientific knowledge: empirical, theoretical, metatheoretical
Empirical knowledge
It is not just a generalization of experimental and observational data, it is a certain conceptual and discussion model of sensory knowledge.
Structure of empirical knowledge:
1. Single empirical statements I, “protocol proposals.” Content - discursive fixation of the results of single observations; important points of content are the exact time and place of observation.
2. Data. Scientific fact- inductive generalization of protocols, necessarily general statements of a statistical or universal nature. Facts provide quantitative certainty and are presented (expressed) as graphs, tables, mathematical models, diagrams, classifications.
3. Empirical laws(various types - functional, causal, statistical, etc.). Scientific laws are a special type of relationship between events, states or properties, which are characterized by temporal or spatial constancy (dimensionality). These are general laws obtained through various induction procedures. They are hypothetical, since the method of induction is generally ambiguous and can only provide conjectural, probabilistic knowledge.
4. Phenomenological theory- a logically organized set of relevant empirical laws and facts. Because induction does not have demonstrative logical force (only confirmatory), then such a theory, in terms of the nature of its origin and the possibilities of justification, remains hypothetical, conjectural knowledge.
The differences within empirical knowledge are quantitative - they differ in the degree of generality of presentation of the same content.
Theoretical knowledge
Theoretical knowledge is a set of statements (usually organized into a logically interconnected system) about ideal objects. It must be emphasized that after its creation, the theoretical world as a whole (like any of its elements) acquires objective status:
· it becomes an objective reality for the consciousness that created it,
· has its own, more artificial trajectories of movement and evolution.
The main factors of consciousness that control changes in the content of theoretical knowledge are intellectual intuition and logic. The content of theoretical knowledge is an immanent product of consciousness itself.
Scientific theory is a logically organized set of statements about a certain class of ideal objects, their properties and relationships.
Features of scientific theory:
1. Theory is a set of hundreds of scientific principles. The unification of knowledge into a theory is carried out primarily by the subject of research itself, by its laws.
2. In order to turn into a theory, knowledge must reach a certain degree of maturity in its development, i.e. when knowledge reveals the causes and patterns of phenomena.
3. For a theory, justification and proof of its provisions are mandatory.
4. The desire to explain as wide a range of phenomena as possible, to continuously deepen knowledge about them.
5. The nature of the theory determines the degree of validity of its defining principle.
6. The structure of scientific theories is meaningfully “determined by the systemic organization of idealized (abstract) objects (theoretical constructs). Statements of theoretical language are directly formulated in relation to theoretical constructs and only indirectly, thanks to their relationship to extra-linguistic reality, describe this reality.”
Methods of scientific knowledge:
· Thought experiment
· Mathematical hypothesis
· Theoretical modeling
· axiomatic and genetic-constructive method of logical organization of theoretical knowledge and construction of scientific theories
method of formalization
· Idealization - from the analysis of the properties and relationships of an empirical object, thinking creates a qualitatively new (purely mental) object, which has properties that can no longer be observed in principle (the dimensionlessness of a point). There are two approaches to the theory of idealization - essentialism(ideal objects and scientific theories describe the essential world, and empirical knowledge is associated with the world of phenomena) and instrumental view(representation of all available empirical information about a certain subject area )
Metatheoretical knowledge
The metatheoretical level of scientific knowledge is more general compared to the theoretical and empirical levels Sciences. It consists of two main sublevels:
1. General scientific knowledge and
2. Philosophical foundations of science
General scientific knowledge consists generally of the following elements:
1. Particular and general scientific pictures of the world;
2. Particular scientific and general scientific epistemological, methodological, logical and axiological principles.
The metatheoretical level of knowledge plays a particularly important role in the class of logical and mathematical sciences. In natural sciences and social sciences and humanities, the metatheoretical level exists in the form of corresponding particular scientific and general scientific principles.
Private scientific picture of the world- this is the totality of ideas about the world dominant in any science. As a rule, it is based on the ontological principles of the paradigmatic theory for a given science. The private scientific picture of the world sets and sanctions as true a certain categorical type of vision by a specific science of its empirical and theoretical (idealized) objects, harmonizing them with each other. It is always a concretization of a certain (more general) philosophical ontology, which is a product of the reflexive-constructive activity of the mind in the sphere of universal distinctions and oppositions.
