"Smersh": historical essays and archival documents. "Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents Historical essays and archival documents

* * *

Dedicated to military security officers - veterans of the Great Patriotic War

Introduction

The history of the activities of Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War has three truths. And each of them has the right to exist.

One is “trench”. It was preserved in the memories of veterans - military security officers and those who came into contact with the activities of the Special Departments of the NKVD - the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF. It is clear that veteran military security officers remember only good things about their activities at the front and in the front line 1
Guskov A. M. Under the stamp of truth. Confession of a military counterintelligence officer. People. Data. Special Operations., – M., 2004; Ivanov L.G. The truth about Smersh. – M., 2007; Ivanovsky O. G. Notes of a Smersh officer. In campaigns and raids of the Guards Cavalry Regiment. 1941–1945. – M., 2006, etc.

And the rest - depending on how the communication with the “special officers” ended for them.

The second is “general” or official. It is reflected in various monographs 2
Ostryakov S.Z. Military security officers. – M., 1979; To protect the security of the Fatherland. Counterintelligence of the Petrograd-Leningrad Military District during the years of war and peace (1918–1998). – St. Petersburg, 2000; History of Soviet state security agencies. M., 1977; Nadtachaev V.N. Military counterintelligence of Belarus: Fates, tragedies, victories... - Minsk, 2008; Sergeev F. Secret operations of Nazi intelligence. 1933–1945. – M., 1999; "Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. – M., 2003, etc.

Published after the end of the war. In it, depending on the political situation at the time of writing, the work of military counterintelligence agencies is shown in a positive or neutral color. In the first case, successes are listed, and in the second, the reader is simply informed that military counterintelligence was actively working, catching German spies and saboteurs, but the main role in the victory over the enemy was played by the command of the Red Army and the leadership of the state security agencies.

One of possible reasons“dosed” story about the work of military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War - that the main “special officer” Viktor Semenovich Abakumov (led military counterintelligence throughout the entire period of the Great Patriotic War) was arrested in July 1951, accused of treason and a Zionist conspiracy in the Ministry State security of the USSR.

At the time of his arrest, he served as Minister of State Security of the USSR. After the death of Joseph Stalin, at the direction of Nikita Khrushchev, the charges against Viktor Abakumov were changed; he was charged with the Leningrad Affair, fabricated by him, according to the new official version, as a member of the “Beria gang” (in fact, the relationship between Viktor Abakumov and Lavrenty Beria deteriorated after 1945).

After torture and beatings in prison, he became disabled. He was put on trial in a closed court (with the participation of Leningrad party workers) in Leningrad, at which he pleaded not guilty, and was shot in December 1954. In 1994, Viktor Abakumov was partially rehabilitated by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: the charge of treason against the Motherland was dropped, and the sentence was replaced by 25 years of imprisonment without confiscation of property and reclassified under the article “military official crimes.”

Another reason - there is a persistent myth - military security officers during the Great Patriotic War were exclusively engaged in hunting for true and imaginary enemies of the Soviet regime (spies and saboteurs of the enemy intelligence services; alarmists and deserters; dissatisfied with the Soviet regime, etc.) and counterintelligence operations. And it’s difficult to tell something new and sensational. After all, most counterintelligence operations followed the same scenario. The detention of enemy intelligence agents (not necessarily German, there were also Hungarian, Romanian, etc.) most often occurred without shooting, chases, hand-to-hand combat and days-long searches. Any deviation from a “silent” arrest is a “failure” in the work of military counterintelligence agencies. Most agents understood perfectly well that according to the laws of war, and taking into account the “bouquet” of crimes they committed (treason, collaboration with the Germans, etc.), they would be shot. So they resisted to the end.

Although military security officers were engaged not only in neutralizing enemy agents. Another important task is to inform the command of the Red Army and the country's leadership about the shortcomings and mistakes made by individual officers of the army. In fact, the “special officers” played the role of the “sovereign eye” in the Red Army and the Navy. It is now fashionable to blame the reasons for all the failures of the Red Army in the first years of the Great Patriotic War on Joseph Stalin and the command of the Red Army. They say that they gave criminal and impossible orders, which became the cause of numerous military disasters. Indeed, there is some truth in this. But if we look at the reports of military counterintelligence officers from the active army (and no one doubts the reliability of the facts reported in them), then even more errors, moreover, inaction and criminal negligence were demonstrated by the commanders and officers of the headquarters of armies, divisions, brigades and regiments. Why the officers did this is a topic for a separate discussion, beyond the scope of this book. Let us only note that the official history of Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War tries not to focus attention on this area of \u200b\u200bactivity of the “special officers”.

The third truth about military security officers is “documentary.” It is in numerous documents that were declassified only in last years. In them you can find everything from detailed stories about infiltration into enemy intelligence agencies, not invented by writers and screenwriters feature films, but how it actually happened, and ending with a description of the shortcomings in the organization of supply to the Red Army and criminal negligence, demonstrated by individual military leaders in the first year of the war. For example, that most of the blame for the death of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front in the summer of 1942 lies with the command of this army.

