Summer campaign 1942
(June - December)
Preparing for the campaign
Faced with the prospect of continued large-scale military operations on the Eastern Front, German strategists were forced to admit that operations built on the same principles as the previous summer's offensives were unlikely to produce the desired result. Long length Eastern Front inevitably pushed to the conclusion that in order to obtain a satisfactory result it is necessary to concentrate the maximum possible forces on any one area. Therefore, it was decided to conduct the main fighting on the southern sector of the front with the goal of capturing the Caucasus (which would cut off the Soviet Union from its main sources of oil and at the same time provide Germany with oil) and open the way to the Middle East simultaneously with Rommel’s strike through Egypt in the Mediterranean theater.
The first condition necessary for the implementation of this plan was the complete occupation of Crimea, necessary to cover the southern flank of the German troops. Therefore, during April, Soviet troops were driven out of the Kerch Peninsula, and only stubbornly defending Sevastopol remained in Crimea. In May, the VIII Air Corps was transferred from the central front to the Crimea and was subordinated to the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, about 600 aircraft were concentrated at the airfields of Crimea various types who were ready to take part in a full-scale assault on Sevastopol. The place of the VIII Air Corps in the central sector of the front was taken by the V Air Corps, withdrawn from the southern sector at the beginning of 1942. It was renamed Luftwaffe Command East and given air fleet status (see Map 17).
The selection of VIII Air Corps for this assault was consistent with the established practice of sending this formation under Richthofen's command to support the most important operations, given its experience and effectiveness in participation in massive ground support operations.
At this stage of the war in the Soviet Union, the Germans attached great importance to operations in the Crimea, since the success of their summer offensive in the Caucasus depended on the occupation of the peninsula. Kerch had already fallen, but Sevastopol continued to stubbornly resist. Accordingly, the VIII Air Corps, which during this period of the war was usually assigned to carry out the most important operations, was transferred from the Moscow direction to the Crimea, where it became available to the 4th Air Fleet. The support of the VIII Air Corps undoubtedly contributed greatly to overcoming resistance Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula.
The section of the front vacated by the VIII Air Corps was occupied by the V Air Corps, which was renamed Luftwaffe Command East. This command had the status of an air fleet and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. In March, the IV Air Corps had to bear the burden of repelling the powerful and successful offensives of Soviet troops in the south of the USSR, so to strengthen it, direct support units of ground troops were transferred from other air corps fighting on the Eastern Front.
The assault on Sevastopol began on June 2 and ended on June 6, and all this time the fortress was subjected to massive air strikes. On average, about 600 flights were carried out per day, with a maximum of more than 700 (June 2). Some 2,500 tons of high explosive bombs were dropped, many of the maximum caliber. However, on June 4, the German infantry, which went on the offensive, suddenly discovered that the fortifications were largely intact, and the morale of the defenders was not broken. However, the Germans stormed so stubbornly that the resistance of the Soviet soldiers was overcome in a relatively short time.
While operations against Sevastopol were underway, a surprise Soviet offensive on Kharkov forced the Luftwaffe to transfer some forces from the Crimea to help stop the enemy advance, and intense air action was required to save the situation. Pre-emptive strike Soviet army not only caused losses that needed to be replaced, but also delayed preparations for the planned main summer campaign. However, in early June, the VIII Air Corps was again transferred to the north. Its headquarters were located near Kursk, in the northern part of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet (see map 18). From May to June, active measures were taken to accumulate large reserves of bombs, fuel, etc. on the Southern Front, for which the railways were fully involved. At the same time, reinforcements were returning to the Eastern Front, rearmed after six months of fighting and further reinforced by aircraft withdrawn from the Mediterranean after the completion of the air offensive on Malta. Thus, by the beginning of July, the strength of German aviation on the Eastern Front had again reached 2,750 aircraft and thus reached the level of forces involved in the operations of the previous summer. However, now 1,500 of them were on the Southern Front as part of the 4th Air Fleet. That is, in the central sector of the front there remained a containment force - about 600 aircraft, in the Leningrad direction - no more than 375, and another 200 aircraft were based in Northern Norway and Finland.
Fighting in July - August 1942
The German offensive began in the first week of July with the VIII Air Corps on a relatively narrow sector of the front, where its aircraft supported the first German attack towards Voronezh. Gradually, the corps' area of operations expanded to the south as tank units advanced along the Voronezh - Rostov railway east of the river Donets. The direct support forces of the ground forces quickly followed the German units advancing along the Don, and after the transfer of part of the long-range bombers to the south in the Voronezh region, which was subject to strong attacks by the Soviet army from the northeast to the flank of the advancing Germans, only insignificant forces remained. However, near Voronezh, Soviet troops were contained without resorting to the forces that participated in the offensive to the south with the constant support of long-range bomber aircraft and close support units of ground troops.
Having completed its mission in the extreme southern sector of the Eastern Front, the VIII Air Corps was now transferred to a new important direction. The corps was transferred from the southern section of the 4th Air Fleet's zone of responsibility to the northern. The redeployment took place during the German preparations for an offensive from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh.
As a result of the movement of the VIII Air Corps, the southern sector of the front, adjacent to the Black Sea, was occupied by the IV Air Corps.
All the time, while German troops were rapidly advancing along the Don from Voronezh in the direction of Stalingrad and from the Rostov region to the Caucasus in the direction of Maykop and Armavir, a significant part of the long-range bomber aviation participated in systematic raids on communications behind enemy lines. These operations covered large areas, including the North Caucasus, where bridges, ferry crossings and railways were subjected to massive attacks. Strategic bombing was also carried out on communications deeper in the rear in order to cut off supply routes between Stalingrad and Moscow, but no attempt was made to bomb cities located far behind the front line and not under immediate threat of occupation. In contrast, long-range bomber aircraft focused their efforts solely on indirect support of the offensive, trying to disrupt Soviet communications. For this purpose, attacks were carried out on the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus up to Poti, and attempts were also made on a small scale to mine the Volga and ships on the Volga were subjected to air strikes all the way to Astrakhan.
Unlike the attack on Stalingrad, which was supported by about 1,000 aircraft of all types, the German offensive in the Caucasus after crossing the Don received almost no air support until the advance was slowed by hilly terrain that prevented the massive use of tanks. Then the need arose to strengthen the IV Air Corps, which was responsible for air operations in the Caucasus, and fighter units armed with single-engine and twin-engine fighters were deployed to bases located along a line running approximately from east to west through Krasnodar.
Fighting in September - October 1942
In September and October, the determining factor in air strategy was the failure of the German High Command to achieve decisive success either at Stalingrad or in the Caucasus. At Stalingrad, active operations were carried out by the VIII Air Corps, which made up the majority of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet. Dive bombers were especially active, often making 4 or more sorties per day.
Despite four months of intense fighting, Luftwaffe strength remained remarkably stable until October: 2,450–2,500 aircraft. During August and September, many aviation units were withdrawn to the rear for rearmament, but their places were taken by fresh units, fully equipped with equipment and crews. Nevertheless, the concentration of forces in the south left only small forces for the Moscow and Leningrad directions. Probably in this area the air superiority was Soviet aviation, since the advances of Soviet troops near Rzhev and in the area of Lake Ilmen forced the Germans in September to transfer to the north part of the aircraft that participated in the battle for Stalingrad. However, the Luftwaffe reinforcement in the Leningrad area that occurred in September was planned, as well as the reinforcement of ground troops in this direction, in preparation for a full-scale offensive, planned with the expectation that Stalingrad would not hold out for long. By the beginning of October, 550–600 aircraft were concentrated on the Leningrad sector of the front, but Stalingrad did not fall, and preparations and movements of Soviet troops in the Moscow region and, to a lesser extent, in the south forced the Luftwaffe to redistribute forces and weaken the group near Leningrad. In the second half of October, at least 300 aircraft were withdrawn from this sector.
