Rodionov, Igor Nikolaevich. Military Leader by the Grace of God Card of the Commander of the 40th Army

25 years have passed since the end of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan. However, to this day there are military personnel who appear on the lists of missing persons. The former head of the special department of the KGB of the USSR of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in the DRA, retired Major General Mikhail OVSEENKO, talks about how the investigative work was carried out by military counterintelligence officers in the 1980s.

We offer an interview with Major General Ovseenko M.Ya. newspaper “Red Star” on the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

For veterans, we inform you that an extended publication prepared by Mikhail Yakovlevich for a special edition is posted in the closed part of the site.

– Mikhail Yakovlevich, why exactly did military counterintelligence officers do this work?

– The fact is that initially the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan was not envisaged.

It was assumed that they would provide humanitarian assistance to the population, assist in the construction of a number of economic facilities, and the creation and strengthening of government bodies and law enforcement agencies of the republic. But in reality everything turned out completely differently. Given the instability of the situation, the inability of the old Afghan army to resist gangs and the growing threat of invasion from outside, the command of the 40th Army had to begin active military operations together with units of the Afghan army to defeat the armed opposition.

There were irretrievable losses and prisoners. It was logical in the context of the KGB tasks to organize events to search for missing servicemen specifically by special officers. But this activity was not regulated from above, so military counterintelligence officers began to petition their leadership to introduce a special department into the staff. So in 1983, the 9th group of the special department of the KGB of the USSR for the 40th Army was created.

– What were the tasks of the new unit?

– Their range of work was quite voluminous. I will name just a few tasks:
– search and release of Soviet military personnel who were in gangs in Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan and Iran;
– search and determination of the whereabouts of missing persons. In the event of the death of some of them, obtaining reliable information about their death, as well as their burial places;
– coordination of investigative activities with representatives of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.
– accounting and search for stolen weapons.

– Is the specific number of military personnel who were captured by militants known? Data on this matter vary from source to source.

– In the list I have, prepared by the 9th group, there were 310 missing people in 1987, more than a hundred of them died, over sixty were identified in gangs, including in Pakistan and Iran.

We had a file for each missing serviceman: characteristics, under what circumstances he disappeared. Somewhere around eighty percent were captured helpless, wounded, or running out of ammunition. But there were also cases of indiscipline among our soldiers and insufficient control on the part of officers in relation to their subordinates. For example, one of the privates wanted to cool off in the river that flowed outside the garrison, another decided to wash clothes in the river, again outside the checkpoint, a group of four soldiers decided to eat apples in the garden of a neighboring village. One of the officers went jogging outside his unit every morning. In all these cases the ending was tragic. Some were killed, some were taken prisoner.

Our file cabinet was constantly replenished with information obtained during the filtering of captured dushmans and our military personnel removed from gangs, through interviews with village elders, through the agents of the state security agencies of Afghanistan.

We knew that in the Dushman dungeons the prisoners were kept in the most terrible conditions, subjected to severe torture, forced drug injections, forced study of the Koran and the local language, and constant humiliation. Sometimes, with the help of notes transmitted through trusted agents, it was possible to contact our military personnel who were with the rebels.

How prisoners were abused

The fate of captured Soviet soldiers was usually terrible, said French reporter Alain Guillot, who often visited the bases. “Once I witnessed a terrible sight. One Russian prisoner was made the center of the attraction. The game, if you can call it that, was called buzkashi. A unique type of Afghan equestrian polo, when a headless sheep is used as a ball. The riders fight and take it from each other. So in this case, instead of such a sheep, they used an unfortunate Soviet prisoner. He had bullet holes in his collarbones and legs, and he was literally torn to pieces...
“Until my death, I will not forget what the dushmans did to me,” says Dmitry Buvaylo, slowly, choosing his words. “On the very first day of the capture, I was brutally beaten, my uniform and shoes were torn off. For several days they were kept in a disguised hole-cave in the mountains in “bracelets” - shackles. In the prison near Peshawar, where I was imprisoned, the food was made entirely from waste. Sometimes after eating I felt a strange state of either excitement or depression. Later, one captive Afghan cellmate said that this was the effect of drugs added to food. In prison, the guards forced me to learn Farsi, memorize suras from the Koran, and pray for 8-10 hours every day. For any disobedience, for mistakes in reading surahs, they were beaten with lead clubs until they bled.
Western correspondents often visited the prison. They brought a lot of anti-Soviet literature and excitedly told me what a carefree life awaited me in the West if I agreed to go there. They clearly hinted that otherwise I would face martyrdom in this dungeon or concentration camp in Siberia.
Information from the website of Krylov A.N.

Until 1989, 88 Soviet military personnel were withdrawn from gangs. Eight of them, as the audit showed, were recruited by the enemy and returned through an exchange channel to the territory of the USSR to carry out reconnaissance missions. Yes, there were some.

Some could not stand the bullying, broke down and became unwitting accomplices of the bandits. Materials regarding them were sent by the special department of the 40th Army to local security authorities.

In addition, military personnel who settled in the USA, Switzerland, France, Iran, Canada, Germany and other countries, who were in gang formations in Pakistan before the withdrawal of Soviet troops, were later identified. Of these, 21 people were identified during my service.

- How did you manage to free him from captivity?

– To remove our compatriots from the gangs, they mainly used exchanges for dushman authorities, relatives of the leaders of the rebel groups, functionaries of opposition parties, and foreign advisers of Arab origin. For one of ours, as a rule, they demanded five or six of their prisoners. We agreed.

In general, each liberation operation was original in its own way and sometimes took several months. Let me give you an example. Private D. did not stand out in any positive way in his service and was noted for using soft drugs. After one of the violations of discipline, he disappeared from the unit with a weapon. Literally a few days later, based on intelligence information, we learned that he was in one of the gangs in the province of Kunduz. It later turned out that after checking and appropriate processing there, he was entrusted with repairing small arms. Over time, he began to actively participate in the torture of captured Afghan army soldiers, which earned him the trust of his new owners. They began to attract him to hostilities, married a local girl, and appointed him as the bodyguard of the gang leader. The cruelty of the former Soviet soldier amazed even the dushmans. His authority increased even more after he executed his father-in-law, suspecting him of sympathizing with government troops. Considering that Private D. had become an odious figure, the special forces were given the task of bringing him to the territory under our control. The rebels rejected ransom and exchange even for the most serious Afghan authorities. Then, according to a developed plan agreed upon with the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan, a false gang was organized from among the secret service employees. The commander of this “unit” sent two representatives to D. with a request for help in smelting iron from Soviet NURS for the manufacture of landmines. So the traitor ended up in the hands of military counterintelligence. The military tribunal sentenced him to capital punishment.

Watch documentary footage. Exchange of prisoners in 40 OA. From open sources of video information

YouTube: please provide the correct link

I would like to note that the command of the 40th Army has always provided us with great assistance in terms of finances and personnel. After all, although infrequently, ransoms had to be paid when military personnel were released - sometimes considerable ones. They also ransomed those who were later brought to justice.

– Was the success of the operation preceded by a lot of work?

- Certainly. But despite the recommendations of a special department of the army to coordinate all issues relating to the release of captured military personnel, it happened that unit commanders did this without permission. Sometimes out of emotion, sometimes in the hope of luck.

For example, in one city, representatives of gangs kidnapped 16 Soviet civilian specialists who were traveling by bus to their place of work in the morning. The Afghan residents of the city, who were kind to us, were also involved in the search. For almost three months there was no information about our compatriots.
Chance helped. A teenager who arrived from a remote village, in a conversation with the dukan-man, mentioned Russian prisoners. Having received this information, the commander of one of the units alerted two helicopters with troops on board and ordered them to proceed to the point indicated by the teenager without any preliminary preparation. We landed a few tens of meters from the adobe hut. The prisoners, seeing the saviors through the window, unanimously leaned on the wall, squeezed it out and rushed to the helicopter.

The guards managed to kill three and seriously wound one. He died on the helicopter. Our military quickly dealt with the bandits who were near the house, took on board the living and dead compatriots and flew off. Before they had time to gain altitude, the spooks opened heavy fire on the car. Fortunately, everything ended well. But it could have turned out differently if the Mujahideen had a clearly established security and surveillance service.

– Tell us how our servicemen behaved in captivity?

– Carrying out investigative activities, we received information about many heroes. There were many such examples. In 1982, junior sergeant S.V. Bakhanov was captured during the clash. During interrogation, he refused to give the enemy information about the Bagram airfield and was shot on the orders of Ahmad Shah.

Privates P.G. Vorsin and V.I. Chekhov was kept under guard in a cave in 1984. They managed to remove two sentries and, having taken possession of their weapons, tried to break through to their own. But they were surrounded by dushmans, they shot all the ammunition and, not wanting to surrender, rushed into the abyss.

Private R.V. Kozurak was captured in 1982. He was brutally tortured to obtain information about the Kabul airfield. Shot while trying to escape.

Ensign N.V. Khalatsky, while in captivity, attacked a sentry, wounded him and ran away from the gang. However, the dushmans overtook him, and he, clutching a heavy stone with his hands, threw himself into the abyss.

Most a shining example The events in the Badaber camp controlled by the Islamic Society of Afghanistan in Pakistan serve as an example of an unbroken will while in captivity. Under him, a “Training Center for Militants” was organized, where members of gangs were trained under the guidance of foreign military instructors.

On April 26, 1985, 12 Soviet servicemen who were in captivity neutralized six sentries and freed prisoners from armed forces The DRA captured the weapons depot and held the camp in their hands for two days. Only through the joint efforts of the armed units of the Mujahideen and Pakistani regular troops was it possible to suppress the uprising. All the rebels died.

From the SVR certificate about the uprising in the Badarbera camp

Information about the heroic uprising of Soviet prisoners of war in the Badaber camp is confirmed by the documents of the US State Department at our disposal, materials of the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan, testimony of direct eyewitnesses and participants in these events from the Mujahideen and Pakistanis, as well as statements by the leaders of the armed formations B. Rabbani (IOA), G. Hekmatyar (IPA) and others...
The area of ​​the uprising was blocked by Mujahideen detachments, tank and artillery units of the 11th Army Corps of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The Grad MLRS and a flight of Pakistani Air Force helicopters were used against the rebels. Radio reconnaissance of the 40th Army recorded a radio interception between their crews and the air base, as well as a report from one of the crews about a bomb attack on the camp. Only the joint efforts of the Mujahideen and Pakistani regular troops managed to suppress this uprising. Most of the rebels died a brave death in an unequal battle, and the seriously wounded were finished off on the spot.

But the bandits also suffered losses: about 100 Mujahideen, 90 Pakistani regular troops, 13 representatives of the Pakistani authorities, six American instructors were killed, three Grad installations and 40 pieces of heavy military equipment were destroyed.

Since all the prisoners, as usual, were given Muslim names, and their original documents were confiscated and classified by the Pakistani authorities, it is still not possible to establish the surnames of our compatriots. But according to available data, the organizer of the uprising was a Russian officer named Victor. Unfortunately, he failed to implement his escape plan due to the betrayal of a soldier from his entourage.

Watch “Mutiny in the Underworld.” TVC plot
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– Last year in funds mass media It was reported that former Soviet soldier Bakhretdin Khakimov, who went missing in September 1980, has been found in the western Afghan province of Herat. He leads a semi-nomadic lifestyle and collects medicinal herbs.

“Although a lot of time has passed, the search for missing servicemen in Afghanistan and the burial places of those killed in order to return the remains to their homeland does not stop.

Captured “shuravi”. Photo Published in Soldier Of Fortune magazine, February 1984. Interview with Soviet prisoners of war captured in Afghanistan, 1983.
By Jim Coyne.

And those who started families or committed serious crimes settled in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, along with the selfless fulfillment of military duty, there were also cases of cowardice, cowardice, abandonment of units with or without weapons in search of a better life.

The destinies of such people, as a rule, did not turn out the way they wanted. For example, in July 1988, it became known about one of those “Afghan” soldiers whom foreign journalists managed to take to the West - Private Nikolai Golovin. He voluntarily returned to the Soviet Union from Canada immediately after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General Sukharev that former military personnel who were prisoners in the DRA would not be subject to criminal prosecution.

On June 29, 1982, Golovin left his military unit without permission. He hoped to get to Pakistan with the help of the Afghans, and from there he was going to go to the West. But he experienced all the torments of Afghan captivity. For a year and a half he was brutally beaten, humiliated, and forced to do hard work. In a word, his dreams of prosperity vanished immediately and forever.

– Did the special department interact with any organizations in the search for missing servicemen?

– In the 1990s, publications began to appear in some media about the involvement of individual journalists and public organizations in the removal of our military personnel from gangs. This is not true. The only organization whose services military counterintelligence officers resorted to was the International Red Cross before the trips of its representatives to Pakistan. We introduced them to information that could be useful. But, unfortunately, their efforts did not produce positive results.

– After the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops and the disbandment of the 40th Army, who is searching for the missing military personnel in Afghanistan?

– Since 1991, this issue has been dealt with by the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers. The permanent leader of this organization is Hero Soviet Union Lieutenant General Ruslan Aushev. He was awarded the highest award of the Motherland for the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Therefore, he knows firsthand what it’s like to lose friends, and understands the pain of wives and mothers who lost their loved ones in the heat of the Afghan war. The search for missing servicemen in Afghanistan cannot be stopped. Their families, loved ones, friends need this, our entire country needs this.

Photo from personal archive
Mikhail Ovseenko.

Watch the film by Rafik Kudoyarov
The secret of the Badaber camp. Afghan trap
Year of release: 2009.
The film is based on the story of the captivity and death of Soviet soldiers who rebelled in a camp for training Afghan militants in the Pakistani town of Badabera, which is located 25 kilometers from the city of Peshawar.

This is truly true: big things are seen from a distance. A long time ago - almost twenty-one years ago - the first Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Viktor Dubynin, passed away, and only now do you realize the true value of this military leader.

It took seeing all the stupidity of the Chechen war, experiencing the collapse of the army under different commanders, feeling the shock of the sins of the first civilian Minister of Defense in order to understand what a rare person Dubynin was, how his talent, his modesty, his selflessness would be required in the protracted reform of our Armed Forces.

He was, without a doubt, the best commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan - that same hundred-thousand-strong group of troops that politicians slyly called a “limited contingent.” And at the same time, since he had the right character and never caved in to anyone, he was passed over in both titles and awards. Only after his death, through the efforts of his Afghan friends, did justice triumph: in 2003, Dubynin became a Hero of Russia, books were written about him, films were made, and the best students and teachers of the General Staff Academy will be awarded the General Dubynin Prize from this year.

The life and destiny of this man deserves to be remembered.

Finding himself in Afghanistan during the most fierce fighting, he did everything to save people. Legends still tell about his personal bravery. In the mountains near Khost, when shells and mines literally tore our command post to pieces and panic was inevitable, Dubynin’s self-control did not falter for a second: he did not even duck under heavy fire - he stood and gave orders in an even voice and controlled the battle.

Dubynin was the first - and few people know about this - to launch preemptive strikes on terrorist and mercenary bases in adjacent territory. In 1987, repeatedly confirmed intelligence data indicated that a large group of Wahhabis was being formed in Pakistan near the Afghan border to break into Afghanistan. Dubynin, at his own peril and risk (without coordination with Moscow), ordered to cover this area with massive artillery fire. For this in those years they could not only be removed from office...

He never thought about the consequences when it came to saving the lives of soldiers, defending the truth, protecting the unjustly offended, supporting the worthy. Many of the major generals owe him their promotions, their heroic stars, their careers. And some - with their lives.

Dubynin allowed soldiers to fight not in boots, but in sneakers, thereby grossly violating existing regulations and causing discontent among high authorities. (Just run around the mountains and over the rocks in "Kirzachs"!) Dubynin introduced mass helicopter landings into practice, which ensured surprise and efficiency. Under Dubynin, double accounting was stopped in counting the killed and wounded, when some numbers were reported to Moscow, but in reality they were completely different.

People like him have always been in short supply. Piece people.

Being first the first deputy commander of the 40th Army, Viktor Petrovich made short notes almost every day - for himself. He recorded the progress of hostilities, kept records of losses - ours and the enemy's, and gave meager assessments of the actions of the commanders. Sometimes - very rarely - he allowed himself to go beyond the formal enumeration of the events that happened during the day. It was as if he was sighing heavily: not a day without war! From these meager notes it is clear what a colossal burden lay on the general’s shoulders, what a huge responsibility he had to bear, how painfully he experienced every failure. Only a very conscientious, very decent person could make such notes. At the same time, this diary is a vivid and eloquent document of the time, a terrible and courageous evidence of a senseless war.

Army General Igor Rodionov, calling Dubynin “a man with nerves of iron,” complained: “His amazing restraint surprised everyone around him, but what was going on inside him, we will never know.” Perhaps lines from Dubynin’s work diary will help us see at least a small part of what was going on inside him.

11/23/84

At 4.30 he began combat operations with the 103rd Airborne Division. They took the fortress with a fight by 11.00, but the “spirits” came out and carried out heavy weapons. Killed in tsaranda uniform (Afghan police - V.S.). He met strong resistance in the village of Chaharkulbay-Ulia, suppressed it with fire and took it by noon. The spotters showed underground shelters and pillboxes, but everything was empty.

Terrible mood. Something went wrong somewhere. Lots of losses. We need to make more rational decisions for the future and specifically ask for losses. Badly. People are very poorly trained, especially in the 70th brigade.

11/25/84

Today is two months since I flew from Semipalatinsk to DRA. Time flew by quickly. Although I get up for surgery in the morning at 4.30 and go to bed at midnight. There is not enough time. I am always so “lucky” in life, all positions are always the most responsible, nervous...

In the DRA, you have to independently carry out at least one operation every month: plan everything, provide for it, be responsible for everyone. The losses alone can drive you crazy. But there are lucky ones here too - they just write papers and give instructions over the phone. So you can fight for ten years.

12/7/84

Second day of surgery. He began moving all troops from Kabul to Baraki... So far the troops are moving slowly. A narrow gorge, many mines... My stomach hurt, my temperature rose. Today I slept 1-2 hours. We need to do something to make sure we survive until the end of the operation.

The weather is deteriorating: wet snow began to fall and the wind rose. Low clouds, mountains are closed, aircraft do not fly. Even transporting the wounded is a problem.

12/12/84

Seventh day of surgery. Got up at 4.00. It rained all night, and in the morning it started snowing. There is heavy fog in the mountains, visibility is 20-30 meters. The weather is bad. How can we take out the wounded - there are 14 of them? He gave the command to carry it out in his arms. And the distance is 10-12 kilometers through the mountains, which means it will take 8-10 hours. They took it out in the evening. They tortured the guys. It's snowing and raining all the time. It's dog cold. Everyone was soaked to the skin. At 20.00 I send a column with the wounded to Gardez. It is very dangerous to drive at night, but there is no way out: we need to save people.

Dushmans are waging a real mine war. In the 10-kilometer section of Norai-Alikheil, during the seven days of the operation, 274 anti-tank mines and 22 land mines were removed and destroyed (by the way, all of them were from our unexploded aerial bombs).

01/01/85

The day before at 17.30 I went on duty in the army for a day. It's an honor New Year meet at headquarters, in your office. Until 4.30 I heard reports from unit and division commanders. At 12:00 Kabul time and 12:00 Moscow time, almost all Soviet posts opened fire with all types of weapons and launched a mass of flares into the sky. Fireworks in honor of the New Year.

Everything is fine at home. Luda is great. It's holding on. How I miss the children, Luda. I really want to stay at home for at least a few hours, but fate is a villain, everything turns out the other way around.

01/10/85

At 10.25 I met the district commander, who flew here to speak to the participants in the training of regimental commanders. He was dissatisfied with the fact that not everyone was gathered (but 42 people in hospitals, 29 in combat).

01/28/85

It was very difficult to understand the situation in the Kijol region (the Panjshir gorge, where the heaviest fighting took place - V.S.). DShKs are constantly being hit from prepared firing points located in caves. There are even rails installed on which carts with machine guns move. From above, the caves are covered with natural “balconies” and it is impossible to take them either by aviation or artillery.

1.02.85

Today I didn’t sleep all night, although the situation is normal. Turned 42 years old. I remembered my entire life, family, stages of service... I had to change my mind a lot. 42 years old... You can consider that you have lived two-thirds of your life, although sometimes it seems that you haven’t lived yet, that everything is ahead... The most important thing now is to serve honestly in the DRA, and then live as before. The best thing is in the Union, at home. Although I work 10-12 hours a day, I work at home.

03/24/85

The “greens” failed (that’s what soldiers of the Afghan government forces were called in slang - V.S.). They refuse to go forward or go, but in the other direction. The advisers lie that the heights are occupied by Afghan troops, but in reality they are not. Because of them, we suffered losses: three killed, four wounded. It’s hard to fight in a coalition... I decided to remove the “greens” from the combat zone, but this is not a solution. Who will defend the April Revolution? Difficult!

Today the adjutant fell ill. Typhus. And I was always in the same kung with him. We ate food together and talked. Am I going to get sick too? You need to wait ten days (incubation period). The adjutant was taken to a hospital in Kabul.

At 10.00 I flew with General Smirnov to Bagram, where I would head the army’s operational group for several months.

No mood. From one operation to another. In all this time there is only one day without war. I was supposed to fly to Tashkent, but they didn’t let me go. And now I’ll have to be here for a long time. Eh, my bad fate...

04/21/85

The situation is normal, however, there were two shellings at night. I can’t understand where they’re hitting from? The terrain in this green zone is complex; it consists of the floodplain of a dozen rivers. Basically a plain with an area of ​​50 by 20 km. There are hundreds of villages here, surrounded by vineyards and tall duvals. Each village has several medieval fortresses. All of them are adapted for all-round defense. A large number of karizs, multi-storey and up to several kilometers long. They pass under river beds, roads, and gardens. You can use them to move secretly from one village to another.

At 10.00 I flew to the CP of the 108th division. When returning back the weather at the pass deteriorated, we were flying in the clouds. We were walking at an altitude of 5300 m, and the helicopter began to become covered in ice. This is the worst thing. A week ago, in such weather conditions, an Mi-8 crashed in the same area after icing (five people died). But everything turned out well for us.

The soldiers fight heroically. They go to their death just to help a friend. But somehow we often quickly forget such heroic deeds.

05/20/85

At 4.00 the troops began to move towards Jalalabad. At 12.00 I fly out and begin to lead the military operations. It's so hot in Jalalabad that your ears are curling. It's hard to work in such conditions. All wet, constantly thirsty. Doctors say that here you need to drink at least eight liters of water per day, only then the body will not become dehydrated.

05/21/85

The 66th brigade acted accurately and by 10.00 completed the task of capturing the road (95 km). The 56th was unable to reach its area in a timely manner, and after landing the landing force came under very heavy fire. A battle ensued that lasted several hours, and we suffered significant losses. The brigade commander is largely to blame for taking the path of deception (he lies, but people die). He was removed from office...

920 people landed during the day.

06/12/85

I was planning to go on vacation, but after talking with the commander I had to forget about it. Must go to Bagram and lead the fighting. This is for the whole summer and even autumn. Whatever you do, you must fulfill your duty honestly and to the end. You have to serve here for two years without anyone reproaching you.

06/19/85

At 4.00 I studied the situation. The Afghans had not yet thought about going to Kijol, although they should have already taken it. At 4.30 I decided to make a landing. At 6.00 the landing began: 33 aircraft, 32 helicopters, 26 artillery pieces were involved. installations. By 10.55 the landing was completed: a total of 700 people, of which 237 were Afghans. It went well, without losses, but during landing one Mi-8 fell. Reason: we landed at an altitude of 3150 meters and the helicopter sank due to lack of power in the thin air. The car fell on its left side, but the crew and troops are alive - that’s the main thing. By 12.00 the landing force had completed its mission.

The Afghans captured Kijol, but by the end of the day the rebels drove them out of there and they retreated back. They fight poorly... The day turned out to be very tense, full of nerves. The combat operations are under the control of the district commander, Moscow, everyone is calling, demanding, interfering...

06/24/85

It has been nine months since I left my family, from Semipalatinsk. How time flies. But it seemed to me that two years had already passed. It seems like an eternity has already passed. It’s like I’ve been in the DRA all my life. Everything here is boring to the point of pain in the heart, to the point of despair, especially these stupid military operations.

06/27/85

Everyone is demanding to capture Kijol as quickly as possible, but we have been unable to do so for the ninth day, although three regiments, 40 planes, 50 helicopters are involved. There are a lot of enemies. The area is well prepared in engineering terms: there are a lot of pillboxes, crevices, caves, and it is impossible to knock out the “spirits” from them.

At 7.30 I flew to Barak to sort things out. The situation is difficult. The companies are lying down. People don’t dare raise their heads, the fire is so dense. Although aviation and artillery carry out dozens of strikes with a large consumption of ammunition.

To divert our forces from Panjshir, Ahmad Shah gave the command to strike on communications, and at 11.30 the rebels began shelling two columns of ammunition in the Salang area. The pipeline was broken - it caught fire, and from it the fire spread to the columns. Two armored personnel carriers, seven cars burned down, 3 killed, 15 wounded.