General scientific picture of the world- this is, as a rule, one of the private scientific pictures of the world, which is dominant in the science of a particular era. It is an additional element of the metatheoretical level of those specific sciences that do not have it as their own private scientific picture of the world.
2) development of scientific knowledge
There are two models for the development of scientific knowledge:
· Internalism-(home driving force development of science - its inherent internal goals, means and patterns)
· externalism - The main source of innovation in science is the social needs and cultural resources of society, its material and spiritual potential, and practical interest.
Raising the issue of the development of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to understand that Theory is not only ready-made, established knowledge, but also the process of obtaining it, therefore it is not a “bare result”, but must be considered together with its emergence and development.
A stable theory must perform the following functions: synthetic, explanatory, methodological, predictive, practical.
The best theory according to Popper is this:
1. verifiable
2. as informative as possible
3. logically strict
4. has explanatory and predictive power
5. verifiable by comparing predictions and observed facts
28. Scientific revolutions and changes in types of rationality. Science and technology.
In the dynamics of scientific knowledge, a special role is played by the stages of development associated with the restructuring of research strategies set by the foundations of science. These stages are called scientific revolutions. The foundations of science ensure the growth of knowledge as long as the general features of the systemic organization of the objects being studied are taken into account in the picture of the world, and the methods of mastering these objects correspond to the established ideals and norms of research. But as science develops, it may encounter fundamentally new types of objects that require a different vision of reality compared to the one assumed by the existing picture of the world. New objects may also require changes in the scheme of the method of cognitive activity, represented by a system of ideals and norms of research. In this situation, the growth of scientific knowledge presupposes a restructuring of the foundations of science. The latter can be carried out in two varieties: a) as a revolution associated with the transformation of a special picture of the world without significant changes in the ideals and norms of research; b) as a revolution, during which, along with the picture of the world, the ideals and norms of science radically change.
In the history of natural science one can find examples of both situations of intensive growth of knowledge. An example of the first of them is the transition from a mechanical to an electrodynamic picture of the world, carried out in physics in the last quarter of the 19th century in connection with the construction of the classical theory electromagnetic field. This transition, although accompanied by a rather radical restructuring of the vision of physical reality, did not significantly change the cognitive attitudes of classical physics (the understanding of explanation as a search for the substantial foundations of the phenomena being explained and strictly determined connections between phenomena was preserved; any indications of means of observation and operational structures through which the essence of the objects under study is revealed, etc.). An example of the second situation is the history of quantum relativistic physics, which was characterized by a restructuring of the classical ideals of explanation, description, justification and organization of knowledge.
29. Cosmocentrism of early ancient Greek Philosophy.
During the VI-IV centuries. BC. in Greece there was a rapid flowering of culture and philosophy. During this period, new non-myths were created. worldview, a new picture of the world, the central element of which was the doctrine of space. Space embraces the Earth, man, the heavenly bodies and the firmament itself. It is closed, has a spherical shape and there is a constant cycle in it - everything arises, flows and changes. No one knows what it comes from and what it returns to. Alone Greek f-s(naturfs) believe that the basis of things is the sensory elements oxygen, fire, water, earth and a certain substance - apeiron; others (the Pythagoreans) saw it in mathematical atoms; still others (Eleatics) saw the basis of the world in a single, invisible being; the fourth considered such a basis (Democritus) to be indivisible atoms; fifth (Plato's school) - the globe is just a shadow, the result of the embodiment of the kingdom of pure thought. Of course, all these F. directions were in many respects naive and contradictory to each other. Having not yet completely broken with mythology, they assigned the gods and supernatural forces a secondary, or even third-rate place, and tried to understand the world from it itself. At first, the ancient Greek philosophers did not realize that the main question of philosophy could have different meanings, but already in the 5th century. BC. (esp.Plato, Democritus) two opposing lines were clearly identified, the struggle between them runs through the entire subsequent history of F.