At this stage, the dangers to which German air power was exposed in the Soviet Union became apparent: its supply lines were stretched; it moved away from the bases equipped in the winter of 1941/42 and operated from poorly prepared airfields; its main forces were so involved in the fighting at Stalingrad that it was impossible to ensure air superiority anywhere else; units of direct support for ground troops operated intensively, many crews made three or four sorties per day, which affected the condition of equipment and crews and ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. At the same time, a continuous series of local operations and the threat of an offensive by Soviet troops in the north required constant redeployment of units, leaving no pause for rest and restoration of combat effectiveness.
In the Soviet Union, by the end of the summer, IV Air Corps' area of responsibility had expanded to the Caucasus, and VIII Air Corps was tasked with supporting the attack on Stalingrad. Taking into account the concentration of VIII Corps forces and the situation in the Don basin, it was decided to create a new operational formation to direct operations north of the 4th Air Fleet's zone of responsibility, on the Voronezh sector of the front. Accordingly, the I Air Corps was transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet (where it fought from the very beginning of the campaign), which received a new designation - Luftwaffe Don Command and, presumably, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. There was not a single air corps left in the 1st Air Fleet.
The map shows the approximate position of the German armies on the Eastern Front.
Combat operations from November 1942 to January 1943
The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began at the end of October and was accompanied by the preparation and concentration of troops in the middle reaches of the Don below Voronezh, where the Germans had only a small force of 70–80 aircraft covering a front of about 500 km. However, this section of the front was considered important enough for the I Air Corps to be transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet, which received the designation Luftwaffe Command “Don”. Thus, in addition to a frontal attack from the east, the Germans also faced the threat of a flank attack from the northwest. Aviation operations near Stalingrad and in the Don bend were hampered by disruption of communications, lack of fuel and bad weather, and by mid-November a decision was made to stop the offensive and switch to defense.
The Soviet offensive from the Don bend in a southwestern direction deprived the Germans of forward airfields and forced them to withdraw direct support aircraft for ground forces to the rear. As a result, Stalingrad was out of range of German single-engine fighters, and Soviet aviation gained superiority in the skies over the encircled German group. At the same time, the stress of constant fighting began to take its toll, and the withdrawal of some units to the rear for reorganization became an urgent necessity. With the onset of Allied offensives in Libya and Tunisia, additional forces had to be withdrawn from the front to reinforce the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, and by early December, German air strength in the USSR had dropped to approximately 2,000 aircraft, of which a significant proportion were inoperative. The strength of the VIII and I Air Corps in the Don region, which previously reached 1000 aircraft, fell to approximately 650–700 aircraft.
After the transfer of approximately 400 aircraft to the Mediterranean, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to cope with all the tasks on the Eastern Front, and activity in the Caucasus direction began to decline. After the transfer of almost all long-range and dive bombers, as well as some single-engine fighters to other sectors of the front, the initiative in this direction passed to the Soviet troops, who took advantage of their numerical superiority in the air to support the offensive through the Kalmyk steppes to Rostov and through western part Caucasus in the direction of the Kerch Strait.
The encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad and the subsequent almost complete encirclement of the 17th Army in the Kuban posed another serious task for the Luftwaffe: supplying the encircled troops by air. For this purpose, Xe-111 bombers were removed from combat missions and transferred to transport aviation. They suffered heavy losses not only due to unfavorable weather conditions, but also due to constant attacks on transport aircraft in the air and on the ground. These strikes forced the Germans to assign fighter escorts, reducing the number of single-engine fighters that could be dedicated to close support of ground forces. By the end of December 1942, there were only about 375 single-engine fighters on the entire Eastern Front, and it was this lack of fighter cover that may have been one of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses during the last few weeks of 1942. However, there was another reason for the high losses: non-combat losses of aircraft left on the ground during the retreat and losses due to adverse weather conditions. If we add to this the losses of combat aircraft used as transports, then the losses in the second half of 1942, apparently, will be equal to the losses in the last six months of 1941, which, as is known, led to a noticeable weakening of the striking power of German aviation in 1942 year, reducing its number to less than 4,000 vehicles by the end of the year after another peak of 4,800 vehicles in July 1941.
The shortage of first-line aircraft at the end of 1942 is evidenced by the introduction of second-line units into battle and the use of obsolete types of aircraft (Xe-146) and reconnaissance aircraft to carry out bombing strikes. During December, the number of German first-line aircraft in the East was reduced by about 150 aircraft, despite the fact that the Soviet offensive required action slightly less active than before the onset of winter.
Analysis of the 1942 campaign
The significant weakening of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942, which was greatly facilitated by the previous six months of the Eastern campaign, is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. It will therefore suffice here only to briefly talk about the strategy and tactics of the Germans and the development of new ideas for the use of air power that became apparent towards the end of the year.
The campaign in the East in 1942, as in 1941, showed that the Luftwaffe continued to strictly adhere to the traditional tactics of massive attacks aimed at directly supporting tank units. Despite some successes in the Battle of France and the Balkan Campaign, by the end of 1942 it became obvious that this approach was not producing the necessary results on the Eastern Front. The reason for this was not only the enormous length of the front, due to which any concentration of forces for an attack left the flank of the German troops unprotected, but also the depth of the theater of military operations. The Soviets took full advantage of these circumstances by retreating, thereby stretching German lines of communication until the Luftwaffe strike forces, cut off from their supply bases, were exhausted by maintenance problems. Thus, despite enormous successes at the initial stage, the specific conditions of the war in the USSR did not allow the Germans to use the proven strategy of combining the most powerful close air support for troops and massive attacks on factories and rear supply bases to achieve final victory.
By the fall of 1942, the failure to achieve the expected results began to lead to a modification of German tactics and a reorganization of forces, but no radical changes followed. Thus, there was a tendency to increase the flexibility of the structure on a "functional" basis, and new units were specifically adapted to the tactical requirements that were dictated by conditions on the Eastern Front. This trend manifested itself in greater attention to defense issues, which was facilitated by the Soviet strategy of organizing counter-offensives in the winter, when the Germans could not fight on equal terms. Such a doctrine should have led to the creation of a balanced group of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front, in which offensive and defensive functions would be more evenly distributed. It therefore represented a step forward in tactical terms, a more intelligent, if less spectacular, strategy and greater flexibility of use than in previous campaigns.
This concept was manifested in the organization of auxiliary and second line units. These included: units equipped with obsolete Xe-46, Khsh-126 and Ar-66, whose tasks included harassing night bombing of concentrations of Soviet troops; anti-tank units equipped with Khsh-129, Me-110, Yu-87 and Yu-88, which carried special heavy weapons to combat Soviet tanks that broke through the German defense line; and, finally, special squadrons for attacks on railways, equipped with the Yu-88 fighter version and designed to attack the main transport arteries in order to impede the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. All of these units were relatively new categories that did not fall under the traditional Luftwaffe organizational chart. These experiments and innovations mainly took place in early July 1942, after the appointment of the commander of the VIII Air Corps, General Oberst von Richthofen, as commander of the 4th Air Fleet, and there is reason to believe that von Richthofen was the main proponent of the new tactics. His experience as commander of the VIII Air Corps, which was the main formation engaged in direct support of ground forces, could well be used to solve defense problems, the main focus of which would be to eliminate the shortcomings that had negated all the successes achieved earlier in the Soviet Union. However, the events of 1943 showed that these innovations, no matter how original, could not be brought to fruition in the face of the ever-increasing lag of the Luftwaffe in both quantitative and qualitative terms, which became stunningly obvious the following year.