At 14.30 the 180th regiment was alerted and at 15.30 it began moving from Kabul to Salang to strengthen the security of the pass and route.

We make a decision: take Kijol at night.

06/28/85

At dawn they took Kijol and began to operate in the direction of the Aushaba gorge, but at about 10.00 a hurricane of fire was opened on us from dozens of caves. We suffered losses. We cannot bring the tanks down, because... the road is destroyed and mined. It was a very nervous and stressful day. We must end these hostilities.

From 06/30/85 to 07/11/85

It was not possible to keep a diary: very tense and difficult days. They took the Kijol crossroads with difficulty and heavy losses. They destroyed a lot of armored vehicles, but the result was zero... What fear people have when crossing this bridge at the Kijol intersection! One Afghan driver (there was shelling from a DShK) out of fear tore out the steering wheel and ran back with it - all wet, pale, unable to make a sound.

Something bad happened on Salanga: the “spirits” burned a convoy of tankers - 64 vehicles and two of our armored personnel carriers. We don’t have time to take retaliatory measures, we don’t have enough strength. And the enemy strives to inflict tangible injections.

On July 7, near Bagram, 10 of our tankers were burned, and 15 KamAZ trucks were disabled. I flew there by helicopter. Seas of fire. I wanted to sit down next to the column, but the “spirits” opened fire on the helicopter.

For 10 days they tried to take at least 2-3 kilometers of the Aushaba gorge... Hundreds of caves prepared for defense (there are caves with doors and rails for the movement of large-caliber machine gun installations). Such fortifications cannot be taken either by aviation or artillery. You can collapse the entrances a little, but you cannot destroy all the mountains. The caves are located at different heights, multi-tiered, and fire weapons there are targeted at every square meter.

It must be said that Soviet soldiers fight very selflessly, bravely, and heroically. If someone is wounded, they go to their death just to help their comrade. There are a lot of such actions that fully deserve the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But somehow we often quickly forget such heroic deeds...

And the Afghans conduct military operations very poorly. There are many attempts at desertion, they don’t want to fight, they are being cunning. Almost the majority are in solidarity with the dushmans. In six months, 16 thousand people were drafted into the army, and more than 14 thousand deserted.

I myself am constantly in Bagram, every day I fly to Salang, Panjshir, and the troops. There is a lot to do from 5.00 am to 23.00. I dream of getting at least one day without war and getting a good night’s sleep. And sleep doesn’t help: I ​​always dream about battles, losses, nightmares. I haven’t seen peaceful dreams for a long time.

07/16/85

From KP-345 they reported that they had captured a prison and several warehouses with weapons and ammunition. He took with him an intelligence assistant, the secretary of the army party committee, and a photographer. We landed - there was no shelling. We went down into the gorge and went under the cover of snipers and scouts. The village is empty, everything is abandoned. Sheep, goats, and donkeys roam. The gorge is very narrow, surrounded by steep cliffs up to 3000 meters high, and a river raging below.

The prison left a strong impression. New buildings. Half of them are in caves, this is for service personnel. And the prison itself is deep wolf pits with hatches at the top. Inside there are three large chambers that can accommodate up to 40 people. The "spirits" held 127 Afghan prisoners of war and 14 Soviet prisoners there. In the cells, there were rags and shoes lying on the floor, and everything was literally covered in blood. At the top there were torture rooms with “tools” and solitary confinement for prisoners.

They shot the prisoners on the bridge over the river and threw them into it. 120 corpses of Afghan soldiers were found in the river, and Soviet prisoners were taken to the south. The bodies were caught on rocks along 1.5 kilometers of the river. All were shot and finished off with knives.

At first I wanted to blow it all up, but then I decided to invite TV and film cameramen from Kabul here - let them film and show the barbarity to the whole world.

07/19/85

At 7.30 he flew to the combat area of ​​the 56th brigade. Then he flew to Salang, to the area of ​​the 201st division’s military base, where he was until 13.00. From there he left for Bagram, and at 15.00 he flew to Barak to control the landing. We flew into a strong wind, and it was chattering again.

I'm in a really bad mood. I was very tired mentally and physically. Lack of sleep all the time, hassle. At least take a day to rest, get some sleep, and get away from all your worries. There have also been no letters from home for about two months. What's happened? In general, things are bad. My heart began to ache from longing for home, for my homeland, for my family. And it’s terrible how long it takes to be here and work productively.

Today, or rather yesterday, is exactly 24 years since I served in the Soviet Army.

07/22/85

At 11.00 I met the new commander-in-chief of the southern direction, Army General Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaitsev, the district commander, Colonel General Mikhail Ivanovich Popov, the army commander, Lieutenant General Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich, and a group of accompanying generals who flew to Barak to study the situation. Reported on Panjshir. The Commander-in-Chief is dissatisfied with the fact that the personnel in the companies have few DShKs and other heavy weapons. It is difficult to prove that people already carry over 25 kg on their shoulders.

From 23.07 to 31.07. '85

There was no time to write in a diary, but many events happened during this period. Units and subunits conducted exhausting combat operations at high altitudes. Thus, the 191st regiment in the Khazar Gorge occupied heights of 3700-4000 meters. It must be said that our soldiers and officers are not ready to operate in such mountains. There is no mountaineering or mountaineering equipment, each person carries a load of 30 kg. Constant danger of shelling. And most importantly, you have to act without any adaptation. It's very difficult for people. There is not enough water, they don’t want to eat. Up to one third of the personnel is sick.

In these conditions, it is difficult to provide units with food and ammunition, and if suddenly someone is wounded or killed, it is impossible to land a helicopter (the Mi-8 at such a horizontal altitude can still fly, but if it cannot hover, it fails).

On the same days, the commander-in-chief ordered additional posts to be set up around the Bagram airfields. I took up this task, but it turns out that it’s not so easy to enter the green zone with armored vehicles: there are a lot of ditches, canals, duvals, the terrain is almost impassable... The dushman’s posts are constantly shelled. Yes, you need to have them to guard the airfield, however, the service there is absolutely unbearable.

On 30.07 I flew to one such post on a mountain in the center of the green area. Not a mountain, but solid peaks, “pencils”, a lunar landscape, blown by winds from all sides. And there is nowhere to hide from the dushman’s bullets. Disembarked from a hover. We were immediately fired upon from a machine gun, although the bullets went over our heads. He sent 24 sappers and a ton of explosives to this mountain, and they made a 6x4 meter "penny" for landing helicopters. It is in such conditions that a company must serve for three months...

On this day, an evening of military friends dedicated to the memory of the outstanding Soviet military leader will take place in the Oktyabr cinema and concert hall on Novy Arbat.

And it's all about him…

He was somewhat similar to Zhukov.

Army General Valentin Varennikov

When it came to principles, Dubynin was adamant.

Colonel General Boris Gromov

Among us who served in Afghanistan, he was the best. Both as a professional and as a person.

Colonel General Georgy Kondratyev

If I could write poetry, I would write a poem about him.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Yuri Kashlev

In Afghanistan they called him neither general nor commander, just Dubynin. This surname was synonymous with success.

Lieutenant General Ruslan Aushev

I understood perfectly well: in my place, in the post of minister, of course, Dubynin should have been. Such commanders are born once every hundred years.

Army General Pavel Grachev

A country Subordination

commander

Included in

Turkestan Military District (TurkVO), Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan (OKSVA)

Type Includes

controls, parts and connections

Function Number

associations

Dislocation

TurkVO, DRA

Participation in

Providing international assistance

Commanders Notable commanders

See Commanders

40th Army (40 A, 40th Army (combined arms)- an association (army) within the Armed Forces of the USSR. She was part of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period 1979 - 1989.

• 1 First formation
• 2 History of creation
  • 2.1 Entry into Afghanistan
• 3 Command staff
  • 3.1 Commanders
  • 3.2 Members of the Military Council
  • 3.3 Deputy commanders
  • 3.4 Head of Operations Department
• 4 Composition
  • 4.1 Units and formations of special troops (command and combat support)
  • 4.2 Units and formations of special troops (logistical support)
    • 4.2.1 Medical support units and institutions
• 5 Weapons, equipment and equipment
  • 5.1 Tanks in the 40th Army
• 6 Reform of the staff structure
• 7 Sentry protection
  • 7.1 Organization of outposts
  • 7.2 Outposts in the “caravan war”
  • 7.3 Conditions of service at outposts
• 8 Afghan training
• 9 See also
• 10 Literature
• 11 Links
• 12 Notes

First formation

Main article: 40th Army (USSR, 1941-1945)

History of creation

The 40th Army (40 A) was formed in the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) according to the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces dated December 16, 1979. Lieutenant General Yu. Tukharinov, first deputy commander of the TurkVO, was appointed commander of the army.

Since December 10, 1979, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, the deployment and staffing of units and formations of the TurkVO and the Central Asian Military District (SAVO) was carried out.

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the final decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

There was no general directive for manning, deployment and combat readiness; troops were brought to readiness and deployed by separate command orders after verbal orders from the USSR Minister of Defense. In just three weeks (until December 31, 1979), more than 30 such orders were issued.

The field control (headquarters) of 40 A was deployed in TurkVO, the control of the 34th mixed aviation corps (34 sak) - in the Northern Military District.

On December 24, 1979, USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov held a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, where he announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan and signed Directive No. 312/12/001.

Until December 25, 1979, about 100 formations and units were deployed, an army set of combat and logistics support units. More than 50,000 people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves for additional staffing, and about 8,000 cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. This was the largest deployment in the Central Asian region in the post-war period.

The following was deployed in TurkVO:

• two motorized rifle divisions: (5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in Kushka and 108th Motorized Rifle Division in Termez);
• 353rd Cannon Artillery Brigade (353 Pabr)
• 2nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (2 air defense brigade)
• 56th Guards air assault brigade (56 airborne brigade)
• 103rd separate regiment communications (103 ops)
• 28th Army Rocket Artillery Regiment (28 reap)

as well as units, formations and establishments of special forces.

in SAVO it was deployed:

• 860th separate motorized rifle Pskov Red Banner Regiment (860 separate motorized rifle regiment)
• 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (attached to 108th Motorized Rifle Division)

The aviation included two aviation regiments of fighter-bombers (apib) - the 136th and 217th, the 115th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) and two separate helicopter regiments (OVP) - the 181st and 280th, 302- I am a separate helicopter squadron (OVE) under the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, part of aviation technical and airfield support.

Three divisions were deployed as a reserve for the introduced group (58th Motorized Rifle Division in TurkVO, 68th Motorized Rifle Division and 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Northern Military District).

Also included in the group were: 103rd Guards. airborne division (103rd Airborne Division), 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment (345th Guards Separate Division).

The time of crossing the state border between the USSR and Afghanistan was set at 15:00 Moscow time on December 27, 1979.

By the time the 40th Army entered Afghanistan, Soviet units were already present. Introduced in early December, the GRU special squad (the so-called “ Muslim battalion"), formed in the summer of 1979 to perform special tasks, two battalions and the 9th company of the 345th Guards Separate Division (one of which had been stationed since July of the same year, the second arrived with the “Muslim battalion”).

Entering Afghanistan

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979.

The first to begin the crossing was the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, whose target was Kunduz. On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division was the first to be transported to the territory of the DRA. Following him, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion (4th Airborne Assault Battalion) of the 56th Registry Brigade crossed, which was tasked with guarding the Salang Pass. BTA planes with troops and military equipment on board crossed the air border of Afghanistan.

From the Air Force, an aviation squadron (ae) of the 115th Guards IAP flew to Bagram, the rest of the aircraft flew from TurkVO airfields.

Army Headquarters, 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 56th Guards Dshbr (minus one battalion), 353rd Artillery Brigade, 2nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 103rd Hotel Signal Regiment, 28th reap, army reinforcement and support units remained on the territory of the Soviet Union.

On the evening of December 27, 1979, the “Muslim battalion” (154th separate detachment special forces of the 1st formation) and special KGB groups stormed the palace of the Afghan leader Amin on the outskirts of Kabul, during which Amin was killed. In the city itself, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division operated, seizing important government and military institutions and blocking Afghan units stationed in Kabul.

On the night from December 27 to December 28, 1979, the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division entered Afghanistan along the Kushka-Shindand route. On the morning of December 28, 1979, units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, redirected to Kabul (except for two motorized infantry regiments remaining near Kunduz and Puli-Khumri) reached the Afghan capital and completely blocked it.

Command staff

Commanders

• Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yuri Vladimirovich. Commissioning of OKSV in DRA - September 23, 1980.
• Lieutenant General Tkach Boris Ivanovich September 23, 1980 - May 7, 1982
• Lieutenant General Ermakov Viktor Fedorovich May 7, 1982 - November 4, 1983
• Lieutenant General Leonid Evstafievich Generalov November 4, 1983 - April 19, 1985
• Lieutenant General Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich April 19, 1985 - April 30, 1986
• Lieutenant General Dubynin Viktor Petrovich April 30, 1986 - June 1, 1987
• Lieutenant General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich June 1, 1987 - February 15, 1989

• Lieutenant General Norat Grigoryevich Ter-Grigoryants 1981-1983 - Chief of Staff
• Major General Ovchinnikov, Alexander Ivanovich 1982-1984

Deputy Commanders

• Korolev Victor

Head of Operations Department

• Turlais, Dainis - from 1985 to 1989.

Compound

The composition of the 40th Army indicates formations and military units from the moment of entry until the final withdrawal of troops (without indicating combat and logistics support units within the divisions). 2

• 5th Guards Zimovnikov Order of Kutuzov motorized rifle division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR
  • 101st Motorized Rifle Regiment
  • 12th Guards Motorized Rifle Red Banner Regiment, Orders of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky (introduced in March 1985)
  • 371st Guards Motorized Rifle Berlin Order of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment
  • 373rd Guards Motorized Rifle Twice Red Banner, Orders of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment (reformed in March 1980 into the 70th OMSBR)
  • 24th Guards Tank Prague Order of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment (withdrawn in October 1986)
  • 1060th Artillery Regiment
  • 1008th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (withdrawn in February 1980)
  • 1122nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Sevastopol Red Banner Regiment (withdrawn in October 1986)
• 108th Motorized Rifle Nevelskaya Twice Red Banner Division
  • 177th Dvinsk Motorized Rifle Regiment
  • 180th Red Banner Motorized Rifle Regiment, Order of Suvorov
  • 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment
  • 186th Motorized Rifle Vyborg Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment (reformed in March 1980 into the 66th Omsbr)
  • 234th Tank Permyshl-Berlin Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment (reassigned from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and withdrawn in the summer of 1980)
  • 285th Tank Uman-Warsaw Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Regiment (reassigned from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. In March 1984, reorganized into the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment)
  • 682nd motorized rifle Uman-Warsaw Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov regiment
  • 1074th Artillery Lviv Red Banner, Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Regiment
  • 1049th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (withdrawn in November 1981)
  • 1415th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (introduced to replace the withdrawn 1049th Zenap, withdrawn in October 1986)
  • 738th separate anti-tank division
• 201st Motorized Rifle Gatchina Twice Red Banner Division
  • 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Czestochowa Red Banner, Order of the Red Star Regiment
  • 191st Motorized Rifle Narva Red Banner, Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment (removed from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division with the status of “separate”)
  • 234th Tank Permyshl-Berlin Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment (reassigned to the 108th Motorized Rifle Division and withdrawn in the summer of 1980)
  • 285th Tank Uman-Warsaw Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Regiment (reassigned to the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in December 1980)
  • 395th Motorized Rifle Regiment
  • 998th Artillery Staro-Konstantinovsky Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment
  • 990th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (withdrawn in October 1986)
• 103rd Guards Airborne Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR
  • 317th Guards Parachute Landing Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment
  • 350th Guards Parachute Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment
  • 357th Guards Parachute Landing Order of Suvorov Regiment
  • 1179th Guards Artillery Red Banner Regiment
• 56th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (withdrawn in June 1988)
• 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Vyborg Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Alexander Nevsky Brigade (withdrawn in June 1988)
• 70th separate guards motorized rifle twice Red Banner, orders of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky brigade (withdrawn in August 1988)
• 345th Separate Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment named after the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol
• 191st separate motorized rifle Narva Red Banner, Order of Alexander Nevsky regiment (withdrawn in May 1988)
• 860th separate motorized rifle Pskov Red Banner Regiment (withdrawn in May 1988)
• 28th Army Artillery Regiment (until 04/01/86 - 28th Army Rocket Artillery Regiment) (withdrawn in August 1988) 17
• 2nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (withdrawn in the summer of 1980)
• 353rd Guards Artillery Mogilev Brigade of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Alexander Nevsky (withdrawn in the summer of 1980)
• Air Force of the 40th Army (Air Force 40 A). Formerly the 34th Mixed Aviation Corps (34 Sak).
  • Through the 40th Army Air Force, in rotation order military units, 11 fighter aviation regiments (IAP), a separate reconnaissance aviation regiment (orap), a separate reconnaissance and tactical aviation squadron (ortae), an assault aviation regiment (shap), a separate assault aviation squadron (oshae), a separate mixed aviation regiment (osap) passed in stages ), 7 fighter-bomber aviation regiments (ibap), 4 separate helicopter aviation regiments (ovap), 6 separate helicopter aviation squadrons (ovae). From the territory of the USSR, 3 bomber aviation regiments (bap), 9 heavy bomber aviation regiments of Long-Range Aviation (tbap) and crews of 17 separate helicopter aviation regiments (ovap) were brought in to strike targets in Afghanistan. Subordinate to the Air Force of the 40th Army there were 7 separate security battalions (obo - essentially a motorized rifle battalion on an armored personnel carrier), 8 separate airfield technical support battalions (obato), 9 separate airfield technical support companies (orato), 7 battalions and 3 communications companies and radio technical support (obsrto and orsrto). 2

Units and formations of special troops (command and combat support)

• 15th separate brigade special purpose (completely introduced with brigade headquarters in March 1985) 5
• 22nd separate special purpose brigade (completely introduced with brigade headquarters in March 1985) 6
• 103rd Separate Order of Kutuzov Signal Regiment
• 1996th separate radio technical air defense battalion of the 40th Army
• 254th separate radio engineering regiment for special purposes. The 254th detachment conducted electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare. 15
• 45th separate engineer-sapper Red Banner, Order of the Red Star regiment. When formed, included in its composition: 14
  • 19th separate engineer battalion
  • 92nd Separate Engineering Road Battalion
  • 1117th separate engineer special mining battalion
  • 2088th separate engineer barrage battalion

Units and formations of special troops (logistics support)

• 159th separate road construction brigade (reformed into the 58th brigade in 1984)
• 58th separate automobile brigade
• 59th Army Logistics Brigade
• 14th separate pipeline battalion (14th OTP), in 1982 reorganized into the 276th separate pipeline brigade
• 276th separate pipeline brigade
• 1461st separate pipeline battalion (1461st optical battalion), commissioned in 1984
• The 692nd separate road battalion (692nd ODB), in 1983 became part of the 278th ODKB, with reorganization into the 692nd ODKB.
• 278th Separate Road Commandant Brigade 8. When formed, it included in its composition:
  • 692nd separate road commandant battalion
  • 1083rd separate road commandant battalion
  • 1084th separate road commandant battalion
• 194th Guards Military Transport Aviation Bryansk Red Banner Regiment named after Gastello, based in Fergana, armed with An-12BP aircraft
• 128th Guards Military Transport Aviation Leningrad Red Banner Regiment
• 930th Military Transport Aviation Komsomol Transylvanian Red Banner Regiment
• 50th Separate Mixed Aviation Order of the Red Star Regiment. The 50th Osap, in addition to squadrons of transport aircraft, included helicopter squadrons and participated directly in combat operations to destroy the enemy. 16
• The 342nd Engineering Directorate is a formation of military construction units formed to create military infrastructure. Organizationally, it included 2 construction companies, 9 battalions - 6 military construction, 2 electrical and technical and 1 plumbing:
  • 2017th separate construction and installation battalion
  • 2018th separate construction and installation battalion
  • 2137th separate construction and installation battalion
  • 1110th separate military construction battalion
  • 1112th separate military construction battalion
  • 1630th separate military construction battalion
  • 1705th separate military construction battalion
  • 1707th separate military construction battalion
  • 1708th separate military construction battalion
  • 773rd separate military construction company
  • 774th separate military construction company

Medical support units and institutions

The management of the activities of medical units and institutions of the 40th Army was carried out by:

• Medical service of the rear of the 40th army;
• Medical service of the rear air force of the 40th army.

To provide specialized and qualified medical care to the wounded and sick, it was deployed

• Kabul - 650th central military hospital of the 40th Army with 400 beds;

• Infectious diseases military hospital with 500 beds;
• Garrison military clinic;
• Dental military clinic;
• Sanitary Anti-Epidemic Squad (SEA);
• Forensic Medical Laboratory (FML);
• Blood Transfusion Station (BTS);
• Pathoanatomical (PAL);
• Scientific Research Laboratory (SRL);

• Bagram - infectious diseases hospital with 400 beds;
• rehabilitation center for convalescents;
• 100th separate medical sanitary battalion 108th motorized rifle division;

• Jalalabad - infectious diseases hospital for especially dangerous infections with 200 beds;
• Puli-Khumri - garrison military hospital with 200 beds;
• Kandahar city - military hospital with 175 beds;
• Shindand - garrison military hospital with 300 beds;

• branch of the blood transfusion station (BTS);

• Kunduz city - sanitary-epidemiological detachment (SED);

• infectious diseases hospital with 150 beds.

Medical support for the garrisons of Kunduz and Kandahar was carried out respectively on the basis of the 99th separate medical battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division and the medical company of the 70th separate motorized rifle brigade. garrison of Fayzabad, medical support was provided on the basis of the medical company of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment. garrison of Gardez, medical support was provided on the basis of the medical company of the 56th separate air assault brigade. Air Force regiments, medical centers with regular infirmaries with 25 beds were deployed as part of OBATO.

Evacuation to nearby medical facilities was carried out by ground. To evacuate the wounded and sick by air, 8 Mi-8 “Bissektrisa” helicopters and 2 An-26 “Spasatel” aircraft were used. Regimental medical stations (RMS) were often not used; the wounded from the medical posts of regiments and battalions were evacuated directly to separate medical battalions of divisions or to army hospitals. During major offensive operations Soviet troops, 90% of the wounded were immediately evacuated by helicopter (74% in 1981, 94.4% in 1987). In 1980, 48% of the wounded were evacuated to division medical hospitals or army hospitals within three hours of injury.

To provide medical equipment and equipment, they deployed

• Medical warehouses as part of Transshipment Bases:

• in the Kabul direction Hairatan (Uch-Kizyl);
• in the Herat direction Turagundi (Kushka);

• 1474th medical warehouse 59 abrmo in Puli-Khumri;
• Medical warehouse (garrison) Kabul;
• Medical warehouse (garrison) Herat;
• Medical equipment repair shop Kabul;

The provision of medical oxygen was carried out at the expense of the AKDS-70M Air Force of the 40th Army. The supply of medical equipment to medical warehouses was carried out, with the exception of Kabul, by road transport. Medical equipment and small-sized medical equipment were delivered to the medical warehouse in Kabul by military transport aviation (MTA) aircraft (Il-76, An-12). The supply of remote garrisons was carried out by pick-up in convoys. Urgent deliveries of urgently needed equipment were carried out by Bisector helicopters

Weapons, equipment and equipment

It should be noted that the Afghan War, after the Great Patriotic War, for the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces turned out to be a convenient testing ground for testing weapons and the organizational structure of troops. On it, directly representatives of the Soviet defense industry and the military could test methods of warfare and weapons capabilities.
Before this period, the assessment of the combat qualities of military equipment produced in the USSR could only be assessed indirectly - by operation in friendly states to which it was supplied and used in wars (Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq War, etc. .).

AGS-17 mounted on the rear axle of a GAZ-66 mortar 2B9 "Vasilyok" mounted on a multi-purpose tractor MT-LB

Throughout the Afghan war, there was a constant modernization of weapons and reorganization of military units and formations of the 40th Army in search of optimal options. Some examples of weapons modernization that were influenced by the realities of the Afghan war include:

• the appearance of infantry fighting vehicles BMP-1D, BMP-2D and the T-62M tank with increased armor.
• the appearance of the BTR-80 armored personnel carrier with improved ergonomics and a more reliable diesel engine.
• the appearance of reconnaissance and signaling equipment complexes (anti-personnel seismic sensors) 1K119 “Realiya-1” and 1K124 “Tabun”.
• truck cabin reservations.
• installation of thermal interference emitters and thermal traps on Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport and landing helicopters.
• installation of a more powerful power plant and armoring of the cabin of Mi-8 transport helicopters.
• modernization of sighting devices and additional armoring of units on the Su-25, Su-17 and MiG-27 attack aircraft.
• the use of new high-precision air-to-ground guided missiles Kh-25 and Kh-29L.

