What happened on March 3, 1917. Literary and historical notes of a young technician. Clashes near Butyrka prison

The year will come, Russia's black year,
When the kings crown falls;
The mob will forget their former love for them,
And the food of many will be death and blood...

M.Yu. Lermontov

On March 2, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II Alexandrovich Romanov abdicated the throne for himself and his son Alexei in favor of his younger brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. On March 3, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed an act of non-acceptance of the throne, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the newly created Provisional Government. The rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as the monarchy in Russia, was over. The country plunged into chaos.

For a hundred years in national historiography, as in the historiography of the Russian diaspora, mixed assessments were given to the event that occurred on March 2, 1917.

Soviet historians diligently ignored the true circumstances of the abdication the last Romanov, as well as the personalities of people who took, one might say, direct participation in deciding the fate of a huge country. And this is not surprising. According to the Marxist-Leninist view of historical process, when one formation replaces another as a result of a revolution, the monarchy is obliged to withdraw itself, otherwise it will be swept away in righteous anger by the revolutionary masses. In this situation, it is completely unimportant what, where, when and why the debunked monarch signed. His further fate was also hushed up or justified by the interests of the revolution.

Russian foreign historiography of the liberal persuasion, which shared the views of those who personally slipped the act of abdication to the emperor on March 2, 1917, also believed that the monarchy in Russia was doomed. The departure of the emperor was seen as a definitely positive moment. Since a monarch like Nicholas II could not change anything in the current situation, he only prevented the new “saviors” of Russia from saving it. The physical, especially the violent, removal of an emperor or dynasty could give an extra trump card to the opposition. But the public discrediting (from the rostrum of the State Duma) of a useless ruler with his subsequent self-denial looked quite decent.

Monarchist emigrant historiography, on the contrary, considered the abdication of Nicholas II to be the key moment when the political Rubicon between order and anarchy was crossed. The monarchists, of course, could not blame the tsar himself (otherwise they would not have been monarchists), and therefore they brought down all their anger on the generals and the liberal public who betrayed Nicholas II.

The attitude of historiographers of all stripes towards the personality and actions of the last Russian emperor throughout the 20th century also constantly changed from complete rejection and contempt to exaltation, idealization and even canonization. In the 1990s, yesterday’s Istpartists began vying with each other to praise human qualities the last Romanov, his devotion to duty, family, Russia. It was proposed to consider the fact of the martyrdom of Nicholas II and his entire family at the hands of the Bolsheviks as atonement for the fatal miscalculations and incompetent policies that brought the country to revolution and a bloody civil war.

Thus, in the minds of living people, Nicholas II appears as a kind of meek, frightened martyr who, during his 23-year reign, made a number of irreparable mistakes, both in foreign and domestic policy. Then weak, but very good man Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov, incidentally the All-Russian Emperor, did not find the strength to resist the circumstances. Like a true martyr, he was vilely deceived, betrayed by his own generals and relatives, driven into a trap at the Dno station, and then went to the slaughter. And all this happened almost on the eve of the victory of Russia and its allies in the First World War.

This touching version continues to be served to the general public, albeit under different sauces, to this day.

But practically none of the historians asked and are not asking the question: did not an ordinary person and the father of a family, but the All-Russian Emperor, God’s anointed, have the right, even when finding himself in such difficult circumstances, to resign? Did he have the right to shrug off the responsibility assigned to him from birth for the fate of one-sixth of the entire Earth?

No matter how painful it is to realize, Nicholas II renounced Russia much earlier than he waved the Manifesto already prepared for him in Pskov. He renounced, deciding for himself that state power was beyond his capabilities. Conscious refusal of radical reforms in domestic policy, of a tough fight against revolutionary terrorism, of dialogue and interaction with that part of society that expected and desired changes, abandonment of the country’s national interests and entry into world war- all this led to the fact that by 1917 Russia itself renounced Nicholas II, and the entire dynasty.

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Romanov was neither a bloody tyrant, nor an insane holy fool, nor a frightened fool. He understood perfectly well what people who suddenly imagined themselves to be “the flower of the nation” could offer in exchange for the “rotten monarchical system.” And although Nicholas II himself could not offer the country anything, he still had the prerogative to retain the honor of a soldier who did not completely leave his post.

By his act of abdication, the emperor abandoned this honor, trying to buy life and freedom for himself and his family, and again he lost. He lost not only his life and the lives of his own children, but also the lives of many millions of Russian people who lost their faith, the Tsar, and the Fatherland at the same time.

How it was

Conspiracy theory

IN modern research, near-historical literature. and also in the domestic media, a version of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy against the Romanov dynasty and Nicholas II personally appears more and more often. The goal of this conspiracy was to weaken Russia as a world player, appropriate its victories and eliminate the victorious powers from the clan in the First World War.

The initiator of the conspiracy, of course, is some hypothetical “ world government", acting through representatives of the Entente powers. The theorists and implementers of the conspiracy were Duma liberals and oligarchs (Miliukov, Guchkov, Rodzianko, etc.), and the direct perpetrators were the highest generals (Alekseev, Ruzsky) and even members of the royal family (Vkn. Nikolai Nikolaevich).

The murder by the conspirators of Grigory Rasputin, a court psychic capable of not only treating the heir, the Tsarevich, but also foreseeing the future fits perfectly into this theory. Throughout 1916, Rasputin and the Tsarina stubbornly “shuffled” senior government officials, trying to get rid of the traitor-conspirators. At the instigation of Rasputin, the queen repeatedly demanded that the sovereign “disperse the Duma,” which was persistently discrediting the monarchy.

However, the king, who supposedly “trusted only his wife,” did not heed the warnings. He appointed himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief, having offended his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (who later joined the conspirators), and spent all his time at Headquarters, where he felt safe in the company of his adjutants general. As a result, the generals also betrayed him, lured him into a trap, and with threats and blackmail forced him to sign an act of renunciation, which legalized the Provisional Government created by Rodzianko.

In fact, everyone knew that the Duma was preparing some kind of coup at the turn of 1916-1917. Guchkov and Miliukov discussed their plans almost daily on the sidelines of the Duma. Nicholas II was well aware of this. Thus, the upcoming “coup” was given a certain operetta character - and no one believed in its seriousness. It must be said that the “conspirators” initially did not plan to eliminate or completely abdicate the emperor, much less to cause any harm to his family. In the most radical version, only isolation from state affairs of the queen was assumed. They wanted to send her further away - to Crimea, to treat her upset nerves.

The main mistake of Nicholas II at this stage was his absolute confidence in the loyalty of the army and military leadership to him personally. The Emperor naively believed that as soon as he, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, ended the war victoriously, all internal problems would disappear by themselves.

Today, the connections of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.I., have been documented. Alekseev with the leaders of the Duma “Progressive Bloc” Guchkov, Lvov and Rodzianko. However, as A.I. later reported. Denikin, M.I. Alekseev rejected the idea of ​​any coups and political upheavals in the rear during the period of hostilities. He understood that the implementation of even very moderate plans of the liberal opposition would inevitably lead to anarchy, the collapse of the army and, as a consequence, to defeat in the war.

The commanders-in-chief of the Southwestern and Northern Fronts, Generals Brusilov, Ruzsky and a number of other adjutant generals did not share this opinion, insisting on immediate action until, as it seemed to them, the inevitable victory of the Russian army on all fronts.

If we put aside the theory of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, invented, by the way, by emigrant historiography in the 1920-30s, and take a sober look at the current situation in 1916-1917, then we can say with confidence that the “conspiracy” against There was undoubtedly a monarchy, since there were still sensible and decent people in the country. Changes in the country at that time were long overdue, and the war, related problems in the economy, dissatisfaction with the monarch and his entourage, the threat of revolutionary terror and ministerial leapfrog only contributed to general political destabilization. Was it a “conspiracy of the adjutant generals” who suddenly began to hate the incompetent commander-in-chief? Or a revolutionary situation, when the monarchist “tops” could no longer do anything and didn’t want anything, the proletarian “bottoms” were not ready, and the liberal opposition wanted something, but could not decide: sturgeon with horseradish or a constitution?

Only one thing can be said with confidence: a way out of the current political impasse was needed, but complete confusion reigned in the minds of the so-called “conspirators” themselves. Some believed that they themselves were quite capable of bringing the war to a victorious end and that they did not need a monarchy at all for this, a military dictatorship was enough; others were going to preserve the monarchy as a factor uniting the nation, but remove Nicholas II and his “advisers”; still others were simply eager for power, having absolutely no idea what they would do once they received it. And “when there is no agreement among comrades,” the result of their actions is usually very, very unpredictable...