In the summer of 1942, Hitler planned to again seize the initiative on the Soviet-German front with the goal of destroying the vital sources of Soviet power, the most important military-economic centers. The strategic goals of the summer campaign of 1942 were the conquest of the fertile southern lands of Russia (bread), the acquisition of coal in the Donbass and the oil of the Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey from a neutral into an ally, and the blocking of the Iranian and Volga Lend-Lease routes. Initially, the invasion of the grandiose region between the Black and Caspian Seas was called "Siegfried", but as the plan was developed and detailed, it became known as "Blau" ("Blue").
To achieve these goals, it was planned to involve, in addition to the German armed forces, the armed forces of the Allies as much as possible.
Summer Campaign Plan German army on the Soviet-German front was set out in OKW Directive No. 41 of 04/05/1942. (Appendix 2.1)
The main task set by Hitler, while maintaining the position in the central sector, was to take Leningrad in the north and establish contacts on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus. This task was planned to be accomplished by dividing it into several stages, taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.
First of all, all available forces were concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, in order to then capture oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.
The capture of Leningrad was postponed until a change in the situation around the city or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose created the appropriate opportunities.
The primary task of the ground forces and aviation after the end of the thaw period was to stabilize and strengthen the entire Eastern Front and rear areas with the task of freeing up as many forces as possible for the main operation, while at the same time being able to repel the enemy’s attack with small forces on other fronts. For this purpose, it was planned to conduct offensive operations of a limited scale, concentrating the offensive assets of ground forces and aviation to achieve quick and decisive successes with superior forces.
Before the start of the main offensive in the south, it was planned to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol to clear the entire Crimea from Soviet troops, providing routes for the supply of allied troops, ammunition and fuel through the ports of Crimea. Block Soviet Navy in the ports of the Caucasus. Destroy the Barvenkovsky bridgehead of Soviet troops, wedged on both sides of Izyum.
The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, to the south of it, as well as to the west and north of the river. Don.
Due to the scale of the operation, the group Nazi troops and their allies should have been built up gradually, in connection with which, the operation was proposed to be divided into a series of successive but interconnected strikes, complementary to each other and distributed in time from north to south in such a way that in each of these strikes in decisive directions As many forces as possible of both the ground army and especially the aviation force were concentrated.
Having assessed the resilience of the Soviet troops during battles in encirclement, Hitler proposed making deep breakthroughs of mechanized units in order to encircle and tightly block the Soviet troops with approaching infantry units. The plan also required that tank and motorized troops provide direct assistance to the German infantry by striking in the rear of the pincered enemy with the goal of its complete destruction.
The main operation was to begin with an enveloping offensive from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh towards the Moscow defense line. The purpose of this breakthrough was to capture the city of Voronezh, and to hide from the Soviet command the true direction of the main attack on the Caucasus (the distance from Voronezh to Moscow is 512 km, Saratov - 511 km, Stalingrad - 582 km, Krasnodar - 847 km).
At the second stage of the plan, part of the infantry divisions advancing behind the tank and motorized formations was supposed to immediately equip a powerful defensive line from the initial offensive area in the Orel area in the direction of Voronezh, and the mechanized formations were supposed to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the river. Don to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough approximately from the Kharkov area to the east. With this, the enemy hoped to encircle and defeat Soviet troops in the Voronezh direction, to reach the Don in the section from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva (40 km south of Pavlovsk) to the rear of the main forces Southwestern Front and seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. Of the two groupings of tank and motorized forces intended for enveloping maneuver, the northern one should be stronger than the southern one.
At the third stage of this operation, the forces striking down the Don River were supposed to unite in the Stalingrad area with the forces advancing from the Taganrog, Artemovsk area between the lower reaches of the Don River and Voroshilovgrad through the Seversky Donets River to the east. The plan was to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to heavy weapons so that it would lose its importance as a center of military industry and a communications hub.
To continue the operations planned for the subsequent period, it was planned to either capture undamaged bridges in Rostov itself, or firmly capture bridgeheads south of the Don River.
Before the start of the offensive, the Taganrog group was planned to be reinforced with tanks and motorized units in order to prevent the majority of the Soviet troops defending north of the Don River from leaving the river to the south.
The directive required not only to protect the northeastern flank of the advancing troops, but also to immediately begin equipping positions on the Don River, creating a powerful anti-tank defense and preparing defensive positions for the winter and providing them with all the necessary means for this.
To occupy positions on the front being created along the Don River, which would increase as operations unfolded, it was planned to allocate allied formations in order to use the released German divisions as a mobile reserve behind the front line on the Don River.
The directive provided for the distribution allied forces in such a way that the Hungarians would be located in the northernmost areas, then the Italians, and the Romanians furthest to the southeast. Since the Hungarians and Romanians were bitterly hostile, the Italian army was stationed between them.
Hitler assumed that the Soviet troops would be encircled and destroyed north of the Don and, therefore, after overcoming the Don line, he demanded that the troops advance beyond the Don to the south as quickly as possible, since this was forced by the short duration of the favorable time of year. Thus, Hitler’s strategists were preparing to create a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops in a vast area that was extremely inconvenient for their defense. And then on the waterless, scorched by the southern sun, smooth as a table, steppe expanses would be dominated by enemy tank and aviation fists.
To carry out an offensive in the Caucasus, already on April 22, 1942, an order was issued from the head of the armament department of the ground army and the head of replenishment on the creation of a command of Army Group “A” with a combat readiness headquarters by 20.5.42. Field Marshal List was appointed commander of the army group. Lieutenant General von Greifenberg was appointed chief of staff of the army group, and colonel of the general staff von Gildenfeldt was appointed first officer of the general staff. During formation, for camouflage purposes, the headquarters is called “Anton Headquarters.”
Operation planning and preparatory work for them are carried out by Army Group South, the corresponding instructions and orders are transmitted to the future command of Army Group A during their development at the headquarters of Army Group South.
On May 23, the working headquarters arrives in Poltava and, under the code name “Azov Coastal Headquarters,” is placed under the command of the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, whose headquarters had previously led military operations on the entire southern sector of the eastern front and was also located in Poltava.
On June 1, Hitler leaves for Poltava, accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel. The commander-in-chief of Army Group "South", the chief of staff of Army Group "South" and the army commanders takes part in the discussion of the situation at the front by the chief of the "Azov Coastal Headquarters". An order is issued about the tasks of the command during operations and preparation for them. Over time, the “Azov coastal headquarters” became involved in the affairs of the armies that later came under his command.
10.6.42 The operational department of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces issues an order on the command of Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol, according to which all ground forces operating in Crimea are commanded by the commander of 42AK, subordinate, after the transfer of command, to the “Coastal Headquarters Azov”. On July 11, an order was issued on the procedure for introducing troops arriving in the second place into battle for the 11th and 17th armies, and on July 5, the operational department of the General Staff reported on the procedure for transferring troops from Crimea to areas 17A and 1TA. First of all, the infantry of the 73rd and 125th Infantry should be transferred, secondly the infantry of the 9th Infantry, and thirdly the infantry of the security division. To guard the Crimea region, one German division each is left in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the third battalion of the 204th tank regiment of the 22nd tank division, and a sufficient number of Romanian formations.