Also, gaining combat experience directly in military units, military personnel, showing their own initiative, began to use standard weapons outside the framework established by service instructions and technical manuals.
Similar examples could be:

• installation of automatic grenade launchers on the turrets of armored personnel carriers and on various rotary supports (for example, on the rear axles of trucks dug into the ground).
• installation of ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns on trucks.
• installation of automatic mortars 2B9 "Vasilyok" on the MT-LB tractor.
• installation of infantry machine guns on helicopters.
• the use of infantry flamethrowers and thermobaric shells to destroy enemy personnel in caves and underground communications.
• the use of the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” self-propelled anti-aircraft gun for firing at ground targets and its modernization for this task with an increase in ammunition, which required the removal of the radio instrument complex from the design.
• installation on tanks by military personnel and regular repair shops, directly in military units, of mechanical protection against cumulative shells.

Directly in Afghanistan, the Soviet Army, for the first time in 40 post-war years, switched to a new type of field uniform, the so-called “Afghan”, replacing the obsolete traditional jacket with open buttons, riding breeches and caps in the summer version and an overcoat/pea coat with cotton pants to a double-breasted jacket with a fur collar and double-layer pants. Also in Afghanistan, dry rations for mountain shooters, a new type of blood substitute (perftoran), camp filters for purifying drinking water, and much more were tested for the first time.

Tanks in the 40th Army

Despite the presence at the southern borders of the USSR (in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts) at the beginning of the 1980s about 1000 modern T-64 and T-72 tanks with an automatic loader and a more powerful 125-mm caliber gun, the backbone of the tank fleet of the 40th Army consisted of T-55 and T-62 tanks. T-64 tanks as part of OKSVA were taken out of service due to problems with the operation of a two-stroke diesel engine in high altitude conditions.

Contrary to established false belief, the lack of more modern tanks was not due to the lack of a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles from the enemy. The opposing side received sufficient quantities of Chinese-made Type 78 recoilless rifles and American-made 75-mm M20 recoilless rifles, not to mention the saturation of enemy units with RPG-2/RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and their Chinese-made analogues, as well as large-caliber DShK class machine guns, which the enemy successfully used against lightly armored targets (armored personnel carriers, BMD, BMP, MT-LB, etc.):

Thanks to foreign financial assistance, the opposition constantly increased its anti-tank arsenals. In 1984, the norm was considered to be the presence of one RPG per ten people, a recoilless rifle, a DShK and 2-3 RPGs for a group of 25 people, and a formation of hundreds of fighters relied on four DShKs, five BZO (Recoilless Gun - abbr.) and a dozen RPGs. In the first half of 1987 alone, units of the 40th Army destroyed or captured 580 DShK machine guns and anti-aircraft mountain installations, 238 recoilless rifles, and 483 anti-tank grenade launchers. If in 1983-1985 there was one RPG-7 for 10-12 militants, then in 1987 - already for 5-6 people..."

The refusal of the military leadership to use more modern tanks can be considered the exceptionally successful design of the T-55/T-62 in matters of reliability, maintenance and repair, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the use of tanks in mountainous areas, proven by practice:

Major General Lyakhovsky, assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the DRA, recalled: “... tanks ... in most cases “did not find” operational space for their use, could not fire at the tops of the mountains, got stuck in the “green stuff” and often became useless in battle ."

Soviet tank crews did everything they could in Afghanistan. If American Abrams or German Leopards were in the place of the T-55, they would not have achieved more in guerrilla warfare. It is characteristic that during the 2001 operation, the Americans did not dare to operate in Afghanistan as a ground force, leaving the dirty work to anti-Taliban opposition troops armed with Soviet equipment.

From a technical point of view, these tanks (T-55/T-62) performed well. The four-stroke diesel engine, which had been used for decades, worked quite steadily both in the mountains and in the deserts of Afghanistan. The fine dust, which was a real curse, quickly clogged the air cleaner's screens and cyclones, but its maintenance was not particularly difficult.

There were practically no complaints about the armament of the tanks - 100-mm and 115-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells had a sufficient effect on unprotected manpower, and there was essentially no armored enemy in Afghanistan.

Armored vehicles in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Reforming the staff structure

It should be noted that steps to reform the staff structure in the 40th Army began two months after the entry of troops:

• For example, regiments and brigades were withdrawn from Afghanistan, whose continued presence there was considered excessive and irrational - the 353rd Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and the 234th Tank Regiment of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. These units were introduced as a reserve in case of expected intervention by other states.
• Having analyzed the situation in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Helmand and Kandahar, the military leadership recognized it as inappropriate to send motorized rifle divisions to them (as they were excessive in numbers) and in the winter of 1980, on the basis of two motorized rifle regiments (186th motorized rifle regiment, 108th motorized rifle division and 373rd Guards MSP 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division) formed two large separate motorized rifle brigades - respectively the 66th with a deployment in Jalalabad and the 70th Guards with a deployment in Kandahar. 11 12
• Another example of the operational reform of an entire regiment is the reorganization of the 285th tank regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division into the 682nd motorized rifle regiment in the spring of 1984. The reason for such a serious step was the need for an additional motorized rifle regiment to enter the Panjshir Gorge in order to partially control it and the irrationality of maintaining a tank regiment in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The introduction of an additional motorized rifle regiment from the territory of the USSR would have an adverse effect on the already difficult political situation surrounding the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. As a result of such a military-organizational reshuffling, the number of regiments in the 40th Army remained the same, but the personnel increased, since a motorized rifle regiment in terms of personnel is more than twice as large as a tank regiment and can solve a wider range of combat missions.
• Despite the complete absence of air and armored targets from the enemy, anti-aircraft and anti-tank units in the detachments, regiments and brigades of the 40th Army were not reduced or disbanded. Moreover, the 1049th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division with outdated weapons, covering the Headquarters of the 40th Army and the strategically important airfield in Bagram, was replaced in 1981 by the 1415th anti-aircraft missile regiment, which was armed with modern weapons. moment mobile anti-aircraft missile systems 9K33 "Osa". The same reform affected the composition of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division with the replacement of the 1008th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment with the 1122nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in the winter of 1980. Since the fall of 1986, anti-aircraft missile artillery divisions (ZRADN) have been formed in all motorized rifle regiments by adding to the standard anti-aircraft missile artillery battery (ZRAB) a newly created anti-aircraft missile battery (ZRB) from individual anti-aircraft missile platoons withdrawn from the staff line battalions.
• The airborne support units in the 103rd Guards Airborne Division and the 56th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade were not completely disbanded. Although the need for them, due to the impossibility of conducting parachute operations, has completely disappeared. The military personnel of these units were used as reserve rifle units during military operations. Extract from the form - a list of military operations of the 56th Guards Airborne Brigade
• The reform of the troops of the 40th Army, which increased its combat power, required the rearmament of all airborne and air assault units. The indicated units, which were armed with lightweight airborne armored vehicles (BMD-1, BMD-2, BTR-D), starting in 1982, began to receive replacement armored vehicles with greater protection and a longer service life (BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-70), standard for motorized rifle troops. In terms of the essence of the combat missions they performed and in terms of armament, parachute and air assault units were no different from motorized rifle units. Also included landing units and formations, tank units were included to strengthen them: in the 103rd Airborne Division - the 62nd separate tank battalion, in the 345th Parachute Regiment - a tank company, in the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade - a tank platoon. 9
• The reform also affected the organizational and staffing structure of linear units. In practice, it turned out that the adopted company and battalion level scheme does not meet the requirements for conducting combat operations in the mountains, where units are forced to independently carry out assigned combat missions, in isolation from fire support units and standard armored vehicles. Due to this, the saturation of heavy small arms and mortars increased. For each motorized rifle company, a 4th platoon was added to the 3 motorized rifle platoons - Machine Gun-Grenade Launcher. The parachute company added the 4th mortar platoon to the 3 parachute platoons. The air assault company added the 4th Mortar Platoon and the 5th Machine Gun Platoon to the 3 air assault platoons. And this despite the fact that the battalion had a Mortar Battery on staff. 11 12
• Regular separate chemical defense platoons in regiments and brigades have been reorganized into flamethrower platoons since 1984. Separate chemical defense companies within motorized rifle divisions were reorganized into separate flamethrower companies 11 12
• Difficulties in providing fuel for military equipment due to constant shelling of transport convoys and the cost of delivering it by road transport forced the military leadership to build a unique pipeline in two lines 438 kilometers long for the supply of diesel fuel and aviation kerosene along the Termez-Hairatan-Puli route. Khumri - Bagram. Complete construction of the pipeline was completed by the spring of 1984. To service this pipeline, the 276th separate pipeline brigade was formed. 4
• The organization of the movement of transport columns of the 40th Army and the road transport of Afghanistan on the Hairatan-Kabul highway, as well as monitoring the condition of the roads and the need for repair and maintenance work, required the creation of the Road Commandant Service and the formation of a new military unit that performed these tasks. Based on the directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the 278th Separate Road Commandant Brigade was formed and introduced into the 40th Army. The brigade was formed in the spring of 1983 and included 3 separate road commandant battalions (692nd, 1083rd and 1084th CSTO). 8

Organizational and Staff Structure of the 177th separate special forces detachment for the summer of 1982

• By the summer of 1984, the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, having analyzed the growing support for dushmans from Pakistan and their allies, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to intensify the fight against caravans supplying weapons and ammunition. It was decided to increase by 4 times the number of special forces units of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. As part of the 40th Army, the number of separate special forces units (SPD) increased from 2 to 8. Units trained for reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind potential enemy lines were repurposed to destroy caravans supplying the enemy. For this purpose, anti-aircraft artillery, artillery, grenade launcher, tank, and engineer units were added to the regular staff of a special purpose battalion. Also, at the same time, the staffing of the logistics support unit was increased. This reform (a 3-company battalion into a combined detachment of 6 companies) made it possible to increase the autonomy and firepower of the combined unit. To resolve organizational issues regarding combat interaction, supply and control, the 2nd separate special purpose brigades (obrSpN) were formed with the 4th special purpose brigades (combined battalions) in each - the 15th special purpose brigade in Jalalabad and the 22nd special purpose brigade in Jalalabad. .Lashkar Gah. 5 6

Sentry guard

OKSVA differed from Groups of Soviet Forces in other countries by one important factor - the order of deployment of units of “line” regiments. If in the USSR Armed Forces in each artillery, motorized rifle, tank, parachute regiments or in motorized rifle and air assault brigades, all units of the regiment/brigade were located within the same military camp - then in OKSVA, directly in the military town of the linear regiment/brigade, there was only 40-50% of all units of the regiment. Usually these were the Regimental Headquarters and units attached to it (band, commandant platoon), combat support units ( reconnaissance company, engineer-sapper company, chemical defense company, communications company), logistics support units (repair company, material support company, medical company) and usually the first and second (by numbering within the regiment) battalion or division. The remaining units were dispersed by platoons (motorized rifle/paratrooper/airborne assault) or artillery batteries along outposts along with standard military equipment.

In total, the 40th Army created 862 outposts, where more than 35,000 people served.

As of July 1, 1986, the army included 133 battalions and divisions (not counting auxiliary and rear units and units). Of these, 82 battalions (or 61.7%) carried out the created 862 outposts security functions: 23 - guarded communications, 14 - airfields, 23 - various military and economic facilities, 22 - populated areas and local authorities. Only the 51st battalion was involved in active combat operations.

A. Volkov 40th Army: history of creation, composition, changes in structure

For example, the 2nd parachute battalion of the 345th separate Guards parachute regiment, stationed in the city of Bagram, was located 50 kilometers from the regimental headquarters in the village of Anava, dispersed in platoons and squads across 20 outposts guarding the exit from the Panjshir Gorge.

The 3rd Parachute Battalion of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Airborne Division was stationed in outposts around the village of Shahjoy, 200 kilometers from the headquarters of the 317th Airborne Division in Kabul.
In the 1074th Artillery Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, for example, the 3rd howitzer battery was deployed as an outpost on South Salang, 100 kilometers from the regimental headquarters in Kabul, the 8th howitzer battery was deployed as an outpost at a dominant height above the headquarters of the 40th 1st Army, the 7th howitzer battery was located in Shahjoy, 200 kilometers from the regiment headquarters.

Some line regiments were almost completely dispersed among outposts - for example, the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, after being withdrawn from the village of Rukha in the spring of 1988, was completely dispersed among outposts along the Kabul-Hairatan highway and around the Charikar Valley. The indicated order of deployment of linear units was the only possible forced measure, giving the command of the 40th Army the opportunity to constantly control as large territories and sections of roads as possible in conditions of guerrilla warfare.

Due to the fact that units dispersed among outposts could not be involved in army operations, only those battalions and divisions that were located directly on the territory of military camps participated in them. And therefore, when in the description of any army operation in the Afghan war it is written about the participation of a specific regiment, it should be understood that this regiment attracted forces with a total number of no more than two linear battalions/divisions.

Organization of outposts

The standard arrangement of the outpost was reduced to the construction of stone or adobe walls along the entire perimeter of the outpost. Mining in several rows with lighting and anti-personnel mines throughout the surrounding area, with the exception of access roads. Equipping multiple stationary firing points for all-round defense. Construction of shell-proof residential and office premises for personnel, such as dugouts or dugouts. Caponier equipment for military equipment and guns.
In addition to standard weapons, heavy small arms were necessarily added, such as a large-caliber heavy machine gun DShK, NSV or KPV, an automatic heavy grenade launcher AGS-17 and sometimes an 82-mm mortar "Tray". The staff of the outpost was supplemented with a paramedic, who was not required for the staff of a motorized rifle (airborne) platoon at permanent deployment points. Outposts on the main highways were located at intervals of 3 to 10 kilometers. At most outposts, surveillance of the surrounding area was also carried out from one or two remote posts, which could be located at a distance of up to 500-700 meters from the outpost. The remote post was an equipped position for all-round defense for one rifle squad for 7-10 people with all the conditions for autonomous living. Remote Posts on roads and in mountainous terrain accessible to military equipment were set up together with the standard equipment of the rifle squad - armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles in a mandatory caponier. in mountainous areas, trenches were cut into rocky ground.

In the history of the Afghan war, outposts played a huge role. With the help of outposts, all important roads and a significant territory of the country were controlled. The outposts not only held back unexpected attacks by the Mujahideen on the columns of Soviet troops. The personnel of the outposts, through observation of the terrain (and in the mountains, optical observation up to 20-25 kilometers is possible) and contact with agents from local residents, provided valuable intelligence information.

Outposts in the “caravan war”

Also, Watch Outposts were used by reconnaissance units as transshipment bases in the “caravan war” (large-scale operations to destroy caravans with weapons in 1984-1988). The scouts were secretly transported on trucks and in armored vehicles to the outposts, disguising what was happening as the delivery of goods by the rear. During the daytime, the scouts were located at the outpost, which did not attract the attention of local residents, among whom there could be enemy informants. And with the onset of darkness, they moved to the site of ambush operations on caravan trails at a distance of 2 to 7 kilometers from the outpost. As dawn approached, the scouts returned to the outpost. In the event of contact with a superior enemy, the outpost could provide fire support to the scouts. 20
At outposts located near the main caravan routes in the east of the DRA, observation posts were installed using such telemetric special equipment as 1K18 Realia-U. With the help of such devices, enemy caravans were timely detected and subsequently destroyed by aviation or artillery.

Conditions of service at outposts

Considering the harsh climate of Afghanistan and the isolation of the outpost personnel, service there was considered very difficult physically and psychologically. If the soldiers and officers serving in the brigade regiment could visit a store, club or library, participate in sporting events, read the latest press, then the soldiers and officers at the outposts saw nothing but the surrounding area for months. If in military units located on the territory of the USSR, according to official instructions, military personnel were allowed to serve on guard no more than once a week (with the exception of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR) - then service at outposts was actually an everyday, 24-hour Guard Service in a combat zone. The personnel spent six months, and sometimes more than a year, in a tense regime, expecting an enemy attack at any moment, being on the front line of the guerrilla war. The overwhelming majority of Soviet soldiers wounded and killed by Mujahideen snipers served at outposts.19

...The most difficult thing is everyday life. The deputy commander of the 6th PDR, S.A. Podgornov, after so many years, described his condition at the 16th outpost. Just as he went up there, he came down a year later. “Sometimes I wanted to shoot at the moon. Sometimes during the day he left the outpost, although this was strictly prohibited, and wandered around the neighboring slopes. Neither the mines, nor the perfume, nor the punishment of the battalion commander scared me. I would probably be glad if I were recalled to the group to scold and punish me. Day after day the same faces, the same events. And monotonous canned food. The mountains, familiar to every pebble, are all around in the haze of heat...”

Lapshin Yu. M. At the outposts in Panjshir

In the history of the Afghan War, there is a case of complete destruction by the enemy of the Soviet Outpost with all its personnel during an unequal battle and several cases of complete destruction of Remote Posts. With Remote Posts this usually happened at night due to the fault of the sentries who had fallen asleep. The last tragic incident was August 1988 on the road between the city of Bagram and the village of Mirbachikot. The Mujahideen massacred 8 motorized riflemen at the Removable Post from the 682nd motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.

At many remote outposts, due to inaccessibility and difficulties with logistical support, there was a harsh soldier’s life without any frills, with a complete absence of cultural events and with a minimum of sanitary and food standards. For example, due to the danger of helicopter fire, drinking water was raised to mountain outpost No. 32 from the 108th MSD once every two months in stockings from the OZK by all personnel of the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the division to a height of 500 meters. The supply of another outpost - outpost No. 19 of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, due to the shortsightedness of the previous command of the division, which found itself deep in the “Charikar greenery” in a tactically inaccessible place (forest-steppe area near the city of Charikar) - was carried out actually in battle conditions, once every three months, alternately 781st separate reconnaissance battalion or motorized rifle battalions from the division's line regiments, under fire support from the tank battalion of the 177th motorized rifle regiment. Therefore, such a combined group of scouts and tankers was absolutely rightly called breakthrough group. 21
The occasionally harsh life and atmosphere at the outpost are shown in Fyodor Bondarchuk’s film 9th Company.

Afghan training

By mid-1981, the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces realized that the military presence in Afghanistan was being postponed indefinitely and was faced with the next serious problem. By this time, most conscripts had completed their two-year service period and required rotation of personnel. The standard combat training program in the training units of the USSR Armed Forces, based on the results of clashes with the enemy, showed that it does not meet all the requirements for conducting combat operations in mountainous and desert areas.
The main requirements for conscripts sent to Afghanistan were enhanced combat training and adaptation to the dry and hot climate of Afghanistan. In connection with this, since the beginning of 1982, specialized training units have been created, called among the military by the term Afghan training, for privates and non-commissioned officers, intended to train military personnel for combat operations on the territory of the DRA. Accordingly, they were called soldier and sergeant training. The former trained enlisted personnel for military registration specialties, the latter trained squad/crew/crew commanders. The preparatory period in soldier training lasted 2 months. But by the spring of 1984, it became clear that the specified period, even with a rich training program, was not enough. It was decided to increase the training period to 3 months for those preparing to become shooters. For military personnel trained in more complex specialties, such training skills as tank gun loader, machine gunner, gun crew number, grenade launcher, etc. - the training period was increased to 5 months. Since May 1985, the training of all young recruits for the 40th Army began to be carried out on the territory of the USSR according to a 5-month program.
Before the creation of Afghan training, the problem of replenishing the personnel of military units of the 40th Army from which servicemen were leaving after demobilization was solved by selectively sending military personnel who had served for more than six months, selected from military units throughout the USSR, which created great organizational problems.
Afghan training was created mainly on the territory of the TurkVO and partly in the North Caucasian Military District, which made it possible to adapt military personnel to the hot and dry climate of Afghanistan. The main places of concentration of Afghan training were the garrisons of the cities of Termez, Kushka and Mary. What is reflected in military folklore:

...There are three holes in the Union: Termez, Kushka and Mary...

Victor Kurenev. Star on forehead

Moreover, Termez and Kushka are located directly near the state border with Afghanistan. Afghan training differed from other training units of the USSR Armed Forces in its more intensive combat training and strict regime. The main emphasis in the combat training program in Afghan training was on fire and tactical training. Officers and warrant officers who gained combat experience directly in the Afghan War were recruited for training.
But the most important difference between Afghan training and other educational units was the systematic moral and psychological intensive training. ordinary training units theoretically prepared military personnel to repel a potential enemy of the USSR (NATO member states, China, Turkey, etc.). Either the military personnel in Afghan training were constantly exposed to stressful physical activity and political training, or that they would have to participate in real combat operations with all possible consequences. During the classes, experienced officers explained the peculiarities of the mentality of the population of Afghanistan, their customs, the basic rules of behavior in an Islamic state, the basic principles of hygiene in hot climates, the tactics of dushmans, the peculiarities of providing combat security in a guerrilla war, etc. etc. Also, military personnel were taught to drink water in moderation. In all Afghan training, a tactical training session on capturing the height “your hill is our hill” was mandatory. The main goal This lesson was to unite a military team to carry out a combat mission and gain skills in quickly ascending to a hill and overcoming various types of slope, which was an important factor given the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The combat training program was constantly adjusted with the course of the Afghan war. That is, the soldier who was sent to training in Afghanistan, by the end of the training period, approximately understood what he would face, and was physically, morally and psychologically prepared for the upcoming difficulties.
An approximate description of the atmosphere and regime that prevailed in Afghan training is shown in the film “9th Company”.
The rank and file for units of the airborne and air assault troops of the 40th Army were trained in the 387th separate training parachute regiment. For this purpose, in 1982, it was withdrawn from the 104th Guards Airborne Division and redeployed from Kirovabad ZakVO to Fergana TurkVO. cinema, in the film “9th Company” the training unit means exactly 387 OUPD.

...Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 13, 1982, the regiment was withdrawn from the 104th Guards Airborne Division, and redeployed to Fergana of the Uzbek SSR (TurkVO) and reorganized into the 387th separate parachute regiment (training young recruits for the airborne and air assault units and formations operating in Afghanistan)...

Alexey Sukonkin. Landing of the land of the Soviets

Since 1985, rank-and-file personnel for special-purpose units have been trained in the 467th separate special-purpose training regiment, stationed in Chirchik. 23

Main article: USSR Armed Forces

see also

• Afghan War (1979-1989)
• Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
• USSR Air Force. Afghan war
• List of USSR Air Force aircraft losses in the Afghan War
• Heroes of the Soviet Union (Afghan War 1979-1989)
• Day of Remembrance of Soldiers-Internationalists

Literature

• Feskov V.I., Kalashnikov K.A., Golikov V.I. Soviet Army during the Cold War (1945-1991)

Links

• Sukonkin Alexey Sergeevich Units and formations of the 40th Army
• Afghanistan. List of military units of the Limited Contingent (40th Army), ArtOfWar

Notes

1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 - 40th Army: history of creation, composition, changes in structure
2. Kompromat.lv - Publishing house of investigative journalism
3. SOLDAT.ru - Afghanistan. LIST OF SOVIET MILITARY UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN (1979-1989)
4. For convenience in all-round defense, the grenade launcher was mounted on the rear axle wheel of a GAZ-66 truck. The rear axle is dug into the ground. July 1988. Outpost of the 1074th Artillery Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division
5. at the combat position of the 70th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade
6. 10 Reconnaissance and signal equipment 1K18 “Realiya-U”, 1K124 “Tabun”, 1K119 “Realiya-1/10”
7. 7 Chapter 1 - Armored vehicles of the 40th Army and its improvement during the fighting in Afghanistan
8. Logistics support for outposts, raiding and blocking groups in Afghanistan
9. Afghan campaign: Unclaimed experience. Evgeny Grigorievich Nikitenko. Magazine "Aerospace Defense". No. 3 2008

Afghan War (1979-1989)
Main events	Articles on the topic	Government forces	Mujahideen	Help for the Mujahideen
1979 Storming of Amin's Palace 1980-1985 Battle near the village of Khara Battle near the village of Shaest Death of the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment Panjshir operations Herat operations Baghlan operations Marmol operations Kunduz operations Takhar operations Faizabad operations Jalalabad operations Kunar operations Urgun and Alikhail operations Kandahar and Helmand operations Tashkurgan and Aibak operations Kufab Raids 1985 Death of the Maravar company Battle of the 4th company near the village of Konyak Battle near the village of Afrij Badaber uprising 1986 Assault on Jawar Battle on Mount Yafsaj Operation "Maneuver" Operation Trap 1987 Operation "Highway" 1988 Battle at height 3234 Operation Typhoon 1989 Withdrawal of Soviet troops	Heroes of the Soviet Union (Afghan War 1979-1989) Military operations of the Afghan War (1979-1989) Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) USSR Air Force aircraft losses Peshawar Seven Shia Eight Big game Anglo-Afghan Wars: 1838-1842, 1878-1880, 1919 Civil War in Afghanistan April Revolution Muslim battalions Shuravi "Black stork" Kokari-Sharshari Tora Bora Javara Islamic Society of Afghanistan Islamic Party of Afghanistan	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan B. Karmal M. Najibullah DRA Army Special service "KHAD" Soviet Union 40th Army Sergey Sokolov Vladimir Vostrov Sergey Akhromeev Valentin Varennikov Boris Gromov Victor Dubynin Yuri Tukharinov Boris Tkach Alexander Rutskoy Pavel Grachev Igor Puzanov Mahmut Gareev Boris Pastukhov Fikryat Tabeev Igor Rodionov Ruslan Aushev Valery Vostrotin Valery Evnevich Alexander Skorodumov Vladimir Isakov Lev Rokhlin	Afghan Mujahideen G. Hekmatyar B. Rabbani M. Nabi S. Mojaddedi Ahmad Shah Masood D. Haqqani Abdul Haq Ismail Khan Abdul Ali Mazari Yunus Khales Said Mansour Muhammad Omar	USA Operation Cyclone Saudi Arabia Pakistan Egypt Great Britain

40th Army (USSR, 1979-1989) Information About

IN THE AFGHAN ARMY, starting from Friday or Saturday, there are weekends, some holidays, there is no fighting, they are walking, and we, the army, which was introduced in order to take on security functions and free up a contingent of the Afghan armed forces for conducting combat operations with the counter-revolution, as they said in the media at that time, they gradually transferred all hostilities onto their own shoulders. As a result, we began to fight instead of the Afghans.