The book will talk about the third truth - “documentary”. What veterans – military counterintelligence officers and official historians – usually do not remember. The first simply did not know about it, because they were on the front line and could not, due to their official position, see the work of the entire system of military counterintelligence agencies. And the second, official historians, in most “open” works devoted to the activities of military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War, concentrated their attention either on individual battles or on one or more topics - the fight against German intelligence services, the work of the central apparatus, etc.

Part one
Abakumov's team

Chapter 1
Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR

Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army on the front line. In fact, ordinary employees (investigative officers serving military units) acted autonomously. Together with the fighters, they first fought on the border and then quickly retreated. In the event of the death or serious injury of the unit commander, the counterintelligence officer had to not only replace the military leader, but also, if necessary, raise the soldiers to attack. At the same time, they continued to fulfill their professional duty - they fought against deserters, alarmists, and enemy agents that were rapidly filling the front-line zone.

They had to fight from the first hours of the war, relying only on themselves. If their colleagues from other divisions of the NKVD were able to receive instructions from their superiors on what to do in “special conditions,” then military counterintelligence officers acted autonomously. It is difficult to say whether they knew about Directive No. 34794 of the 3rd Directorate of NCOs of the USSR adopted on June 22, 1941. In it, the main task of security officers in the active army and military counterintelligence officers of the Far Eastern Front (FEF) was to identify the agents of German intelligence agencies and anti-Soviet elements in the Red Army. It was ordered to “accelerate the creation of residencies and provide them with reserve residents”, to prevent military personnel from disclosing military secrets, and special attention should be paid to employees of headquarters and communications centers 3
Directive of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NPO No. 34794 on the tasks of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate in connection with the outbreak of hostilities to repel an aggressive attack fascist Germany on the USSR // State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Beginning. June 22 – August 31, 1941, – M., 2000. – P. 37–38.

Maybe they were able to tell it to them after all.

But about another governing document of the 3rd Directorate of NGOs of the USSR - Directive No. 35523 of June 27, 1941 “On the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NGOs in war time", Most likely no. During the first days of the war, there was no communication between Headquarters and the headquarters of individual armies. 4
North A. The Great Mission of the NKVD. – M., 2008. – P. 156.

This document defined the main functions of military counterintelligence:

“1) intelligence and operational work:

a) in units of the Red Army;

b) in the rear, supporting units operating at the front;

c) among the civilian environment;

2) the fight against desertion (employees of special departments were part of barrage detachments The Red Army, which, contrary to popular belief, did not have a direct relationship with the state security agencies. - Author);

3) work on enemy territory” (initially in an area up to 100 km from the front line, in contact with the intelligence department of the USSR NPO. – Author’s note) 5
From the directive of the 3rd Directorate of NGOs of the USSR No. 35523 on the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NGOs in wartime, dated June 27, 1941 // State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Beginning. June 22 – August 31, 1941. – M., 2000. – P. 90–93.

Military counterintelligence officers were supposed to be located both at headquarters, ensuring secrecy, and in the first echelons at command posts. At the same time, military counterintelligence officers received the right to conduct investigative actions against military personnel and civilians associated with them, while they had to receive authorization for arrests of mid-level command personnel from the Military Council of the army or front, and for senior and senior command personnel from the People's Commissar of Defense.

The organization of counterintelligence departments of 3 departments of military districts, armies and fronts began; their structure provided for the presence of three departments - to combat espionage, nationalist and anti-Soviet organizations and individual anti-Soviet activists.

Military security officers took control of military communications, delivery of military equipment, weapons and ammunition to the active army, for which purpose railways 3 departments were established, the activities of which were intertwined (and, apparently, duplicated in some way) with state security agencies in transport.

At the beginning of July 1941, the head of the 3rd department of the NPO, Anatoly Nikolaevich Mikheev, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, received the right to independently appoint to positions in the structure of special departments up to deputy heads of district and front-line 3rd departments 6
"Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. – M., 2003. – P. 21.

By order of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR dated July 13, 1941 7
Order of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR No. 00110 on the introduction of military censorship of military postal correspondence. July 13, 1941 // State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Beginning. June 22 – August 31, 1941. – M., 2000. – P. 308–309.

The “Regulations on military censorship of military postal correspondence” were introduced, which defined the structure, rights and responsibilities of military censorship units, methods and techniques for processing correspondence, and also provided a list of information that is the basis for the confiscation of items, and in accordance with which they are formed under the military - postal sorting points, military postal bases, military post offices and military postal stations of the military censorship department, which are staffed by 900 controllers transferred by the 4th Department of the NKGB of the USSR (of which 650 controllers are assigned to the 3rd Department of the NPO of the USSR and for the 3rd Directorate of the NKVMF of the USSR - 250 controllers).

In the system of 3 departments of the NPO and NK of the Navy, military censorship departments were created, located at the headquarters of units of the active army and in the rear at military sorting centers, military postal bases, departments and stations of the Navy (located in the office premises of the People's Commissariat of Communications).

Already in August 1941, military censorship was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR (operational equipment headed by Senior GB Major Evgeniy Petrovich Lapshin), operational management continued to be carried out by the army, front-line and district Special Departments.