On July 5 at 14.45, the “Azov coastal headquarters” received by telephone the final order to assume command from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces. On July 7, the “Azov coastal headquarters” at 0.00 in encrypted form takes over command of 11A, 17A, with the Witersheim group (57TK), 1TA, Romanian formations, and the Italian 8th Army (upon its arrival in the unloading area) subordinate to it.
In total, by June 28, 1942, on the Soviet-German front, the enemy had 11 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups, which included 230 divisions and 16 brigades - 5,655 thousand people, more than 49 thousand guns and mortars, 3, 7 thousand tanks and assault guns. These forces were supported from the air by aviation from three air fleets, the Vostok aviation group, as well as aviation from Finland and Romania, which had about 3.2 thousand combat aircraft.
The largest grouping of Wehrmacht forces - Army Group South, which made up 37 percent of infantry and cavalry and 53 percent of tank and motorized formations, was deployed by the last ten days of June 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It consisted of 97 divisions, of which 76 were infantry, 10 tank, 8 motorized and 3 cavalry. (History of the Second World War vol. 5, p. 145)
As a result of the measures taken to strategically deploy troops for the summer offensive of 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the total number of armies in Army Group South increased to eight; In addition, the 3rd Romanian Army followed in marching order to Ukraine.
The enemy held the operational-strategic initiative in his hands. Under the circumstances, this was an extremely great advantage, providing the Nazi command with freedom to choose the direction of attack and the opportunity to create a decisive superiority of forces and means in this direction.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army recognized the possibility of a summer offensive by the German army in the south, but believed that the enemy, who held a large group of his troops in close proximity to Moscow, would most likely deliver the main blow not towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but to the flank of the central grouping of the Red Army with the goal of capturing Moscow and the central industrial region, therefore Headquarters continued to strengthen the central section of the front and strengthen the Bryansk Front, the bulk of whose troops were grouped on the right wing, covering the direction to Moscow through Tula.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief had no doubt that the main task of the Wehrmacht remained the same - the capture of Moscow. Taking this into account, the General Staff in July 1942 analyzed the general operational-strategic situation and events on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. It was necessary to decide which of the two directions - to the Caucasus or to Stalingrad - was the main one. The distribution of troops and materiel, the use of strategic reserves, forms of interaction between fronts, the nature of preparatory measures, and much more depended on this decision.
The General Staff took into account that the Caucasus direction was connected for the enemy with the need to overcome a powerful mountain barrier with a relatively poorly developed network of convenient roads. Breaking through our defenses in the mountains required large available forces, and in the future a significant replenishment of troops with people and equipment. The enemy's main strike weapon - numerous tanks - could only roam the fields of the Kuban, and in mountainous conditions they lost a significant share of their combat capabilities. The position of Hitler's troops in the Caucasus would be seriously complicated by the fact that their flank and rear, under favorable conditions, could be threatened by our Stalingrad front and troops concentrated in the area south of Voronezh.
In general, the General Staff considered it unlikely that Hitler’s troops would deploy their main operations in the Caucasus. According to General Staff estimates, the Stalingrad direction was more promising for the enemy. Here the terrain was conducive to the conduct of extensive combat operations by all types of troops, and up to the Volga there were no major water barriers, except the Don. With the enemy's access to the Volga, the position of the Soviet fronts would become very difficult, and the country would be cut off from sources of oil in the Caucasus. The lines through which the Allies supplied us through Iran would also be disrupted. (Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, Voenizdat 1981, vol. 1, p. 87)
Taking this into account, the bulk of the strategic reserves were located in the western and also in the southwestern direction, which subsequently allowed the Headquarters to use them where the Nazi command delivered the main blow. Hitler's intelligence was unable to reveal either the number of reserves of the Soviet Supreme High Command or their location.
Due to an underestimation of the southern direction, Headquarters reserves were not stationed there - the main means of influencing strategic leadership on the course of important operations. Options for action by Soviet troops in case of sudden change situation. In turn, underestimating the role of the southern direction led to tolerance for the mistakes of the command of the Southwestern and partly the Southern fronts.
As a result of the unsuccessful actions of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts during the May offensive in the Kharkov direction, the situation and balance of forces in the south changed sharply in favor of the enemy. Having eliminated the Barvenkovsky ledge, German troops significantly improved their operational position and took advantageous starting positions for a further offensive in the eastern direction. (diagram of Operation Wilhelm and Frederick 1)
Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, gained a foothold by mid-June at the line of Belgorod, Kupyansk, Krasny Liman and put themselves in order. Having gone on the defensive, they did not have time to properly gain a foothold on new lines. The reserves available in the southwestern direction were used up.
Education anti-Hitler coalition
The rapprochement between England and the USA began during the period "Battles of England" when Churchill convincingly begged Roosevelt to strengthen them with destroyers
March 11, 1941 US Congress passed Lend-Lease Law , which marked the abandonment "politics of isolationism" .
Lend-Lease– a system for the United States to loan or lease weapons, ammunition, strategic raw materials, food, and other allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition.
The first transaction was the transfer 50 obsolete American destroyers in exchange for the lease of British territories on the Atlantic coast of North America. In the future, all US aid to the allies will be provided for gold or in exchange for the lease of territories.
After Germany’s attack on the USSR, Lend-Lease began to spread to our country, due to which the country received assistance not only with weapons, but also with food, shoes, things, etc.
It would be wrong to belittle the importance of this assistance for our country, even though its volume compared to domestic production was only 4 % . But to attribute it to decisive importance for the course of the war on the eastern front, as some Western historiographers do, is completely unlawful.
The final formation of the anti-Hitler coalition received after the United States entered the war and the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, during which the Soviet army regained its prestige, lost during the Soviet-Finnish War.
January 1, 1942 26 states signed in Washington United Nations Declaration , in which they pledged to use all their military and economic resources against the countries of the fascist bloc, and not to conclude a separate peace or truce with the enemy.
The Soviet side immediately began to insist at the opening of the “second front” in Europe, which would have eased its situation, but an attempt to land troops in Northern France in August 1942 failed, forcing the Allies to begin more thorough preparations for this operation.
Until then, the main theaters of military operations for our allies remained Africa, Asia And Pacific Ocean .
Meanwhile, the main events 1942 deployed on the Soviet-German front, where after failures con. 1941 – beginning 1942 Hitler was preparing a new large-scale offensive.
a) Hitler’s plans and Stalin’s miscalculations
Planning offensive actions on summer 1942 , Although Hitler still had superiority in men and weapons, he no longer had the ability to conduct a simultaneous offensive in all strategic directions, as was the case in 1941
Therefore, the main forces were concentrated in the army group "South" , which were supposed to take over the industrial Donetsk basin , bread Kuban , oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and master Stalingrad to cut off oil-bearing fields for Moscow trade route along the Volga (plan "Blau" ).
Hitler spoke:
“If I don’t get the oil from Maikop and Grozny, then I will be forced to end this war.”
The capture of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, according to the Germans, was supposed to finally change the course of the entire war, and not just the situation on the eastern front.
Ribbentrop said:
“When Russia's oil sources are exhausted, Russia will be brought to its knees. Then the English... will bow down to save what remains of the tormented empire.
America is a big bluff..."
The capture of the Caucasus should also have prompted Russia's historical rival in the region to enter the war. Turkey .
After completing these tasks, which put the USSR in a critical situation, a new attack on Moscow and Leningrad was planned.
Meanwhile Stalin
was confident that the Germans would repeat the attack on Moscow, and ordered the main forces to be concentrated in the Moscow direction.