The army began to lose authority and support among the Afghan people, because... In pursuit of victory as quickly as possible and at any cost, decisions were repeatedly made to use long-range aviation and GRAD area destruction systems, which wiped out villages with all the inhabitants, including the elderly and children, from the face of the earth.

This is how the most respected in Afghanistan soviet man, whose hands have done so much to improve the quality of life of the Afghan people, has turned into a murderer and enemy.

Afghanistan is larger in area than France. Let's add to this the demographics: Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Pashtuns and many others. And each such tribe has its own army, its own lands, its own court, its own leader - the leader. As far as I understand, the entire art of governing Afghanistan by the monarchical regime that ruled before the revolution lay in the ability to build relationships with the leaders of all these ethnic formations.

Have we taken this into account? Don't know. The army did not deal with such problems at all; this was the work of representatives of the State Security Committee and the chief military and other advisers who focused on the ambassador. There were enough controllers and responsible people who reported to Moscow on the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, during my entire stay in Afghanistan, no one ever asked me about any analysis. What is your opinion, Comrade Commander? What is the conclusion? What are the analytical results of past hostilities, or past time, for six months, for a year? What's good and what's bad? We were never interested.

The war was treacherous, because there is no front, there is no focused enemy army in front of you either, the enemy is on all sides. Day and night, summer and winter, you could get a bullet from any direction if you walked with your mouth open. The army is accustomed to fighting a real enemy, seeing him in front of him, feeling him, knowing that there are flanks, some kind of rear, but in Afghanistan everything is mixed. The troops left the garrison, carried out military operations, shot the ammunition, ate food, returned to the point of permanent deployment, and those with whom they had fought descended from the mountains and continued to go about their business, either peaceful or anti-peaceful. Whether they supported the government or not was difficult to understand.

Every year began with an aggravation of the situation in Panjshir, then Kandahar in the south, around Kabul - the shots never ceased, then came Jalalabad, Khost, Herat and again Panjshir. So they fought in circles, from year to year. I remember my feeling of admiration for our personnel. Exhausted soldiers, who always lacked water, ate canned food, and the heat. We did not consume anything local, absolutely afraid of poison or infections. The army had four infectious diseases hospitals, specializing only in the fight against hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria, fever, etc. Not to mention the hospitals that cared for the wounded and injured.

Throughout my life I have retained a feeling of satisfaction with the system that existed in the Soviet Army. Her positive traits were revealed mainly during hostilities. That is, impeccable fulfillment of assigned tasks, devotion, fidelity to the oath, courage, mutual assistance, mutual assistance.

But why does the attitude of the military-political elite differ sharply from the attitude towards the service of lower levels, units and units?

Later, in the Union, reading documents about Afghanistan, I was surprised at the bias of the information that came to Moscow. All messages sounded reassuring messages, boiling down to phrases like: the situation is difficult, but there are tendencies towards its improvement, recovery and, in general, towards victory. At these levels, careerism, lies and the desire for profit already reigned. They made money on supplies and much more.

Counterintelligence also worked very poorly. I didn't feel it at all. Theft, and especially speculation, all of this was in full bloom. I remember one singer* came to visit us more than once. But not many people decided to fly here. We considered him a real brave man. Only later did I learn that when he flew to Afghanistan for his concerts, he sang as much as necessary, but flew away loaded with contraband. And in this he was helped by political workers and senior commanders. I learned about this not from counterintelligence agents, who should have informed me, but from other sources and from witnesses.

http://www.odnoklassniki.ru/profile438145405512

Sent to the National Library
The Republic of Belarus
ANNOUNCEMENT

To the 20th anniversary of the withdrawal
Limited contingent
Soviet troops from Afghanistan

“Lessons of the war in Afghanistan 1979 – 1989”

Based on an article by retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev,
former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments:

“Results and results of the main large-scale operations
combat operations of units and formations of the 40th Army of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the period 1980 - 1989 in Afghanistan"

February 15, 2009 is a memorable event in the history of the Soviet Army and its military traditions. Twenty years ago at 15:00 - February 15, 1989 - the last soldier of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCSV) in Afghanistan, represented by the Commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, crossed the bridge across the State Border of the USSR along the Amu Darya River in Hairaton (Republic of Afghanistan) and Termez (USSR).
Thus, the so-called “undeclared war,” which lasted a little less than 10 years, ended with the complete withdrawal of formations and units of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces from the Republic of Afghanistan.
In total, for the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces stationed in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), later the Republic of Afghanistan (RA), more than 620 thousand military personnel participated in hostilities and their combat support ( including 62,900 officers); in operational maneuver groups border troops, special forces units “Cascade”, “Omega”, units of the KGB of the USSR - more than 90 thousand military personnel; in formations internal troops and police, in the special forces “Cobalt” of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - more than 6,000 military personnel.
During this period, 21 thousand people were employed as civilian personnel.
The annual average number of OKSV troops was 80–104 thousand military personnel and 5–7 thousand civilian personnel.

In December 1979, the Supreme Leadership of the Soviet Union decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. It was understood that formations and units would be garrisoned near populated areas and would guard the most important facilities and communications in 31 provinces and 290 counties and volosts. The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA took place from December 25, 1979 until the second half of January 1980.

It included:
Directorate of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces with support and service units;
4 divisions (5th Guards, 108th and 201st Motorized Rifle Divisions (MSD), 103rd Guards Airborne Division (Airborne Division));
6 separate brigades (66th separate motorized rifle brigade, 56th separate air assault brigade, 70th guards separate motorized rifle brigade, 15th and 22nd separate special purpose brigades, 278th separate airborne brigade);
4 separate regiments (191st, 682nd, 860th, 373rd separate motorized rifle regiments);
4 regiments of front-line combat aviation (apib, iap, shap);
3 helicopter regiments of army aviation and the 50th mixed aviation regiment;
7 separate helicopter squadrons;
separate pipeline crew;
59th Army Logistics Brigade;
repair and restoration base and other parts;
military construction department institutions.

The length of stay of military personnel in the OKSV was set at no more than 2 years for officers and one and a half years for conscript soldiers and sergeants.
During this period, more than 32 thousand Belarusians and representatives from the Red Banner Belarusian Military District (KBVO) served in the 40th Army, border troops, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the war of 1979-1989, military units and units of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan carried out large-scale peacekeeping and anti-terrorism tasks: protecting the population from the threat of continuous incursions by armed opposition units; Mujahideen groups with the aim of destroying the state structure; destruction of administrative authorities; the forcible instillation of interethnic conflicts and the takeover of control of various areas of the territory by centers of influence and power located outside the country.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan during the war of 1979 - 1989, the main part, carried out tasks to protect the country's strategically important infrastructure facilities: transport and others of all types (air, energy, water, car roads, mountain passes and trails) communications, objects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation (gas fields, power plants, nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.). Eight separate security battalions, in conditions of incessant shelling and all possible methods of infiltration and forays for the purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks, guarded and ensured the functioning of airfields in large cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Shindand, Kunduz, Bagram); and also to cover the State Border of the USSR and the border area.

The fulfillment of all tasks assigned to the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan during the war of 1979 - 1989 was associated with the utmost strain on the physical and moral forces of the human body in difficult climatic conditions of mountainous and desert areas (daily temperature drops of up to 40 degrees, in particular Kandahar, etc. .) environmental influences. Factors such as: a sharp change in air pressure, the presence of oxygen starvation, dust pollution, daily sandstorms, dangerous infectious diseases (hepatitis, paratyphoid, malaria, dysentery), bites of poisonous insects and snakes, contributed to the acquisition of chronic forms of diseases and irreversible deterioration processes health (over 70%) of OKSV personnel.

Modern weapons and equipment of the Mujahideen detachments, the presence in them of trained, prepared command staff, units consisting of foreign military specialists, transformed the fulfillment by our units of the tasks of escorting, guarding and defending automobile convoys with military and national economic cargo for their needs in the interests of Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) into a new type of combat operations.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 did not lead to a decline in armed confrontation in the country. On the contrary, since the spring of 1980, the activity of armed formations and opposition groups for control over the provinces of the country has intensified.
Thus, the Soviet troops sent to Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the Government and the state, led by the General Secretary of the PDPA party B. Karmal.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities for the entire period are divided into four stages:

Stage 1 (December 1979 – February 1980). Entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. The successful implementation of Operation Storm-333 by operational combat groups of special forces detachments of the KGB and GRU, airborne units: storming the Taj Beg Palace, blocking control points and possible centers of resistance. Marching troops, capturing key infrastructure facilities, taking them under control and, subsequently, placing units and individual units in garrisons. Organization of security and defense of permanent deployment points and strategically important objects.
In the eastern direction from Kabul to Hairaton, Gardez, Ghazni, Shahjoy, Kalat, Jelelabad, Soviet troops were stationed in 134 military camps and at 760 outposts and posts guarding the most important facilities, airfields and communications.
In the western direction from the city of Kandahar, the city of Lashkar Gah, the city of Farah and the city of Shindanda, the city of Herat, the village of Turagundi - introduced units of the 5th Guards. Motorized Rifle Division, 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 22nd Special Forces Brigade were stationed in 45 military camps and carried out security service at 89 outposts (posts).

Stage 2 (March 1980 – April 1985). Conducting active combat operations, carrying out large-scale combat operations together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the DRA.
At this stage, 420 large-scale military operations were carried out, which include the most significant military operations carried out in the Panjshir and Andarab gorges and adjacent areas (1980 - 1985); in the green zone of Jabal - Ussaraj, Charikar (Parwan province), Mahmudraki (Kapisa province) - in January-February 1982; in Kandahar - in January 1982; in Nijray district (Kapisa province) - in April 1982; in the Lurkokh mountains - in December 1984; in Helmand province - in May 1985; in the provinces of Farah, Baghlan, Kunar, Kapisa - in 1985.
Special forces units and units (15th and 22nd Special Forces brigades, operational combat groups of the KGB Special Forces detachment "Cascade", "Omega" - 9 in total, OBG Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" - 23 in total) carried out combat missions: destruction detachments, groups of armed rebel formations of the Mujahideen; suppression of the delivery of weapons and ammunition on 96 caravan routes from abroad, in some cases, drug supplies; providing assistance in the creation of state security bodies - KhAD (Cascade detachments), Tsarandoy - Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cobalt detachment), their organization of intelligence and operational work on the ground, conducting special operations; support of combat operations and participation in combat operations.

Stage 3 (May 1985 – December 1986). The transition from active combat operations of OKSV units to support of combat operations of Afghan troops with the participation of Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units.
The combat use of Soviet motorized rifle, airborne and tank units, mainly as a reserve and to increase the moral, political and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Special forces units and subunits (15th and 22nd Special Forces brigades) intensified combat activity to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad and drug supplies. Assistance continued in the creation and equipment of the armed forces of the DRA. In 1986, six tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the 5th Guards were withdrawn to their homeland. Motorized Rifle Division, 108th Motorized Rifle Division and 201st Motorized Rifle Division, incl. 24th, 285th and 401st tank regiments.
In October 1985, a large series of large-scale combat operations of the armed forces of the DRA was carried out with the active participation of Soviet troops in the provinces of Baghlan, Kapisa and Kunar.
In the province of Herat in 1986, a military operation was carried out, including the destruction of the base - the Kakari-Shushari arsenal, as well as operations to defeat the base areas and large bases of the opposition in the provinces of Jawzjan (Darzyab), Nimroz (Rabati-Jali), Ghazni (Iskapol), Kandahar (Islamdad), Paktia (Srana), in the Khost district (Javida, Lmafhauz), etc.

Stage 4 (January 1987 – February 1989). Participation of Soviet troops in the activities of the National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) carried out by the Afghan leadership. Continuation of full-scale support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

Thousands Soviet soldiers During combat operations in large-scale military operations, attacks and shelling of outposts and columns during the years of this war, they showed examples of courage and courage, performed feats, remaining known only to a small number of fellow soldiers who witnessed the events taking place, sometimes due to the death of heroes.

For the courage and personal courage shown in carrying out the tasks assigned to the Soviet troops during the 1979-1989 war on the soil of Afghanistan, 86 military personnel were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Of these: 16 airborne troops, 20 air force pilots, soldiers ground forces– 30 and KGB and MVD soldiers – 14; awarded the Order of Lenin to military personnel of the Soviet Army - 103 and the Order of the Red Banner - 1972.
In total, 200,153 military personnel from the OKSV were awarded state awards in Afghanistan, including 10,955 who were awarded posthumously. Among those awarded orders and medals were 111,966 soldiers and sergeants, 19,261 warrant officers, 66,251 generals and officers, 2,657 workers and employees of the Soviet Army, including .h. 1350 – women.

Over the entire period of OKSV presence in Afghanistan, more than 9,200 military personnel originally from Belarus and representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District were awarded state awards of the Soviet Union.

During the periods of military operations during the war of 1979 - 1989, sabotage and shelling, and the performance of other tasks by units and units of the OKSV, 13,833 military personnel from the 40th Army, KGB employees and border guard soldiers - 589, employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 were killed. advisors, specialists and translators Soviet army 180 died in formations and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan.
The greatest losses in the death of Soviet soldiers occurred in 1982, when 1948 soldiers and officers died, in 1984 - 2343 soldiers and officers, and in 1985 - 1686 soldiers and officers.
Among the dead, 771 military personnel were natives of Belarus and representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District (KBVO).

23,258 soldiers and officers were wounded in combat, 22,939 soldiers and officers suffered injuries and injuries, and 404,464 military personnel became ill.

6,669 soldiers and officers became disabled, including 1,479 soldiers and officers from the 1st group, 4,331 soldiers and officers from the 2nd group, and 859 soldiers and officers from the 3rd group. 38,614 military personnel and officers – 6,194 – were returned to duty after treatment.

Among the awarded Belarusian soldiers and graduates of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District participating in the 40th Army, 2235 military personnel were awarded military orders, 252 soldiers were awarded orders twice and 23 soldiers received awards three times and four times.
Eight military personnel - Belarusians and graduates of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, commander of the 40th Army. Among those awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union is I.P. Barchukov, V.V. Pimenov, A.A. Melnikov, N.P. Chepik, V.V. Shcherbakov, E.I. Zelnyakov, F.I. Pugachev, S.A. Filipchenko. 906 military personnel from the Republic of Belarus were awarded the medal “For Courage”.

Representatives of Belarus fought bravely on the battlefields during the hostilities, not sparing their blood or even their lives in the name of achieving the goal and success in battle.
Posthumously, among them, the Orders of Lenin and the Red Star were awarded to Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Ferko. from Bobruisk, captain Tatur G.A. from Karelich (awarded 2 Orders of the Red Star), captain Sechko G.A. was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. from Lyuban.

The Order of the Red Banner was awarded posthumously to reconnaissance soldiers from Belarus - officers Tropashko Yu.K. from Grodno, Styrov V.V. (KBVO), Spelov S.Yu. (KBVO), Major Slizh V.M. from Volozhin, Skakun S.V. from Minsk, Sidorovich V.P. from Dzerzhinsk. I would like to note such warriors who were awarded the Order of the Red Star and medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit”. These are our fellow countrymen: Private Serafimovich from Borisov, Private Semenits from Zhlobin, Private Rizmont and others who laid down their lives on Afghan soil.

IN Lately Among veterans, a mania arose to attach Soviet orders illegally, including by former Afghan soldiers, without certificates in accordance with the Law for the right to wear them.

As of February 15, 1989, after the completion of the withdrawal of the 40th Army OKSV, 334 military personnel were wanted, of which: missing - 316, interned in other countries - 18, were in opposition units - 50, captured by the Mujahideen - 39, returned to their homeland - 17, refused to return to their homeland - 6 people.
Among the missing are natives of Belarus - private Belitsky V.A., (from Minsk), lieutenant Babilo M.M. (from Grodno), private Buza A.A. (from Baranovichi), private Durnev N.A. (from the village of Uzda), lieutenant Evtukhovich O.A., captain Kulazhenko G.I. (from Minsk), private Zverkovich A.A. (from Minsk), private Kozlov A.D. (from Glussk), private Lavidenko V.E. (from Rossony), private Lopukh A.A. (from Baranovichi), private Pikhach V.V. (Nesvizh district), private Sinyak M.V. (from Minsk), private Talashkevich A.A. (from Pruzhany), etc.
During joint large-scale military operations for the period 1980 - 1988. The total combat losses of the Afghan army amounted to 26,595 military personnel, 28,002 people were missing in action.
Over nine years, 285,541 military personnel deserted from the Afghan army.
During the same period, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan lost: tanks - 362 units, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, BRDM - 804 units, guns and mortars - 750 barrels, cars - 4199 units, aircraft - 120 units, helicopters - 169 units.
The OKSV in 1988, taking into account the withdrawn tank and anti-aircraft regiments in 1986, the main types of weapons and equipment in units and formations, included: tanks - T-62D and T-62 MR - up to 590 units; BMP-1 and BMP-2 – from 1300 units. up to 1150 units, wheeled armored personnel carriers (BTR-70 and BTR-80) - from 2650 units. up to 2345 units; cars of all types, tracked tractors - from 19,500 units. up to 16,450 units; D-30 guns - from 300 units. up to 320 units, 122-mm 2S1 “Gvozdika” self-propelled guns – from 196 units. up to 86 units; 152 mm 2S3 "Acacia" - up to 54 units, 120 mm 2S9 "Nona-S" - 70 units, 152 mm guns - 2A36 (2S5) "Gyacinth" - 60 units; MLRS systems "Grad-1" - 122 mm and 240 mm - 120 units; anti-aircraft weapons - 235 units; airplanes – 118 units, helicopters – 332 units.
Our losses of weapons and equipment were: tanks - 147 units, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BRDM - 1314 units, guns and mortars - 433 units.

Thanks to the achievement of a high political and moral state of the troops, coordinated efforts in troop management by commanders, staffs, political workers of units and subunits, taking into account the staffing of OKSV troops, mainly with all types of weapons and equipment, uninterrupted provision of units and subunits with ammunition and supplies of material and technical means , timely restoration and return to operation of previously damaged and faulty equipment with positive results, all planned combat operations and other activities in pursuance of large-scale peacekeeping tasks to protect strategically important infrastructure facilities of the Republic of Afghanistan, to prevent mass deaths of civilians during the confrontation with armed groups and opposition formations.

Successful organization of the participation of Soviet troops in the activities of the policy of national reconciliation of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan in relation to the situation and national characteristics of the country, the best experience of the OKSV Command in planning and directing the combat operations of entrusted units and subunits, based on the military experience of the defenders of our Fatherland, combat coordination of troops and personal example , allowed us to save a lot of people.
The following generals and officers of the 40th Army, divisions and brigades distinguished themselves: Yu.V. Tukharinov, B.M. Tkach, N.G. Ter-Grigoryants, V.M. Mironov, Yu.V. Shatalin, I.F. Ryabchenko, E.V. Vysotsky, V.F. Ermakov, A.E. Slyusar, L.E. Generalov, S.P. Seleznev, V.G. Vinokurov, M.N. Rodionov, A.I. Sergeev, G.P. Kasperovich, V.P. Dubynin, Yu.P. Grekov, V.N. Shekhovtsev, B.V. Gromov, G.G. Kondratyev, P.S. Grachev, V.I. Isaev, N.P. Pishchev, A.G. Sheenkov, V.V. Ruzlyaev, V.M. Barynkin, V.A. Loginov, A.V. Uchkin, V.A. Vostrotin and others. The commanders, generals Yu.V., successfully commanded the 40th Army. Tukharinov, B.I. Tkach, V.F. Ermakov, L.E. Generalov, I.N. Rodionov, V.P. Dubynin, B.V. Gromov.
The most active participation in the planning and conduct of joint and independent operations of the Afghan troops was taken by the main military advisers in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, army generals: A.M. Majors; G.I. Salmanov; M.I. Sorokin, Colonel General: V.A. Vostrov; MM. Sotskov, as well as others, generals and officers of the advisory apparatus in the armed forces, the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In particular, generals T.I. were killed among them. Shkidchenko and N.A. Vlasov. Much work to maintain weapons and military equipment in combat readiness of OKSV troops was carried out by the deputy commanders of the 40th Army for armaments, representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, generals: G.V. Zhuravel; P.S. Creanga; S.A. Maev; V.S. Korolev (author of the article).
Logistics generals V.I. took an active part in ensuring the need for material supplies for army troops and clear planning of logistics support. Isakov, A.M. Zhukov, V.A. Vasenin, A.A. Moskovchenko, who arrived in the 40th Army from the Red Banner Belarusian Military District.
In the period 1986 - 1989 The head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Afghanistan was our fellow countryman, Belarusian General V.D. Egorov, the Belarusian officers of the advisory apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, now generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs V.M. Lazebnik, N.I. Cherginets, enjoyed great authority and influence in the troops. and others.
Between May and September 1983, units and units of the 40th Army carried out 12 planned and 10 unscheduled combat operations, set up 2,800 ambushes and carried out 198 reconnaissance missions, as a result of which 17,632 rebels were destroyed and 4,334 units were captured. small arms, 98 units. DShK machine guns, 129 RPG grenade launchers, 79 mortars. During the same period, the Mujahideen carried out: 103 attacks on convoys and 116 attacks on deployment points; 98 mine explosions were carried out.
Our losses were: 491 military personnel killed, 1,182 military personnel wounded, including 179 officers.
From May to September 22, 1984, 22 planned and 19 unscheduled operations were carried out, 248 reconnaissance data were carried out with 2084 ambushes, including 181 that were successful (8% of the total).
During the fighting, 18,184 rebels were destroyed, 3,839 small arms, 146 DShK machine guns, 101 grenade launchers, 48 ​​mortars, 46 recoilless rifles, about 2 million units were captured. ammunition.
During this period, the rebels carried out sabotage attacks on convoys - 81, shelling of deployment points - 96, and 53 mine explosions were also carried out. At the same time, the losses of our troops amounted to 886 military personnel killed, including 111 officers and 1,958 military personnel wounded, including 233 officers.
During the winter period of 1984 - 1985, the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces carried out: 10 planned, 3 unplanned and 19 private operations involving combat operations, 120 combat missions to implement intelligence data, and set up 1,460 ambushes. At the same time, 7,890 rebels, 198 caravans were destroyed, 38 guns and mortars, 16 rocket launchers, 119 RPG hand grenade launchers, 7 MANPADS, 79 DShK and ZPU machine guns, 1,744 small arms were captured.
About 12,000 ammunition for heavy weapons and RPGs, more than 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 4,130 engineering mines, and 5 tons of explosives were seized from more than 100 warehouses.
However, despite the significant damage inflicted on the Mujahideen as a result of the joint actions of the 40th Army and the DRA Armed Forces, their activity, numbers and influence in most provinces of the country did not decrease. If in 1981 the Mujahideen units consisted of 30,000 rebels, then in 1983 there were about 40,000 rebels, and in 1985 there were over 50,000 rebels.
The main reason for this situation was the decrease in the effectiveness of combat operations, complacency among a certain part of the OKSV Command and the RA Armed Forces, underestimation of the operational situation and serious systemic omissions in the training and management of units during military operations on the part of the command staff of formations and units.
Every officer knows that political (information) work in the troops plays a leading role in the management of military units, reveals the spirit of the warrior, his face, intentions and goals of the war.
Individual commanders who do not have a comprehensive system for preparing and training personnel for combat operations, based on the method of combat coordination, ignored the combat experience of our fathers and grandfathers, gained with blood and sweat over more than a thousand years of history of the Fatherland. The requirements of the combat regulations of the USSR Armed Forces were strict real rules of war and met the modern laws of warfare, allowing the flexible use of their individual provisions in combination with the real situation to organize training and control of units in the entire complex of tasks assigned to units and subunits of the OKSV in Afghanistan.