Trap for the Emperor

The beginning of the February events in Petrograd found Nicholas II at Headquarters in Mogilev. He left there on February 22, 1917 at the urgent request of General M.I., who had just returned from Sevastopol. Alekseeva. What the “urgent matter” was that the chief of staff wanted to talk about with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is unclear to historians to this day.

Supporters of the “conspiracy” claim that Alekseev deliberately lured the sovereign to Mogilev on the eve of the uprising in the capital. In this way, the conspirators’ plan to isolate the emperor from his family and force him to abdicate was to be realized.

But here it is worth noting that even the most persistent request of the general might not have any effect on Emperor Nicholas II. And if the sovereign had not gone to Mogilev, all the plans of the conspirators would have collapsed?

In addition, Alekseev, as we remember, until the evening of March 1, acted as a resolute opponent of any changes in domestic policy until the end of hostilities, and even more so the abdication of the emperor.

Perhaps Nicholas II himself suspected that something was again afoot in the army, and not in Petrograd, or he decided, as always, that in the event of unrest, it would be better for him, as an emperor, to be with loyal troops than among traitorous courtiers.

And then, the emperor did not need to look for a special reason to leave Petrograd. From the moment Nikolai Nikolayevich was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the emperor spent almost all his time at Headquarters, leaving only Alexandra Fedorovna “on the farm.” His visits to Mogilev were more like escapes from internal problems than caused by pressing needs.

News of the uprising in the capital reached Headquarters only 2 days after the start of the events - February 25, and even then in a very distorted form.

According to eyewitnesses, Nicholas II brushed off reports of unrest for several days, considering them another “bakers’ strike” that would take a few days to suppress.

On February 26, the State Duma stopped working. A Provisional Committee of the State Duma was elected, chaired by Rodzianko. Representatives of the Provisional Committee understood that if they did nothing, all power in the country would pass to the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Petrosovet), which led the uprising.

Rodzianko began bombarding Headquarters with panicked telegrams. They clearly spoke about the need for decisive action, namely: the choice of a new government accountable to the State Duma, i.e. it turned out that it was already for him personally, A.I. Rodzianko, because the Duma was dissolved.

Nicholas II considered all Rodzianko's telegrams complete nonsense. He did not want to answer them, feeling himself still under the protection of Alekseev. The only thing that interested the sovereign in those days was the fate of the family remaining in Tsarskoe Selo.

General Alekseev was ordered to remove loyal troops from the front and send them to Petrograd. The expedition was led by General N.I., loyal to the emperor. Ivanov. But according to the testimony of Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, who was on the royal train, General Alekseev immediately ordered the concentration of allocated troops in Tsarskoye Selo and only after that sent them to Petrograd. That is, Ivanov’s first priority should have been to protect (or capture?) royal family, and the suppression of unrest in Petrograd itself faded into the background.

On February 27, Nicholas II talked with the empress for several hours by telegraph, after which in the evening he suddenly broke down and announced his departure to Tsarskoe.

General Alekseev tried in vain to dissuade him from this trip. Alekseev, like no one else, knew how it could end for the emperor, and for all of Russia.

The Emperor and his retinue left on two letter trains. They had to cover about 950 miles along the route Mogilev - Orsha - Vyazma - Likhoslavl - Tosno - Gatchina - Tsarskoe Selo, but, as subsequent events showed, the trains were not destined to reach their destination. By the morning of March 1, the trains were only able to get through Bologoye to Malaya Vishera, where they were forced to turn around and go back to Bologoye. By order of the Commissioner of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma A. A. Bublikov, the emperor’s train was stopped at Dno station (not far from Pskov).

While the emperor was there, Rodzianko was actively processing telegrams from Alekseev and the commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, assuring that Petrograd was completely under his control.

Alekseev, still apparently doubting the need for a coup d'etat, decided to submit to the inevitable.

After this excellent work done by Rodzianko, by the evening of March 1, both letter trains arrived in Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front was located.

March 1. Pskov.

Arriving in Pskov, the sovereign naively hoped that he had finally entered a territory with firm military power, and that they would help him get to Tsarskoye Selo.

But it was not there! There was no talk at all about moving the train to Tsarskoye Selo.

Commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, one of the supporters of the “most decisive changes,” began to passionately prove to the emperor the need for a responsible ministry, that is, changing the existing system to a constitutional monarchy. Nicholas II began to object, pointing out that he did not understand the position of a constitutional monarch, since such a monarch reigns but does not govern. Assuming supreme power as autocrat, he simultaneously accepted, as a duty to God, the responsibility for managing state affairs. By agreeing to transfer his rights to others, he deprives himself of the power to control events without getting rid of responsibility for them. In other words, transferring power to a government that will be responsible to parliament will in no way relieve it of responsibility for the actions of that government.

The only thing the emperor was ready to do was agree to the appointment of Rodzianko as prime minister and give him the choice of some cabinet members.

The negotiations dragged on until late at night and were interrupted several times.

The turning point was the receipt at 22:20 of a draft of the proposed manifesto on the establishment of a responsible government, which was prepared at Headquarters and sent to Pskov signed by General Alekseev. According to the draft, Rodzianko was tasked with forming a Provisional Government.

Alekseev's telegram was the decisive moment of the action aimed at breaking the will of the emperor. It showed that the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the actual commander-in-chief of the army in the field unconditionally supported the decision proposed by Ruzsky.

Obviously, at that moment, Nicholas II realized that he had finally fallen into a trap, and the door slammed behind him. In the presence of only Count Fredericks, the Minister of the Court, as a witness, he signed a telegram authorizing the publication of the manifesto proposed by Alekseev.

Later, Nicholas II, in communication with his loved ones, complained about rudeness and pressure from General Ruzsky. According to the emperor, it was he who forced him to change his moral and religious convictions and agree to concessions that he did not intend to make. The story of how Ruzsky, having lost patience, began impolitely insisting on the need for an immediate decision, came from the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. It was to her that Nicholas II, after his abdication, told in detail about everything that happened in Pskov.

General A.I. Spiridovich wrote in his memoirs:

That evening the Emperor was defeated. Ruzsky broke the exhausted, morally tormented Sovereign, who in those days did not find serious support around him. The Emperor gave up morally. He gave in to force, assertiveness, and rudeness, which at one point reached the point of stamping his feet and banging his hand on the table. The Emperor spoke with bitterness about this rudeness later to his August mother and could not forget it even in Tobolsk.

On March 2, at one in the morning, signed by Nicholas II, a telegram was sent to General Ivanov: “I hope you arrived safely. I ask you not to take any measures until I arrive and report to you.” At the same time, General Ruzsky orders to stop the advance of the troops allocated to him towards Petrograd, return them to the front and telegraphs to Headquarters about the recall of the troops sent from the Western Front. The armed suppression of the rebellion in the capital did not take place.

On the night of March 1-2, Ruzsky informed Rodzianko that he had “pressured” the tsar until he agreed to form a government responsible “to the legislative chambers,” and offered to give him the text of the corresponding tsar’s manifesto. In response, Rodzianko stated that the situation in Petrograd had changed radically, and the demand for a responsible ministry had already become obsolete. Renunciation is necessary.

Ruzsky realized that his work was not finished yet and he could not do without assistants, so he immediately telegraphed to Headquarters.

Then Alekseev, on his own initiative, compiled and sent summary conversation between Ruzsky and Rodzianko to all the commanders-in-chief of the fronts: Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to the Caucasus Front, General Sakharov to the Romanian Front, General Brusilov to Southwestern Front, General Evert to the Western Front. Alekseev asked the commanders-in-chief to urgently prepare and send to Headquarters their opinion specifically about the abdication of the sovereign.

Alekseev's telegram to the commander-in-chief was formulated in such a way that they had no choice but to speak out for abdication. It said that if the commanders-in-chief shared the views of Alekseev and Rodzianko, then they should “telegraph very quickly their loyal request to His Majesty” for abdication. At the same time, not a word was mentioned about what should be done if they do not share this view.

On the morning of March 2, Ruzsky also received the text of a telegram sent by General Alekseev to the commander-in-chief of the fronts, and read it to the tsar. It became clear that Alekseev fully supported Rodzianko’s positions.

Renunciation. Option 1.

The emperor's mood changed greatly by morning. In the current situation, abdication attracted him as a more worthy solution than the position of a constitutional monarch. This exit gave him the opportunity to relieve himself of all responsibility for what had happened, what is happening and the inevitable future of Russia under the rule of people who, as they themselves assured, “enjoy the people’s trust.” At lunchtime, walking along the platform, Nicholas II met with Ruzsky and told him that he was inclined to renounce.

At 14-14:30, responses from the commanders-in-chief of the fronts began to arrive at Headquarters.