By a joint order of the NKO and the NKVMF on July 15, 1941, the 3rd departments were organized at the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the North-Western, Western and South-Western directions. Within two days, the subordination of the army's military counterintelligence agencies changed, returning to the state security system.

By Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 187/ss dated July 17, 1941, signed by Joseph Stalin, the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NPO were reorganized into Special Departments, and the NPO Directorate itself received the name “Directorate of Special Departments with transfer to the NKVD of the USSR” 8
Lazarev V.I. Activities of military counterintelligence agencies in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. // Sat. “Russian special services. History and modernity. Materials of historical readings at Lubyanka". 1997–2000. – M., 2003. – P. 217.

The main task of the Special Departments, according to the GKO decree of July 17, 1941, was “a decisive fight against espionage and betrayal in units of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion directly in the front line.”

The Directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. 169, which appeared the next day, explained that “the meaning of transforming the bodies of the third directorate into Special Departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors.” The leadership of the NKVD expressed confidence that the employees of the Special Departments would justify the trust of the party and “with dedicated work will help the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army strengthen discipline in its ranks and defeat the enemies of the Motherland.” 9
Lazarev V.I. Activities of military counterintelligence agencies in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. // Sat. “Russian special services. History and modernity. Materials of historical readings at Lubyanka". 1997–2000. – M., 2003. – P. 217–218.

On July 19, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Viktor Semenovich Abakumov was appointed head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR.

The former head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD and the 3rd (secret-political) Directorate of the NKGB, Commissar 3rd Rank Solomon Rafailovich Milshtein (who served in the Special Department of the Caucasian Red Army in the 20s), was appointed Abakumov’s first deputy. The heads of the Special Departments were appointed:

Northern Front - former head of the UNKGB for Leningrad and the Leningrad Region, 3rd Rank GB Commissar Pavel Tikhonovich Kuprin;

Northwestern Front - former head of the Special Department of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR in 1938–1941, and in June 1941, Prosecutor of the USSR (part-time), Major General Viktor Mikhailovich Bochkov;

Western Front - People's Commissar of State Security of Belarus, Commissar of the 3rd rank Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava;

Southwestern Front - former head of the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 3rd Rank GB Commissioner Anatoly Nikolaevich Mikheev;

Southern Front - former People's Commissar of the NKGB of Moldova, GB Commissioner of the 3rd rank Nikolai Stepanovich Sazykin;

Reserve Front - former head of the Third Department of the NKVD, 3rd Rank GB Commissioner Alexander Mikhailovich Belyanov.

On the same day, order No. 00941 of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR Lavrentiy Beria, in order to combat deserters, spies and saboteurs, ordered the formation of rifle platoons under the Special Departments of divisions and corps, separate rifle battalions under the Special Army Departments, and separate rifle battalions under the Special Front Departments. staffing of these units from the NKVD troops 10
Order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 on the formation of units of the NKVD troops under Special Departments. July 19, 1941 // State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 2. Book. 1. Beginning. June 22 – August 31, 1941. – M., 2000. – P. 366–367.

The structure of the central apparatus of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, approved on August 15, 1941, looked like this:

Chief and three deputies;

Secretariat;

Operational department (public staff);

1st Department - central bodies of the Red Army (General Staff, military prosecutor's office, intelligence department);

2nd department - Air Force;

3rd department - armored forces, artillery;

4th department – main branches of the military;

5th department – quartermaster and sanitary service;

6th department - NKVD troops;

7th department - operational search, records, mobile processing;

8th department – encryption service 11
"Smersh". Historical essays and archival documents. – M., 2003. – P. 26.

In August - December 1941, the structure of the NKVD continued to change and become more complex. In August, the head of the Directorate of Special Departments received two more deputies - divisional commissar Fedor Yakovlevich Tutushkin and state security major Nikolai Alekseevich Osetrov; in October 1941, Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava became deputy head of the Department of Special Departments.

In total, in August 1941, the staff of the Office of Special Departments (together with the investigative unit, the secretariat, the operational department, the administrative, economic and financial department) included 387 people 12

After the transfer of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVMF in January 1942 to the UOO, the 9th Department was organized. By June 1942, the structure of the UOO had the following form.

Management (Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, Solomon Rafailovich Milshtein, Fedor Yakovlevich Tutushkin, Nikolai Alekseevich Osetrov, Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava).

Secretariat (Yakov Mikhailovich Broverman).

Operational department (Alexander Vasilievich Miusov).

Investigative part (Boris Semenovich Pavlovsky):

1st department (for espionage);

2nd department (anti-Soviet formations);

3rd department (for the management of investigative work on the periphery).

1st Department (GB Major Ivan Ivanovich Moskalenko; General Staff of the Red Army, headquarters of fronts, armies, intelligence agencies):

1st department (operational department of the General Staff of the Red Army, front and army headquarters);

2nd department (all directorates and departments of the General Staff, communications center, personnel department);

3rd Department (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, intelligence agencies of fronts and armies).