The combat experience gained in the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 only complements the combat manuals of the armies of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - the national heritage of our Fatherland, and fills the military strategy “the science of winning” with advanced combinations of modern methods and techniques for conducting combat operations in modern conditions.
The appearance of the parties to the military confrontation large quantity mobile assault units for special purposes, the use of the same type of old and new weapons, mine-sabotage weapons, man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), automatic grenade launchers (AGS), laser sights and guidance equipment, the latest communication and command and control systems, high-tech equipment , medical support, predetermined the merging of combat tactics foreign armies.
During the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, a new practice, little known to the world community, of conducting full-scale combat operations with mobile assault units in conditions of military, armed confrontation of a focal nature arose; the enemy could suddenly appear anywhere and anytime.
In the world theory and practice of preparing and waging war, military operations, there have been qualitative changes in the operational art and tactics of combat operations of units of foreign armies due to their rearmament, which has led to the rapid development of tactics of small units of all countries of the world.
These circumstances fully affected the equipment, training and combat capabilities of the armed opposition units of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Command of the USSR Armed Forces, in a number of issues of equipping our units with everything necessary, including the use of the latest weapons, communications, medical support, and equipment for conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, ignored the requirements of the situation of the significantly increased combat capabilities of the armed formations of the Mujahideen , the presence of trained military specialists in their composition, the conditions of mountainous desert terrain, a hot climate with large daily temperature changes.

Infectious diseases departments of medical institutions were staffed at 85% of regular positions. The level of training of the vast majority of infectious disease doctors was very low. Of the 56 specialists from among OKSV officers, only 5 people had sufficient qualifications for independent work in medical institutions and were practically unable to provide high-quality intensive care for patients with emergency conditions.

Among the personnel of the OKSV, in conditions of overload of medical institutions with typhoid patients, weakened and exhausted, with risk factors for complications and requiring intensive care, in 1983 there were 32,097 cases of infectious diseases. The predominant ones were:
viral hepatitis A – 15,221 cases;
typhoid and paratyphoid fever – 4,349 cases;
acute dysentery – 1,119 cases;
enterocolitis – 4,362 cases.
In 1984, the number of patients with typhoid fever was three times more, acute dysentery and enterocolitis - twice as much.
Nosological forms of diseases:
typhoid fever - 1983 - 42.3%, 1984 - 47.2%;
acute dysentery - 1983 - 20.4%, 1984 - 21%;
enterocolitis – 3.3%.

The mortality rate, deaths from infectious diseases in 1983 was 0.28% and was mainly due to typhoid fever. Almost all cases of late hospitalization were associated with the participation of patients in hostilities or being in convoys.
The main complaints of personnel were: shortness of breath - 80%, lack of appetite - 44%, dizziness and weakness, gastrointestinal upset - 30%, stomach pain - 12%, decreased visual acuity and hearing - 12%, nosebleeds - 10%, resting tachycardia - up to 100 heart beats per minute, mood instability.
A decrease in physical and mental performance was observed among all personnel. With obvious signs of various pathologies, there were constantly cases of personnel being removed from participation in a combat operation and hospitalized. A big problem was the development of underweight in the overwhelming majority of personnel (45-50% of the total number of those examined).

Medical standards were developed to overcome combat stress and fatigue against the background of inadequate nutrition and limited water consumption. Thus, the duration of combat operations in the mountains was no more than 7 - 10 days, a series of operations should not exceed 2.5 months. The duration of rest after operations should have been at least 1.2 times their duration. The OKSV command formed requirements for the prevention of climate impacts in mountainous desert areas. Particular attention was paid to measures to restore thermoregulation functions, so during the daytime the rate of water consumption ranged from 4 to 10 liters per day. This explained many cases of gastrointestinal disorders and enterocolitis, especially in units located in the regions of Kandahar province. The personnel experienced prolonged and persistent diarrhea for 2-3 months after arrival in Afghanistan.
The personnel of OKSV units and units were exposed to a complex of negative environmental factors, the main one of which was high air temperature. The influence of this factor was aggravated by constant combat stress.
Among the officers constantly participating in hostilities, high physical and neuropsychic fatigue and a significant decrease in performance were noted. The nutritional status of various age groups was generally assessed as satisfactory; underweight was detected in 15% - 20% of officers of motorized rifle units.

There were special requirements for the equipment of personnel in mountainous desert areas. significant discrepancy with real equipment of units. The following was revealed:
all types of uniforms were subject to increased wear and tear;
the forced use in the daytime of uniform elements that provide ventilation to the surface of the human body, and at night the forced insulation from hypothermia rendered the quilted jackets and blankets, constantly transported and carried with oneself in combat operations in the mountains, unusable.
The duffel bag used by personnel is inconvenient, makes it difficult to move in the mountains, unmasks personnel during combat operations, impedes movement, and is subject to frequent tears in the fabric.
Shoes in the form of boots with elongated cuffs generally satisfied the personnel, however, after overcoming the ditches, the boots, after getting in with water and mud, greatly contributed to abrasions on the feet.
The steel helmet (helmet) had a number of significant disadvantages; among personnel, its use was noted to be restrained, which led to dangerous head wounds. Its disadvantages:
sun glare, extreme heat and solar heatstroke;
low bullet resistance;
unreliable fastening on the head.
Body armor was used differently by personnel. The most common used was the standard B 2 body armor. Characteristic disadvantages:
getting clothes under body armor wet in hot weather, causing heat stroke;
at night - hypothermia, with the initiation of colds.
In the OKSV units performing combat missions in mountainous areas, there was practically no mountain equipment.
The equipment of the personnel of OKSV units and subunits did not meet the requirements of the theater of operations and the combat situation.
The inspection groups of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which carried out the tasks of tracking and monitoring the support and participation in combat operations of OKSV units and subunits, were repeatedly, in a harsh form, made proposals by OKSV officers:
on the use of camouflage coloring of uniforms;
on the use of shoes with ventilation holes on the inside, special materials for mountain shoes, removable mine-resistant insoles;
on the use of a cover for a steel helmet (helmet) of different colors;
on strengthening the protection of steel helmets;
on the use of climatic special clothing items;
on the use of a removable body armor cover (bra for machine gun magazines) with patch pockets for storing and carrying ammunition and food, drinking water containers, and medical kits;
on the use of a removable modular-type bulletproof vest cover, with the use of additional thermal protection of arms and legs with equipment for transportation in case of injury;
about the use of a medical instructor's bag in the form of a paratrooper's backpack;
about the use of bandages with camouflage coloring to reduce the likelihood of repeated hits.
The wounded, who received bullet wounds from modern powerful small arms, are overwhelmingly severe, have a terrifying appearance on the battlefield and give the impression of being hopeless. Loss of consciousness, painful shock, and closed brain injuries were observed in every third wounded person. Of particular difficulty in providing medical care were those wounded in the maxillofacial area, which accounted for 9.6% of all gunshot wounds.
Based on the nature of the damage, personnel injuries were approximately distributed as follows:
through wounds – 47%;
blind wounds – 53%;
tangents – 3.3%, of which combined – 43%.
Maxillofacial wounded patients with combined injuries to the skull and brain were of greater difficulty. The leading ones in frequency and severity were bullet wounds; the pronounced severity of gunshot and shrapnel injuries was due to the significantly increased power of small arms and the massive use of mines.

Wounded people with general disorders, loss of consciousness, shock, head trauma, as a rule, are the reason for the inability to quickly recover and return to duty, in approximately 30 cases out of 100.

The command of the Turkestan Military District, studying in detail the episodes of combat activity of the troops, established examples of negligence and dishonesty of individual officials in organizing training and equipping units for combat operations, which subsequently led to the lack of results of combat operations, failures in suppressing ambush actions of mujahideen detachments, and senseless death of people.
Thus, military operations in the province of Parvan, carried out by Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Zinevich in the period from December 18 to December 26, 1984 were disorganized and poorly managed. The units were ambushed after escorting an Afghan column to Pishgor. As a result, 5 soldiers were killed and 33 wounded.
During the period from December 5 to December 14, 1984, during the fighting, under the leadership of the commander of the 682nd infantry regiment, 7 servicemen were killed, 29 were wounded, and an SU-25 aircraft was shot down. For four days the units could not get out from under the rebel fire, but the command of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division and the 40th Army organized practically no support for the units and did not provide assistance to the commanders in directing the combat operations.
There are plenty of such facts and examples of superficiality, disorganization, and sometimes even negligence in the conduct of military operations. This was revealed during combat operations in Pechdara by the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and the 350th Infantry Division of the 103rd Airborne Division, where there were large losses in personnel.
The rebels, using mine-explosive methods in ambush operations, carried out acts of intimidation and sabotage to destroy the population and villages, personnel and equipment of Soviet units and units on the roads and routes of movement of OKSV troops in the gorges. As a rule, attacks and shelling were carried out at the moments of the return of units and subunits from places of hostilities, when the fatigue of the personnel affected them, and vigilance was dulled.
In addition, most of the officers from the regiments and battalions who arrived under the plan of the second - third replacement in Afghanistan, who had previously served in the internal districts of the Soviet Union, arrived mainly from reduced and staffed (without personnel) units, and therefore had no experience in managing regular units, sufficient skills in organizing interaction with units and subunits of the army of the RA Armed Forces, did not know how to assign tasks to the units of the assigned aviation and artillery.
Thus, during a joint operation in the Panjshir Gorge on April 30, 1984, as a result of negligence in the performance of his official duty in a combat situation, the commander of the 285th tank regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division, Lieutenant Colonel Suman P.R. The first battalion of this regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses as a result of the battle - 53 soldiers were killed, including 12 officers, and 58 were wounded.
In the rear of this battalion there were units of the RA government forces, which could have supported the actions of this battalion and changed the course of the fire confrontation, but the uninitiative actions of the commander of the Afghan formation contributed to the shooting of the personnel of the Soviet battalion by the rebels.
For negligence in the performance of his duties, Lieutenant Colonel Suman P.R. was removed from office and sent to the KBVO troops, from where he had previously arrived as a planned replacement.

For personal irresponsibility in managing their units when carrying out assigned tasks during combat operations in Afghanistan, which led to unreasonable losses of personnel, 8 officers were previously removed from command of regiments, including the well-known commander of the 860th separate infantry regiment L.Ya. Rokhlin, who was removed from his post in April 1983 for significant losses of personnel, and then sent to Ghazni as deputy commander of the 191st infantry regiment. L.Ya. Rokhlin held this position until January 1984, and then was reinstated as commander of this regiment after the removal of the former commander V.I. Golunov, who was put on trial for cowardice, for the fact that, having abandoned his subordinates to death, he alone escaped by helicopter, abandoning the regimental command post. For unjustified losses of personnel during hostilities, the commander of the “SpN” brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Yu.A. Sapalov, who was also seconded to the KBVO, was removed from his post.
In the tactics of our troops, elements of military cunning and measures to disinform the enemy were not sufficiently used. Active reconnaissance and combat operations at night by some combat units and subunits during certain periods of the war were not planned or conducted.
In the Kunar operation, which took place in December 1984, in May - June 1985, along the entire length of the gorge from Jalalabad to Barikot (at a distance of 170 kilometers), when during the operation, units and units of OKSV troops numbering more than 11,000 people, there were still serious shortcomings and omissions in troop management.
The reasons for the low results of combat operations of units and subunits were insufficient command training of officers, the lack of real experience of combined arms commanders in managing assigned and supporting forces and means, setting tasks for assigned aviation and artillery to strike and fire.
Many commanders and officers who arrived as replacements from the Union, from units of reduced and staffed personnel, had absolutely no idea and did not understand the techniques and methods of action of the rebel armed formations, did not follow their development, the rapid change of situation. Even then, many officers began to think that in our army, with the possible exception of paratroopers and special forces, there was a lack of professionalism in military affairs.
The general results of the conduct of combat operations by reconnaissance and special forces units over the entire period of the war are well known: more than 70% of positive results with a ratio of 5% in numerical strength to the entire OKSV.

The main methods of action of the rebels were: shelling of troops and populated areas with heavy weapons (rocket shells); attacks on posts (outposts), small garrisons of government troops; ambushes, mining, sabotage at national economic facilities and sabotage and terrorist acts against government officials and military personnel; mine-explosive actions to disrupt transportation on the country's main communications.

In 1985, OKSV troops lost 1,868 military personnel in the Republic of Afghanistan (irretrievable losses). Of these: combat losses - 1552 military personnel (including 240 officers), killed in battle - 1194 (including 202 officers), 358 military personnel died from battle wounds (including 33 officers).
The irretrievable losses also include non-combat losses - 316 military personnel (62 died from illnesses, 45 died in car accidents, 65 from careless handling of weapons, 59 suicides, 85 died from other causes). In addition, 36 military personnel were captured by the rebels, and 37 were missing. In October 1986, in the area of ​​the village of Aram, at the end of hostilities, while escorting convoys, on the route Gardez - Chamkani, the rebels surrounded The 72nd PP of the 8th Infantry Division, which carried out the withdrawal of units carrying out the defense task from sections of the road, from positions - “blocks”. The regiment's battalion escaped the encirclement, but 60 people were captured.

The main objects of sabotage were: power lines; government agencies; industrial and agricultural facilities. On June 13, 1985, sabotage was committed at the Shindand airbase, as a result of which 19 combat aircraft from the Afghan Air Force were blown up on the ground (13 MIG-21 units, 6 Su-17 units) and 17 aircraft were damaged. At the Shindanda airfield, a group of traitors, soldiers and officers of the RA Armed Forces, was identified and neutralized, 31 servicemen were arrested, incl. 13 officers.

The rebels used the following methods of terror: killing or capturing officials, arson and robbery, mining buses with magnetic mines; use of cars filled with explosives; the use of children and teenagers to place mines on government officials' cars; using domestic animals to deliver explosives.
Soviet and Afghan planes and helicopters were constantly fired at from MANPADS along their flight routes. MANPADS of the Stinger and Blowpipe types were used. Special groups with MANPADS were sent to airfield areas to destroy aviation technology during its takeoff and landing. It is typical that 50% of aviation losses occurred in the protected areas of airfields.
In April 1987, the rebels were armed with 341 MANPADS, including 47 Stinger MANPADS, which doubled the number of MANPADS compared to 1986. The number of MANPADS launches against Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters has sharply increased. So, if in 1984 there were 62 launches of MANPADS, in 1985 - 141 launches, then in 1986 - 847 launches (26 airplanes and helicopters were shot down). In three months of 1987, 86 MANPADS launches were carried out (18 air targets were shot down).
In 1981–1983, the number of active mujahideen formations in Afghanistan was about 45,000 people. In 1986, the number of Mujahideen was 150,000.
By this time, the combined Afghan-Soviet group of troops operating in Afghanistan had reached a strength of approximately 400,000 military personnel, of which Soviet troops comprised about 100,000 soldiers and officers. They reliably controlled more than 20% of the country's territory.

Cities and the main highways connecting them remained under government control. The vast majority of rural areas were under the increasing control of Islamic committees and mujahideen.

Since the beginning of 1986, the OKSV command has taken a number of organizational measures with the task of strengthening the system of independent control of formations and units of the military leadership of the RA Armed Forces, solving problems on its own in confronting opposition armed formations.
Thus, in 1986, a military operation was carried out to destroy the Mujahideen transshipment base of Javara “Wolf Pit” in the Khost district, where, in accordance with the operation plan, 54 Afghan battalions, artillery units and the RA Air Force participated under the leadership of the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Major General I. A. Delaware. However, the operation was in jeopardy due to the low combat readiness of the units. The OKSV command was forced to introduce into combat some units and units of the Soviet troops (5 battalions) under the leadership of the chief of staff of the army, Major General Yu.P. Grekova. Additionally, from April 5 to April 9, 4 Soviet battalions were landed at the Khost airfield to assist units of the RA Armed Forces. However, this did not help either.
After the bombing of base structures and special mining, by the end of April 22, government troops were withdrawn from the combat area and, angry at the failure and demoralized, began looting. From the city of Javara, government troops transported three tanks, four armored personnel carriers, 23 guns and mortars, 60 DShK and ZPU machine guns and 45 MANPADS to Khost.

Detachments and groups of armed forces of the opposition were armed with small and heavy weapons, the weight characteristics of which made it possible to transport them with pack animals and carry them disassembled.
Most of the weapons of the opposition armed forces were Soviet-made. The main type of small arms were Kalashnikov assault rifles made in China and Egypt, as well as Soviet ones, obtained through third countries or obtained in battle. During the seizure of rebel warehouses, American M16A1 rifles and machine guns of West German, Israeli, English and Swedish production were encountered.
The Mujahideen were armed with and widely used: Chinese-made heavy-caliber DShK machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber, AK-47 assault rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers RPG-2, RPG-7, Swiss-made RPG Volsknet, German – “Lanze - 2”, American – “M72A”, French – “Sarpak”, Israeli – “Piquet”; Chinese, Pakistani and American recoilless rifles of 75 mm and 82 mm caliber.
The main weapon of fire was 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, which almost every armed rebel group had. Since the beginning of 1984, the Mujahideen have had Chinese PU RS (launchers) for firing rockets, which were used when shelling outposts and garrisons of Afghan administrative centers.

As air defense systems, large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft mountain installations (ZGU), small-caliber anti-aircraft guns "Oerlikon" were used, since 1981 - man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) "Strela-2" of Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian production, "Red - Ai", "Jevelin", later the English "Blowpipe" and the American "Stinger" appeared.
The rebels were armed with various types of mines, including anti-tank mines (ATM) and anti-personnel mines (APM), as well as landmines. Most of them were in the detachments operating near communications. These were Italian mines (TS-1; TS-2.5; TS-1.6; TS-50; SH-55), American (M-19, M 18A-1, DCME-C Claymore), Swedish M-102 and English MK-7, in small quantities Czechoslovakian of Soviet origin.
The most widely used were mines in a plastic casing, which exploded (triggered) after several clicks on the lid and were difficult to detect by mine detectors, as well as land mines and land mines with remote control, and radio-controlled mines.
Control of detachments and groups was carried out using HF, VHF, radio communications equipment made in Japan, West Germany, China, and Soviet (R-105 M, R-118 BM, R-118 BMZ) production.

The main principles of controlling rebel combat operations were:
avoid direct clashes with superior forces of regular troops;
do not turn combat operations into positional warfare, refuse to hold occupied areas for a long time;
attack suddenly, widely use the tactics of the “Basmachi” movement, as well as terror and ideological indoctrination of the personnel of the Afghan army and the population.
The armed confrontation was conventionally divided into three stages:
1. Organized with an inactive form of hostilities, holding individual points and areas, conducting broad propaganda events among the population and attracting them to their side.
2. Increasing combat activity through sabotage and terrorist attacks, raids on garrisons and posts of government troops, attacks on convoys; the main goal is to seize weapons, ammunition and various logistics.
3. Complete and widespread destruction of the enemy.
In the period from January 1 to June 15, 1987, government troops completed 31 combat missions, including 17 joint ones and 14 independent ones.
Results:
rebels killed - 3096, captured - 60;
44 RS launchers, 53 mortars, AZGU-1650 units, 56 DShK machine guns, 29 RPGs, more than 1200 units were destroyed. small arms, 1149 RS, 624 mortars;
13 RS launchers, 21 mortars, 15 BO, 10 ZGU, 7 units were captured. MANPADS;
58 land mines, 751 anti-tank mines, 434 anti-tank mines were removed.
WITH the greatest result The tasks assigned to the troops were completed during the fighting in the provinces of the Republic of Armenia in 1987:
joint – Kandahar (February, May, June), Prov. Nangarhar (April), Kabul (May), Prov. Lagman (May);
independent - Herat (May), province. Bagman (May).
During the fighting, 46 villages were liberated.
The losses of the Afghan army were:
a) in terms of personnel: 370 military personnel were killed, 1232 were wounded;
b) for weapons and equipment: 20 tanks; 2 infantry fighting vehicles; 23 armored personnel carriers; 4 BRDM; 7 guns; 15 mortars; 14 PGI; 4 DShK; 15 machine guns; 1998 small arms; 108 cars; 9 aircraft; 15 helicopters.
During this period, Soviet troops conducted 8 joint military operations:
1. “Squall” - in the province of Kandahar (pass, Shinarai base). In the period from February 4 to March 11, by forces: 5th Motorized Rifle Division (3 battalions); 70th Omsbr (1 battalion); 45th Infantry Division (1 battalion) together with the 7th Infantry Division (2 battalions); 7th Tank Brigade (2 battalions), 506th Airborne Battalion (2 battalions, MSB battalion).
There are 12 battalions in total.
Head – Major General Yu.P. Grekov.
2. “Strike” - in the province of Kunduz (Madras region), from February 16 to 23, 1987, by forces: 201st Motorized Rifle Division (4 battalions) together with the 20th Infantry Division; a separate battalion of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
There are 8 battalions in total.
Head – Colonel V.N. Shekhovtsov.
3. “Thunderstorm” - in the province of Ghazni (base area of ​​Piadad) from March 2 to March 21, 1987, by the forces of the 56th airborne brigade (2 battalions), the 19th motorized infantry regiment (2 battalions) together with the 14th infantry division; 38th airborne brigade; a separate battalion of the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
There are 10 battalions in total.
4. “Circle” - in the provinces of Kabul, Lagar (Jigdalai region), 64 kilometers west of Jalalabad, from March 8 to March 21, 1987, by forces: 108th Motorized Rifle Division (2 battalions); 103rd Airborne Division (3 battalions); 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2 battalions) together with the 11th Infantry Division (2 battalions); 8th Infantry Division (3 battalions); orb 1st Ak, 2nd about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 2nd about the MGB.
There are 19 battalions in total.
Head – Major General G.G. Kondratiev.
5. In the province of Herat (west of the outskirts of Herat) from April 11 to 21, 1987, by the forces of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division (4 battalions) together with the 17th Infantry Division (4 battalions); 145th Tank Brigade (3 battalions); about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MGB.
There are 13 battalions in total.
Head – Major General A.V. Uchkin.
6. “Spring” - in the province of Kabul (base region of Kuhi-Sofi). 234 kilometers northwest of the settlement. Surubi; Chakarai base area, 30 kilometers southeast of Kabul from April 12 to April 24, 1987, by forces: 108th motorized rifle division (3 battalions), 103rd airborne division (3 battalions) together with the 8th infantry division (5 battalions); orb 1 ak, 61st opp (2 battalions); about the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
There are 16 battalions in total.

7. “Volley” - in the provinces of Lagar, Paktia, Kabul (base area of ​​Hisarak, Azrats, Mount Norai area, Alikheil), from May 20, 1987 to the beginning of June 1987, by forces: 108th Motorized Rifle Division (3 battalions); 103rd Airborne Division (3 battalions); 66th Infantry Motorized Infantry (2 battalions); 56th airborne brigade (2 battalions); 345th Regiment Regiment (2 battalions) together with the 8th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 11th Infantry, 12th Infantry (6 battalions), 14th Infantry (5 battalions); about the MGB (2 battalions), about the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2 battalions).
There are 25 battalions in total.
Head – Major General V.P. Dubynin.
8. “South-87” – in the province of Kandahar (“green zone” of the Arghandab River) from May 25, 1987 – by the forces of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division (3 battalions); 70th Omsbr (2 battalions); 191st separate infantry regiment (2 battalions); 3rd Infantry Infantry, 22nd Special Brigade Brigade, together with the 7th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 15th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 7th TD (2 battalions); 466th Airborne Regiment (2 battalions); 38th airborne brigade (2 battalions); 21st Infantry Division (2 battalions); 1st regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 93rd regiment (1 battalion); about the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
A total of 31 battalions.
Head – Major General N.P. Pishchev.

6 operations were carried out to support independent combat operations of the DRA Armed Forces, 11 local combat operations, 32 operations to implement intelligence data, of which: 24 with results of 66% destruction of objects and targets, 2071 ambushes, of which: 259 with results of destruction of rebel personnel of 72%.
During this period, 11,925 rebels, 111 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 279 missile launchers (RS), 14,855 rocket launchers (RS), 438 Degtyarev-Shpagin large-caliber machine guns (DShK) and anti-aircraft mountain installations ( ZGU), 302 mortars, 180 recoilless rifles (RC), 314 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPG), 1566 units. small arms, 230 warehouses with rebel property.
Captured: 349 captured rebels, 102 MANPADS, 69 RS launchers, 38,019 RS, 142 DShK and ZGU, 3,800,000 rounds of DShK, 73 mortars, 64,019 mines for mortars, 58 BO, 26,026 rounds for them, 169 RPGs, grenade for them - 28,283, 2155 units. small arms, 8,190,000 rounds of ammunition. Warehouses with property - 686.

As a retaliatory strike, the rebels carried out military actions: sabotage - 927, of which shelling of outposts and posts - 752, columns - 142, permanent deployment points - 182, mine explosions - 104, other sabotage - 51.
Losses in units and subunits of the 40th Army were: killed - 68 military personnel, of which 15 were officers; wounded 46.