Neither the reports from our intelligence about the planned German attack in the South-Eastern direction, nor the opinion of the members of Headquarters could convince him.
Zhukov wrote:
“J.V. Stalin assumed that the Nazis, without taking Moscow, would not abandon their main group to capture the Caucasus and the south of the country.
He said that such a move would lead German forces to excessively stretch the front, which the high command would not agree to.”
b) order No. 227
In May 1942 German and allied Italian, Hungarian and Romanian troops began offensive on the Crimean front .
4th of July , after 250-day defense , Soviet troops were forced to leave Sevastopol .
Further takeover Rostov-on-Don led to loss Donbass and opened the way to the Caucasus and Stalingrad .
Hitler had to decide which direction should become the main one and where to direct his main forces. But he turned out to be too self-confident and undertook to solve both problems at the same time.
Chief of the General Staff Halder wrote bitterly about this character trait of Hitler:
“The always observed underestimation of the enemy’s capabilities gradually takes on grotesque forms and becomes dangerous.”
The attack on Stalingrad was so successful that July 13
Hitler withdrew from this direction 4th Tank Army
and transferred it to the aid of the 1st Tank Army in the Caucasus.
This was a mistake. The pressure on Stalingrad eased and Moscow managed to establish an organized defense there.
Having understood this, through 2 weeks Hitler returns the 4th Panzer Army to Stalingrad, but it was unable to radically change the situation, and the weakened Caucasian group failed to capture the oil-bearing areas of Grozny.
Hitler did not want to understand that the German army no longer had the strength to fight two major operations, and he took out all his anger on the generals, replacing them at the most inopportune moment.
The commander of the troops in the Caucasus direction, Field Marshal, was removed Sheet
and Chief of the General Staff Halder
, sent to the Dachau concentration camp, where he remained until liberated by the Americans.
The German offensive led to an overextension of the southern front.
The German headquarters was especially concerned about Don flank
, covered by the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians, who militarily have not proven themselves to be the best. In the event of the collapse of this flank, the German Stalingrad group would not only be surrounded, but also cut off from the Caucasian group.
But Hitler did not want to listen to the arguments of his generals, who proposed to withdraw troops from Stalingrad. He brought more and more divisions into battle, demanding to capture the city and cut the Volga transport artery, vital for the USSR.
Meanwhile, the position of the Soviet units was critical.
The loss of rich industrial and agricultural areas had a serious impact on the supply of the army; the power of German tank wedges tore apart our defenses, creating huge gaps.
The front was held together only by the desperate resistance of ordinary soldiers, who German tanks had to be met with Molotov cocktails. The fighters especially proved themselves in these battles Marine Corps, nicknamed by the Germans "black death" .
Stalin needed to justify his own miscalculations, which led to a new retreat after the winter offensive, which he did July 28, 1942 V Order No. 227 , which went down in history under the name "No step back!" .
In it, Stalin characterized the catastrophic nature of the current situation, but he declared the main reasons for this to be indiscipline, cowardice and alarmism of soldiers and officers:
“The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it, loses faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army for putting our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, and itself flowing to the east "
The order ordered the shooting of anyone who retreated without permission or left their positions. In the rear of the Soviet units were placed punitive barrage detachments , who, without warning, opened fire on anyone suspected of fleeing their positions.
This inhumane order did not stop the retreat, but many participants in the war believe that it largely made it possible to delay the enemy’s advance and prepare the defense of Stalingrad.
c) “Battle of Stalingrad”
August 23, 1942 , with the crossing of the Don by German tank units, began battle for Stalingrad . Massive raids began on the city, turning it into ruins.
After the Germans reached the Volga from the north and south of Stalingrad, the city itself became the main goal. In continuous battles for every block and house, the entire September and October .
Changed hands more than once Mamaev kurgan , the soldiers of the tractor plant repeatedly took up arms and cleared the factory territory of the Germans, after which they returned to the machines.
Entered the chronicle of the Battle of Stalingrad as a heroic page "Pavlov's House" , which within 59 days defended by a group of guards led by a sergeant Pavlov .
On Paulus's map this house was marked as a fortress.
During the assault on this house alone, the Germans lost as many soldiers as they lost during the capture of some large European cities, but they were never able to take it.
One of the direct participants in the battles of Stalingrad, Wehrmacht officer G. Welz in his notes he wrote:
“In the central sector there have been battles for days on end with the aim of breaking into the city from the west. But the resistance of the Stalingraders was stubborn, incredibly stubborn.
The battle is not even for the streets, not for the neighborhoods. Every basement, every step is defended. The whole day there is a battle for a single stairwell. Hand grenades fly from room to room. It seems that we have already captured this floor, it is firmly in our hands, but no, the enemy received reinforcements on the burning roofs, and close combat broke out again. Yes, Stalingrad is devouring German soldiers! Every meter costs lives. More and more battalions are thrown into battle, and the very next day only a platoon remains of them.
Slowly, very slowly, the divisions are moving forward through the ruins and piles of rubble.”
But Soviet units also carried huge losses.
According to average statistics, a person died every 20 seconds in Stalingrad, and the average life expectancy of a soldier was less than a day.
In November, ice shackled the Volga, cutting off the city’s defenders from the right bank and leaving them without ammunition and food. Of the 7 districts, the Germans captured 6 - only Kirovsky district remained ours.
The population remaining by Stalin's will (Stalin said that the army does not protect empty cities) found itself in a terrible situation.
Hiding in basements, wells, etc., being on the front line, they existed without any food, under constant fire.
Even in the “Pavlov’s house”, in addition to the soldiers, there were also civilians, and during the fighting even one girl was born.
When they talk about the torment of the besieged Leningraders, for some reason they forget that they received at least some grams of bread and lived in their houses, while the Stalingraders did not even have this for 6 months.
In November Hitler was already celebrating the victory and in his speech he told the Germans:
“I wanted to reach the Volga at one specific point, at one specific city. By chance, this city bears the name of Stalin himself.
But that’s not why I wanted to go there. The city could have a completely different name. I went there because it is a very important point.
Through it, 30 million tons of cargo were transported, of which almost 9 million tons of oil. Wheat flocked there from Ukraine and Kuban to be sent to the north. Manganese ore was delivered there. There was a giant transshipment center there. It was this one that I wanted to take, and – you know, we don’t need much – we took it! Only a few very insignificant points remained unoccupied.”
d) Operation Uranus
And in this situation the city survived, and Headquarters developed a counteroffensive plan "Uranus" .
Goal of the plan: with the forces of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts, strike the flanks of the German army group “South” and, having broken through them, unite, encircling the Stalingrad German group.
The operation has begun November 19 and already November 23 near 330 thousand The Germans were in the bag - the final stage of their destruction began.
Paulus did not dare to begin a breakthrough operation without Hitler's permission while it was still possible.
Hitler demanded to resist to the last, promising help.
But all attempts by the Germans to arrange supplies for their encircled troops by air were thwarted by our aviation and the tank crews of General Badanova
, who carried out a raid behind enemy lines and destroyed a large airfield and over 300 German aircraft
.
Attempts by the Germans to break through to help the encircled were thwarted by attacks by Soviet units on the flank of the advancing German units.
January 8, 1943 The Soviet command, in order to avoid unnecessary casualties, invited Paulus to surrender, but he refused.
January 10 Soviet units unleashed a barrage of artillery and aviation fire on the encircled Germans.
To strengthen Paulus's resolve to continue his resistance, Hitler assigned him rank of field marshal , but the surrounded units no longer believed in Hitler’s genius and did not want to die for him.