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Tsar's uncle) stated that “as a loyal subject, I consider it the duty of the oath and the spirit of the oath to kneel and beg the sovereign to renounce the crown in order to save Russia and the dynasty”.

Generals A.E. spoke in favor of abdication. Evert (Western Front), A.A. Brusilov (South-Western Front), V.V. Sakharov (Romanian Front), as well as the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral A.I. Nepenin (on his own initiative). Commanding Black Sea Fleet Admiral A.V. Kolchak did not send any response.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, Ruzsky entered the tsar, taking with him the texts of telegrams from the commanders-in-chief received from Headquarters. Nicholas II read them and asked the generals present to also express their opinions. They all spoke in favor of renunciation.

At about three o'clock the Tsar announced his decision in two short telegrams, one of which was addressed to the Chairman of the Duma, the other to Alekseev. The abdication was in favor of the heir-crown, and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich was appointed regent.

Undoubtedly, this was a step back from the concessions of the previous night, since not a word was said about the transition to a parliamentary system and a government responsible to the Duma. Ruzsky intended to immediately send telegrams, but for the members of the imperial retinue the abdication came as a complete surprise, and they considered that this step had been taken with excessive haste. They immediately began to persuade the Tsar to stop the telegrams. Ruzsky had to return the telegram addressed to Rodzianko to the tsar.

At this time, Ruzsky was informed that representatives of the State Duma A.I. were leaving for Pskov. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin.

While the Duma representatives were traveling, members of the retinue asked what the abdicated monarch was going to do next? How does citizen Nikolai Romanov even imagine his future existence in Russia? He said that he would go abroad and live there until the end of hostilities, and then return, settle in Crimea and devote himself entirely to raising his son. Some of his interlocutors expressed doubts that he would be allowed to do this, but Nikolai replied that parents are never prohibited from taking care of their children. Nevertheless, some doubts arose in him, and for the first time he openly turned to S.P.’s personal doctor. Fedorov about the health of the prince. The king asked him to sincerely answer whether it was possible for the heir to be cured, to which he received the answer that “miracles do not happen in nature” and that in case of abdication, the heir would most likely have to live in the family of the regent. After this, Nikolai decided to immediately abdicate for his son, in order to leave Alexei with him.

Renunciation. Option 2.

Representatives of the Duma arrived on the royal train at 21:45. Before their arrival, General Ruzsky received information that “armed trucks” with revolutionary soldiers expelled from Petrograd were moving toward the Tsar’s train. According to Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, Shulgin informed him about the strong friction between the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet: “Something unimaginable is happening in Petrograd, we are completely in their hands, and we will probably be arrested when we return.”

Guchkov told Nicholas II that they had come to report what had happened in Petrograd and to discuss the measures necessary to save the situation, since it continued to remain formidable: no one planned or prepared the popular movement, it broke out spontaneously and turned into anarchy . There is a danger of unrest spreading to the troops at the front. The only measure that can save the situation is abdication in favor of the young heir of the Tsarevich under the regency of Grand Duke Michael, who will form the new government. This is the only way to save Russia, the dynasty and the monarchy.

After listening to Guchkov, the tsar uttered a phrase that, according to G. M. Katkov, had the effect of a bomb exploding. He said that even during the day he decided to renounce in favor of his son. But now, realizing that he cannot agree to separation from his son, he will deny both himself and his son.

Guchkov said that they must respect the tsar's paternal feelings and accept his decision. Representatives of the Duma proposed a draft act of renunciation, which they brought with them. The Emperor, however, said that he had his own edition, and showed the text, which, on his instructions, was compiled at Headquarters. He has already made changes to it regarding the successor; the phrase about the oath of the new emperor was immediately agreed upon and also included in the text.

On March 2 (15), 1917 at 23:40, Nikolai handed over to Guchkov and Shulgin the Act of Abdication, which, in particular, read: “We command our brother to rule over the affairs of the state in complete and inviolable unity with the representatives of the people in legislative institutions, on those principles that will be established by them, taking an inviolable oath to that effect. »

In addition to the Act of Abdication, Nicholas II signed a decree dismissing the former composition of the Council of Ministers and appointing Prince G.E. Lvov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, an order for the Army and Navy appointing Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

To avoid the impression that the abdication occurred under pressure from the Duma delegates, it was officially stated that the abdication took place on March 2 at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, that is, precisely at the moment when the decision about it was actually made. The time of appointment decrees was marked as 14:00, so that they had the legal force of being made by the rightful emperor before the moment of abdication and to respect the principle of continuity of power.

The entire protocol of negotiations between Nicholas II and representatives of the Duma was recorded by the head of the campaign office, General Naryshkin, under the title “Protocol of Abdication.”

At the end of the audience, Guchkov left the carriage and shouted into the crowd:

“Russian people, bare your heads, cross yourself, pray to God... For the sake of saving Russia, the Sovereign Emperor withdrew his royal service. Russia is embarking on a new path!”

In the morning Ruzsky came and read his long conversation on the phone with Rodzianko. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma is powerless to do anything, since the Social Democratic Party, represented by the working committee, is fighting it. My renunciation is needed. Ruzsky conveyed this conversation to headquarters, and Alekseev to all commanders in chief. To 2? h. answers came from everyone. The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed. Headquarters sent a draft manifesto. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I talked and gave them the signed and revised manifesto. At one o'clock in the morning I left Pskov with a heavy feeling of what I had experienced. There is treason, cowardice, and deceit all around!

What's next?

The Tsar's train departed Pskov back to Mogilev shortly after midnight on March 2-3, 1917. The former emperor wanted to say goodbye to the generals and meet his mother, who came from Kyiv especially for this purpose. He was never released to his family in Tsarskoe Selo.

Before the train departed, Nicholas II handed over a telegram to the palace commandant V.N. Voeikov for Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich:

"Petrograd. To His Imperial Majesty Michael the Second. The events of recent days have forced me to irrevocably decide to take this extreme step. Forgive me if I upset you and didn’t have time to warn you. I will forever remain a faithful and devoted brother. I fervently pray to God to help you and your Motherland. Nicky."

The telegram was sent from railway station Sirotino (45 km west of Vitebsk) already in the afternoon. According to the assurance of the wife of the Grand Duke N. Brasova, Mikhail Alexandrovich never received this telegram.

The abdication in favor of Mikhail was an unpleasant surprise, both for the Grand Duke himself and for the revolutionaries. Members of the Provisional Government decided not to publish the manifesto on the abdication of Nicholas II for now, and immediately sent their representatives to Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich.

According to A.F. Kerensky, he was completely shocked by the decision of his older brother. While Tsarevich Alexei was alive, Mikhail, who was in a morganatic marriage, had no rights to the throne and did not intend to reign.

After a three-hour meeting with members of the Provisional Government, who (except Miliukov and Guchkov) advised the Grand Duke to renounce the throne, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed the following document:

“A heavy burden has been placed on me by the will of my brother, who handed over to me the Imperial All-Russian Throne in a time of unprecedented war and popular unrest.

Inspired by the common thought with all the people that the good of our Motherland is above all, I made a firm decision in that case to assume the Supreme power, if such is the will of our great people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new basic laws of the Russian State. Therefore, calling on God’s blessing, I ask all citizens of the Russian State to submit to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma and is vested with full power, until the Constituent Assembly is convened as soon as possible on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage by its decision on the form of government will express the will of the people. 3/III - 1917 Mikhail.

Petrograd."

He later wrote in his diary:

“Alekseev came with the latest news from Rodzianko. It turns out that Misha renounced. His manifesto ends with a four-tail for elections in 6 months of the Constituent Assembly. God knows who convinced him to sign such disgusting stuff! In Petrograd, the unrest stopped - as long as it continues like this."

The next morning, the usual meeting with Alekseev took place at Headquarters. After him, Alekseev conveyed to the Provisional Government the emperor’s “request” or “wish” that he be allowed to return to Tsarskoe Selo, wait there for the recovery of the children who had fallen ill with measles, and then the whole family leave for England through Murmansk.

As you know, the plans of the ex-emperor were not destined to come true. When signing the abdication, Nicholas II did not stipulate any mandatory conditions or guarantees of safety for yourself and your family. What, exactly, he didn’t know what to negotiate: there were no precedents for the voluntary abdication of a monarch in Russia. And is it a royal thing to bargain with conspirators, revolutionaries, rebels?..

The officers in the troops accepted the tsar’s abdication without enthusiasm, but almost everyone remained silent (isolated riots by Colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment A.P. Kutepov and the “first checker of Russia” General A.F. Keller do not count).