Results of combat operations of special forces units:

1. Combat sorties completed - 168. Of these, 20% were successful.
2. Destroyed:
caravans – 131, warehouses – 31;
rebel groups - 53;
rebels - 1416;
PU RS – 2, RS – 3002 units;
DShK machine guns - 23, ammunition for them - 74,300 pcs.
BO – 6 units, ammunition for BO – 1800 units;
mortars – 2, mines for them – 1402 units;
RPG – 52 units, shots for them – 1584 units;
MANPADS – 10 units;
small arms - 110 units, ammunition for them - 1,030,000 units;
cars – 80 units;
tractors – 14 units;
rebel pack animals - 690;
PTM – 200 pcs.;
PPM – 709 pcs.
3. Captured:
prisoners - 176 rebels;
PU-11 – 4,437 units;
DShK – 28 units, cartridges for them – 295,800 units;
mortars – 11 units, rounds for them – 4,014 units;
MANPADS - 60 units;
small arms – 624 units, ammunition – 1,757,000 units;
cars – 26 units, tractors – 9 units;
pack animals – 22;
motorcycles – 33 units;
PTM – 481 pcs.;
PPM – 873 pcs.;
medicines – 2038 kg;
drugs – 9,000 kg;

Results of hostilities in 1987.
Head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Army General V.I. Varennikov, summing up the results, noted: in 1987, 18 joint combat operations of the OK SV with units and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia were carried out. The largest of them are “Shkval”, “Energy”, “Blockade”, “Magistral”. There were also 25 local (private) and 610 intelligence implementations. About 1,000 caravans were discovered and destroyed, more than 7,000 ambush combat operations were carried out, and 24 episodes of participation of Soviet units and subunits in supporting independent combat operations of the RA Armed Forces were carried out.

The war in Afghanistan continued every day and all night, the intensity of the fighting had no tendency to decrease. The blood of our soldiers and officers continued to flow. At the same time, the goals and objectives of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan acquired vague outlines. None of the USSR leadership could clearly define the timing and final tasks of the peacekeeping mission of the Soviet troops during the war in Afghanistan.

The joint military operation “Magistral” with the RA Armed Forces was carried out between November 1987 and January 1988. Units and subunits of the Soviet troops operated successfully with minimal losses.

The purpose of the combat operation “Magistral”: unblocking the road from Gardez to Khost and delivering food, fuel, and other essential items to the district center using vehicle convoys. The demonstration of the capabilities of the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan to solve complex political problems was fully realized.

The following were involved in the joint military operation "Magistral":
from the 103rd Airborne Division - reconnaissance companies of the 350th airborne division and the 317th airborne division (parachute regiments);
one parachute battalion of the 357th airborne regiment,
separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division;
from the 108th Motorized Rifle Division - reconnaissance companies of the 180th and 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment;
from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division - 2 reconnaissance companies, small infantry infantry from the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2 small infantry infantry units from the 395th Motorized Rifle Regiment;
from the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade - reconnaissance company, 3 small infantry infantry units;
from the 56th airborne brigade - 2 battalions (1st and 3rd infantry battalions, reconnaissance company);
from the 345th separate detachment division - 2 infantry battalions, reconnaissance company;
from the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment - 2 small infantry units;
from the 15th Special Forces brigade - 2 separate Special Forces detachments.
A total of 40 armies were recruited:
personnel - 5634 military personnel;
tanks - 28 units;
BMP-2 – 190 units;
BTR-70 (80) – 102 units;
MLRS "Grad" (BM-21) - 21 units;
self-propelled artillery (2С 5 "Giacint" - 10 units, 2С 3 "Acacia" - 8 units, 2С 1 "Gvozdika" (122 mm) - 34 units, 2С 9 "Nona-S" - 14 units, 2С 4 “Tulip” – 2 units, mortars 2B 14 – 24 units, 2B 9 – 15 units);
trucks – 298 units, special vehicles – 195 units.
From the Afghan Armed Forces:
formations and units of the 1st and 3rd AK (army corps), 15th Tank Brigade, 37th Airborne Brigade, 66th Airborne Regiment, 230th Airborne Assault Brigade;
separate battalions of the MGB - two and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - two.
The head of the military operation is the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, Deputy Commander for Technical Support, Major General V.S. Korolev
Decisive actions of the 103rd Airborne Division (commander P.S. Grachev), 345th Special Operations Division (commander V.A. Vostrotin), 15th Special Forces Brigade (commander Yu.T. Starov) made a decisive contribution to the success of the military operation " Highway"

Soviet troops are leaving home.

First phase of withdrawal
Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

On April 14, 1988, through the mediation of the United Nations, in Geneva, at the UN headquarters, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a package of diplomatic documents designed to stop the bloodshed in Afghanistan. The USA and the USSR acted as guarantors of the agreement. The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees committed both sides to take the necessary security measures to resolve this complex issue.
In accordance with these agreements, the Soviet Union committed itself to withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan within nine months, starting on May 15, 1988. At the same time, during the first 3 months, half of all Soviet troops were withdrawn.
To monitor the fulfillment of the parties' obligations, a collective monitoring body was created under the auspices of the UN.
However, the leaders of the Mujahideen, without being invited to Geneva, stated that these agreements signed by the leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan and other countries do not concern them. One of the opposition leaders G. Hekmatyar said: “The treaties in no way affect or oblige us to anything. Even if the Soviets begin to withdraw troops, we will continue to attack the Shuravi.
On April 7, 1988, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov signed a Directive that stated: “The withdrawal of troops after the signing of the Geneva Agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan will be carried out in accordance with the approved plan from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989, in two stages.” Attached to this Directive was a document for the Command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army - a schedule for the withdrawal of OKSV, approved by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces also developed a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of units and units of the 40th Army, which provided for measures for its implementation on the territory of Afghanistan and in the Soviet Union (organizational measures, road and rail transportation, air transportation, deployment of units and units, disbandment storage of weapons, etc.).
The practical implementation of the measures of the plan of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for the preparation and withdrawal of troops began the next day after the signing of documents by the Heads of the guarantor states of the USA and the USSR in Geneva. During the preparatory period (April - the first half of May 1988), by the decision of the commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, the units stationed there were withdrawn to the main points in advance from individual small garrisons: Asadabad, Gulbahor, Bamiyan, Baraki, Chakhcharan, Shahjoy, Rukha, etc. deployment of regiments, brigades, divisions.

At the time of signing the Geneva agreements, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 100,600 thousand troops.

At this time, the OKSV formations and units included:
; armored vehicles - 4697 units. (including tanks - 636 units, infantry fighting vehicles - 1388 units, armored personnel carriers and BRDM - 2582 units);
; ground artillery of all types - 1595 barrels;
; automotive equipment – ​​16,676 units;
; aircraft - 517 units. (including airplanes - 168 units, helicopters - 349 units).
Based on the provisions of the OKSV withdrawal plan from Afghanistan, in accordance with the approved schedule, at the first stage (May 15 - August 15, 1988), formations and units were to leave the garrisons:

; Jalalabad (15th Special Forces Brigade, 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, ground echelon of the 335th Helicopter Regiment, air defense units, district control unit, security battalion) - four columns;
; Lashkar Gah (22nd Special Forces brigade, ground echelon of the 205th helicopter squadron) - in one column;
; Faizabad city (860th motorized infantry regiment in full force) - in two columns;
; Ghazni (191st motorized infantry regiment in full force, 2nd battalion of the 15th brigade “Spetsnaz”) - in two columns;
; the city of Gardez (56th airborne brigade in full force, 4th special forces battalion of the 15th special forces brigade, ORATO squadron of the 335th airborne division) - in two columns;
; Kandahar (70th Motorized Rifle Brigade - in full force, both 280th helicopter regiment, battalion of the 22nd "SpN" brigade, KECH, hospital, security battalion) - in five columns;
; Shindand (403rd obato, Air Force obmo, military hospital, KECH, SEO, 424th, 196th motor battalions) - in two columns;
; Kunduz (149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 996th Artillery Regiment, Orb, Obs, 340th Orvb, Obmo, ground echelon of the 181st Helicopter Regiment) - six columns;
; Kabul city. Service and support units and construction units were withdrawn in nine columns.

Soviet troops left Afghanistan in two directions:
1. from the cities of Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kabul, Kunduz through the settlement. Hairatan on the city of Termez;
2. from the cities of Kandahar, Shindand, Lashkar Gah, Herat through the village of Turagundi to the city of Kushka.

At the same time, the phased and consistent execution of the troop withdrawal schedule was strictly observed in accordance with the plan of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
The troops were controlled from a command post in Kabul, a reserve command post in Naibabad, and a reserve command post in Shindand by army operational groups headed by:
; area five kilometers east of Kabul - Major General A.G. Sheenkov;
; northern outskirts of the village Jabal Ussaraj - Colonel V.F. Yakubovsky;
; Salang pass - Major General V.S. Korolev (the author of these lines);
; Chaugani - Major General V.G. Profatilov;
; Puli-Khumri - Colonel V.A. Vasenin;
; area 3 kilometers south of the settlement. Hairatona - Colonel V.A. Dybsky.
To prevent the influence of the rebels on the columns while moving in the eastern direction of their exit route, sections of the road on the routes were blocked in advance by the forces of units and subunits: by the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division from Gardez to Kabul and from Jalalabad to Kabul , 191st Motorized Regiment from Ghazni to Kabul; 345th Regiment Regiment and 177th Motorized Rifle Regiment on Salang, and further to Chaugani - 395th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and from the city of Tashkurgan to the settlement. Hairatana - 122nd infantry regiment, 201st infantry regiment.
The 40th Army Command determined operational and tactical cover of sections of the road along the exit route of the OKSV in the eastern direction by organizing a security and defense system for the most dangerous sections of the road by units of entrusted units in the areas of strongholds:
by forces of the 103rd Airborne Division from Kabul to Jabal Ussaraj,
108th motorized rifle division to the Salang pass,
by the forces of the 345th separate detachment division on Salanga to the village of Chaugani,
395th Motorized Rifle Division 201st Motorized Rifle Division to the city of Puli-Khumri;
At the same time, artillery groups were created at prepared firing positions located along the troop movement routes.

In the western direction of the route, the movement of columns was carried out by conducting combat operations with simultaneous blocking of routes by units of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade in the section Kandahar - Girishk, then from Girishk to Turagundi by units of the 371st and 101st Motorized Rifle Regiment 5 th msd.
In the security zone of the settlement. Turagundi sections of the road were guarded by units of a separate battalion of the 22nd SpN brigade.
On the eve of the withdrawal of troops, during April - May 1988, a commission of the 40th Army Command, headed by the commander of the 40th Army and me, as his deputy for armaments, carried out a 100% verification program technical condition weapons and equipment, its readiness for deployment to the Soviet Union, as well as maintenance and restoration activities.
The 40th Army Commission, in accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, transferred a large amount of weapons and equipment to units and subunits, the armed forces, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan.
Simultaneously with the restoration of standard equipment in units and subunits of the 40th Army, the conditions and tasks for advancement and return to the Soviet Union were studied.
By decision of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Command of the 40th Army took measures to restore faulty equipment and weapons of formations and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the garrisons, all buildings and objects of the residential zone were transferred to military units of the Republic of Afghanistan at permanent deployment points, in the territories of outposts and combat outposts.
During the preparatory period (March - May 1988), the Command of the 40th Army organized the creation of three-month reserves of ammunition of all types, property, food, fuel in the amount of 85,063 tons, in the garrisons of the cities left by the Soviet troops: Jalalabad, Gardez, Shindand, Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, Kabul, Jabal Ussaraj, Baghlan, Puli Khumri, Mazar-i-Sharif.

In the preparatory stage of the withdrawal of OKSV, officers of the technical services of the army armament department in units and individual subunits underwent a 100% inspection of standard equipment, the organization of repair work, and the restoration of faulty weapons of all units and subunits of the 40th Army.
The forces of the 501st evacuation battalion of the army repair and restoration base of the ARVB carried out the transportation of faulty equipment and weapons to be sent for overhaul to the army's SPPM deployed on the State Border of the USSR. The ARVB carried out a partial removal of armored hulls of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles to the Soviet Union, which were concentrated along the advance routes and in the park area of ​​the units' deployment points.
During the preparatory phase, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan were handed over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan by representatives of the 40th Army Command:
more than 50 T-62 tanks;
65 units BMP-1;
277 units armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles;
more than 80 units artillery pieces;
11 rocket launchers;
46 anti-aircraft installations;
12 ATGM combat vehicles;
6,850 units small arms.
Technical support for the withdrawn units and subunits of the 40th Army along the movement routes was organized with standard repair and evacuation means, with the allocation of technical closures in the amount of 5 to 10 units on each section of the road. heavy-duty trailers for the purpose of transporting military equipment that cannot be restored for subsequent concentration and storage at army SPPM.
In the eastern direction, collection points for damaged vehicles (RPM) were deployed:
SPPM No. 1 on the eastern outskirts of Kabul from 10.05. 1988 units 4904 ARVB for comprehensive repairs;
SPPM No. 2 in the area of ​​Jabal-Ussaraj, by units of the 333rd airborne infantry battalion of the 108th motorized infantry division and three army platoons of the 884th airborne infantry regiment RAV, the 762nd airborne infantry brigade MA and the 682nd airborne infantry battalion BT;
SPPM No. 3 in Baglan by units of the 340th ORVB, 201st Motorized Rifle Division;
SPPM No. 4 in the city of Puli-Khumri by the forces of the 890th rear airborne infantry battalion, the 59th ABR of the Defense Ministry with attached army assets - a platoon of the 884th airborne infantry battalion RAV and the 682nd BT airborne infantry battalion;
SPPM No. 5 in the village of Hairaton - on the basis of the 501st army evacuation battalion with attached three platoons of the 762nd orvb MA, 681st orvb BT and 889th orvb RAV.
In the western direction SPPM No. 1 were deployed:
in the city of Shindand - on the basis of the 177th ORVB of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division with an attached repair company of the 762nd ORVB MA and the 682nd ORVB BT, with the 285th TM company;
SPPM No. 2 - in the village of Turagundi, on the basis of the repair company of the 177th orvb of the 5th mechanized division and attached to the platoon of the 762nd orvb MA and the platoon of the 285th or TM.
In the eastern direction, the leadership and coordination of the work of the SPPM is Colonel (now Lieutenant General) V.S. Korolev. partially instructed the head of 4904 AROB, Colonel Tskhovrebov Kh.M.
In the western direction, the management of the activities of both SPPM was entrusted to the head of the army's automobile service, Colonel L.E. Kiyashkina.
The transfer of equipment, weapons and military camps to formations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, as well as the creation of the necessary reserves for them (including ammunition and fuels and lubricants) was carried out in accordance with the approved plan of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense.
At the first stage of the withdrawal, the command of the OKSV transferred to the leadership of the RA Armed Forces the housing stock, barracks, communal facilities and equipment, and apartment property in 58 military camps of units and subunits.
By 15.05. In 1987, operational groups of the 40th Army Command arrived in the indicated areas to supervise the deployment of units and subunits of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in accordance with the action plan of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The first to move forward on May 15, 1987 were the military units of the Jalalabad garrison. On the initiative of the Afghan side, mass rallies were held along traffic routes in the cities of Jalalabad, Kabul, and Kunduz. 12,000 people took part in the farewell in Jalalabad, about 100,000 people took part in the streets and rallies in Kabul, and all members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, headed by the President of the Republic of Afghanistan Najibullah, were present at the rallies here in the capital of Afghanistan.
The withdrawal of troops was covered by 212 correspondents, including 22 people from 10 countries of Europe and America, 15 Soviet ones, who were escorted to the State Border of the USSR on military equipment, along with personnel, the rest were delivered to the area of ​​Termez - settlement. Hairatan by plane.
The march along the indicated routes of formations and units of the Limited Contingent of the Army in the eastern and western directions occurred without serious incidents and mass deaths of personnel, without the massive use of standard weapons of the troops and organized fire from the rebels. On the mountain slopes in the area of ​​the Salang pass, seven cars, armored personnel carriers, and armored vehicles overturned into the abyss, resulting in the death of 14 people.
The first to advance were 4 columns from Jalalabad, which included 1216 units. military equipment and vehicles. At the head of the columns were Colonels Yu.T. Starov. and Avlasenko V.V., Lieutenant Colonels Yakuba V.I., Tashko A.A. Two columns from the city of Gardez were headed by Lieutenant Colonels Evnevich V.G. and Goryachev B.I. From Kunduz, 5 columns of units of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and one column of ground air force services advanced towards the USSR. From Ghazni, the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment moved out in two columns led by Colonel V.M. Shcherbakov. and Mironenko V.P. In the western direction from Kandahar, the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade advanced in four columns with air force ground services, led by Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Nikulin, S.P. Dunaev, Major P.S. Salnik, V.P. Medvedev. The 22nd “SpN” brigade advanced from Lashkar Gah in two columns, led by Colonel Nekhai I.P. and Major Kovalchuk A.Z. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division with combat and technical support units advanced from Kunduz: 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 998th AP, five columns, under the command of Colonels V.V. Ruzlyaev, A.D. Kalinin, Lieutenant Colonel S.G. Perepelitsa ., Lieutenant Colonel Berezhev S.G., Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov P.G.
During the period of preparation for the withdrawal of troops, the 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment, stationed in Faizabad in the eastern direction, found itself in the most difficult condition, where the 2nd motorized rifle battalion in the village of Baharak found itself in a blocked position, where the bandit formation, having triple superiority, mined all the withdrawal routes for equipment and personnel. The Dushmans demanded that the Soviet command hand over all weapons and military equipment to them. The command of the 40th Army decided to disarm the BMP, remove machine guns, gun locking devices and blow up 16 BMP-1s. The withdrawal of the regiment was carried out in two columns along the route Faizabad, Talukan, Khanabad. The first column was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Yu.P. Ryzhakov, the second by the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Churkin.

At the first stage, the withdrawal of OKSV troops was carried out in the most favorable weather conditions and a stable military-political situation. However, an analysis of the activities of the rebels shows that the leaders of the main opposition groups and armed formations, ignoring the Geneva Agreements and the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, maintained an irreconcilable position towards the existing state structure and continued to increase their efforts to seize political power in the country.
In order to make up for losses and strengthen the opposition armed groups of the Mujahideen, in April-May 1988 alone, the arrival of about 10,000 militants from Iran and Pakistan was noted.
By May 15, 1988, Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan amounted to 4,492 units and 190 groups, which included 160,580 rebels.
There were 1,776 active armed groups and detachments, which included 67,090 rebels. They were supplemented by 134 detachments with a total number of 6,010 rebels. The beginning of the withdrawal of OKSV did not cause a decrease in the level of combat activity of the Mujahideen.
The largest concentration of Mujahideen remained in the provinces of Takhar, Badakhshan, Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul, Wardak, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Ghazni, Kandahar, Helmand, Kunduz, Herat, Khost district, as well as the main communications.
In these provinces, 2,842 detachments and groups were concentrated, numbering over 103,000 Mujahideen, which accounted for 64% of the total grouping of armed opposition forces, of which 1,250 detachments and groups numbering 46,800 people showed particular activity and audacity in attacks on columns and outposts of Soviet troops.
The communications through which the OKSV was deployed served as the territory of constant fire confrontation between the Soviet troops and the armed formations of the Mujahideen:
Ghazni - Kabul. 63 detachments and groups numbering 2,100 rebels;
Kabul - Gardez. 55 detachments numbering 1850 rebels, having 8 MANPADS, 8 RS launchers, 15 BO, 62 mortars, 8 ZGU, 64 DShK machine guns, 147 RPGs;
Kabul - Hairatan. 439 detachments and groups numbering 12,200 rebels, who had 29 MANPADS, 18 RS launchers, 6 GP, 80 BO, 100 mortars, 12 ZGU, 182 DShK machine guns, 599 RPGs.
The situation in Kandahar province remained very tense. The Mujahideen group consisted of 251 detachments and groups numbering 8,770 Mujahideen, of which 86 units numbering 3,165 Mujahideen showed combat activity. The situation was heating up.
In the province of Ghazni, the armed formations of the Mujahideen numbered 174 detachments and groups, with 6,496 rebels, of which greatest activity 54 detachments in which 2,175 Mujahideen fought.
In Helmand province, armed forces consisted of 155 detachments and groups of Mujahideen, numbering 6,755 rebels.
In the first stage, Soviet troops were withdrawn from 12 provinces from May to August 15, 1988. 50.2 thousand military personnel (50% of the total personnel) returned to their homeland, in accordance with the obligations stipulated in the Geneva agreements.
From the garrisons of the cities of Ghazni, Gardez, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Kunduz, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, more than 30,000 OKSV military personnel were transported by transport aircraft to Tashkent and Termez.
After August 15, 1988, Soviet troops remained in only six provinces of Afghanistan (Kabul, Herat, Parwan, Samangan, Balkh, Baghlan), consisting of 50, 1 thousand people. 55% of the personnel were left in the Air Force units of the 40th Army, of which 90% were front-line aviation, and 35% were army aviation.
The main efforts of the units and divisions of OKSV were focused on performing tasks to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, in holding the most important administrative centers, air bases, communications, as well as in supporting the combat operations of the Afghan army against armed opposition forces.
For the period from March 15 to August 15, 1988, at the first stage the following was derived:
110 T-62 tanks;
1026 units BMP, armored personnel carrier;
346 guns and mortars;
48 units anti-aircraft weapons;
3728 units cars, 203 units. special machines;
14 airplanes, 207 helicopters;
Total 5,582 units.
As the head of the operational group on Salang, Colonel (currently retired lieutenant general) Korolev V.S. During his stay, he was forced to monitor the outposts and posts on a daily basis. The armed forces of the mujahideen of the opposition leader, the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, received orders from him to stop fighting and shelling of Soviet troops. However, some of the leaders of the Mujahideen, such as Gul Kaidar, Mirzgo, Mosandkhan, neglected the Geneva agreements and continued the terror.
During this period, active hostilities on the part of armed opposition groups in the Salang area clearly did not appear. At the same time, 36 military personnel died from mine explosions, shelling and road accidents, of which 14 were killed at the Salang Pass.

During the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, 174 tanks, 49 infantry fighting vehicles, 262 armored personnel carriers and BRDMs, 160 units were repaired for the army, units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan in units and subunits of the 40th Army. BTR-152, 41 barrels of 152 mm GD-1 guns, 46 units. 120 mm mortars, 30 units. 122 mm howitzers, 93 units. 76 mm ZIS-3 guns, 23 units. 57 mm ZIS-2 guns; 237 units 82 mm mortars.
Organizationally and operationally, the 40th Army was part of the Turkestan Military District and was subordinate to the commander of the troops, Army General N.I. Popov and the district headquarters headed by Lieutenant General V.T. Denisov. Therefore, for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it was necessary to carry out organizational measures to disband the withdrawn units during the second stage from November 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.
Having received instructions personally from the commander of the district troops, Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. with the operational group of the district headquarters consisting of officers of the Organizational-Mobilization Directorate, officers of technical services and logistics, he left for the city of Termez, where units and formations were withdrawn to the base of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division along the eastern route:
56th Airborne Brigade, which, after the confiscation of its excess equipment and weapons, was sent to the railway. transport to the city of Iolatan, Mary region of the Turkmen SSR;
860th Motorized Rifle Regiment - was completely disbanded on the spot with the transfer of personnel and weapons to other formations;
66th Motorized Rifle Brigade - after the withdrawal it was reorganized into the 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment and here in Termez the 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment was stationed as part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The management of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and support and maintenance units, together with the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment, were relocated to the PPD site in Dushanbe.
The 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, withdrawn in a western direction to the Kushki area, was reorganized into the 373rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with its inclusion in the 5th Motorized Rifle Division.
The 15th Special Forces brigade, withdrawn to the city of Termez, was disbanded, except for the 154th Special Forces unit, which was left in TurkVO, and the remaining railway units. were sent by transport to other military districts, after the seizure of non-standard equipment and weapons (SAVO, BVO and KVO).
The 22nd Special Forces brigade, withdrawn to the city of Kushka, was disbanded, and special detachments were stationed in restricted areas until the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, then sent to the railway. transport (Moscow Military District, ZakVO, Leningrad Military District, PrikVO).
Separate guard battalions withdrawn from the cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz were subject to complete disbandment.
The ground echelons of the 335th and 181st separate helicopter regiments, the 254th, 239th, and 205th separate helicopter squadrons departed to internal military districts.
At meetings of the command staff, the commanders of the withdrawn units, first in Termez and then in Kushka, were informed of the requirements of the Directive of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 314/1/0520 dated April 24, 1988 and the instructions of the commander of the district troops. An operational group led by Colonel (now Lieutenant General) V.S. Korolev. immediately began disbanding (reforming) units, as well as verifying the availability of standard equipment and weapons in accordance with the report cards according to the district and army services.
The dispatch of personnel upon their transfer to the reserve, transfers to other units and formations of internal military districts were carried out.

Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments, recalls:
“A lot of work was done to compile documentation for equipment that required major repairs, decommissioned and sent to the repair enterprises of the Center (factories and bases of GBTU, GRAU, GlavTU), which were handled by the technical services of TurkVO, headed by Major General Yu.N. Burovtsev, Yu.A. Nagula and Colonel I.A. Ryzhenkov.
This work was carried out in parallel in the garrisons of Kushki and Termez by officers of operational groups, until September 15, 1988.
On the night of August 22 this year. I flew to Kabul to investigate, by order of the commander of the district troops, the fact of the explosion and mass destruction of army reserves of ammunition and materiel in the warehouses of the 59th army logistics brigade in the city of Puli-Khumri. As a result of an investigation conducted by district officers under my leadership, it was established that as a result of an act of sabotage and simultaneous massive shelling of the warehouse area with rockets, seven army warehouses were destroyed. According to intelligence data, this raid was carried out by gangs of leaders Farakhutdin and Malid.
As a result of RS (missiles) hitting a stack of 122-mm rockets, a strong fire started that engulfed all the buildings. After the explosion of ammunition, exploding rockets began to be scattered over a territory within a radius of up to 3 kilometers.
During the fire, residential, park and warehouse areas burned. In addition to the army artillery warehouse, the buildings of six more army warehouses burned down (BTI, ATI, engineering and chemical weapons, as well as clothing and medical).
Military personnel, workers and employees of the 59th Army Logistics Brigade were taken by surprise by explosions and fires during their lunch break. As a result of this sabotage, the following were completely destroyed: an ammunition depot with a capacity of 1,200 wagons and six warehouses with general army supplies, in particular: 200 tank engines, infantry fighting vehicles, wheeled armored personnel carriers, about 50 gearboxes and transmission units of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
More than 50 engines, about a hundred power transmission units, about a thousand sets of tires, more than 500 pieces were destroyed at the automobile warehouse. batteries, etc.
Together with the storage facilities (hangars), about 20 prefabricated panel buildings (modules) burned down completely, and therefore the entire ABRMO personnel were left homeless.
In order to dress and put on shoes for the “fire victims,” a “hat went around the circle” among the army servicemen to collect voluntary donations in favor of the “fire victims.”
In addition to the sabotage and explosion of army reserves in the city of Puli-Khumri, three-month supplies of ammunition and fuel left for the army, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan were blown up in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar.

Arriving in Tashkent and reporting the results of the investigation into the explosion of army supplies to Army General N.I. Popov, we made a decision to partially replenish ammunition and necessary spare parts for BT and AT equipment, directly to formations and units, bypassing army warehouses that were destroyed, in an amount that ensures the maintenance of combat readiness of OKSV divisions and regiments. At the same time, the verification of documentation on the availability of weapons and equipment continued - by the heads of services of the withdrawn units at the first stage and the execution of acceptance certificates and orders for sending weapons samples to the factories and bases of the Center for repair.”

The main problem of reforming the army, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Guard of the Ministry of State Security of the Republic of Afghanistan for this period was the catastrophic shortage of specialists for armored tanks, ground and anti-aircraft artillery, ATGM systems and missile technology supplied to the RA Armed Forces such as the Luna-M and operational tactical complex 8K14-R-300 "Scat".
In pursuance of the decision of the General Staff, on the basis of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division in Termez, the 720th training center was created for the retraining of Afghan soldiers in specialties corresponding to their standard equipment and weapons. It turned out that we left a surplus of samples of weapons and military equipment, without taking into account the availability of specialists for them - soldiers of the Afghan army. The number of specialists capable of operating weapons and driving equipment did not exceed: 50%, and for certain specialties it was even lower, such as mechanics-drivers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, gunners-operators of ATGMs, MANPADS and missile system specialists - up to 75% of the required numbers.
In connection with the above, three-month courses for military personnel of the Republic of Afghanistan were created. Directly by the leadership of the district - the leadership of departments and technical services, 24 technical classes, directors, training fields and tankodromes with all the elements of combat training, everyday life and life were created.
In one single period, we retrained from 1000 to 1300 Afghan military personnel with theoretical and practical mastery of the specialty. After completing their studies, they received full-time military equipment, were formed into the appropriate units and units, then, under the command of Afghan officers and generals, they made marches under their own power to their places of deployment. At this training center, from September 1, 1988 to July 1, 1989, more than 5,000 Afghan soldiers underwent retraining.
154 Soviet specialist officers from the TurkVO troops and Dari translator officers were involved in conducting classes at these courses.
At this time, in the units and formations of the OKSV remaining on the territory of Afghanistan, intensive preparation of personnel, weapons and military equipment was underway to carry out marches under their own power in both directions in the USSR.
The preparation and transfer of weapons and military equipment to the Afghan armed forces (army, MGB guards and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), which began during the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, continued, in the next quantitative composition: tanks - 240 units, BMP 1 - 212 units (including BMP 2 - 127 units, wheeled armored personnel carriers - 850 units, BRDM - 183 units, vehicles - 3293 units, ground artillery samples - up to 168 barrels, anti-aircraft guns - 236 units, small arms - 15,584 units).
During the period of troop preparation at the final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Najibullah, did not want to involve the armed forces of his country to fight the irreconcilable opposition (apparently, they were saving it for the future).

Facts and documents testify: The RA leadership tried to use mainly units of the 40th Army for these purposes, hoping to involve the “shuravi” in large-scale military operations, especially against the armed detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud and thereby detain them in Afghanistan.
The Afghan leadership repeatedly appealed to the Soviet Government: “Stop the withdrawal of troops due to the fact that Pakistan and the United States do not comply with the Geneva Agreements.”
Immediately, as soon as RA President Najibullah began to develop defeatist sentiments and the idea began to emerge to appeal to the Soviet leadership with a request to leave troops in Afghanistan, after the deadline for their final withdrawal stipulated by the Geneva Agreements (02/15/1989), the Center began to receive reports from the military OKSV command with proposals not to do this.
At the beginning of 1989, USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov demanded that an operation be prepared and carried out in the Panjshir gorge and in the southern regions of Takhar province in February-March. However, according to the Command of the 40th Army, this was unrealistic in winter conditions.
And yet, common sense prevailed: at a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, it was decided not to detain some of the troops in the Republic of Armenia, but to fully and accurately fulfill the obligations assumed in Geneva and withdraw them on time.
This decision was greeted with enthusiasm by all military personnel stationed in Afghanistan.
On January 27, 1989, the withdrawal of OKSV was resumed. The highway began to work in one direction - from south to north.
The opposition, with some exceptions, did not interfere with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, as well as the occupation of sensitive zones, outposts and security posts by the RA armed forces.
Columns of tracked and automotive vehicles walked to the State Border of the Soviet Union in extremely difficult weather conditions (low temperatures, fog, icy roads).
In high mountain areas, especially on the Salang pass, the movement of vehicles was hampered by snow avalanches. They often descended from the mountains, forming many kilometers of snow and stone blockages on the road. A huge amount of work was carried out on engineering, road, technical and logistics support.
The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul on February 4, 1989.
Only a small force remained to guard the Kabul airfield, since the transportation of food and flour to the capital by air continued.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops at the first stage, and then government troops from Panjshir, in the spring of 1988, the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud gained a foothold in this area and in the summer began to “crawl” to South Salang (north of Kabul).
At this time, Soviet units carried out a number of combined arms operations, such as “Veil”, “Blockade” and a number of local (private) military operations in the provinces of Kabul, Kapisa, Lagar, Baghlan and others, and fought with large detachments of the armed opposition.

The Afghan leadership, led by RA President Najibullah, tried by any means to delay the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from their country.
RA President Najibullah personally asked Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU Gorbachev M.S. leave part of the troops, division or brigade to guard communications. Its representatives also persistently persuaded the USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov on the organization of the military operation of the 40th Army to defeat the group of the leader of the armed opposition Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Gorge. Soviet intelligence data did not confirm the information and requests of the RA leadership to consider the group of Ahmad Shah Massoud as a priority threat to the state, and as a version, there was an economic interest of one of the country’s ruling clans in mastering the deposits of metals and precious stones of Panjshir.
Therefore, President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah, during the withdrawal of OKSV at the first stage, was able to convince the Soviet leadership that at this stage, instead of withdrawing the 101st and 12th motorized rifle regiments of the 5th guards motorized rifle division from Herat, carry out the withdrawal of units of the 201st motorized infantry division from Kunduz city.
Subsequently, President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah repeatedly insisted to the OKSV Command on the destruction of the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud by Soviet troops and thereby delayed the start of the withdrawal of troops at the second stage.
Instead of the planned withdrawal date of OKSV - November 15, 1988 - the start date of withdrawal was postponed to the first days of January 1989.

When checking the state of affairs on organizational issues, after the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it was established: all units were reorganized, personnel with weapons from other military districts were sent to permanent deployment points at their destination.
The equipment repair stock was transported to repair bases and factories (GBTU, Grau, GlavTU). Personnel who have served the established terms of service are dismissed and sent to their place of residence.
After flying over the garrisons of Termez and Kushka, it was established that all activities related to the withdrawal of OKSV at the first stage were basically completed.
In December 1988, Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. was sent to study at military academy General Staff for higher academic courses for senior leadership of military districts and naval forces.
The training program included the study of changes in the organizational and staffing system of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the USSR. New methods of command and control of troops in a combat situation were mastered. Measures for interaction between the ground forces and the nuclear forces and space forces were worked out.

The training sessions were conducted using automation and computerization tools introduced into the troops of all processes associated with command and control of troops in various combat conditions. During the classes, much attention was paid to the use of military weapons and the influence of electronic warfare (electronic warfare) on their use.

Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments, recalls:

“While in class on January 7, 1989, I was called through the academy duty officer to the head of the academy, Army General G.I. Salmanov, who announced to me that by decision of the leadership of the General Staff my studies were being interrupted and I urgently needed to leave for Tashkent to resolve issues related to ensuring the second stage of the withdrawal of troops, their disbandment and reorganization, and the redeployment of units to other military districts. This was due to the fact that a new leadership and military council of TurkVO was appointed. Lieutenant General I.V. became the new commander of the district troops. Fuzhenko, his first deputy was Lieutenant General G.G. Kondratyev and chief of staff - Lieutenant General Yu.D. Bukreev. And therefore, I, as the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments and General V.V. Petukhov, who was previously in Afghanistan as an adviser, could provide practical assistance to the withdrawing OKSV troops at the second stage of withdrawal, as well as in organizing their march and in matters of security and defense of routes. In advance, the commander of the district troops by his order assigned the task of ensuring the withdrawal in the eastern direction to General V.V. Petukhov, and me on the withdrawal of troops in the western direction.
Starting from December 28, 1988, rear units, service, support and security units began to move out from the garrisons of the cities of Kabul, Bagram, Jabal Ussaraja, Shindand and Puli Khumri.
To organize uninterrupted passage across the State Border of the USSR, two operational groups were created from representatives of all departments and services of the district with the powers of control, resolving issues of reformation, sending withdrawn troops to a new place of duty, demobilization of conscripts, secondment of officers and warrant officers to a new place of duty. Together with officers of the operational groups in the cities of Kushka and Termez, the readiness of sites for equipment, the condition of residential camps and the organization of the condition of weapons parks were checked.
January 20, 1989 I was personally assigned the task by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Direction troops - Army General N.I. Popov - immediately go to the city of Mary, Turkmen SSR, where the 266th district ammunition depot was stationed, and organize the shipment according to the specified nomenclature of ammunition for heavy weapons and ensure their airlift by military transport aircraft to the Kandahar airfield, where in due time Three months of ammunition reserves left after the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the formations and units of the 2nd Army Corps of General H.A. were destroyed as a result of sabotage. Olumi.

For this purpose, an aviation regiment of transport aviation with AN-12 aircraft was placed at my disposal. This urgent task was solved for the reason that the formations and units of the 40th Army were either on the march or ensuring the safety of the movement of troops while on “blocks” and therefore could not practically provide assistance in delivering ammunition to Kandahar to the 2nd Army Corps of the Armed Forces RA.

The supply of stacks of ammunition to the sides and loading of aircraft was carried out by personnel, warrant officers and warehouse officers, day and night, in a volume of 2,276 tons. The airlift was carried out every night by 18-20 “aircraft” - AN-12 aircraft out of 27 units available in this regiment. In one night, each crew had to make two or three flights, airlifting from 100 to 150 tons. For 10 days, the pilots and personnel of the warehouse, following orders from the command, continuously carried out loading operations and the transfer of ammunition. During this time, more than 1,200 tons of shells for ground artillery and mines for 120 mm and 82 mm mortars were airlifted to Kandahar.
Things didn't go as we planned. At the airfield of Kandahar, blocked by the mujahideen, there was no normal navigation support, drive and tracking equipment. the runway was not lit.
During takeoff and landing, some of the aircraft suffered landing gear damage and other breakdowns.
To the credit of the pilots, soldiers and officers of other units of the 40th Army, by February 1, 1989, the task of providing ammunition to the 2nd AK in Kandahar was completed in full; the required range of ammunition was submitted on February 2.
Having thanked the workers, personnel and officers of the warehouse, presenting them with valuable gifts, on the orders of the commander of the district troops, I left for the city of Kushka, where the 88th motorized rifle division was located, at the base of which OKSV troops of the western direction were leaving. Together with the commander of the 88th MRD, we checked the readiness of all facilities to receive troops, the equipment of field parks, tent camps and food points. I inspected and checked the readiness of the customs and border areas of the city of Kushka to receive and pass units.
On the morning of February 2, 1989, I proceeded across the State Border of the USSR to the settlement. Turagundi, where he checked the organization of the evacuation of the district transshipment base, as well as the availability of a repair fund focused on the SPPM (assembly point for damaged vehicles) of the army.
Then, having flown to the city of Termez, to the location of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division, I made a detailed inspection of the areas of deployment of troops being withdrawn in the eastern direction, where areas for equipment (settlement tanks) with elements of tent camps and field parks were already equipped.
Together with Major General V.V. Petukhov, we conducted an instructional session with representatives of the customs service and border control posts on the specifics of inspecting standard weapons and equipment.
I draw your attention to the combat readiness of the OKSV troops stationed in Afghanistan and preparing to march towards the USSR-RA state border.
According to the intelligence services of the OKSV, the transfer of rebels, weapons and ammunition to the Afghan border in vehicles of the Armed Forces of Pakistan has been repeatedly noted. In September 1988 alone, Pakistani army logistics services delivered over 4 thousand rockets to the Parachinar region from Peshawar, which were subsequently transferred to Kabul, Logar and Panjshir.”

During the second period of withdrawal of Soviet troops, the sending of foreign advisers and specialists to the territory of Afghanistan to provide support and assistance to armed rebel groups did not stop. Arab advisers acted in the provinces of Uruzgan and Ghazni, and Pakistani military specialists acted in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Paktia. The most significant material, financial and advisory assistance in Pakistan at this time was provided by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

During this period, the Command of the 40th Army made a decision on the procedure for the withdrawal of formations and units from the Republic of Afghanistan at stage II:

In accordance with the directive of the USSR Minister of Defense and the approved schedule of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the withdrawal of formations and units of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces from the Republic of Armenia was to be completed before February 15, 1989.
Based on this, the Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov. decided: the withdrawal of formations, units and institutions from the Republic of Armenia should be carried out in two directions (eastern - the cities of Kabul, Bagram, Puli-Khumri, Hairaton; western - the cities of Shindand, Herat, Turagundi settlement) sequentially, garrison by garrison, starting from the most remote from the Soviet-Afghan border.
Combat support for the withdrawal of units of the 40th Army in the eastern direction in the period from January 2 to January 10, in order to eliminate the influence of the rebels on the columns, was decided to be carried out by: occupying platoon strong points along the movement routes in the most dangerous places; creating artillery groups, occupying firing positions along the troop advance route.
It was decided to move parts of the technical support in advance to the specified areas of deployment of the SPPM. With the help of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, equip and maintain night rest areas in the cities of Puli-Khumri and Hairatan for 1,900 military personnel and 300 units of equipment.
ZKP (reserve command post), OG (operational groups) of the army and CP (command post) of the 108th motorized rifle division - withdraw to pre-planned areas.

At the points of combat orders of the Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V. it was also stated:
“In the period from January 10 to January 28, 1989, withdraw formations and logistics support units to the territory of the USSR: the rear of the 108th and 201st motorized rifle divisions, the 103rd airborne division, the 59th Abrmo (army logistics brigade), the rear of the withdrawn regiments and garrison establishments (military hospitals), carry out the transfer of personnel by air (about 30,000 military personnel) not involved in the combat crews of standard military equipment during the withdrawal of troops from the airfields of the cities of Kabul, Puli-Khumri, Shindand in the period from January 3, 1989 to January 31. 1989
In the period from January 28 to February 15, carry out the withdrawal of combat units and units to the territory of the USSR.

Fire engagement of the enemy should be carried out in 10-15 minute fire raids from the moment the columns enter the area of ​​responsibility and accompanied by harassing fire on planned targets and fire on call from artillery spotters located in the columns.
Air cover of marching columns on the march will be provided by the forces of the Air Force of the 40th Army and the front-line aviation of the TurkVO troops from the airfields of the cities of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kakaidy.
Control the withdrawal of troops from the command post - Kabul, ZCP - Naibabad, as well as the allocation of OG (operational groups) to the areas: Jabal-Ussaraja, lane. Salang, Chaugani, Puli-Khumri, Hairaton, Termez, Tashkent.
To ensure the safety of the withdrawal of troops and to exclude the influence of the rebels, the withdrawal route was blocked by occupying platoon strong points at dominant heights and areas of the most likely movement of the rebels in the areas: Kabul-Kalakan - two battalions of the 181st motorized rifle regiment, the cities of Charikar - Jabal - Ussaraja - two battalions of the 682nd infantry regiment; Jabal-Ussaraja - Chaugani - 345th Regiment; Chaugani - Dashi - 668th separate battalion "SpN", Dashi - northwestern (outpost No. 15 - Naibabad - 1st and 2nd motorized rifle battalions of the 122nd motorized rifle regiment and 773rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division "
The withdrawal of army troops was controlled from the Kabul command post, the Naibabad command post, the Shindand military command post, as well as by army operational groups headed by:
Jabal-Ussaraj - Colonel V.F. Yakubovsky;
Salang pass - Major General A.G. Sheenkov;
Chaugani - Major General V.G. Profatilov;
Puli-Khumri - Major General V.A. Vasenin;
Hairaton - Colonel V.A. Dybsky;
Termez - Colonel V.P. Shcherbiy;
Tashkent - Colonel S.F. Kitsak.
Departure of operational groups to places of work - 01/3/1989 Departure of the operational group to Tashkent - 9/01/1989 Departure of the Army ZCP - 7/01/1989
The Army Commander and the Commander's Task Force managed the withdrawal of troops from the Army CP at Dur-ul-Aman until 14/01/1989;
From January 14, 1989 to February 2, 1989, control was carried out from the army command post deployed at the base of the 103rd Airborne Division; from 02/02/1989 – army command post in Naibabad.
Upon completion of the withdrawal, the army commander’s task force moves to Tashkent and manages the disbandment of the army from the command post - the Tashkent transit point (Tuzel airfield).

Withdrawal of rear formations and army units, rear divisions, regiments and garrison institutions.
The withdrawal schedule for OKSV units and subunits included the following:

01/13/1989 - the 59th Abrmo, rear of the 108th motorized rifle division is withdrawn from Bagram; intersection of the State. Borders of the USSR - 59th AbrrMO - January 14, 1989
01/15/1989 - the 47th order is withdrawn: the 668th separate battalion "SpN" blocks the Chaugani-Dashi section, and the 47th order from the city of Puli-Khumri, under the protection of the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division, continues to move to the city of Hairaton. Crosses the state border of the USSR on January 18, 1989.
01/17/1989 - army communications units are withdrawn from Kabul to Hairaton, the USSR state border is crossed on January 18, 1989.
01/19/1989 - army support units march from Kabul. The state border of the USSR is crossed on January 22, 1989.
01/21/1989 – the rear of the 103rd Airborne Division moves forward; The state border of the USSR is crossed on January 24, 1989.
01/23/1989 - the 45th smallpox (separate engineer-sapper regiment) begins to move without an engineer-sapper battalion from the city of Charikar;
01/26/1989 - the 278th dbkr (road commandant brigade) is withdrawn from Chaugani. The state border of the USSR is crossed on January 27, 1989.
01/28/1989 - the 276th TPBR (pipeline brigade) is withdrawn from the city of Puli - Khumri. Crosses the state border of the USSR on January 29, 1989.
01/29/1989 - the rear of the 180th and 181st infantry regiments begin to move from Kabul. The state border of the USSR is crossed on January 31, 1989.
01/30/1989 - the rear of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division begins to move and on the same day crosses the State Border of the USSR.

Withdrawal of combat formations and units

From the garrison of Bagram: 01/28/1989. The withdrawal of the ground echelon of the Air Force and the 179th separate battalion of the Special Forces, which, with access to the city of Hairaton, was guarding and strengthening the security zone.
An Air Force ground echelon crosses the border on January 30, 1989.
01/28/1989 – the 2nd MSB of the 180th MSB, after being removed from the outposts, moves forward to strengthen the route in the regiments’ area of ​​responsibility;
01/28/1989 – The 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th motorized rifle division, after being removed from the blocks, is concentrated in the area of ​​the “Bagram” intersection as a reserve.

Garrison of Kabul. Displayed in the period from February 1 to February 4, 1989 in three columns:
1. The first column advances the ground echelon of the Air Force. The movement began on February 1, 1989. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 4, 1989;
2. The second column advances the 317th airborne division of the 103rd airborne division after holding a rally in Kabul. The movement began on February 2, 1989. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 5, 1989. The security of the rally was ensured by the forces of the 357th RPD;
3. The 357th airborne division advances in the third column. The movement began on February 4, 1989. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 7, 1989.
The withdrawal of troops from the Kabul garrison was completed on February 7, 1989.

02/04/1989 After the withdrawal of troops from Kabul and the transfer of outposts, units of the 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment are removed from the blocks and march from Jabal to Ussaraj.
Units of the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment are removed from the blocks in the area of ​​Kalakan - “Bagramsky” intersection and concentrated in the area of ​​the intersection.
02/5/1989 The 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment from the city of Jabal-Ussaraja marches to the city of Hairaton. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 7, 1989.
The 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment is removed from the blocks at the Bagram intersection - Charikar city and is concentrated in the city of Jabal-Ussaraj.
02/07/1989 CP 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment from Jabal Ussaraj move to Hairatan. The USSR state border is crossed on February 9, 1989.
The 2nd battalion of the 177th infantry regiment, after the transfer of outposts in the Jabal-Ussaraj - Kalawulang section, is concentrated in the city of Chaugani.
The 1st battalion of the 345th detachment detachment is removed from the “blocks” in the Jabal - Ussaraj - Kalawulang section and concentrates in the city of Kalawulang.
02/08/1989 The 177th Motorized Rifle Regiment, after the transfer of outposts in the Kala-vulang-Dashi section, is concentrated in the city of Puli - Khumri.
After being removed from the “blocks” in the Kalawulang-Chaugani section, the 345th detachment unit is concentrated in the city of Chaugani.
02/09/1989 The 345th Regiment Regiment marches to the city of Puli-Khumri.
The 668th separate battalion "Special Forces" is removed from the "blocks" in the Dashi-Puli-Khumri section;
The 2nd airborne division (parachute battalion) of the 350th airborne division is removed from the “blocks” in the Dashi-Puli-Khumri section.
02/10/1989 The 345th Special Operations Division, 668th Special Operations Division marches to Hairaton. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 11, 1989.
02/11/1989 The 395th Motorized Rifle Division of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, after the transfer of guard posts in the regime zone and in the section of Puli-Khumri - Mirza Pass, concentrates in the area of ​​the pass (guard outpost No. 15) and marches from area No. 15 to the city .Hairathon.
The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 12, 1989.
02/12/1989 The 350th airborne division is removed from the “blocks” and concentrated in the area of ​​​​Aibak and marches to the area of ​​​​Hayraton.
The state border of the USSR will be crossed on February 13, 1989.
After the transfer of outposts, the 122nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division is removed from the “blocks” in the Tashkurgan Gorge area and concentrated in the city of Naibabad. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 13, 1989.
02/13/1989 The 1st MRB of the 149th MRD with a ground echelon of the Air Force marches from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989.
The 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (without the 3rd Motorized Rifle Regiment) marches from Naibabad to Hairaton. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 13, 1989.
02/14/1989 Army command post, control of the 201st motorized rifle division with the 783rd orb makes a march to the city of Hairaton. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989.
02/15/1989 The 3rd motorized infantry regiment of the 122nd motorized rifle regiment, the optical division of the 108th motorized rifle division, the transshipment base are withdrawn to Termez until 12.00.
The 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division crosses the state border of the USSR before 15.00.
Commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan, General B.V. Gromov. Crosses the state border of the USSR at 15.00 on February 15, 1989.