2nd Department (GB Major Alexander Alekseevich Avseevich; service of the Air Force, Airborne Forces and Air Defense):

1st Department (Red Army Air Force Headquarters);

2nd department (weapons and logistics of the Air Force);

3rd Department (Air Force Academy and management of peripheral work in Air Force units);

4th department (air defense);

5th department (airborne troops).

3rd Department (GB Major Vyacheslav Pavlovich Rogov; Main Armored Directorate (GABU), Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) of the Red Army, tank troops and artillery, guards mortar units):

1st department (GABTU of the Red Army, ABTU of fronts and armies, tank armies, tank corps and brigades, research institute tank training ground);

2nd Department (Main Directorate of the Chief of Artillery (GUNART) of the Red Army, Directorate of Guards Mortar Units, artillery departments of the fronts, artillery departments of the armies, artillery of the Reserve of the Main Command, mortar units of the Red Army);

3rd department (GAU of the Red Army).

4th Department (GB Major Grigory Samoilovich Bolotin-Balyasny; management of intelligence and operational work of special agencies of the fronts by branch of service: infantry, artillery, cavalry, fight against treason, desertion, crossbows and barrage service):

1st department (served the fronts: Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin; 7th separate army and reserve army);

2nd department (served the fronts: Western, Bryansk, South-Western, Southern and North Caucasian);

3rd department (to combat treason, desertion and crossbows, organization of barrage service);

4th department (editorial offices of military newspapers, military prosecutors, military tribunals, the Central House of the Red Army (CDKA), the House of Creativity of the Red Army (DTKA), ensembles, orchestras, military academies).

5th Department (GB Major Konstantin Pavlovich Prokhorenko; Main Quartermaster Directorate, Main Sanitary Directorate, Veterinary Directorate, Main Directorate of Military Communications, Glavvoenstroy, AHO, Housing and Operations Directorate, academies):

1st Department (Main Quartermaster Directorate, front quartermaster departments, army quartermaster departments, ACS, Fuel Supply Directorate, army quartermaster departments);

2nd department (Main Sanitary Directorate, Veterinary Directorate, front-line and district sanitary and veterinary services, Military Communications Authorities (VOSO), Main Road Directorate, Apartment Operations Directorate (KEU), Glavvoenstroy, Voenproekt, academies).

6th Department (GB Major Semyon Petrovich Yukhimovich; NKVD troops):

1st department ( border troops And educational establishments NKVD troops);

2nd department (internal troops and troops protecting the rear of the fronts);

3rd department (railway, industrial and convoy troops);

4th department (military supply bodies of the NKVD troops).

7th department (A.F. Soloviev; operational accounting):

1st department (current records for the management of special departments, reporting of front-line special agencies, records of traitors to the Motherland, spies, saboteurs, terrorists, cowards, alarmists, deserters, self-shooters and anti-Soviet elements, special records of traitors to the Motherland, intelligence agents and persons compromised by testimony the latter);

2nd department (checking the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, code workers, access to top secret and secret, mobilization and TOS (special secrecy equipment) work, checking workers sent abroad and personnel of the Red Army and Navy).

8th department (Mikhail Petrovich Sharikov; encryption):

1st department (cipher);

2nd department (agent and operational support for the Red Army's cipher organs, inspection of OO cipher organs, accounting and forwarding of ciphers).

9th Department (GB Major Pyotr Andreevich Gladkov; for Navy services):

1st Department (Main Naval Headquarters, Naval Intelligence Directorate, School of Intelligence, command of the People's Commissariat of Directorates, units and institutions of the NKVMF of central subordination, management of the specified objects in the periphery);

2nd Department (Air Force Directorate, Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Communications Center, Air Force Peripheral Management, Air Defense Directorate).

10th Department (GB Major Ivan Ivanovich Gorgonov; for the management of counterintelligence work of special bodies of fronts and districts).

11th department (Alexander Evstafievich Kochetkov; for maintenance of engineering and chemical forces, sapper armies, defensive construction and signal troops).

12th Department (Petr Mikhailovich Tchaikovsky; for servicing the Main Directorate of Formations and Recruitment of the Red Army).

Devices subordinate to the UOO NKVD of the USSR:

OO NKVD Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force and Monino Air Garrison;

OO NKVD Separate Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Division named after. Dzerzhinsky (OMSDON);

OO NKVD garrison of the Moscow Kremlin 13
Chertoprud S. NKVD - NKGB during the Great Patriotic War. – M., 2005. – P. 58–62.

In June 1942, the staffing level of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR was 225 people 14
North A. Marshal from Lubyanka. Beria and the NKVD during the Second World War. – M., 2008. – P. 51.

"SMERSH": HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND ARCHIVED DOCUMENTS

V.S. Khristoforov, V.K. Vinogradov, O.K. Matveev, V.I. Lazarev, N.N. Luzan, V.G. Makarov, N.M. Peremyshlnikova, A.P. Cherepkov

THE TRUTH ABOUT SMERSH
(Book "SMERSH": HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND ARCHIVED DOCUMENTS)
Vadim UDMANTSEV
"VPK" N8. March 3 - 9, 2004

Another closed page from the history of domestic intelligence services has become available to the general public. Many people know that at a certain stage of the Great Patriotic War, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was transformed into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR, and the abbreviation of this organization itself was composed of the initial letters of the well-known slogan: "Death to spies!" However, not everyone knows that by the same resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 19, 1943, the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKVMF of the USSR and the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR were created.