February 2 the surrounded units capitulated: they surrendered into captivity 24 generals led by Paulus himself and about 113 thousand soldiers and officers .
e) the results and significance of the victory at Stalingrad
The effect of the destruction of German troops at Stalingrad was stunning - the Germans lost about 25 % his army in the east.
This victory of the USSR undermined the morale of German soldiers (a 3-day mourning period was declared in Germany), raised the prestige of the Soviet army and instilled hope for the conquered peoples.
In addition, there was a threat of encirclement of German troops in the Caucasus, which forced them to begin withdrawing.
German historian Tippelskirch in his history of World War II he admitted:
“Although within the framework of the war as a whole, the events in North Africa is given a more prominent place than the Battle of Stalingrad, but the disaster at Stalingrad shocked the German army and the German people more because it turned out to be more sensitive for them.
Something incomprehensible happened there... - the death of an army surrounded by the enemy.”
In an effort to build on the success of Stalingrad, the Red Army went on the offensive on all fronts.
During the winter of 1942-43. managed to finally remove the threats to Moscow, break the ring around Leningrad, connecting the besieged city with the mainland, and liberate Kursk.
By the spring of 1943
active hostilities ceased.
By this time, Soviet units had occupied convenient bridgeheads and had built up enough forces for new offensive operations
1.1 Plans of Hitler's military command
On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War position Soviet Union remained heavy. Its material and human losses were enormous, and the territories captured by the enemy were vast. However, the strategy of "blitzkrieg" war fascist Germany against the USSR failed. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, Red Army troops defeated the main Wehrmacht group and drove it back from the Soviet capital. The Battle of Moscow has not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic War and the Second World War.
According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was supposed to be the decisive year in the war, because Hitler was confident that the United States and England would not attempt to land their troops in Europe this year; he still had a free hand for actions in the east.
However, the defeat near Moscow and the losses in the summer of 1941 inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders could not but have an impact. Despite the fact that by the spring of '42, Hitler's army had increased in number and received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.
“At the end of 1941, there were 9,500 thousand under arms in Hitler’s army, and in 1942 there were already 10,204 thousand.” The overall strength of the army increased, and the chief of the Nazi general staff ground forces Colonel General Halder made the following significant entry in his diary: “As of May 1, 1942, 318 thousand people are missing in the East. It is proposed to send 240 thousand people to the army in the East in May. For the period from May to September there is a reserve of 960 thousand young conscripts. Then in September there will be nothing left.”
Somewhat later, at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW, a more precise document was drawn up regarding the general condition of Hitler’s army. The certificate intended for Hitler stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the inability to fully ensure their replenishment with people and material means».
“And yet, by the summer of forty-two,” writes General Chuikov, “Hitler managed to concentrate quite significant forces against us. On the Soviet-German front, he had an army of six million, numbering up to 43 thousand guns and mortars, over three thousand tanks, and up to three and a half thousand combat aircraft. The forces are significant. Hitler started the war with the smaller ones.”
Hitler undertook a campaign in the Caucasus with the aim of seizing oil sources and access to the Iranian border, to the Volga. He apparently hoped that at a distance from the center of the country, the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so thorough.
By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to drag Turkey into the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By reaching the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to drag Japan into the war against the Soviet Union. The performance of Turkey and Japan was his last chance for success in the war against us. Only this can explain such a broadcast nature of his directive for the spring-summer campaign of 1942.
Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as Directive No. 41. The introduction itself does not contain an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.
The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is approaching its end. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with great success by German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in men and equipment. In an effort to exploit his apparent initial success, he spent this winter most of the reserves intended for further operations.
“The goal,” says the directive, “is to completely destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers.”
“...First of all, all available forces must be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.”
And here comes a disclaimer. “The final encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Ingria are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose creates the appropriate opportunities.”
This reservation shows that Hitler, having forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to carry out operations along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.
As General Chuikov wrote: “The Directive is a document of a secret nature, a document that a limited circle of people had the right to familiarize itself with, it is a document in which there is no place for propaganda formulations. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that in its premise the German command completely incorrectly assesses our forces, and is trying to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. By underestimating our strength, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own.”
Thus, the main goal of the enemy’s offensive on the Eastern Front, according to Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. “However, unlike the Barbarossa plan,” writes A.M. Samsonov, - achieving this political goal was no longer based on the “blitzkrieg” strategy. That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, and take possession of the southern regions of the USSR, rich in strategic raw materials.” To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasus directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task on the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.
Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 “the Russian army will be completely destroyed.” It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the scope of the real strategy. But there was more likely something else going on here.
Hitler's policy, adventurous in its essence, could not be built on the basis of deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all, on the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult for Hitler's generals.
Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful implementation “in the first place” of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. This strategic plan of the enemy very much reflected the urgent need of Nazi Germany for fuel.
Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting command staff Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler said that “if he does not receive the oil of Maikop and Grozny, he will have to end this war.” At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. “It was a subtle calculation that was closer to its goal than is generally believed after its eventual catastrophic failure.”
So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. “The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for main goal- defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops begin military operations on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubt that a second front would not be opened at least in 1942.” And although the prospects for a war against the USSR for some people looked completely different than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity on this.
“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command was faced with the question of what form to continue the war in: offensive or defensive. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of our chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. The year was 1942 last year, in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in the offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a front 3 thousand kilometers long to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that along most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive.”
The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among Hitler's generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also favored resuming the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended launching the main attack on Moscow with the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.
The point of war of the allied nations against the forces of aggression.” The whole world learned about the heroic battle. Here are its results: 1. Under the influence of the Battle of Stalingrad, major changes took place in the international situation. The world realized that a radical change had occurred during the Second World War, that the military potential of the Soviet Union was so great that it was capable of fighting a war to a victorious end. 2. The defeat of the Wehrmacht under...
For days without sleep or rest, the fire steamer "Gasitel" fought the sea of fire while participating at the same time in transporting the evacuated population of the city and valuable cargo to the left bank. The ship's logbook, which is kept in the Battle of Stalingrad Panorama Museum, indicates that the Gasitel's pumps did not stop working for a minute on August 23, 1942. On August 25, enemy planes attacked...
700 thousand killed and wounded, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 thousand tanks and assault guns and about 1.4 thousand aircraft. An interesting source of information when considering the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad in human history is a book published by German general K.Tippelskirch in Bonn in 1954 and republished in Russia in 1999. This interest lies in the fact that we are provided...
He ordered the restoration of the city at any cost. And already in March 1943, restoration work began in the city. It is with a tragic impression that I think about how many lives the Battle of Stalingrad, and the war in general, claimed. Although our people had someone and something to boast about before the enemy, the ends did not justify the means. Millions of human lives that were claimed by the war (as they rightly said: “For...
WINTER CAMPAIGN 1942/43, a designation adopted in Russian literature for military operations in Great Britain. Otech. war from November 19, 1942 to March 1943.
By the end of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the Soviets. the troops were able to stop the enemy advance in all directions. Despite the fact that the enemy achieved major successes, he failed to completely solve the tasks he had set for himself. In connection with this, in the winter of 1942/43, the military-political leadership of Germany planned to retain the captured territories and create conditions for the subsequent resumption of active offensive operations.
In turn, the leaders of the Sov. The Union was put before Kr. the army's task is to radically change the course of the war, liberate the most important industrial and agricultural areas of the south of the country, break the blockade of Leningrad, strengthen the position in the central sector Soviet-German front and thereby create favorable conditions for the complete expulsion of the occupiers from the territory of the USSR.