Almost immediately after the abdication of the tsar, a collapse began in the army. The fatal blow was dealt to her by “Order No. 1” against the Petrograd garrison, issued by the Petrograd Soviet on March 1, 1917 (i.e., even before the abdication). The order ordered the immediate creation of elected committees from representatives of the lower ranks in all military units, divisions and services, as well as on ships. The main thing in Order No. 1 was the third point, according to which in all political speeches, military units were now subordinate not to officers, but to their elected committees and the Council. All weapons were transferred under the control of soldiers' committees. The order introduced equality of rights for “lower ranks” with other citizens in political, general civil and private life, and the title of officers was abolished. Subsequently, with the connivance of the new Minister of War A. Guchkov, this order was extended to the entire army and led to its complete disintegration.

Order No. 1 buried the hopes of the highest Russian generals to bring the war to a victorious end. Achieve its abolition in May 1917, before the planned offensive on Western Front Neither the “conspirator” Alekseev, who had already bitten his elbows, nor his comrades in the Provisional Government, Milyukov and Guchkov, succeeded.

“With the fall of the Tsar,” wrote General P.N. Wrangel, - the very idea of ​​power has fallen, in the concept of the Russian people, all the obligations that bind them have disappeared. At the same time, power and these obligations could not be replaced by anything.”

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Today it is difficult to imagine what would have happened if General Alekseev had fateful days March 1917, his very near future was revealed, at least for a moment. What would happen if he suddenly saw how, together with Denikin, Kornilov, Markov, walking or riding in a miserable cart across the snow-covered Kuban steppe, how officers of the Kornilov regiment, unarmed, rushed into a “psychic attack” near Ekaterinodar, how they fought for their lives and honor the remnants of the Russian army near the village of Dmitrovskaya already in February of the following year, 1918?...

Perhaps Alekseev, Ruzsky, Milyukov, Guchkov and other “saviors” would have immediately stopped rocking the already flimsy edifice of Russian statehood, stood on the edge, imbued with loyal feelings for their monarch and really saved the country from the impending catastrophe. Perhaps not.

Unfortunately or fortunately (?), no one can foresee even the very near future. It is no coincidence that various kinds of “prophets” were persecuted and killed at all times.

However, the reign of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II was marked by the most vulgar mysticism. The royal couple, as you know, did not shy away from prophets, fortune tellers, or notorious charlatans. There is also a known legend about the prophecies of the monk Abel, received by Nikolai and Alexandra Fedorovna on the centenary of the death of Paul I (1901), and the predictions of the English astrologer Cairo (1907), and the prophecy of Seraphim of Sarov, which allegedly accidentally fell into the hands of the emperor, the ominous predictions of Rasputin, etc. .. etc.

If we assume that Nicholas II was the only emperor in history who knew his fate, knew the year of his death and the death of his entire family, then it is this mystical knowledge, and not “weakness,” that explains many facts of his reign. It is known that he tried several times to change his fate, and especially decisively in March 1905, trying to abdicate the throne and become a monk, but he could not. The entire second half of his reign (after March 1905) passed under the sign of fatal prophecies raining down on him from all sides, invisible to anyone (except Alexandra Fedorovna).

All of the above allows us to look at the life and fate of the royal couple more objectively, but does not exclude a new “conspiracy theory.”

Playing on the inclination of Nicholas II (and especially Alexandra Feodorovna) towards mysticism, “slipping” them with predictions, prophecies and the prophets themselves - all this could be a multi-step combination for the collapse of the country and the elimination of the ruling dynasty.

The authorship of this operation, which was too long in time, but very effective in its results, could belong to British intelligence. UK with late XIX centuries, she only dreamed of eliminating Russia, her main rival on the continent and in the eastern possessions, from the political arena.

The mystic king, Job the Long-Suffering, armed, or rather disarmed, with numerous prophecies about his unhappy fate - what could be worse for a country drawn into a world war? And his elimination on the eve of victory and the collapse of the state turned out to be in the hands not so much of the opponents in the war, but of yesterday’s Entente allies, who rushed under the guise of help to rob Russia, already torn by civil strife and bleeding.

Version by A. Razumov

Currently, A. Razumov’s version, supported by some representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and historian and publicist N. Starikov, which denies the very fact of Nicholas II’s abdication of the throne, has also gained great popularity among jingoistic patriots.

Razumov compared the published text of the Manifesto on abdication and the text of General Alekseev’s telegram No. 1865 dated March 1, 1917, addressed to Nicholas II, found a number of coincidences in them and came to the conclusion that all known witnesses to the abdication (Shulgin, Guchkov, Rodzianko, Fredericks and others ) formed a conspiracy of liars. For many years they unanimously lied that on March 2, Nicholas II himself drew up the text of his abdication in favor of his brother Mikhail and voluntarily signed it. The conspirators needed a living monarch who had independently abdicated the throne in order to cut the ground from under the feet of pro-monarchy-minded patriots who were supposedly capable of preventing the rapid collapse of the army and the country.

As a key argument, Starikov cites the complete coincidence of individual fragments of the text, as well as the signature of Nicholas II, written for some reason in pencil.

Meanwhile, there is nothing surprising or sensational in the coincidence of the texts of the telegram and the Manifesto.

Judging by the diaries and letters of Nicholas II that have come down to us, the last emperor was not particularly distinguished by his quickness of pen. It is unlikely that he had any skill in drafting official documents. As is known, during the days of the sovereign’s stay in Pskov, more than a dozen different telegrams were drawn up on his behalf at Headquarters, as well as several options for abdication (including in favor of his son). Standard clerical phrases could have been used by one of the adjutants or by the same Lukomsky and Basili, who prepared the texts of telegrams and draft versions of the Abdication Manifesto for Nicholas II. He, in turn, simply made his changes to the finished text sent from Headquarters and signed the Manifesto like a telegram - in pencil.

Of course, for various kinds of conspiracy theorists, the version about the deliberate use of a pencil when signing such an important document looks much more attractive. They say that the unfortunate emperor wanted to show his subjects that violence had been committed against him, and this document could not be trusted. But the subjects did not understand this or did not want to understand. The last senseless protest of the last emperor could not erase 23 years of incompetent rule, nor regain lost opportunities, nor correct fatal mistakes that had already become history.

Elena Shirokova

Sources and literature:

Spiridovich A.I. Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917

Shulgin V.V. Days. 1925.

Multatuli P.V. “May the Lord bless my decision...” - St. Petersburg: Satis, 2002.

It's him. Nicholas II. A renunciation that never happened. - M.: AST, Astrel. 2010. - 640 p.

The mood in the capital is extremely alarming. The wildest rumors are circulating in society, both about the intentions of the government authorities (in the sense of taking various kinds of reactionary measures), and equally about the assumptions of groups and segments of the population hostile to this government (in the sense of possible and probable revolutionary initiatives and excesses).

Everyone is waiting for some exceptional events and performances from both sides. They are equally serious and anxiously awaiting various revolutionary outbreaks, as well as the seemingly undoubted “palace coup” in the near future, the herald of which, according to general belief, was the act against the “notorious old man” (meaning the murder of Rasputin).

Among such chaotic judgments, gossip and rumors, special attention is drawn to the repeated conversations and rumors everywhere about terror as a phenomenon not of a party nature, but of a general one. In this regard, rumors about the probable possibility of manifestations of terror are usually associated in progressive social circles with the question of the probable final dissolution of the State Duma under the current situation.<…>

It should be noted that if the workers came to realize the necessity and feasibility of a general strike and the subsequent revolution, and the circles of the intelligentsia came to believe in the salvific nature of political murders and terror, then this quite clearly shows the oppositional mood of society and its thirst to find one or another way out of the created politically abnormal situation. And this situation is becoming more abnormal and tense every day, and that the masses of the population, nor the leaders of political parties, do not see any natural peaceful way out of it - there is no need to talk about this.

FROM A LETTER OF EMPRESS ALEXANDRA FYODOROVNA TO NICHOLAS II

Strikes and riots in the city are more than provocative.<…>This is a hooligan movement, boys and girls running around and shouting that they have no bread - just to create excitement, and workers who prevent others from working. If the weather had been very cold, they would all probably have stayed indoors. But this will all pass and calm down, if only the Duma behaves well. The worst speeches are not published, but I think that anti-dynastic speeches must be immediately and very severely punished, especially since now war time. The strikers must be told directly not to organize strikes, otherwise they will be sent to the front or severely punished.