30. Atomistic and idealistic interpretation of being and knowledge (Democritus and Plato).
A prerequisite for atomism there was a need to give a material explanation of the observed properties of things - their multitude, movement and change. Atomists assumed the existence of an infinite number of corporeal particles; they assumed the existence of a void in which the movement of particles occurs and denied the possibility of particles dividing indefinitely; they saw them as impenetrable atoms. A prominent representative of atomism was Democritus. The starting position of the atomic system is the existence of atoms and emptiness, which form all complex bodies with their endless connections. Consequently, one of the main premises of the teachings of Democritus is the view according to which sensations represent, although insufficient, a necessary source of knowledge. Democritus distinguishes what exists in opinion from what exists in reality: “only in general opinion there is sweet, in opinion bitter, in opinion warm, in opinion cold, in opinion color, but in reality only atoms exist.” and emptiness." However, Democritus does not deny the reality of the sensuality of the perceived. According to Democritus, the human soul consists of tiny, round, fire-like, constantly restless atoms; Possessing internal energy, it is the cause of the movement of living beings. The atomic doctrine is extended by Democritus to the doctrine of life and soul. The life and death of an organism comes down to the combination and decomposition of atoms. The soul consists of fiery atoms and is their temporary connection. The soul is not immortal.
Plato's doctrine of the "idea" Plato is a great thinker who traces the world’s philosophical culture with his finest spiritual threads. According to Plato, the world is dual in nature: it distinguishes between the visible world of changeable objects and the invisible world of ideas. The world of ideas represents true existence, and concrete, sensory things are something between being and non-being: they are only shadows of things, their weak copies. Idea- a central category in Plato's philosophy. The idea of a thing is something ideal. So, for example, we drink water, but we cannot drink the idea of water or eat the idea of sky, paying in stores with the ideas of money: an idea is the meaning, the essence of a thing. Plato's ideas summarize all cosmic life: they have regulatory energy and govern the Universe. Plato interpreted ideas as certain divine essences. They were thought of as target causes, charged with the energy of aspiration, and there were relations of coordination and subordination between them. The highest idea is the idea of absolute good - it is a kind of “Sun in the kingdom of ideas”, the world’s Reason, it deserves the name of Reason and Divinity. Plato proves the existence of God by the feeling of our affinity with his nature, which, as it were, “vibrates” in our souls.
31. Aristotle's doctrine of causes, matter and form.
Aristotle's philosophy is a generalization and processing (completion) of all previous Greek. philosophy. A. is the creator of the most extensive scientific system from existing in antiquity. She relied on extensive empirical material both from the field of natural science and general science. Sci. He pays great attention to nouns. questions of philosophy, the core of which he considers ontology. A. considers the so-called first matter to be the basis of all existence. This primary matter is not determined by any of the categories by which we define the real states of existence. It forms a prerequisite for existence. And although it is the basis of all being, it cannot be identified with being. The simplest definition of this 1st category is, according to A., 4 elements - fire, air, water and earth. They represent a certain intermediate stage between primary matter, which is sensually incomprehensible, and the really existing world, which is sensually perceived.
His understanding of movement says a lot about A.’s ontological views. We meet movement as a category in the 10th book of “Metaphysics”, where it is associated with the categories of location of activity and passivity. Movement is closely associated with specific forms of existence. The opposite of movement is simply rest. The general characteristic of the movement of A. is given by the following image: realization, realization of existence. A. adheres to the point of view that the soul is inherent in all objects belonging to living nature (i.e. plants and animals and humans). The soul is considered as a form of realization of the natural body. The relation of soul and body is analogous to the more general relation of matter and form. Soul has 3 different levels: vegetative - the soul of plants (we are talking about a certain ability to live), sensual, predominant in the souls of animals, and rational, inherent only in humans. The rational soul is that part of the soul. which thinks and knows. Perception is characteristic of the lower stages of the soul, but the ability to think is the privilege of the rational soul. The rational soul is not connected with physicality; it is eternal.
Cognition was presented to A. as a developing process. It develops from the simplest stages to the extremely abstract. A.'s creativity is the pinnacle of ancient philosophy. A number of modern special sciences (ethics, aesthetics, logic) have their origins in his works. A. was able not only to organize, but also to systematically generalize the achievements of knowledge of his time.
32. Ethical rationalism of Socrates.
Socrates' constant thought is that right behavior and true knowledge cannot be separated from each other: it is impossible to act courageously or piously without knowing what courage or piety is. An action only has moral meaning when a person commits it consciously and out of inner conviction, but if he behaves well because, for example, “everyone does it” - then if “everyone” begins to behave badly, then there will be no reason to be virtuous. According to Socrates, not only the truly moral (good) is always conscious, but also the conscious is always good, and the unconscious is bad. If someone acts badly, it means that he does not yet know how to act (evil is always an error of judgment), and after his soul is cleansed of false prejudices, a natural love for good will appear in it, and good is self-evident . Just as one cannot act well without knowing virtue, one cannot truly love without knowing what love is and what should be the true object of desire. The theme of love (eros) and friendship is the most well-attested theme of Socrates' reasoning. This theme was reflected in one way or another in the works of all the Socratics - Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, Xenophon and Euclid Megaricus.