Unfortunately, we must admit that, despite the obvious military merits of the Smershevites, the specifics of their work were hushed up for many years. Here is what the head of the Directorate for Registration of Archival Funds of the FSB of Russia, Major General Vasily Khristoforov, who at the same time headed the team of authors of the newly published book, said: “During the period of work on the book, we published materials from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia for the first time, so we even discovered a lot of new and interesting things for ourselves: But We tried to give an objective picture without embellishment or shortcuts... What is said in the book has not previously appeared in the open press, moreover, all previous books about the work of SMERSH employees were either outright misinformation or an invention of the authors themselves. , reflecting the reality of the work of SMERSH, is Bogomolov’s novel “The Moment of Truth. In August 1944..." By the way, Vladimir Georgievich Bogomolov also made a significant contribution to the creation of the book "SMERSH. Historical essays and archival documents", agreeing to informally advise younger authors, but his untimely death did not allow him to hold this publication in hand.

In the book a large number of photographs, color and black and white images of various documents, wartime posters. Separate pages contain diagrams of the GUK SMERSH, the UK NCO SMERSH of the fronts, OK NKO SMERSH of the armies, as well as photo galleries of portraits of the leaders of these structures during the Great Patriotic War. A significant part of the photographs and documents are from personal archives, and this is very gratifying, since not many veterans are left alive, and also because service in the “authorities” left its mark for many years - most of these people are accustomed to “keeping their mouths shut.” ". It is known, for example, that the wonderful Russian classic writer Fyodor Abramov, having front-line experience behind him, did not leave any noticeable purely “military” works or memories for his descendants. Meanwhile, after spending several months in hospitals after being seriously wounded in the battles near Leningrad, from April 1943 he continued to serve in the counterintelligence department SMERSH of the Arkhangelsk Military District. Incomplete university education and knowledge of German and Polish languages allowed Abramov to short term make a good career: from a reserve detective to a senior investigator. And, perhaps, it is precisely in “Smershev’s” training that the key to the writer’s amazing powers of observation and the accuracy of conveying psychological portraits of genuine characters in a number of his stories?

On the pages of the book "SMERSH". Historical essays and archival documents" in detail, at specific examples tells about the confrontation of Soviet counterintelligence officers with espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army, about the fight against traitors to the Motherland, deserters and those who engaged in self-mutilation at the fronts. Several chapters are devoted to the counterintelligence work of the “Smershevites” both deep behind enemy lines and in the front line, about brilliantly carried out operations on the radio, as a result of which the military counterintelligence of the USSR in this direction had no equal during the Great Patriotic War. This is how, in turn, the living chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation, a holder of three Orders of the Red Banner, three Red Stars and many other military awards, Lieutenant General Alexander Matveev, responded to the book “SMERSH”: “The book is written in a simple, in clear language. This will help convey the idea of the book more clearly to young security officers... When I read this book, I imagined my entire military journey... We had a very insidious and well-prepared enemy in the person of the Abwehr. Equipped with everything they needed, they behaved brazenly and aggressively..."

Indeed, since the years of repression and the first months of the war had a deplorable impact on most Soviet “organs,” yesterday’s students, teachers, and engineers—who made up the bulk of the employees of SMERSH departments and directorates during the Great Patriotic War—were confronted by professionals of the highest class, worked in intelligence and counterintelligence for years. In this regard, a separate chapter of the book contains detailed information about the structures and methods of work of the intelligence services of the four main states opposing the USSR: Germany, Japan, Romania and Finland. These pages are illustrated with diagrams of enemy organizations, captured photographs of the leaders and most valuable agents of the German Abwehr, Zeppelin, Waffen SS Jagdverband, Romanian SSI, as well as Japanese and Finnish intelligence and counterintelligence, IDs of members of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and seized them by SMERSH weapons and equipment authorities. Of particular interest are photographs of buildings that have survived to this day in the territories of Germany, Poland, Russia and the Baltic countries, in which the headquarters of enemy intelligence services and structures were located during the war.

One of the chapters - "The Big Sieve of Military Counterintelligence" - talks about the work of the "Smershevites" among prisoners of war. This was also not easy work, because during the entire period of World War II, the Red Army captured 4,377,300 military personnel of enemy European states and 639,635 - Kwantung Army. Secret service officers were hiding among the soldiers and officers, while the agents recruited and trained by them still continued to shoot in the back the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the liberated territories. However, SMERSH units still installed over 2000 former employees the German Abwehr and RSHA and about 900 intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers of Imperial Japan. The book contains reports on the results of the work of assembly points, on the results of intelligence and operational work among enemy prisoners of war, intelligence reports, denunciations and statements of German prisoners of war about their readiness to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence, and corresponding photographs.