TELEGRAM S.S. KHABALOVA TO STAKE

I report that on February 23 and 24, due to a lack of bread, a strike occurred in many factories. On February 24, about 200 thousand workers went on strike and forcibly removed those working. The tram service was stopped by workers. In the middle of the day on February 23 and 24, some of the workers broke through to Nevsky, from where they were dispersed. Today is February 25, the workers’ attempts to penetrate Nevsky are successfully paralyzed. The unit that has broken through is dispersed by the Cossacks. In addition to the Petrograd garrison, five squadrons of the 9th reserve cavalry regiment from Krasnoe Selo, a hundred Life Guards of the combined Cossack regiment from Pavlovsk, and five squadrons of the guards reserve cavalry regiment were called to Petrograd to suppress the unrest.

(S.S. Khabalov - commander of the Petrograd Military District, lieutenant general)

“NO SLOW DOWN.”

TELEGRAM OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA M.V. RODZYANKO TO NICHOLAYIIFEBRUARY 26, 1917

Your Majesty!

The situation is serious. There is anarchy in the capital. The government is paralyzed. Transport, food and fuel were in complete disarray. Public discontent is growing. There is indiscriminate shooting in the streets. Troop units shoot at each other. It is necessary to immediately entrust a person enjoying the confidence of the country to form a new government. You can't hesitate. Any delay is like death. I pray to God that at this hour the responsibility does not fall on the crown bearer.

“TOMORROW MAY BE ALREADY LATE”

FROM M.V.’S TELEGRAM RODZYANKO TO NICHOLAYII 27 FEBRUARY 1917

The government is completely powerless to suppress the disorder. There is no hope for the garrison troops. The reserve battalions of the guard regiments are in revolt. Officers are being killed. Having joined the crowd and the popular movement, they head to the house of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Duma. The civil war has begun and is flaring up. Order to immediately call new government on the principles I reported to Your Majesty in yesterday’s telegram. Order the legislative chambers to be reconvened to repeal your highest decree. Announce these measures without delay the highest manifesto. If the movement spreads to the army, the Germans will triumph and the collapse of Russia, and with it the dynasty, is inevitable. On behalf of all of Russia, I ask Your Majesty to fulfill the above. The hour that decides your fate and the fate of your homeland has come. Tomorrow may be too late.

RODZYANKO ABOUT HIS POSITION IN FEBRUARY 1917

In 1919, the former chairman of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma wrote: “Of course, the State Duma could have refused to lead the revolution, but we must not forget the complete absence of power that has been created and the fact that if the Duma were to be eliminated, complete anarchy would immediately set in and the fatherland would perish immediately. .. The Duma had to be protected, at least as a fetish for power, which would still play its role in difficult times.”

TELEGRAM S.S. KHABALOV IN THE NAME OF M.V. ALEXEEVA

I ask you to report to His Imperial Majesty that I could not fulfill the order to restore order in the capital. Most of the units, one after another, betrayed their duty and refused to fight against the rebels. Others fraternized with the rebels and turned their weapons against the troops loyal to His Majesty. Those who remained faithful to their duty fought against the rebels all day, suffering heavy losses. By evening, the rebels captured most of the capital. Small units of various regiments gathered near the Winter Palace under the command of Major General Zankevich remain faithful to the oath, with whom I will continue to fight.

(M.V. Alekseev - Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, Adjutant General of the General Staff, Infantry General)

FIRST SOLDIER OF THE REVOLUTION

On February 27, 1917, at 5 o’clock in the morning, the senior sergeant major of the training team of the Volyn Regiment, Timofey Kirpichnikov, raised the soldiers subordinate to him, fed, armed and lined up before the arrival of his superiors. The day before, their commander, Staff Captain Lashkevich, led the team into the city to shoot at unarmed demonstrators who were outraged by the lack of bread in stores; At the same time, Lashkevich personally killed several dozen civilians. At night, Timofey Kirpichnikov persuaded his assistants, the “platoon leaders,” to refuse to participate in the executions of Petrograd residents. Arriving at the unit's location, the officer argued with his subordinates; as a result, he tried to escape and was shot.

The rebel training team, arms in hand, moved towards the reserve battalion of their regiment and carried it along with them. Then Timofey Kirpichnikov led the soldiers further - to raise the neighboring regiments. Overcoming the resistance of sentries and officers, they were able to bring many thousands of armed people onto the streets within a few hours. At some point, Kirpichnikov himself ceased to control the actions of the crowd, which randomly opened fire, stormed objects occupied by the gendarmerie, and ultimately prompted government agencies, including the government, curtail their activities, and later completely flee.

Thanks to the abilities of Timofey Kirpichnikov, the riots organized with the participation of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters M.V. Alekseev, commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District S.S. Khabalov and other high-ranking officials were beyond the control of any government authorities.

Deputies of the State Duma tried to form a new government, activists of the left parties began to create Soviets - they called for sending representatives from every part and from every thousand workers to elect the Executive Committee. In parallel, A.I. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin, with the support of the highest generals, forced Nicholas II to abdicate the throne. The power in the country was weakening more and more (especially after order No. 1, which contributed to the collapse of the army). This did not prevent the new commander of the Petrograd Military District L.G. Kornilov from presenting the award to Kirpichnikov - the St. George Cross of the 4th degree. The hero of February was also promoted to lieutenant.

The leaders of extremist political organizations gathered in Petrograd and were already trying to take power into their own hands - the “April crisis” arose. At the same time, Timofey Kirpichnikov stood up for the Provisional Government. He again brought an armed demonstration into the streets, which paralyzed the actions of the revolutionaries. In April they had to abandon their plans.

After October 25, 1917, when P.N. Krasnov advanced on Petrograd, captured by the Bolsheviks, Kirpichnikov tried to repeat his signature move with a revolt of the garrison soldiers. However, the uprising of the cadet schools did not evoke responses among the soldiers - the plan failed.

In November, Kirpichnikov was able to escape from the capital to the Don. He arrived to A.P. Kutepov, who was in Petrograd on vacation in February and tried in vain to restore order (the soldiers assigned to him fled) while Kirpichnikov was destroying it. A very short conversation took place between the two heroes, recorded by A.P. Kutepov in his memoirs: “One day a young officer came to my headquarters and very cheekily told me that he had come to the Volunteer Army to fight the Bolsheviks “for the freedom of the people,” which the Bolsheviks were trampling on. I asked him where he had been until now and what he had been doing, the officer told me that he was one of the first “fighters for the freedom of the people” and that in Petrograd he took an active part in the revolution, being one of the first to oppose the old regime. When the officer wanted to leave, I ordered him to stay and, calling the officer on duty, sent for a squad. The young officer became agitated, turned pale and began asking why I was detaining him. Now you will see, I said, and when the squad arrived, I ordered that this “freedom fighter” be immediately shot.

ORDER No. 1

PETROGRAD COUNCIL OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES FOR THE GARRISON OF THE PETROGRAD DISTRICT

Order No. 1. March 1, 1917 To the garrison of the Petrograd district to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.

The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies decided:

1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various types of military departments and on naval vessels, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.

2) In all military units that have not yet elected their representatives to the Council of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative from each company, who will present themselves with written certificates to the State Duma building by 10 a.m. on March 2.

3) In all its political speeches, the military unit is subordinate to the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.

4) Orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be executed, except in cases where they contradict the orders and resolutions of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

5) All kinds of weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees and in no case be issued to officers, even at their request.

6) In the ranks and during the performance of official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside of service and formation in their political, civil and private life, soldiers cannot in any way be diminished in those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing in front and the mandatory salutation outside of duty are abolished.

7) The titles of officers are likewise abolished: Your Excellency, Honor, etc., and replaced by the address: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.

Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them as “you” is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter are obliged to bring to the attention of company committees.

This order should be read in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant commands.

Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Citizens!

The temporary committee of members of the State Duma, with the assistance and sympathy of the capital's troops and population, has now achieved such a degree of success over the dark forces of the old regime that it allows it to begin a more durable structure of executive power.

For this purpose, the Temporary Committee of the State Duma appoints the following persons as ministers of the first public cabinet, in whom the country's trust is ensured by their past social and political activities.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, Prince G.E. Lviv.

Minister of Foreign Affairs P.N. Milyukov.

Minister of Military and Naval A.I. Guchkov.

Minister of Railways N.V. Nekrasov.

Minister of Trade and Industry A.I. Konovalov.

Minister of Public Education A.A. Manuilov.

Minister of Finance M.I. Tereshchenko.

Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod V.N. Lviv.

Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev.

Minister of Justice A.F. Kerensky.

State Comptroller I.V. Godnev.

Minister for Finnish Affairs F.I. Rodichev.

In its present activities, the cabinet will be guided by the following principles:

1. Complete and immediate amnesty for all political and religious cases, including terrorist attacks, military uprisings and agrarian crimes, etc.

2. Freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings and strikes, with the extension of political freedoms to military personnel within the limits permitted by military-technical conditions.