33. Main directions of Hellenistic philosophy.
1. Stoicism is a philosophy of duty. Representatives: Zeno, Seneca and Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Basic provisions: A person is a part of the whole, his task is to realize his place in this whole. The idea of universal brotherhood: a person must recognize himself as a member of this brotherhood, a Citizen of the Highest City. True happiness lies in freedom from passions and peace of mind. Training in equanimity of spirit leads to true freedom. The highest point of this freedom is the freedom to choose death (Zeno's suicide).
2. Epicurean school. Key points: Recognizing the primacy of divine reason, Epicurus argues that the gods do not care about the human world. A person's happiness is in his hands. The criterion of truth is not the mind, but our sensations. The mistake is that we do not judge sensations correctly. Epicureanism proclaims pleasure as life value. Epicurus calls for achieving pleasure as a permanent state of mind.
3. Skepticism is an exponent of extreme individualism. Founder: Piron. Key points: Our knowledge is based on habit and custom; there is neither truth nor lie - everything is relative. Piron also seeks happiness by achieving equanimity of spirit, ataraxia. One must refrain from all judgment, live without fuss, be indifferent to good and evil, and strive for apathy. In everyday life, one must live in accordance with common sense, that is, general habits and laws.
4.Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism arose during the late Roman Empire. The founder, Plotinus, uses the philosophical concepts of Plato and Aristotle. Neoplatonism is the doctrine of the superintelligibility of being. Key points: Preaching the atonement of sin. Recognition of a single original supersensible essence - God. A single origin permeates the world like a ray; a person perceives it in a kind of ecstatic tension, in an impulse towards the one, since the human soul is part of the cosmic soul. Plotinus speaks of three stages of the outflow of the one (the question of the outflow of the divine essence): 1. One in itself 2. Mind 3. Soul
34. Theocentrism of medieval philosophy. Polemics of realism and nominalism in medieval scholasticism.
The basis of medieval human knowledge was the religious (theocentric) attitude that God is the beginning of all things. He created the world, man, and determined the norms of human behavior. The first people (Adam and Eve), however, sinned before God, violated his prohibition, wanted to become equal with him in order to determine for themselves what good and evil are. This is the original sin of humanity, which was partially redeemed by Christ, but which must be redeemed by every person through repentance and godly behavior. Medieval philosophy raised fundamental questions about essence and existence, about God, man and Truth, the meaning of eternity, the relationship between the cities of the “earthly” and “God’s” (Augustine, Boethius, Eriugena, Albertus Magnus, etc.). At the pinnacle of medieval intellectual thinking stands Thomas Aquinas. According to Thomas Aquinas, “there are some truths that transcend no matter how powerful reason: for example, God is one in three persons. Other truths are quite accessible to reason: for example, that God exists, that God is one, and similar things.” Thomas Aquinas first introduced the distinction between the truths of fact and faith, which became widespread in religious philosophy. God is the active and final cause of the world, the world was created by God “out of nothing”; the soul of man is immortal, his ultimate goal is bliss found in the contemplation of God in the afterlife; man himself is also a creation of God, and in his position he is an intermediate being between creatures (animals) and angels.
Controversy between realism and nominalism
The essence of the problem lies in the question of the meaning of the general. Realism (in the scholastic sense) ascribes reality general ideas(universalia sunt realia). Thus, this realism is what from another point of view is called idealism. Plato, in his doctrine of ideas, gave for the first time a completely clear solution to the problem in a realistic spirit, and realists of all times see their prototype in Plato.