The same chapter talks about the filtering by military counterintelligence of hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers and other persons who were captured or surrounded by the enemy, about numerous cases of concealment of former punishers, collaborators of enemy services and their agents. Among others, specific facts are cited of the recruitment of USSR citizens by the intelligence services of foreign, including allied states. Photos of fake participant IDs published for the first time partisan detachments French Resistance, as well as corresponding memos to the head of the State Administration of the NPO "SMERSH" V. Abakumov, marked "Top Secret".

The only thing that remains to be regretted is that the book, being a “gift edition”, was published in a small edition - only 4000 copies - and is expensive, which is why it is unlikely to be affordable for both historians and veterans. However, some hope for a possible more widespread and less expensive re-release of SMERSH was inspired by the phrase of a member of the team of authors - the head of the Main Archive of Moscow, Alexei Kiselev, said at the presentation of the book: “These materials should be accessible to the mass reader. They must be published, first of all , for young people - so that they know the real, and not fictitious, truth about those events..."

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"Smersh": Historical essays and archival documents

The second, corrected and expanded edition of the book-album “Smersh”: Historical Sketches and Archival Documents has been published (M., 2005. – 343 p.). People have written and are writing different things about “Smersh” here and abroad. They write, sometimes being overly carried away, accidentally or intentionally, mixing truth with lies, reality with legends.One stereotypes are replaced by others.

Nowadays, for the first time, historians have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the texts of authentic materials from the funds of the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, which are directly related to the activities of Smersh. All essays presented in the book are strictly documentary.

This name determined the main task - protecting the Red Army from enemy intelligence services. In addition to combating the activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army, Smersh also solved the problem of “creating conditions at the fronts that would exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity”; was supposed to fight betrayal and desertion, check military personnel and other persons who had been captured, and also carry out “special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.” Head of GUKR "Smersh" V.S. Abakumov reported directly to I.V. Stalin and was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

The structure of Smersh was built strictly vertically, each unit was subordinate only to its superior counterintelligence agencies.

Smersh counterintelligence officers received their baptism of fire at Kursk Bulge. To the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk Central Archives The FSB of Russia prepared a special publication in which for the first time materials related to the participation of Smersh in these events were presented. Therefore, in the book under review, a description of some points related to Battle of Kursk, given condensed to avoid repetition.

Behind the lines of previously unknown materials given in the book, one can see how the war crushed human destinies. The recent scandal that erupted around the film “Bastards,” which was about a school for teenage saboteurs that allegedly existed in the USSR, once again showed that the so-called. The “rulers of thought” from among the “creative intelligentsia” do not know (or do not want to know) the true history.

#comm#If they had looked at the published documents at one time, they would have learned that it was the German, and not the Soviet, as stated in the film, intelligence services that actively used children to carry out reconnaissance activities and carry out sabotage.#/comm#

Having selected several groups of street children, Abwehr officers trained them in mine explosives and threw them behind the lines of Soviet troops, setting them the task of disabling steam locomotives. To accomplish this goal, teenagers were given explosive devices camouflaged as pieces of coal.

Captured Red Army soldiers whom the Germans transferred across the front line were also actively used for reconnaissance and sabotage operations. According to official data, during the war years, counterintelligence neutralized 43,477 agents of the German intelligence services.

It is no secret that in the USSR there were those who were waiting for the Germans to arrive and were ready to provide them with all possible assistance. Some radio games ("Monastery", "Janus") were specifically aimed at preventing the emergence of a "fifth column" from various anti-Soviet groups; others (“Destruction”, “Reeds”) were designed to paralyze the attempts made by the Germans to organize armed uprisings against Soviet power in national-territorial formations of the USSR. From published sources, we today learned about the Baltic, Turkestan, Tatar, Caucasian, Ukrainian and Russian formations of the armed forces of the Third Reich from among the citizens of the USSR and emigrants. The book contains information about how the Germans prepared a special group, which was entrusted with the task of “unifying small rebel groups operating in Kalmykia and organizing a Kalmyk uprising against Soviet power, as well as carrying out large acts of sabotage in the Soviet rear.” Some of the enemy paratroopers who landed were captured, after which we managed to start the “Aryans” radio game, during which our counterintelligence obtained important information, disinformation was transmitted to the enemy, its agents were liquidated or captured, and military equipment etc.

Radio games not only contributed to obtaining valuable information, but also made it possible to disorient the enemy. The largest radio game, called “Riddle,” lasted from the summer of 1943 until April 1945 and was carried out against the Zeppelin-Nord intelligence agency.

#comm#During the war, Soviet counterintelligence conducted 183 radio games, as a result of which it was possible to identify and neutralize over 400 agents and employees of German intelligence. #/comm#

The publication touches on the circumstances of Lieutenant General A.A.’s defection to the enemy’s side. Vlasova; describes the circumstances of Hitler's suicide and the methods of ideological war. Until recently, these were closed topics. This circumstance has given rise to many myths, which to this day continue to excite the minds of publicists, with a frequency worthy of better use, who continue to publish books about " tragic fate"a traitor (according to all the laws of officer ethics, Vlasov committed precisely treason).