3. Abolition of all class, religious and national restrictions.

4. Immediate preparation for the convening of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, secret and direct voting, which will establish the form of government and constitution of the country.

5. Replacement of the police with a people's militia with elected authorities subordinate to local governments.

6. Elections to local government bodies on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret voting.

7. Non-disarmament and non-withdrawal from Petrograd of military units that took part in the revolutionary movement.

8. While maintaining strict military discipline in the ranks and while on duty military service- elimination of all restrictions for soldiers in the use of public rights granted to all other citizens. The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it does not at all intend to take advantage of military circumstances for any delay in the implementation of the above reforms and measures.

Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Prince. G.E.Lvov.

Ministers: P.N.Milyukov, N.V.Nekrasov, A.N.Konovalov, A.A.Manuylov, M.I.Tereshchenko, Vl.N.Lvov, A.I.Shingarev, A.F.Kerensky.

ABOUT THE REFUSAL OF THE GRAND DUKE MICHAEL ALEXANDROVICH

FROM THE PERCEPTION OF SUPREME POWER TILL THE ESTABLISHMENT
IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF THE BOARD AND NEW
BASIC LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN STATE

A heavy burden has been placed on me by the will of my brother, who handed over to me the imperial all-Russian throne in a time of unprecedented war and popular unrest. Inspired by the common thought with all the people that the good of our Motherland is above all, I accepted firm decision in that case, to assume the supreme power, if such is the will of our great people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish the form of government and new fundamental laws of the Russian state.

Therefore, calling on God’s blessing, I ask all citizens of the Russian state to submit to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma and was invested with full power, until such time as it is possible to convene

in the shortest possible time, on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, the Constituent Assembly, with its decision on the form of government, will express the will of the people.

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In the context of a sharply worsened food crisis, the events of February 1917 took place. On February 22, 1917, the Putilov plant in Petrograd was closed “until special permission.” The workers turned to the entire proletariat of the capital for support. The government took measures to prevent revolution. At the beginning of February 1917, the Petrograd Military District was removed from the command of the Northern Front and transferred to the subordination of the Minister of War M. A. Belyaev. The district commander, General S.S. Khabalov, received emergency powers to suppress possible unrest.

On February 23, 1917, events spontaneously began in Petrograd, which just a few days later ended with the overthrow of the monarchy. Thus, International Women's Day (March 8, new style) became the first day of the revolution. The rallies of workers that began at textile factories on the Vyborg side grew into mass protests. From the working-class outskirts, columns of demonstrators headed towards the city center. The behavior of the soldiers and Cossacks set the workers in an optimistic mood. Petrograd, meanwhile, took on the appearance of a military camp. Machine guns were installed on fire towers and on some houses. The government decided to fight by arming the police and using the army. On February 25, soldiers, at the command of their officers, began to use weapons. General Khabalov - received an order from the tsar to immediately stop the unrest in the capital. To keep soldiers from communicating with the rebels, the command of some units did not issue them overcoats and shoes.

On February 26, the streets of Petrograd were stained with blood - a mass execution of the rebel workers took place. These events became the turning point of the revolution. On February 27, troops began to go over to the side of the rebels - the execution had an effect that the authorities did not count on. The Petrograd garrison, numbering 180 thousand people at that time, and together with the troops of the nearest suburbs 300 thousand people, sided with the people.

Nicholas II wrote in his diary on February 27, 1917: “Unrest began in Petrograd several days ago; Unfortunately, troops also began to take part in them. It’s a disgusting feeling to be so far away and receive fragmentary bad news.” On the afternoon of February 28, the Peter and Paul Fortress was occupied. The position of the remnants of the government troops, led by General Khabalov in the Admiralty and trying to strengthen themselves there, became hopeless, and they, laying down their arms, dispersed to their barracks. The tsar's attempt to organize a punitive expedition, led by General I. I. Ivanov, ended in failure.

On the night of February 28, the IV State Duma created a Temporary Committee from among its members to govern the state (chaired by Octobrist M.V. Rodzianko). The committee sought to restore order and save the monarchy. The Committee sent its representatives A.I. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin to Headquarters, where the Tsar was located, to negotiate with him. Nicholas II still hoped to suppress the uprising with armed forces, but the troops he sent went over to the side of the rebels.


Nicholas II, meanwhile, left Headquarters, located in Mogilev, hoping to arrive in Tsarskoe Selo. However, the path was occupied by the rebels, and only in the middle of the day on March 1, the tsar arrived in Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front was located. Soon the question of abdication was raised. The front commander, General N.V. Ruzsky, on the morning of March 2, read to Nicholas II “his longest conversation on the apparatus with Rodzianko.” The latter insisted on renunciation.

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma A. I. Guchkov and V. V. Shulgin went to Pskov. Moreover, it was decided to act secretly and quickly, “without asking anyone, without consulting anyone.” By the time Guchkov and Shulgin arrived, Nikolai had already made his decision. The renunciation was signed by the tsar on March 2 at 23:40, but in order to avoid the impression that this act was of a violent nature, the time was set on the manifesto when it was signed - 15:00.

Nicholas II abdicated the throne for himself and for his young son Alexei in favor of his younger brother Mikhail Alexandrovich, however, the latter, in turn, refused to accept supreme power. This meant the complete victory of the revolution. Leaving Pskov late at night on March 2, former king He wrote bitter words in his diary: “There is treason, cowardice, and deception all around.” From the evening of March 3 until the morning of March 8, Nikolai was at Headquarters. When leaving, he said goodbye to its inhabitants. According to the testimony of the head of the Military Communications of the theater of military operations, General N. M. Tikhmenev, the separation procedure turned out to be very difficult for many: “convulsive, intercepted sobs did not subside... The officers of the St. George battalion - people, for the most part, wounded several times - could not stand it: two of them fainted. At the other end of the hall, one of the convoy soldiers collapsed.”

Meanwhile, during the February events, the workers of Petrograd began to create Soviets of Workers' Deputies; elections of deputies were held at enterprises. On the evening of February 27, the first meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies took place in the Tauride Palace. Having the full support of the rebels, the Council began to show itself as a real power. The majority in the Council was held by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who believed that the democratic revolution should end with the creation of a democratic government.

The issue of creating such a government was decided in the IV State Duma. The Octobrist and Cadets parties had a majority and influenced the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionary deputies. On March 1 (14), the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided to grant the Temporary Committee of the State Duma the right to form a provisional government from representatives of the political parties that were members of the Council. On the same day it was formed under the leadership of Prince G.E. Lvov. Along with it, another power arose - the Soviets, although not officially recognized. A dual power was created in the capital: the power of the Provisional Government and the power of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Following Petrograd, the revolution won in Moscow, and then peacefully (“by telegraph”) in most cities and provinces. The Provisional Government, lacking the strength to resist the revolutionary elements, was forced to seek support from the Petrograd Soviet, which relied on armed workers and soldiers. The leadership of the Council, consisting of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, provided this support.

The new “tops” who came to power immediately found themselves faced with the need to solve the urgent historical tasks facing the country - ending the war, liquidating the landowners’ latifundia, allocating land to the peasants, solving national problems. However, the Provisional Government promised to solve them at the Constituent Assembly and tried to restrain the discontent of the masses by citing the impossibility of carrying out fundamental reforms during the war.

Plurality of power, which became an all-Russian phenomenon, was deepened by two parallel processes occurring simultaneously - the emergence and formation of government bodies of different political orientation - Soviets and various committees: public safety, rescue committees. In addition, city dumas and zemstvos, elected under tsarism, continued to function, consisting mainly of representatives of the Octobrist, Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties.

A manifestation of the extraordinary political activity of the broad masses of the people who carried out the revolution was their participation in thousands of rallies and demonstrations that took place on a variety of occasions. It seemed that the country could not get out of the state of anarchy, euphoria from the unexpectedly victorious revolution. At the rallies there was a search for answers to questions about what happened, how to end the war, how to build a Russian democratic republic. The answers proposed by political parties and the authorities were supported by the thesis that from now on the war was fought in the name of protecting the gains of the revolution.

Issues that worried the country were discussed on a daily basis at meetings of the Petrograd Soviet. On the main point, about power, the majority assumed that power should be with the people. An 8-point declaration was developed, which the Provisional Government was supposed to form the basis of its activities. The main ones are: freedom of speech, press, unions, abolition of all class, religious and national restrictions, immediate preparation for the convening of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, secret and direct voting, which will have to establish the form of government and prepare the constitution of the country.

The Provisional Government postponed the resolution of all key issues (war and peace, agrarian, national) until the Constituent Assembly. Thus victory February Revolution did not immediately solve the problems facing the country, which left objective conditions for continuing the struggle to solve them.