The philosophical problem in scholasticism was not considered completely freely; in studies of the issue, the theological point of view dominated, or at least joined them. In scholastic philosophy, the reason for the dispute between realists and nominalists was Porphyry’s book “On the Five Voices” (γένος, ειδος, ιδίιον, διαφορά and συμβεβηχός), which raised the question of the meaning of genera and species. During this dispute, which lasted from the 11th century. before the 14th and passed into the new philosophy, many intermediate points of view were expressed along with radically opposing opinions (usually four types of realism are distinguished; see Nominalism). There is no doubt that the realistic point of view was more suitable to the dogmatic Christian one; That's why nominalism was first persecuted, and then they never stopped looking at it more or less suspiciously. Although nominalism rendered a significant service to the freedom of philosophical research, Ritter already noted (“Geschichte d. Philosophie”, VII, p. 161) that liberal tendencies are completely incorrectly attributed to it (one need only remember Hobbes); in the same way, the opinion that the victory of nominalism is final is completely unfounded. “Il faut bien se résoudre,” said Charles Remusat ironically, “à entendre quelquefois parler de Dieu.”
In scholastic philosophy, the struggle between realism and nominalism ended in the victory of nominalism; but in a different form this struggle continues to this day.
35. Anthropocentrism and humanism of Renaissance philosophy.
Renaissance - philosophical and sociological teachings in the era of the formation of early bourgeois society (mainly in Italy) 14-17 centuries. Scholasticism remained the official philosophy in this era, but the emergence of a culture of humanism and significant achievements in the field of natural science led to the fact that philosophy ceased to play the role of the handmaiden of theology and the prospect of its development acquired an anti-scholastic orientation. First of all, it manifested itself in ethics - the renewal of the ethical teachings of Stoicism (Petrarch) and Epicurism (Balla), directed against Christian morality. The greatest role in the philosophy of the Renaissance was played by natural philosophical concepts (Bruno, Cordano, Paracelsus), which testified to the collapse of scholastic methods of understanding nature. In the fight against medieval theocratism, humanistic, anthropocentric motives come to the fore of the revival culture. Anthropocentrism- the view that man is the center of the universe and the goal of all events taking place in the world. Humanism- reflected anthropocentrism, which comes from human consciousness and has as its object the value of man. Contempt for earthly nature is replaced by recognition creativity man, mind, desire for earthly happiness. Humanism begins when a person begins to talk about himself, about his role in the world, about his essence and purpose, about the meaning and purpose of his existence. These reasonings always have specific historical and social prerequisites; humanism in its essence always expresses certain social and class interests. Renaissance humanism manifested itself in revolutionary ideas addressed to the inner, earthly ((divinity) of man, in attracting man to life activity, in affirming man's faith in himself. In the narrow sense of the word, humanism is defined as an ideological movement, the content of which is the study and dissemination of ancient languages , literature, art and culture.Therefore, Italian humanism is characterized as literary, philological.
36. Nominalism and empiricism of F. Bacon. Development of an inductive method.
The founder of English materialism and empiricism of the New Age was Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Bacon had the intention of writing a large work, “The Great Restoration of the Sciences,” which would set out the foundations of understanding, but managed to complete only two parts of the work, “On the Dignity and Increase of the Sciences” and the famous “New Organon,” which sets out and substantiates the principles of a new inductive system for that time. logic. As a materialist and the founder of the epistemological principle of empiricism, Bacon criticizes medieval scholasticism and essentially directs his philosophy against the religious-idealistic worldview, which, in his opinion, hindered the development natural sciences and increased the powerlessness of man. He was aware that while the greatest discoveries had occurred in the field of knowledge and nature, theology and scholasticism still reigned in philosophy. Bacon emphasized the great importance of the development of natural science, but for this it was necessary to learn correct thinking, which means freeing yourself from “idols”, i.e. misconceptions that envelop the human mind and interfere with the knowledge of nature, hinder correct human thinking. F. Bacon's greatest merit in the development of the experimental-inductive method or inductive logic. He devoted his main work “New Organon” to this problem, named in contrast to the old “Organon” of Aristotle. Bacon speaks not so much against the genuine study of Aristotle as against medieval scholasticism, which interprets this teaching. Bacon defines the essence of his new logic as a science that “teaches and instructs the mind,” which “comes not only from the nature of the mind, but also from the nature of things, which will everywhere be accompanied and illuminated by observations of nature and experiments.” The essence of Francis Bacon's logic is the analytical experimental method, transferred from natural science to philosophy and developed in detail by him, which is characterized by materialist empiricism, the widespread use of analysis and induction. At the same time, Bacon sharply condemns the verbal-syllogical method, especially its idealistic version, which goes “from words to words.”