This book about Smersh is the first document-based description of the activities of the most successful counterintelligence of the twentieth century. Its effectiveness was recognized not only by the allies, but also by the opponents of the USSR. This was the merit of those who thought through, led and directly carried out special operations. On the pages of the book we repeatedly come across the name of a man whose activities as head of Smersh were consigned to oblivion for many years. Arrested in July 1951, USSR Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov, was shot in December 1954. Since then, if his name was mentioned, it was only in a negative context, next to the names of L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulova and others.

A separate chapter is devoted to the intelligence services of those countries with which the USSR waged war (Germany, Romania, Finland, Japan). The confrontation between the Abwehr and Soviet counterintelligence is shown in detail, a diagram of the organizational structure of the German military intelligence; information about its leaders is provided; photographs and documents. It is characteristic that the activities of enemy intelligence services are analyzed objectively and impartially, without any “party” pathos.

#comm#Striving for objectivity is generally one of distinctive features works of the team of authors of this publication.#/comm#

The book-album is illustrated with rare photographs, including from the personal archives of counterintelligence officers who took part in the Great Patriotic War.

A separate chapter is devoted to the activities of documenting the crimes committed by the invaders in the occupied areas, as well as the work to search for and punish war criminals and their accomplices from among Soviet citizens.

In the afterword to the book, the authors build a bridge to modern times. Although Smersh as a structure ceased to exist in 1946, military counterintelligence continued to operate effectively. Short review her work in the 1960-80s and beyond, right up to the present day, presented on the last pages of the book, is quite logical and fits into the general concept of the publication.

Note that on All-Russian competition journalistic and literary works "We are proud of our Fatherland" in April 2004, the team of authors of the book was awarded the first prize in the "Documentary" section.

Special for the Centenary

CLARIFY What the new head of the department had to do on Rostov soil, I think, is not necessary. Abakumov differed from many other leaders of the same level only in his youth and personal participation in interrogations, during which he, a man of great physical strength, applied the harshest interrogation methods to those arrested. At that time, methods of physical coercion were common practice - higher political leadership demanded that state security officers expose “enemies of the people” by any means necessary. No matter how much other “party degenerates” try today to distance themselves from the NKVD - KGB, these bodies first of all carried out the “will of the party,” or rather, the orders of the party leadership. However, like everyone soviet man at your workplace...
The service zeal of the young leader did not go unnoticed by Lavrentiy Beria, who himself was not lazy to participate in the interrogations of especially important people. It was people like Abakumov - young, unquestioningly and successfully fulfilling all the instructions of the leadership and, most importantly, not associated with any of the groups of the highest party nomenclature - that Stalin needed in Moscow. At the beginning of 1941, when the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR decided to divide into two independent structures - the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and State Security, new vacancies opened up in leadership positions. Abakumov was appointed to one of them - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. He was entrusted with overseeing not the most important area: the main police and fire departments. However, he was also in charge of the 3rd department, which was engaged in operational security services for border and internal troops. So Abakumov began to enter the “Stalinist circle.”
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War opened Abakumov's path to higher power. On July 19, 1941, he was entrusted with heading military counterintelligence - the directorate of special departments of the NKVD. Later, in April 1943, it was renamed the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The head of Smersh became deputy people's commissar of defense, a position held by Stalin himself.
But it’s interesting that Viktor Semenovich ended the war only with the shoulder straps of a lieutenant general. Military rank He was awarded the rank of Colonel General in July 1945.
IN THE YEARS During the hard times of war, Abakumov proved himself to be a good organizer. According to the recollections of veterans of military counterintelligence, he skillfully took advantage of the experience of the General Staff and built the leadership system of Smersh on the model of the active army: front departments were created in the Main Directorate. This allowed the head of military counterintelligence to better understand the operational situation at the fronts and raised his authority in the eyes of Stalin, who did not allow his subordinates to cover up their incompetence with verbiage. The leader was also captivated by the efficiency of the military counterintelligence, whose structures demonstrated greater efficiency in the fight against enemy agents than their colleagues from the People's Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs.
Being a decisive man, Viktor Semenovich was not afraid to take responsibility and did not want to blindly follow the then established order. The military situation often required quick and non-standard solutions. Thus, Abakumov ordered that German agents who had turned themselves in from criminal liability be released from criminal liability, which greatly helped military counterintelligence officers in the confrontation with German intelligence services and in neutralizing their agents.
“It is not serious to belittle Abakumov’s merits in the successful work of the GUKR “Smersh”; I think that not a single wartime counterintelligence officer would allow himself to do this. The practical results of Smersh’s activities turned out to be higher than those of the NKGB, which was the reason for Abakumov’s nomination.”
From the Hero's memories Soviet Union Army General P.I. Ivashutina.
Abakumov’s strong character and his ability to go against the opinions of others were evident in the episode with the search for Hitler’s remains. In the fall of 1945, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria was inclined to decide to familiarize our Western allies with materials on the investigation into the circumstances of Hitler's death. The People's Commissars for State Security and Foreign Affairs were of the same opinion. All that remained was to formally obtain approval from the State Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and give the corresponding instructions to the representative of the NKVD in Germany, General Serov.
In November 1945, a draft cipher telegram was already drawn up:
"Berlin.
Comrade Serov
To your number 00399
There are no objections to transferring to the British and Americans the information you have about the results of the investigation into the circumstances of Hitler’s disappearance.
Please note that, in addition, the allies may request the interrogation of certain persons who are with us: Günsche, Rattenhuber, Baur, etc.
In what form this information should be conveyed to your allies, think about it and decide for yourself.
L. Beria"
Everything seemed clear, and suddenly on November 26 the secretariat of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs reported to him about the disagreement of military counterintelligence.
"Reference
T.t. Merkulov, Kruglov, Kobulov agree with the draft telegram. Comrade Abakumov objects and said that he will report to you personally on this issue.”
As a result, General Serov never received instructions to transfer information on Hitler to the Allies. Having gained weight in the apparatus, Abakumov could already afford to disagree with Beria, to whom he, of course, owed his rise in the late 30s.