Assessing the situation that had developed by mid-November. 1942 setting, Soviet the command came to the conclusion that the main blow should be delivered in the southwestern direction. In accordance with the plan VGK rates, at the first stage of the winter campaign it was envisaged, concentrating large forces in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction, to encircle and destroy the enemy group in the Stalingrad area. Then, introducing additional forces from the General Headquarters reserve into the battle, defeat the enemy in the Middle Don and, with a strike in the general direction of Rostov-on-Don, cut off the escape route to the Donbass for the enemy group located in the North Caucasus. If these operations were successful, conditions were created for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Germans. eastern front.
On November 19, 1942, the Soviet offensive began with powerful artillery preparation. troops at Stalingrad (see Battle of Stalingrad 1942–43). Having delivered powerful blows to the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed the encirclement on November 23. There were 22 divisions and more than 160 separate enemy units in the cauldron. However, they were not immediately destroyed.
German the command attempted to break the encirclement. For this purpose, a group was created consisting of 6 divisions, incl. 2 tank. To repel its attack it was necessary to use the 2nd Guards. an army intended to destroy the surrounded enemy. At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts to speed up preparations for the operation in the Middle Don. The plan of this operation was to strike in the direction of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which would make it possible to cut off the entire German group. troops in the North Caucasus from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. However, due to the need to repel the enemy's unblocking strike, changes were made to the offensive plan to reduce the scope of the operation.
December 16 owls troops went on the offensive in the Middle Don. As a result of the operation, by the end of December they broke through the enemy front. up to 340 km and advanced 150–200 km, reaching the rear of the entire enemy. grouping on the southern wing of the Soviet-Germans. front.
Successful actions of the owls. troops at Stalingrad gave the Supreme Command Headquarters the basis to plan an offensive operation to defeat the enemy in the North Caucasus (see. Battle for the Caucasus 1942–43). She set the task for the Transcaucasian Front, which operated in two operational groups - the Black Sea and Northern: to strike in the Krasnodar direction, capture Krasnodar and prevent the enemy Caucasian group from retreating to the north-west. To do this, it was necessary to bypass Novorossiysk with a strike from the left flank of the Black Sea Group and subsequently capture the Taman Peninsula, and the formations of the Northern Group should attract the main forces of the enemy’s 1st Tank Army, pressing them to the Caucasus Ridge.
However, German the command, fearing to get another “cauldron”, even larger than at Stalingrad, began to withdraw its troops from the North Caucasus to a previously prepared defensive line between the rivers. Kuban and Manych. It assumed thus. create a continuous defense front along the line Novaya Kalitva, Armavir, Maykop. At the same time, a defensive position on Taman was being prepared. The withdrawal was carried out in 2 directions - through Rostov and to the Taman Peninsula.
Sov. The command belatedly discovered the enemy's retreat, which began from the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range on January 1, 1943. His pursuit began only on January 3 and was carried out hesitantly. On January 5, the Headquarters clarified the tasks of the Black Sea Group of Forces. She had to act in 2 directions. One group was tasked with defeating the enemy north-west of Tuapse, capturing Krasnodar, and then developing an offensive on Tikhoretsk and Bataysk, the other was to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Novorossiysk, capture the village of Krymskaya, and then, in cooperation with an amphibious assault, liberate Novorossiysk. The northern group of troops was tasked with “light pursuit” of the enemy. However, this plan was not fully implemented.
The enemy continued the systematic withdrawal of his troops to Rostov. He managed to create a stable defense front along the river by mid-January. Don and Manych. The troops of the Southern Front, advancing on Rostov from the east, were unable to overcome it and thereby cut off the escape routes of the main enemy group from the North Caucasus. However, some of the enemy forces were still unable to retreat to Rostov and took up defense on the previously prepared defensive line “Gotenkopf” (“Head of the Goth”, in Russian literature - “Blue Line”) on the Taman Peninsula. The owls who came to him in mid-March. the troops were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses. On March 16, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the troops of the North Caucasus Front to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
In Jan. 1943 owls The troops successfully operated in the Stalingrad and Voronezh directions. As a result of the defeat, troops and their allies at Stalingrad, significant gaps appeared in the enemy’s disposition. In such a situation in front of the owls. The command opened up the prospect of further deep dissection of enemy groups, their isolation from each other and destruction in parts. For this purpose, in the winter of 1943, the Soviet Union. troops in the southwestern direction carried out a series of offensive operations, during which the enemy was successively defeated in the areas of Ostrogozhsk, Rossosh, Voronezh, Kastorny, Kursk and Kharkov.
During the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation, the enemy was inflicted a major defeat: 15 divisions were defeated, 6 divisions suffered heavy losses, and 86 thousand people were captured. As a result of the defeat of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group, favorable conditions were created for the destruction of the enemy in the regions of Voronezh and Kastorny. The offensive here began on January 24. The next day, Voronezh was completely liberated, and on January 28, the Soviets. troops surrounded up to 9 enemy divisions south of Kastorny.
A significant gap opened in the enemy's defenses. In such a situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, believing that the defeat of the encircled enemy would not take much time, ordered the commanders of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts to leave strictly the necessary number of troops to eliminate it, and with the main forces to develop success in the Kursk and Kharkov directions. As a result, a continuous frontal encirclement was not created. The enemy took advantage of this and managed to bring 6 of his divisions to join the main forces. But they could not avoid defeat. and Hung. divisions surrounded southeast of Kastornoye.
Powerful strikes of owls. troops inflicted in January. 1943 in the Ostrogozh and Kastornen directions led, in essence, to the defeat of it. Army Group B. Its remains were thrown back to the river line. Tim and Oskol, and a huge gap appeared in the enemy’s defense. In order to close it, the Wehrmacht command was forced to create separate consolidated formations and attract reserves not only from other sectors of the Eastern Front, but also to transfer troops from Western European countries.
In turn, the owls the command sought to build on the success achieved. The offensive was planned to be carried out in 2 directions - towards Kursk and Kharkov. It began on the day when the liquidation of the encircled group of Field General. F. Paulus, the Battle of Stalingrad ended on February 2, and developed successfully. February 8 owls troops liberated Kursk, the next day - Belgorod, February 16 - Kharkov.
Impressed by these successes, the Supreme Command Headquarters demanded that front commanders not slow down the pace of the offensive. However, the situation began to change in favor of the enemy, who in the second half of February transferred additional forces and means to the threatened areas - several infantry and 2 tank divisions. Sov. The troops by this time were significantly weakened and required replenishment with people, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food. In this regard, the offensive began to fade. March 3 owls The troops went on the defensive to repel the blow of the enemy, who was preparing for a counter-offensive.
At the end of January, active hostilities broke out in the Donbass. Developing the offensive after encircling the enemy at Stalingrad, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts approached the industrial center of Ukraine - Donbass. At the same time, the main forces are mute. Army Groups "Don" were covered from the north and south. In such a situation, the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General. N.F. Vatutin developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Leap”.
Its plan was to deliver the main blow to Mariupol with the right wing of the front, cut through the Donbass enemy group and, together with Southern Front complete its defeat. The enemy, putting up stubborn resistance at intermediate lines, began to retreat in the western and southwestern directions. In this situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters clarified the task for the Southwestern Front. It was to “prevent the enemy from retreating towards Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye and take all measures to squeeze his Donetsk group in Crimea, block the passages through Perekop and Sivash and thus isolate it from the rest of the enemy forces in Ukraine.”