Bacon characterizes the experimental analytical method as a tool of the new science and a decisive condition for its success. Basis scientific method according to Bacon is induction, which proceeds from the sensation and perception of individual facts, step by step, reaching common systems. He connects induction with analysis - the isolation of the simplest elements or “natures” and “forms”. The philosopher distinguishes between ordinary, everyday induction and scientific induction. For induction as a scientific method, the correct organization of observation and experiment is important, as well as the ability to obtain and correctly process factual data. The inductive method developed by Bacon, as opposed to narrow empiricism, which goes from one particular experience to another, allows, in the scientist’s opinion, to discover reliable truths and laws of nature.
37. Rationalistic metaphysics of the 17th century (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz).
Rationalism in the theory of knowledge of the 17th century. represented by the teachings of R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, G. Leibniz. The central concept of rationalistic metaphysics is the concept of substance, the roots of which lie in ancient ontology. Descartes defines substance as a thing (by “thing” in this period was meant not an empirically given object, not a physical thing, but every existing thing in general), which does not need anything other than itself for its existence. Descartes divides the created world into two types of substances - spiritual and material. The main definition of a spiritual substance is its indivisibility, the most important feature of a material one is divisibility to infinity. Here Descartes, as is easy to see, reproduces the ancient understanding of the spiritual and material principles, an understanding that was mainly inherited by the Middle Ages. Thus, the main attributes of substances are thinking and extension, the rest of their attributes are derived from these first ones: imagination, feeling, desire - modes of thinking; figure, position, movement - modes of extension. R. Descartes in his work “Discourse on Method” comes to the conclusion that the source of knowledge and the criterion of truth is not in the external world, but in the human mind. Intellectual intuition or pure speculation is the starting point of knowledge. Descartes divided all ideas into two groups: those that came from the senses and those that were innate. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz are adherents of a dualistic understanding of the world. The dualistic doctrine of substance of Descartes was overcome by the Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza(1632-1677), who developed the monistic doctrine of peace. His monism appeared in the form of pantheism: in his ontology, he identified God and nature, which appears as nature - creating and nature - created. The philosopher pays a lot of attention to specific states of substance - modes. He divided them into two groups: modes - eternal, infinite and modes - temporary, finite. Infinite modes are determined by the attributes of substance - thinking and extension, and finite ones - by all other phenomena and things. Spinoza argued that movement is not a consequence of some divine impulse, because nature is “the cause of itself.” Movement is its essence and source. B Spinoza distinguishes three types of knowledge: 1) sensory, giving only vague and untrue ideas, 2) knowledge through reason, giving knowledge about modes, and 3) the highest type of knowledge - intuition, which reveals the truth. German scientist and philosopher Gottfried-Wilhelm Leibniz He added the principle of active force, or “self-activity,” to Spinoza’s concept of substances. In his work "Monadology" he declared material phenomena to be the manifestation of indivisible, simple spiritual units - monads. An indivisible monad has no extension and is not located in space, since space is infinitely divisible. The Monad is an immaterial, spiritual center of active force. Monads are eternal and indestructible; they cannot arise or die naturally. They do not change under external influence. Every individual monad is a unity of soul and body. The external expression of the spiritual essence of the monad is a number. Activity, movement is a property of the monad. Nature, Leibniz believes, cannot be explained by the laws of mechanics alone; it is also necessary to introduce the concept of purpose. For each monad is at once both the basis of all its actions and their goal. The soul is the goal of the body, what it strives for. In the philosophy of G. Leibniz, the rational basis reveals a combination of rationalism and empiricism. In the work “New Experiments on the Human Mind,” he criticizes Locke’s thesis that there is nothing in the mind that was not previously in the senses, with the exception of the mind itself. All truths he divides into necessary (truths of reason: concepts of substance, being, cause, action, identity, principles of logic, mathematics, morality) and accidental (truths of fact).
38. The theory of knowledge and principles of natural law in the philosophical teachings of T. Hobbes and D. Locke.
The great English thinker made a great contribution to the development of materialist philosophy and the theory of knowledge THOMAS HOBBS . His main works are “Philosophical Elements of the Doctrine of the Citizen” (1642) and “Leviathan” (1651).