100 years ago, at the end of February - beginning of March 1917, events occurred that, at lightning speed, short term changed the political system of Russia and served as the fuse for unrest, which surpassed in the scale of upheavals that which our country experienced and overcame three centuries earlier. These events were named. The destruction of the Russian state, which began in February 1917, continued for several more years, accompanied by a series of coups d'état, among which the one that occurred in October 1917 is usually highlighted, but the catastrophe began not in October, but in February.

What exactly happened in those last winter days of 1917? In historiography, there has been a tradition of counting the revolution from February 23 (March 8), when protest demonstrations took place in Petrograd against the backdrop of mass strikes, among the participants of which women distinguished themselves as particularly violent, outraged by the fact that they had to stand in queues for a long time (“tails” as they said then) for bread and many of them did not get this bread: due to snow drifts, transport difficulties arose with the delivery of flour to the capital. On February 24, official information appeared in the newspapers that there was enough bread in Petrograd, that the military commissariat allocated flour from its reserves for sale, but the unrest did not subside: demonstrations continued and, under the influence of opposition and radical party agitators, acquired a political orientation - slogans “Down with autocracy!" and “Down with war!” As always, the demonstrations were attended by propagandized workers, radical students, and professional revolutionaries from different parties. In the capital before, despite the fact that there was a war, similar actions were organized; the police, however, managed to cope with the unrest, preventing it from developing into a rebellion, but in the February days of 1917 the police were powerless to restore order in the city. Demonstrators fought with police and, outnumbering them, in many cases beat and maimed them. To restore order, several units of the Petrograd garrison were withdrawn from the barracks, but in a number of cases the soldiers refused to carry out orders to disperse the rioting demonstrators.

When they reported about the dangerous development of events in Petrograd, he adequately assessed the threat and urgently telegraphed the Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. Protopopov and the commander of the capital's military district, General S.S. Khabalov: “I command you to stop the riots in the capital tomorrow, which are unacceptable during the difficult times of the war with Germany and Austria.” From the very beginning of the war until the end of his reign, the holy Tsar Nicholas considered the achievement of victory to be his highest goal, subordinating all other considerations of a political nature to it. Fulfilling the will of the tsar, General Khabalov ordered regimental commanders and chiefs of police stations to arrest the instigators of demonstrations, and in extreme cases, in clashes with violent demonstrators, to use firearms. He said then: “When the flags have the inscription “Down with autocracy!” “No bread will calm you down.” Up to a hundred rioters were arrested, and on several occasions police and soldiers opened fire. There were dozens of dead and wounded among the demonstrators. At the same time, however, cases of soldiers failing to comply with the orders of their commanders increased. Therefore, arrests were made in military units, but these arrests did not stop the disobedience of the lower ranks to the orders of the commanders, and in the end, protest sentiments resulted in a military mutiny.

On February 27 (March 12), the Volyn Life Guards Regiment rebelled. This day should be considered the beginning of the revolution; until then its prologue was played out. The match to the gunpowder was brought to the gunpowder by the senior non-commissioned officer of the Volyn regiment Timofey Kirpichnikov, who persuaded the soldiers of his unit not to carry out the order to suppress the riots. One of the participants in the riot, private Konstantin Pagetnykh, later told in his “Memoirs” about what happened then in the barracks of the Volyn regiment:

On February 26, “non-commissioned officer Kirpichnikov read us an order: tomorrow we will form the team again at 7 o’clock in the morning. At this time, eighteen people from the lower ranks gathered in a dark, remote corner of the barracks... and all eighteen... decided: tomorrow we will turn everything our way!.. On February 27 at 6 o'clock in the morning, a team of 350 people was already formed. Kirpichnikov spoke and outlined general position and explained how to act and what to do. Almost no campaigning was required. The propagandized soldiers seemed to be just waiting for this... At this time, the rattling of spurs was heard in the corridor. The team became wary and froze for a minute. Ensign Kolokolov entered... Commander Lashkevich entered after him. Everyone was wary. Silence reigned. To the greeting “Great, brothers!” “Hurray” rang out - that’s what we agreed earlier... Lashkevich turns to non-commissioned officer Markov and angrily asks what this means. Markov, throwing the rifle in his hand, firmly answers: “Hurray is a signal for disobedience to your orders!” The rifle butts clattered on the asphalt floor of the barracks and the bolts began to crack. “Leave while you’re still alive!” - the soldiers shouted...

Having lost hope of pacifying the team, Lashkevich and Kolokolov ran out the door. In the corridor they met ensign Vorontsov-Velyaminov, and all three took flight. Markov and Orlov quickly opened the window in the window, pointed their rifles, and when the three officers reached the window, two shots were heard. Lashkevich, like a formation, stretched out at the gate... The entire detachment, under the command of Kirpichnikov, went out into the yard... They released those arrested from the guardhouse. They immediately sent delegates to the nearest teams with an offer to join our rebel unit.”

Non-commissioned officer Kirpichnikov soon became a celebrated hero of the victorious revolution. He was promoted to lieutenant ensign. The Provisional Government honored him as "the first soldier to take up arms against the tsarist system." General L.G. Kornilov personally presented him with the Cross of St. George on a red bow. Prince N.D. Zhevakhov wrote about him: “...I have not seen a more vile person. His little ones running around grey eyes, the same as Miliukov’s, with an expression of something predatory, his manner of deporting himself when, engrossed in his story, he took theatrical poses, his immensely insolent appearance and swagger - all this produced an extremely disgusting impression.”

Prince Zhevakhov: “The name of the English ambassador Sir Buchanan was definitely mentioned as one of the main leaders of the revolution”

It is not known exactly who killed Staff Captain Lashkevich. The emigrant writer Ivan Lukash reported that, according to Kirpichnikov himself, he only ordered Lashkevich to leave the barracks, after which the soldiers “rushed to the windows, and many ... saw that the commander suddenly spread his arms wide and fell face down into the snow in the courtyard of the barracks. He was killed by a well-aimed random bullet!” “A Well-Fired Random Bullet” is, of course, a masterpiece of observation. But the murder of the officer could indeed have been the work of provocateurs who were not in the barracks at that time. In any case, outside provocateurs were involved in the events of those days. As Prince Zhevakhov, a witness to the events already quoted here, wrote, “On February 27... trucks appeared, delivering revolutionary proclamations to all parts of the city... The name of the English ambassador Sir Buchanan was definitely mentioned as one of the main leaders of the revolution.”

Well, the instigator of the military mutiny, Kirpichnikov, ended badly. Exalted by the leaders of February, he stood strongly for the Provisional Government, and when it fell, he tried in vain to persuade the soldiers to come out in his support against the Bolsheviks. In November 1917, Kirpichnikov fled from the Bolsheviks to the Don, where the Volunteer Army was then being formed. But by chance or not by chance he ended up in a unit commanded by Colonel A.P. Kutepov: in February 1917, he was one of the last officers to carry out the will of the Emperor and participate in counteracting the mutinous garrison troops. Kutepov in his “Memoirs” recounted the conversation he had with Kirpichnikov at that time:

“One day a young officer came to my headquarters and very cheekily told me that he had come to the Volunteer Army to fight the Bolsheviks “for the freedom of the people”... I asked him where he had been so far and what he had been doing, the officer told me that he had been one of the first “fighters for the freedom of the people” and that in Petrograd he took an active part in the revolution, being one of the first to oppose the old regime. When the officer wanted to leave, I ordered him to stay and, calling the officer on duty, sent for a squad. The young officer became agitated, turned pale and began asking why I was detaining him. “You’ll see now,” I said, and when the squad arrived, I ordered this “freedom fighter” to be shot immediately.”

The body of the shot Kirpichnikov was thrown into a roadside ditch.

Meanwhile, after the murder of Staff Captain Lashkevich, the bridges were burned for the rebel soldiers of the Volyn Regiment. For what they had done, according to the laws of war, they were subject to execution, and they had nothing to lose. When earlier the demonstrators called on the soldiers, those who probably sympathized with them, to join, the soldiers refused, reasonably saying: “You will return to your home, and we will be shot.” Now, after the murder of the staff captain, the Volynians saw one way out for themselves - to induce other regiments of the capital garrison to mutiny. The agitation was a success in the Pavlovsky Life Guards, then in the Lithuanian Guards Regiment and in other units. In most regiments of the Petrograd garrison, the mood was approximately the same as in the Volyn regiment.