Confident that he is dumb. The command hastily withdraws its troops beyond the Dnieper, Vatutin demanded that the pace of the offensive be accelerated. However, the offensive began to fade. By mid-February, the armies of the front's right wing had advanced 150–300 km in battle and were simultaneously attacking in 3 diverging directions. At the same time, the front commander did not have reserves. Associations and formations operated in wide areas, there were not enough people in the troops, military equipment, weapons, ammunition and fuel. Moreover, it is mute. the command did not intend to withdraw its troops beyond the Dnieper. It took every measure to stop the owls first. troops, and then go on a counteroffensive and restore the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-Germans. front.
German The counteroffensive began on the evening of February 19. Having delivered powerful attacks with tank corps from the Krasnograd and Krasnoarmeisky areas, the enemy not only stopped the advance of the troops of the Southwestern Front, but also surrounded a number of formations that suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Unable to repel the enemy's blow, the Sov. the troops were forced to retreat. By March 3, they retreated 100–120 km, retreated beyond the Seversky Donets and took up defense along its left bank.
At the end of February The command regrouped its main forces to the area southwest of Kharkov and struck at the Sov, which was preparing to attack. 3rd Tank Army. On March 2, the enemy cut off her communications. By March 5, 2 tank corps of the army had lost almost all tanks, and rifle divisions were left without artillery and vehicles. Developing the offensive, the enemy captured Kharkov and Belgorod, forcing the troops of the Voronezh Front to retreat to the left bank of the Seversky Donets, after which the position on the southern wing of the Soviet-German. front stabilized before the start Battle of Kursk 1943.
In the central area of the Soviet-German. it was planned to defeat the front. Army Group Center, which still posed a potential threat to Moscow and could be used by the Wehrmacht command to strike in the Moscow direction. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters envisaged eliminating the enemy in the Rzhev-Vyazma salient, as well as striking in the direction of Velikie Luki in order to forestall the enemy group concentrated in the areas of Smolensk and Vitebsk.
The Velikolukskaya operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front began on November 24. Stubborn battles continued until January 20, 1943. As a result of the operation of the owls. The troops defeated one and defeated another 4 enemy divisions, liberated Velikiye Luki and advanced westward 25–30 km. In addition, the interaction between Army Groups “Center” and “North” was disrupted, the joint actions of their forces on adjacent wings were hampered, and favorable conditions were created for the further advance of the Soviets. troops. To repel the attacks, the enemy was forced to additionally strengthen its grouping in the Velikiye Luki direction with 6 divisions from other sectors of the front.
In the area of the Rzhev salient, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned an operation codenamed “Mars”. Its plan included a strike on the converging directions of the troops of the Kalinin Front, covering the ledge from the north and north-west, and the troops of the right wing of the Western Front from the lines on the river. Vazuza and Osuga surround the group without speaking. 9th Army and destroy it piece by piece.
The offensive began on November 25 and developed slowly. The enemy, having created a strong, defense in depth, offered stubborn resistance. In addition, heavy snow turning into a blizzard did not allow the attackers to use aviation and prevented artillery and tanks from conducting targeted fire. The troops of Kalininsky and Western fronts were able to penetrate the enemy defenses in some areas only in depth. from 6 to 35 km, but they could not break through it.
Maneuvering reserves, the enemy repelled the attacks of the owls. troops and in a number of areas threw them back to their original position. By December 20, the offensive capabilities of the Kalinin and Western fronts were exhausted, and they went on the defensive.
Despite the fact that the main goals of the operation were not achieved, it had a positive impact on the implementation of the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the end of 1942. With active offensive actions, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts pinned down large enemy forces (up to 30 divisions) and not only did not allow them. command to transfer troops from this section of the front, but also forced it to send here an additional 4 tank and 1 motorized divisions from the reserves of the main command and Army Group Center. However, these results came at a very high price. Sov. troops lost 215.7 thousand people, incl. irrevocably - 70.4 thousand people, more than 1.3 thousand tanks.
After the defeat of the enemy at Stalingrad and Voronezh, the Supreme High Command Headquarters planned an offensive operation with the goal of destroying the main forces of the Germans. Army Group "Center" in the areas of Orel, Bryansk and Rzhev with subsequent access to the line Vitebsk, Bryansk, Gomel. It was planned to be carried out in several stages by troops of 4 fronts.
The offensive in the Oryol direction began on February 11. In 2 weeks of fighting, the troops of the Bryansk Front managed to penetrate the enemy’s defenses only 10–30 km. The troops of the Western Front, which went on the offensive on February 22, also did not achieve success, managing to advance only 1–3 km.
The introduction of troops from the Central Front into the battle did not make any significant changes. In the first days of the offensive, they broke through the enemy’s defenses in depth. up to 25 km, and the front mobile group advanced 100–120 km, cut off railway Bryansk - Konotop. However, the mobile group was not supported by the rest of the front troops and itself found itself surrounded, from which it was able to escape with heavy losses. Attempts to resume the offensive in the Oryol direction were made until mid-March.
On March 21, the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts went on the defensive at the line of Velizh, Mtsensk, Novosil, Sevsk, Rylsk. The northern face of the Kursk ledge was formed.
The fighting that took place at that time in the area of the Rzhev-Vyazma salient took on a somewhat different character. At the beginning of the second ten days of February, when the Bryansk and Central fronts went on the offensive, German. The command began to withdraw individual divisions from the areas of Rzhev and Gzhatsk.
The Supreme Command headquarters ordered the commanders of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to speed up preparations for the offensive operation. However, due to a lack of ammunition and the slow arrival of reinforcements and equipment, it was postponed again and again. Meanwhile, the enemy began a systematic withdrawal of the main forces from the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. The beginning of the offensive of the owls. troops were fought at a low pace. On March 24, formations of the Kalinin and Western fronts approached the enemy’s defensive line along the river. Vonets, Dnieper, Osma, which they could not overcome, and went on the defensive.
The Kr offensive that unfolded at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. The army in the southwestern and western directions attracted almost all the forces and reserves of the Wehrmacht, depriving them of power. command the ability to strengthen its groups in other directions. This made it much easier for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to carry out an offensive operation on breaking the siege of Leningrad 1943, and the troops Northwestern Front- liquidation of the enemy’s Demyansk bridgehead.
Shock groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts went on the offensive on January 12. During fierce battles, formations of 2 fronts broke through the enemy defenses and united on January 18, forming a corridor 8–11 km wide along Lake Ladoga. Land connections between Leningrad and the rest of the country were restored.
After breaking the blockade in front of the Soviets. The troops were faced with the task of firmly holding the broken corridor and ensuring the uninterrupted movement of trains along the railway line laid here. To do this, it was necessary first of all to capture the Sinyavinsky Heights. However, the offensive launched on February 10 did not develop. The enemy, relying on a natural line, which were the heights, built a strong, defense in depth. Attempts to break through continued until the beginning of March. Taking into account the spring thaw, as well as the increased resistance of the enemy, the Supreme Command Headquarters on March 2 ordered the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to stop the offensive and gain a foothold on the achieved lines.
The commander of the North-Western Front planned to eliminate the enemy in the Demyansk ledge by counter-attacks under the base of the ledge with the simultaneous dissection of the formations located in it by an offensive in 5 directions. The operation began on February 15. German The command, seeing the futility of holding the Demyansk bridgehead and fearing encirclement, began withdrawing its troops from it on February 17. On February 28, formations of the North-Western Front reached the prepared enemy defensive line along the river. They caught and were stopped by the enemy.