Hobbes was a systematizer of Baconian materialism. The world, in his opinion, is a collection of bodies. Nothing incorporeal exists. It is impossible to separate thinking from the matter that thinks. All objects (bodies) and changes in them occur due to the mechanical movement of material elements.
Even spiritual life, which is made up of sensations, comes down to movements. Therefore, for him, people and animals are complex mechanisms whose actions are determined by external forces. Hobbes laid these starting points as the basis for far-reaching conclusions: the denial of the existence of souls as special substances, bodies as the only substances, faith in God is only a product of human imagination.
Cognition, by Hobbes, is carried out through ideas. The source of ideas can only be sensory perceptions of the external world. He rejected Descartes's point of view, according to which the starting point of reliable knowledge is thinking, and also opposed his doctrine of innate ideas. No idea can be innate: what is innate must always be present. In accordance with this, Hobbes believed that external feelings are the source not only of ideas, but also of all our knowledge.
In England, a follower of Bacon and Hobbes was JOHN LOCKE(1632-1704). His main work is “An Essay on the Human Mind” (1690). In it he criticizes Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas and substantiates the principle of materialistic sensationalism, i.e. the origin of all knowledge from sensory perception of the external world. Locke declared experience to be the only source of ideas (Tabula rasa - a blank sheet, a smooth tablet, something pure, untouched).
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Scientific revolutions and changes in types of rationality. Science and technology.
Scientific revolutions and changes in types of rationality.
The stages of the development of science associated with the restructuring of research strategies set by the foundations of science are called scientific revolutions. The main components of the foundation of science are the ideals and methods of research; scientific picture of the world; philosophical ideas and principles that justify the goals, methods, norms and ideals of scientific research.
The restructuring of the foundations of science, accompanied by scientific revolutions, can be, firstly, the result of intradisciplinary development, during which problems arise that are insoluble within the framework of a given scientific discipline. Secondly, scientific revolutions are possible thanks to interdisciplinary interactions based on the transfer of ideals and norms of research from one scientific discipline to another, which often leads to the discovery of phenomena and laws that, before this “paradigmatic grafting,” did not fall into the scope of scientific research. Depending on which component of the foundation of science is being rebuilt, two types of scientific revolution are distinguished: a) the ideals and norms of scientific research remain unchanged, but the picture of the world is revised; b) simultaneously with the picture of the world, not only the ideals and norms of science, but also its philosophical foundations change radically.
The first scientific revolution was accompanied by a change in the picture of the world, a restructuring of the vision of physical reality, and the creation of ideals and norms of classical natural science. The second scientific revolution, although, in general, ended with the final formation of classical natural science, nevertheless contributed to the beginning of a revision of the ideals and norms of scientific knowledge that were formed during the period of the first scientific revolution. The third and fourth scientific revolutions led to a revision of all the above components of the foundation of classical science.
The main condition for the emergence of the idea of scientific revolutions was the recognition of the historicity of reason, and, consequently, the historicity of scientific knowledge and the corresponding type of rationality. Philosophy of the 17th - first half of the 18th centuries. considered reason as a non-historical, self-identical ability of man as such. The principles and norms of rational reasoning, with the help of which true knowledge is obtained, were recognized as constant for any historical time. Philosophers saw their task as “cleansing” the mind from subjective additions that distort the purity of true knowledge.
And only in the 19th century. the idea of the ahistorical nature of reason was called into question. French positivists (Saint-Simon, O. Comte) identified the stages of knowledge in human history, and German philosophers of the post-Kantian period, especially in the person of Hegel, replaced Kant’s concept of the transcendental subject with the historical subject of knowledge
In the middle of the 20th century. A whole research direction appeared, called “sociology of knowledge.” This direction saw its task in the study of social determination, the social conditionality of cognition and knowledge, forms of knowledge, types of thinking characteristic of certain historical eras, as well as the social conditionality of the structure of spiritual production in general. Within this direction, scientific knowledge was considered as a social product.
The principle of historicity, having become key in the analysis of scientific knowledge, allowed the American philosopher T. Kuhn to present the development of science as a historical change of paradigms that occurs during scientific revolutions1. He divided the stages of development of science into periods of “normal science” and scientific revolution. During the period of “normal science,” the overwhelming number of scientists accept established models of scientific activity or paradigms, in the terminology of T. Kuhn (paradigm: Greek - example, sample), and with their help solve all scientific problems. The period of “normal science” ends when problems and tasks appear that cannot be resolved within the framework of the existing paradigm. Then it “explodes” and is replaced by a new paradigm. This is how a revolution in science occurs.