"We need to touch someone"

OF COURSE that during the war years the main counterintelligence directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense had to not only deal with the fight against espionage, but also monitor the political sentiments of the officers. By the way, the archives contain many interesting documents about this side of the activities of military counterintelligence agents. For example, on December 23, 1943, in a memo labeled “Top Secret,” Abakumov reported to Stalin at the State Defense Committee about the responses of Red Army soldiers to the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR “On the National Anthem of the Soviet Union” published in the press.
About this document, recently provided to the editors of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper by the Presidential Archive Russian Federation, we will tell you in detail, but for now we will give only a few statements. Here is the opinion of the head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General N. Yakovlev: “Abroad, this will be regarded as a step back, as a concession to the allies, but in fact it is not so. After all, how many such steps did we take during the war: we eliminated the commissars - nothing happened, we began to fight even better, we introduced general and officer ranks, put shoulder straps on everyone - we strengthened discipline.
The Holy Synod was created, the Patriarch was elected, the Comintern was dissolved and, finally, the “International” was abolished - and all for the benefit of the Motherland..."
Of course, statements of a different kind did not pass the attention of military counterintelligence officers.
Lieutenant General of Aviation Grendal, Chief intelligence agency Air Force Headquarters: “It’s good that they finally remembered Rus' in the anthem, but still it seems to me that there is some concession to Roosevelt and Churchill.”
Lieutenant Colonel Vorobyov, teacher of higher political courses named after Lenin: “All this is being done under the great influence of the allies. They dictate their will, especially since they succeed now, when our country is seriously weakened in the war and their will has to be taken into account.”
Colonel Krylov, head of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: “We are gradually moving towards the appearance of the anthem “God Save the Tsar.” We are gradually changing our basic attitude and getting closer to being pleasant to our allies."
Captain of the quartermaster service Nordkin, senior assistant to the head of the department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: “The anthem contains glorification of the Russian nation while silencing other nations. This can be used by dark elements as great power Russian chauvinism. The consistent protrusion of the Russian people is noticeable.”
Senior Lieutenant Baranov, assistant head of the searchlight service department of the headquarters of the separate Moscow Air Defense Army: “The essence of our state has changed so much that we are no longer faced with the task of building a communist society and we are sliding into a bourgeois system. In this regard, Marxism is no longer suitable for us and needs to be reconsidered.”
Sharapov, head of the administrative and economic department of the Central House of the Red Army: “All that remains is to change and dissolve the Bolshevik Party. In 1918 – 1919 there was something to agitate about, then there was the slogan “Land to the peasants, factories to the workers” and freedom of speech, and then they pressed so hard that millions of people laid down their heads.”
The leader’s resolution is also curious: "Important. We need to touch someone."
After the end of the war, the aging Stalin began to think about his successor. It was obvious to him that his closest associates were of little use as statesmen capable of preserving and strengthening the recreated mighty empire. The leader needed new people, personally loyal to him - those on whom he could rely in the planned purge of the party nomenklatura, which during the war period had recovered from the psychological shock of the 30s.
State security agencies were also called upon to play a role in the upcoming changes in the country. At their head, Stalin decided to put Abakumov, whose loyalty and efficiency he had the opportunity to personally verify during the war period. In addition, Abakumov did not have personal relationships with most of the leaders of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was also important for the Kremlin owner, who was becoming increasingly suspicious. The cruel school of struggle for power taught him to be extremely cautious, which over the years increasingly developed into suspiciousness. Although, who knows, maybe these fears were not unfounded. After all, the mystery of the leader’s death remains unsolved...
TO BECOMING in May 1946, as Minister of State Security instead of Army General Vsevolod Merkulov, who was close to Beria, Abakumov had to solve problems that helped him make many ill-wishers in the upper echelons of power. But this, apparently, is the fate of all leaders of the “secret police”: - the more effectively you work in the interests of power, the more bitter fruits you can subsequently reap. In particular, the new head of the MGB had to deal a lot with military affairs - at this time, in the process of reorganizing state security bodies, the State Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" moved from the military department to the MGB as one of its structural divisions - the 3rd Directorate.