In historiography, Soviet and liberal, Februaryist, there is a banal and false explanation for this fatal circumstance: they say that the soldiers did not want to shoot at their comrades and brothers because they sympathized with them. But until then, especially during the failed revolution of 1905–1907, soldiers, with rare exceptions, carried out orders to restore order. And during the course of the active army, manifestations of disobedience were rare; front-line soldiers, faithful to the oath, fought with the enemy, as in past wars, shedding blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. On the other hand, when the country was unleashed Civil War, the people involved in it, for almost three years, easily shot at their brothers, apparently without experiencing any particular remorse, so the reason for the military mutiny lay not at all in the imaginary pacifism of the soldiers and not in their imaginary class solidarity with striking St. Petersburg workers.

The fact is that shortly before these events, a true rumor spread through the St. Petersburg garrisons that the command was going to send most of the officers and soldiers stationed in the capital to the front, replacing them with military personnel who by that time had already been under enemy fire on the line for two and a half years front. Such an exchange caused discontent and indignation among the lower ranks of the Petrograd garrison, whose fate until then had been much more pleasant than that of the front-line soldiers. By participating in the rebellion, they earned the glory of heroes of the revolution; they were honored and glorified by politicians, temporary ministers and generals. When six months later, the chairman of the Provisional Government A.F. Kerensky, due to the difficult situation at the front, finally tried to send the last reserve - the “heroes” who had taken root in the capital - to the front; these heroes, for the most part, took the side of the party that had long been conducting anti-war propaganda and promising “peace to the peoples.” The Petrograd garrison overthrew the Provisional Government and handed power to the “peacekeepers” - the Bolsheviks.

A few hours after the start of the rebellion, the entire Vyborg side was in the hands of the rebel regiments. Then the rebel units crossed the Liteiny Bridge to the left bank of the Neva. General S.S. Khabalov and Minister of War M.A. Belyaev concentrated reliable units in the center of the capital. By their order, a detachment of 1000 officers and soldiers under the command of Colonel of the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment A.P. Kutepova was sent to disperse the demonstrators, to the very epicenter of the riot, but the detachment got stuck in a crowd that was many times larger than it, with which armed rebels mixed, and was forced to retreat.

By mid-afternoon on February 27, most of the city was in the hands of the rebels. Shooting was heard in different parts of the capital. Soldiers killed commanders who tried to keep them from mutiny, and hundreds of policemen - policemen - fell victims of lynching on the streets. Some of them were brutally torn to pieces during the “bloodless and great” revolution.

The Tauride Palace was under the control of the rebels, where several dozen deputies of the State Duma, shortly before dissolved by the Emperor, hastily arrived. Some of them were filled with anxiety and discouraged, others were jubilant, and others clearly did not understand what was happening and what the stormy course of events would ultimately lead to. After a short meeting of overexcited politicians, it was decided to form a “Provisional Committee of the State Duma” from the existing deputies belonging to different factions, under the chairmanship of M.V. Rodzianko, who headed the dissolved Duma. In the fevered imagination of the Duma members, who represented mainly the Kadet party and the “progressive bloc”, a fantastic idea arose that the unrest in Petrograd was caused by the dissolution of the Duma and that these unrest would subside when they were successful, that is, the Duma would resume the session in its entirety and force the Tsar to give consent to a “responsible ministry” - this slogan meant the formation of a government responsible to the Duma, that is, from deputies of the party or bloc of parties constituting the Duma majority, as is customary among “adults” - in states of mature parliamentarism. The degree of Khlestakov’s self-delusion and political blindness, which constituted the generic features of classical Russian liberalism, revealed in such an original view of the situation, went off scale.

At the same time, on February 27, left-wing political figures released from prison and at large came to the Tauride Palace, joined by Duma socialist deputies: Mensheviks and Trudoviks. After consulting, they formed the “Executive Committee of the Council of Workers’ Deputies.” This committee sent its agents to St. Petersburg factories in order to urgently hold elections to the council itself according to a quota: 1 deputy per 1000 workers. By 7 o'clock in the evening, hastily elected workers' deputies flocked to the Tauride Palace, which became a kind of headquarters of the revolution. At its first meeting on the evening of February 27, the council, which soon later, including representatives of the rebel units of the St. Petersburg garrison, became known as the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, elected Menshevik N.S. as its chairman. Chkheidze. Thus, in one palace, two spontaneously formed unauthorized institutions were installed, each of which laid claim to supreme power or, at least, participation in it: the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet.

In the evening of the same day, the Council of Ministers, headed by its chairman, Prince N.D., met at the Mariinsky Palace. Golitsyn. The ministers, depressed by what was happening, were not able to make decisions that would reverse the fateful course of events. They had an illusory hope that the resignation of the Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. could help matters. Protopopov, who was an odious figure in the eyes of the opposition Duma members, was considered a renegade by them, because he himself had previously belonged to the Cadets, but about whom the mutinous soldiers hardly had a clear idea at all. The Emperor, who was informed of Protopopov’s order to “surrender his position due to illness to the senior comrade of the minister,” that is, his deputy, responded with a telegram to Prince N.D. Golitsyn: “I consider changes in personnel under these circumstances unacceptable.” In this hasty resignation, he saw a useless humiliating gesture towards the opposition, demonstrating weakness when the rebellion had to be countered by the will to suppress it.

A day earlier, on February 26, the previously scheduled meeting of the Holy Synod took place. In the absence of Chief Prosecutor N.P. Raev's government was represented by his comrade (deputy) Prince N.D. Zhevakhov. Before the start of the meeting, Zhevakhov, in his own words, suggested that the leading member of the Synod, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev, “issue an appeal to the population so that it would not only be read in churches, but also posted on the streets.” It was supposed to become “a formidable warning to the Church, entailing in case of disobedience, church punishment." Hieromartyr Vladimir, as Prince N.D. wrote. Zhevakhov said in response: “It’s always like this. When we are not needed, then we are not noticed; and in times of danger they turn to us first for help.”

The proposal of the comrade chief prosecutor was not accepted because it was made informally, before the start of the synodal meeting, and besides, the chief prosecutor and especially his assistants did not constitute an independent authority - they represented the Emperor in the Synod, from whom such an initiative was not came out. In addition, speaking about this on the merits, one cannot help but admit that such an appeal could not have an immediate effect, and events developed rapidly: among the participants in political demonstrations and military rebellion, only in exceptional cases could there be people ready to listen to the voice of the clergy, a significant majority the rioters would not have noticed the synodal appeal, and if they had noticed it, they would have ignored it.

The assertion that the episcopate seemed to consciously want changes political system, groundlessly

The next day, the Chief Prosecutor himself made a similar request to the Synod, but he also did this on his own initiative, and not at the direction of the Sovereign, that is, he acted at his own peril and risk. Therefore, such an appeal, which would not have had the expected effect, but would undoubtedly have complicated the position of the Church in the conditions that arose under the Provisional Government, was not issued. One of the modern publicists on this matter makes, to put it mildly, unfounded conclusions that the episcopate allegedly consciously sought to change the political system, to abolish the autocracy. This exotic version is radically at odds with everything that we know from letters, memoirs and other documents of the era, which indisputably testify to the anxiety that the bishops experienced in those terrible February and March days of the collapse of the Orthodox empire and in the months and years that followed. . The historian mentioned here refers to the quoted passage from the “Memoirs” of Prince Zhevakhov, but Zhevakhov himself was far from such invective, or, better said, innuendo. In his own words, Metropolitan Vladimir did not fulfill his requests because he, “like many others, was not aware of what was really happening, and his response was not a refusal of the highest church hierarchy to help the state in a moment of danger, but the very an ordinary phenomenon of the Synod’s opposition to the Chief Prosecutor.” However, Prince Zhevakhov’s assumption that Hieromartyr Vladimir underestimated the dangers of the current situation does not seem justified.

On the evening of February 27, troops loyal to the tsar were gathered on Palace Square, but the emperor’s brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, asked generals M.A., who were also there. Belyaeva, S.S. Khabalov and M.I. Zankevich, appointed commander of these military units, withdraw them towards the Admiralty in order to prevent shelling, which could have damaged the Winter Palace and the Hermitage collections. The troops were redeployed to the Admiralty building, and on the morning of February 28, Naval Minister Admiral I.K. Grigorovich asked General Zankevich not to risk shelling the Admiralty, where valuable shipbuilding drawings were kept, after which the officers and soldiers who remained loyal to the end, numbering about 1.5 thousand, were disbanded and dispersed. From that moment on, all of Petrograd was in the hands of the rebels. Arrests of ministers and other high-ranking dignitaries began, and extrajudicial reprisals against police officers continued.

The capital of the empire was lost, but the country, with the exception of a few cities, was not yet involved in rebellion. The active army remained in obedience to the Emperor and the commanders appointed by him. The epicenter of events became the Headquarters and the headquarters of the fronts and armies. The further course and outcome of the rebellion from then on depended on the loyalty of the generals to the oath.

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