The restructuring of the foundations of science, which occurs during scientific revolutions, leads to a change in the types of scientific rationality. And although historical types of rationality are a kind of abstract idealization, historians and philosophers of science still identify several such types.
It should be noted that rationality is not limited to scientific rationality. The entire European culture was formed and developed under the sign of rationality, which was the formative principle of the life world of European man, his activities, his relationship to nature and to other people. Rationality presupposed a person’s ability to think and make decisions independently. I. Kant believed that rationality is the main principle of the Enlightenment. The essence of this principle is that the subject of rational thinking is fully responsible for the content of his thoughts. “Have the courage to use your own mind... without guidance from someone else,” was the motto of the Enlightenment, the philosopher believed. Confidence in the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the human mind was formed, the power of which was manifested in the creation of science and technology.
Historical types of scientific rationality
Three major stages of the historical development of science, each of which is opened by a global scientific revolution, can be characterized as three historical types of scientific rationality that succeeded each other in the history of technogenic civilization. This is classical rationality (corresponding to classical science in its two states - pre-disciplinary and disciplinary organized); non-classical rationality (corresponding to non-classical science) and post-non-classical rationality. Between them, as stages in the development of science, there are peculiar “overlaps”, and the emergence of each new type of rationality did not discard the previous one, but only limited the scope of its action, determining its applicability only to certain types of problems and tasks.
Each stage is characterized by a special state of scientific activity aimed at the constant growth of objectively true knowledge. If we schematically represent this activity as a “subject-means-object” relationship (including in the subject’s understanding the value-goal structures of the activity, knowledge and skills in using methods and means), then the described stages of the evolution of science, acting as different types of scientific rationality, are characterized by different depths of reflection in relation to the scientific activity.
The classical type of scientific rationality, focusing attention on the object, strives to eliminate everything that relates to the subject, means and operations of its activity during theoretical explanation and description. Such elimination is considered as a necessary condition for obtaining objectively true knowledge about the world. The goals and values of science, which determine research strategies and ways of fragmenting the world, at this stage, as at all others, are determined by the worldviews and value orientations that dominate the culture. But classical science does not comprehend these determinations.
The non-classical type of scientific rationality takes into account the connections between knowledge about the object and the nature of the means and operations of the activity. The explication of these connections is considered as conditions for an objectively true description and explanation of the world. But the connections between intrascientific and social values and goals are still not the subject of scientific reflection, although they implicitly determine the nature of knowledge (they determine what exactly and in what way we highlight and comprehend in the world).
The post-non-classical type of rationality expands the field of reflection on activity. It takes into account the correlation of the acquired knowledge about an object not only with the characteristics of the means and operations of the activity, but also with value-goal structures. Moreover, the connection between intrascientific goals and extrascientific, social values and goals is made explicit.
Each new type of scientific rationality is characterized by special, inherent foundations of science, which make it possible to identify and study the corresponding types of system objects in the world (simple, complex, self-developing systems). At the same time, the emergence of a new type of rationality and a new image of science should not be understood simplistically in the sense that every new stage leads to the complete disappearance of ideas and methodological settings of the previous stage. On the contrary, there is continuity between them. Non-classical science did not destroy classical rationality at all, but only limited the scope of its action. When solving a number of problems, non-classical ideas about the world and knowledge turned out to be redundant, and the researcher could focus on traditionally classical models (for example, when solving a number of problems in celestial mechanics, it was not necessary to involve the norms of quantum relativistic description, but it was enough to limit ourselves to the classical standards of research). In the same way, the formation of post-non-classical science does not lead to the destruction of all ideas and cognitive attitudes of non-classical and classical research. They will be used in some cognitive situations, but will only lose their status as dominant and determining the face of science.
When modern science, at the forefront of its search, has placed at the center of research unique, historically developing systems, in which man himself is included as a special component, then the requirement for the explication of values in this situation not only does not contradict the traditional orientation towards obtaining objectively true knowledge about the world, but also acts as a prerequisite for the implementation of this installation. There is every reason to believe that as modern science develops, these processes will intensify. Technogenic civilization is now entering a period of a special type of progress, when humanistic guidelines become the starting point in determining the strategies of scientific research.