Western direction

The withdrawal of troops in the Western direction is carried out from February 1 to February 15, 1989 in ten columns.
The head of military operations for the withdrawal of troops in the western direction is Major General N.P. Pishchev.
02/04/1989 - a convoy from the city of Shindand of the ground echelon of the Air Force begins to move, consisting of the 403rd Obato and the 5th Motorized Rifle Division. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 5, 1989.
02/04/1989 Units of the 196th and 424th in the amount of 434 vehicles of the district automobile battalions of the 246th KEC, the 704th military hospital and the 279th SED are moving forward in one convoy. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 6, 1989.
The rear units of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division and the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment, consisting of the 375th Infantry Division and the 460th Medical Battalion in the amount of 284 vehicles, begin to move. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 7, 1989.
02/07/1989 Beginning of the deployment of the control of the 5th motorized rifle division, the 3rd motorized rifle division of the 371st motorized rifle regiment consisting of 360 units of military equipment and vehicles in the amount of 365 units. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 8, 1989.
02/08/1989 Advancement of the 177th orvb of the 5th motorized rifle division, the 1st and 2nd motorized rifle battalions of the 371st motorized rifle regiment after their removal from the blocks and the transfer of outposts (posts) from the city of Shindand to the city of Herat. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 9, 1989.
02/09/1989. Advancement of the 12th Motorized Rifle Regiment in full force after removal from the “blocks” and transfer of outposts in the area from Herat to the Mirza-Rabati pass, consisting of 432 units of equipment. Crosses the border on February 10, 1989
02/10/1989 The 101st Motorized Rifle Regiment begins to move with 432 units of military equipment, joining the column of units removed from the “blocks” after the transfer of guard (outpost) posts. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 11, 1989.
02/11/1989 Deployment of combat support units of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division as part of the 650th reconnaissance battalion and engineer battalion. Removal of units of the 101st Motorized Rifle Division from the “blocks”. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 12, 1989.
02/12/1989 Advancement of motor transport columns consisting of 465 units. vehicles of the 1468th transshipment base of the district from the village of Turagundi. The USSR state border is crossed on February 13, 1989.
02/13/1989 Transportation of the 278th separate company of heavy vehicles from the army SPPM, with the repair stock of overhaul vehicles, and decommissioned armored hulls removed from the garrisons of the Western direction. It crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989. The export was carried out on two flights - 278 or.TM.
02/14/1989 Advancement of the convoy of the 1356th separate security battalion with the removal of its units from the “blocks” in the section of the Rabati-Mirza region to the security zone of the village of Turagundi.

The last soldier of the Soviet troops crossed the state border of the USSR in the area of ​​Turagundi - Kushka, Major General N.P. Pishchev.

After the withdrawal of troops in the western direction, the 5th Guards. The MSD was reorganized and transferred to staff “B” - reduced strength with the deployment of reduced personnel in the city of Kushka.
The 101st Motorized Rifle Regiment has been completely disbanded. The 1122nd anti-aircraft missile regiment and the 164th separate flamethrower company were also subject to disbandment. The 28th Army Artillery Regiment has been reorganized into a rocket regiment.
After the withdrawal in the eastern and western directions, the repair units of the 4904 ARVB (army repair and restoration base) and the 59th ABRMO (army logistics brigade) were completely disbanded. Ground echelons of aviation units of front-line aviation and helicopter regiments and individual squadrons of army aviation were sent to the railway. transport to places of deployment:
168th IAP - to the Starokonstantinov airfield, to the 24th Air Army of the Kiev Military District;
378th oshap - to the Postavy airfield in 26 VA (Belarusian Military District);
274th opib - to the airfield in Migalovo (Moscow Military District);
181st military regiment - Davlenkanovo (Ural VVAU);
50th Osap - with support units to the Lipki airfield (26 VA BVO).
Separate helicopter squadrons were redeployed with regular oratos (separate aviation support companies):
205th Air Force - to the Sudzhi airfield (23 VA Transbaikal Military District);
239th Air Force – to the Nikolaevka airfield (Far Eastern Military District);
254th Air Force - to the airfield in Gissar (Air Force of the Central Asian Military District);
262nd Air Force - to the Malino airfield (Moscow Military District);
302nd Air Force - to the Osovtsy airfield (26 VA Belorussian Military District).
The remaining air force units with support equipment were redeployed to the permanent deployment points of the TurkVO and SAVO troops.

20 years ago, at 15.00 on February 15, 1989, citizens of the Soviet Union saw on television, live, a solemn meeting of our soldiers and officers at the last stage of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops, when the Commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, General B.V. Gromov. was the last to cross the Friendship Bridge and left the borders of Afghanistan, and then his report to Army General N.I. Popov, as well as the solemn passage of columns of armored vehicles with personnel in military units and units past the jubilant population.

Further, retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments, recalls:
“However, after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the activities of the officers of the arms departments, logistics departments, personnel departments and the organizational and mobilization department of the district headquarters did not end. All these departments have had a sharp increase in work related to the reassignment of officers and sending them to new duty stations, the demobilization of personnel who have served their assigned terms and the sending to new duty stations of those who have not served their term. This work was carried out until April 1, 1989.

The Arms and Logistics Services needed to conduct a documentary reconciliation and audit of material reserves exported from Afghanistan to the USSR, check the availability of arriving weapons and military equipment according to documents and determine their technical condition.
Then the supernumerary weapons were withdrawn and transferred to other formations and units.
According to extraordinary orders (GBTU, GlavTU and Grau), weapons and equipment requiring major repairs were shipped to factories and bases.
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at both stages and concentration in the garrisons of Kushka and Termez, there were some incidents when, in the atmosphere of a general holiday of returning to the homeland, the end of a long bloody war, due to a decrease in military discipline of officials of the arriving units, when unloading of weapons and ammunition remaining in the fighting compartments of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers; children from local villages and settlements took possession of ammunition. As a result, ammunition explosions and accidents occurred, causing limb injuries and even deaths in children, especially in the city of Termez.
These were the main lessons and results of the measures for the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops, the 40th Army from the Republic of Afghanistan.”
In mid-July 1987, Major General V.S. Korolev, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, was appointed deputy commander of the TurkVO troops for armaments and handed over the post of deputy commander of the 40th Army to Colonel A.A. Korunny and left for Tashkent. After accepting the post of ZKV, the district continued to provide assistance to OKSV in the border garrisons of Termez and Kushka, where the disbandment of withdrawn units and units was carried out and further sending of personnel for further service in other military districts.

It should be recognized that the majority of ordinary people and those citizens whose children and relatives did not take part in the hostilities, and even some of the participants in the Great Patriotic War, they still believe that there was no war in Afghanistan, but that there were isolated clashes between OKSV units and Mujahideen formations. This is explained by the fact that in Afghanistan there was no continuous front of confrontation between the conflicting parties.

During the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, a new practice, little known to the world community, of conducting full-scale combat operations by mobile assault units in conditions of military, armed confrontation of a focal nature arose.
Any long war saturates the population with military technologies, arms them with trophies and forms sustainable knowledge and survival skills, unites them into armed communities, and deprives them of their humanity in search of food and means of subsistence. In conditions civil war they become easy prey for international swindlers and bandits, are susceptible to violence and robbery, and are ready to fight with anyone for money.
In armed formations and Mujahideen detachments, there were fixed payments for each killed Soviet soldier or officer, called “shuravi”. Particularly large rewards were paid for participation in hostilities, terrorist attacks, and combat damage to Soviet equipment, comparable to the cost of housing or a car. Countless armed groups migrated across the territory of Afghanistan, fighting for money. Therefore, small internecine wars constantly broke out for control over villages and the territory of districts (districts).

Over the nine years of this “undeclared” war, more than 420 military operations equivalent to army operations were carried out.

During the Second World War, about 1000 army operations were carried out, about 200 front-line and 51 strategic operations.

For nine years, Soviet troops in Afghanistan participated in hostilities that, in their intensity, taking into account the scale of the peacekeeping missions they performed, the hot climate with large temperature changes, the extremely difficult terrain for communication, in the conditions mountain ranges with most slopes with inclination angles of more than 45 degrees, seemed an insurmountable task for the army of any country with the weapons and equipment of those years.
On this basis, calculations of the armed confrontation of the opposition in Afghanistan were made by leading foreign military experts in the field of strategy and tactics of the Cold War of the late 20th century.
Units and subunits of the 40th Army suffered significant losses in personnel, weapons and equipment every day due to enemy fire, harsh climate, infectious diseases, wounds, shell shock, and road accidents in rugged terrain.
At the same time, if we take into account the mountainous terrain and the occupied area of ​​the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, which is equal to an area of ​​655,000 km2, then to conduct full-fledged combat activities by the standards of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 would require a grouping of our troops consisting of three four combined arms fronts.

Conclusions and opinions of soldiers and officers, generals - participants in the fighting in Afghanistan.

Nowadays, after comparing the military-historical characteristics of the episodes of the war in Afghanistan 1979 - 1989 with the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and other countries of the world in the second half of the 20th century, the miscalculations and mistakes of the political and military leadership of these countries carrying out peacekeeping operations abroad are comparable his country, in the loss of influence on the course of events of the war. Thus, the total losses of the international contingent of the NATO peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and the civilian population over a shorter period significantly exceeded the losses of Soviet troops and citizens of the country over 10 years of war.

Currently, as follows from reports of the international TV channel Euronews dated January 29, 2009, since the deployment of NATO peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan, the area under cultivation and, accordingly, the production of opium in the country has increased 20 times and significantly exceeds the needs of the world market. drugs, which poses a massive threat to the lives of all humanity.
The peacekeeping experience in Iraq and Yugoslavia also does not stand up to the criticism of military historians and combat veterans, participants in the events that ended the confrontation between the conflicting parties.

It is obvious to every sane person: the unreasonably large material and monetary costs of conducting combat operations on the territory of countries of military conflict, losses in manpower and equipment, and civilian population during the tasks of reconciling warring parties in the modern period can be explained by other intentions of the “peacekeepers” - the merciless interests of international capital, excess profits of the military-industrial complex.
Everything can be learned by comparison: the international practice of classifying local military conflicts and military operations, after a year of events in Afghanistan, unambiguously defined the military operations of the Soviet troops and the resulting armed confrontation as a full-scale war using all available means on the territory of the state of Afghanistan: the population, its Armed Forces, divisions and units of the Soviet troops. In the 1980 UN documents, which determine the policies and positions of the states of the world, the events in Afghanistan are clearly classified and spelled out as waging war in order to carry out a peacekeeping mission due to the inadequate use of military force by Soviet troops.
In the modern period, some peacekeeping countries, under the guise of a unified “peacekeeping” strategy, have created the latest military doctrine of the use of secret aggressive operational plans for the implementation of national interests in local military conflicts.
Little known to the world community, the practice of conducting full-scale combat operations by mobile assault detachments in conditions of military, armed confrontation of a focal nature, the new requirements of the time for the combat capabilities of the army, formed during the war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989, in the events of other military conflicts of this period of modern history, finally determined the beginning of irreversible reforms and rapid qualitative changes in the armed forces of all countries of the world, their goals and objectives.
The experience and practice of using the new operational art of combat, accumulated as a result of the war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989, the merger of combat tactics of countries participating in other wars and military conflicts, the achievement of high efficiency of the mass use of air assault units, special forces and reconnaissance caused profound processes of structural reform of the armies of the world, the creation of rapid reaction forces within them.

Global trends in the development of military development of the armed forces of all countries in the conditions of massive rearmament of armies, the use of a fundamentally new operational art of combat, highly effective command and control systems, the use of high-precision weapons, the creation of powerful forces and means of combat support (space reconnaissance and communications), the transportation of units, have led to the abandonment of large armies by most civilized states.
The emergence of combat operational highly mobile components in the armies of the countries of the world, an increase in the depth and effectiveness of reconnaissance and fire destruction, temporary and spatial capabilities for the movement of troops, an increase in the independence of combat tactical units, a sharp increase in their fire capabilities, large-scale changes in other components, influenced the nature of combat operations and principles of warfare in general.

This message, in brief form, presents the results of the main military operations, the opportunity to compare the bitter military experience with the experience of the armies of other states, while taking into account the daily losses of personnel and environmental impacts.
So, in the 70th Guards Omsbr (commanders: Guards Colonel E.V. Meshcheryakov, Guards Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Loginov), located 12 km from Kandahar, in 1983, 39 officers died in battles, which amounted to 30% of the officers who participated in the hostilities, among the personnel - 186 people, and in other cases 30% of the number of personnel directly involved in the hostilities. In 1983, units of the 70th Guards. The UMSBR made 326 combat missions, including night ones, with the aim of stopping the movement of caravans with weapons deep into the territory of Afghanistan, of which 32 cases involved combat operations.
In 1984, the total share of irreparable losses (together with sanitary ones) in the personnel of the 70th Guards Omsbr increased due to: the strengthening of the grouping of opposition units (up to 18,000 people), its weapons and equipment in the area of ​​​​responsibility, the participation of a significant number in their leadership foreign hired military specialists; daily attacks on outposts in the green zone of the province, in Kandahar; repelling attacks by Mujahideen assault groups on columns; other episodes of participation in active hostilities and amounted to 40% in relation to other direct participants in hostilities.
The combat reports of the commanders of the units of the 70th Guards Omsbr in 1984 stated: “... the weapons, equipment, and portable ammunition in the Mujahideen detachments were not inferior to the regular ones in the Soviet units, and often were qualitatively superior and allowed them to participate in battles with prolonged intense fire contacts, to use modern combat tactics, to resist, through maneuver, using the terrain, the fire of assigned artillery and supporting aviation ... ".
Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments:
“The OKSV included 133 battalions and divisions. Of these, 82 battalions (61.72%) performed security functions, communications - 23, airfields - 14, military and economic facilities - 23, local authorities - 22. 51 battalions were involved in active combat operations throughout the country.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that within the OKSV divisions there were from 12,000 to 17,000 personnel, while during the Second World War the division had from 3,000 to 4,000 people. The motorized rifle brigade OKSV had a strength of 3500 - 4000 people, 300 - 550 units. armored vehicles, and the motorized rifle regiments had from 2500 to 3000 people, about 200 units. military equipment and 160 units. cars.
Military formations and units of the OKSV were four to five times larger than the number of similar units during the Great Patriotic War in terms of manpower, service weapons and equipment.

A limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989, waged a full-scale war, in its intensity and intensity, the participation of personnel and weapons, not inferior to the combat operations of the Second World War, the war in Vietnam and Korea.”

The war in Afghanistan 1979 - 1989, according to many prominent military analysts of the armies of the world, as an episode of military art, is one of the most successful operations in the history of wars.

In the information bodies of the power structures of the Republic of Belarus and the minds of a limited part of civil society, an unfounded opinion still reigns about this war, in which Belarusians participated as part of the Soviet army, that internationalist soldiers cannot be equated with soldiers - veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

The tasks assigned by the Soviet Government to the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan to protect strategically important infrastructure facilities of the country, cover the State Border of the USSR and the border territory were completed with the least possible losses during the military confrontation between the warring parties, continuous incursions of armed opposition units, Mujahideen groups with the support of a number leading foreign states, the presence of severe climatic and unsanitary conditions in mountainous desert areas, lack of civilized communications infrastructure, aggressive full-scale political and religious influence on the population.

These, in our opinion, are the main lessons and results of the measures for the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops (40th Army) from the Republic of Afghanistan.

This circumstance makes it possible to believe that the application of the “Law on Veterans” by the authorities of the Republic of Belarus is based on the principle of equal determination of the status of participants in the Great Patriotic War and participants in the war in Afghanistan of 1979–1989.

Veterans of the war in Afghanistan in a significant majority support the President of the Republic of Belarus A.G. Lukashenko. in all internal and foreign policy, believe in the wisdom of the Leadership of our country, are confident in the recognition of their participation in the war in Afghanistan as a personal contribution to national security and the bright future of their Fatherland, the Republic of Belarus.

Former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for Armaments, retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev.

Assistant to the Chairman of the organization Shagov (Alexandrov) A.A. took part in the selection and presentation of thematic materials from newspapers and media for the “Information Message”.

Advisor to the chairman of the organization on science and high technology, graduate of the graduate school of the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (now the FSB Academy), officer “Cascade-2”, veteran of the special security forces unit “Vympel”, member of the Public Organization of KGB Veterans of the Republic of Belarus “Honour” Pitsyk A.V.

The “Information Message” was prepared and compiled by A.A. Osipov, a military intelligence veteran of the USSR Ministry of Defense. based on the texts of official reports, the book “War in Afghanistan” 1991. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, books “Special Forces of Russia. Encyclopedia" 2007, LLC Publishing House "Yauza", "Eksmo".

Osipov A.A. Currently, he is a correspondent for the newspaper “Peace and Security” of the International Public Association of Veterans of Special Security Forces “Vympel”.

The partisan regional organization of Minsk OO BSVVA is a co-founder of the International Union of Public Associations of Veterans of Airborne, Airmobile and Special Forces Forces “International Union of Paratroopers”.

Chairman Osipov A.A.

Note:

Composition
Limited Contingent Soviet Troops
in the Republic of Afghanistan

Author: Sukonkin Alexey Sergeevich, Vladivostok
Member of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period 1979-1989. included the following parts, connections and associations:
40th Combined Arms Army Turkestan Military District (Kabul, former residence of Amin)
34th Aviation Corps (later 40th Army Air Force)
USSR KGB troops
Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
Airborne Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Units and divisions of the GRU General Staff
Office of the Chief Military Adviser
40th OA
733rd headquarters of the 40th OA, PP 78864 Kabul
205th Oro Special Department of the 40th OA
logistics headquarters of the 40th OA, PP 84641 Kabul
2nd air defense brigade (withdrawn to the USSR during the first withdrawal of troops in the early 80s)
353rd Guards Abr (withdrawn to the USSR during the first withdrawal of troops in the early 80s)
55th Guards Apt 40 OA "Gyacinth"
28th reap point 85615 (popular name "madhouse") Shindand, Lashkar Gah
47th Ordn OTR "Luna" Kabul (at the final stage of the war the division made 92 launches)
103rd ops brigade 52011 40th OA Kabul
254th (264th) ORT Special Forces (radio-electronic intelligence) Kabul (three companies of the regiment were located in Kabul, Kandahar and Shindand).
822nd Ortb OSN Bagram 141st Ortb OSN (SAVO)
244th ORT (withdrawn to BelVO in 1989)
1996th Ortb Air Defense PP 55996
1959th (1956th) about electronic warfare PP 15779
421st US
278th infantry brigade: Jabal-Ussaraj military unit 83437
-1083rd CSTB Jabal-Ussaraj military unit 34361
59th regiment: Puli-Khumri
-425th oavtb
-446th OAVTB PP 92053
-449th oavtb (1042nd column)
-424th oavtb
-650th oavtb
-714th oavtb
-659th oavtb -1323rd oavtb
-1476th oavtb (district)
-660th refueling battalion
-714th motor depot
-602nd obmo Bayram-Ali
276th Brigade: Puli-Khumri (formed from the 14th Brigade, military unit 38021)
58th Brigade:
-118th oavtb
-134th oavtb (1051st, 1052nd column) military unit 21231 Bagram
-262nd oavtb
-261st oavtb
1032nd column
6593rd column
1174th PTOR
125th VAI
71st VAI
4904th (4909th) repair and restoration base
-682nd orvb 3541st prtb
762nd Orvb
210th Oremr 40th OA Kabul
66th transshipment point
1594th transshipment base
-479th sanitary control point
3557th engineering equipment warehouse
6357th food warehouse

76th Dental Clinic

70th VG
341st VG Kabul
346th VG
743rd VG infectious Bagram
VEO
VEO
VEO
SEA
SEA
342nd UIR PP 06462
1154th UPR
1563rd VP MO
220th VP MO
3292nd VP MO
52628th field institution of the State Bank
5131st base of reinforced concrete structures
353rd Optadn
395th orvb AT AL
98th Orvb
164th ORR
129th TP
135th MSP
254th Guards MSP
367th Guards MSP
201st Motorized Rifle Division: Kunduz
-122nd MSP PP 65753 Tash-Kurgan
-395th MSP PP 24785 Puli-Khumri
-149th Guards MSP PP 82869 Kunduz
-234th TP (launched in the USSR in 1980)
-998th sap "Starokonstantinovsky"
-1098th air defense missile system (launched in the USSR in 1986)
-350th optadn Kunduz
-783rd orb pp 53336
-oisb pp 22430 Kunduz
-254th Obs Kunduz
-340th orvb
-36th obmo
-propaganda squad
5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division: Shindand
-101st MSP Herat
-12th Guards MSP PP 33541 Herat (introduced into the DRA in March 1985 from the PribVO, Gvardeysk)
-371st MSP PP 51883 Shindand
-373rd MSP (in 1980, reorganized into the 70th OMSBR)
-24th Guards Corps Shindand (withdrawn, then reintroduced)
-1060th ap Shindand

-278th OISB (?) Adrascan
-650th orb Shindand
-388th obs "Prazhsky"
108th Motorized Rifle Division: Kabul, since the summer of 1980 Bagram
-177th MSP PP 51863 Jabal-Ussaraj
-180th MSP PP 51884 Kabul
-181st MSP PP 51932 Kabul
-682nd infantry regiment 86997 Rukha, Panjshir (formed in March 1984 on the basis of the 285th tank regiment)
-285th TP (in 1984 reorganized into the 682nd MRR) -1074th AP Hairakhan
-zrp (introduced in the USSR in 1986)
-783rd (738th) optadn pp 83565
-271st ISB Bagram
-221st Obmo PP 15559 Kabul
-781st orb
-808th obs (according to V. Grigoriev - 600th obs)
- ovkr according to msd military unit 86302
-propaganda squad
186th Motorized Rifle Regiment PP 77800 (at the initial stage - in the northern regions of Afghanistan) - in 1980, reorganized into the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade
191st Motorized Infantry Regiment, 39776 Ghazni
-omsb military unit 43151
860th motorized infantry regiment 89933 Fayzabad, Badakhshan (attached to the 40th Army from North-East Military District)
66th Motorized Rifle Brigade PP 93992 Jalalabad (according to some sources, the brigade was called the 66th separate combined arms brigade) - formed in 1980 from the 186th Motorized Rifle Brigade - the brigade included, in addition to the brigade set of forces, also the 48th separate infantry battalion and one mountain rifle battalion
-propaganda squad
70th Motorized Rifle Brigade PP 71176 Kandahar (according to some sources, the brigade was called the 70th separate combined arms brigade) - formed in 1980 from the 373rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment - within the brigade, in addition to the brigade set of forces, there was also one separate infantry battalion (formerly 1- th pdb 39th airborne brigade) and one so-called. "desert" battalion
-propaganda squad
56th Airborne Brigade, PP 74507 Gardez
-odshb in the village Souffle guarding the 668th Special Forces
103rd Guards Airborne Division: Kabul (subordinate to the Airborne Forces Directorate) PP 16159, 13879
-350th airborne patrol Kabul/Kandahar
-317th traffic police station 24742 Kabul, Bagram
-357th traffic police station 48059 Kabul
-387th UPDP (non-staff, formed to train young recruits, after the withdrawal of the division from the DRA it was disbanded. Did not take part in hostilities. Perhaps the regiment was located on the territory of the TurkVO)
-1179th ap pp 15789
-80th Guards Orr
-130th OISB
-62nd detachment (deployed to the DRA as reinforcement, after the withdrawal of the division it was disbanded. T-55AM tanks were in service)
-742nd obs
-105th Oradn
-1388th obmo
-115th medb
-8th squad
-opdb Lashkar Gah
-opdb Girishk
-opdr Kalat
345th Bagram Special Detachment Division (subordinate to the Airborne Forces Directorate)
PU "Ekran" Kabul (GRU General Staff) at the headquarters of the 40th OA
797th RC GRU military unit 44628 Kabul
RP GRU "Herat"
OAGR "Urgun"
OAGR "Kalat"
OAGR "Kandahar"
15th Specialized Brigade: (1st Omsbr) Jalalabad brigade
- Jalalabad Brigade Headquarters
-oSRS Jalalabad
-154th ooSpN (1st omsb) Jalalabad
-334th ooSpN (5th Omsk) PP 83506 Asadabad (from the 5th OsoSpN BelVO)
-177th ooSpN (2nd omsb) Ghazni (formed in the 22nd oopsspn and transferred to the 15th)
-668th ooSpN (4th omsb) Sufla in the Baraki-Barak area (from the 9th oopsspn KVO)
22nd ObrSpN (2nd Omsbr) PP 11659 Lashkargah
- Lashkar Gah Brigade Headquarters
-oSRS Lashkar Gah
-173rd ooSpN (3rd Omsb) Kandahar (from the 12th OsoSpN ZakVO)
-370th ooSpN (6th omsb) PP 83428 Lashkargah (from the 16th special brigade of the Moscow Military District)
-186th ooSpN (7th Omsk) PP 54783 Shahjoy (from the 8th OsoSpN PrikVO)
-411th ooSpN (8th omsb) PP 41527 Farah
897th OR RSA (RU 40th OA) Kabul
459th OrSpN PP 44633 (RU 40th OA) Kabul
OKSV troops could be supported at any time by a strike from operational-tactical missiles deployed on the territory of the USSR and aimed at targets in Afghanistan:
-regiment of front-line OTRK "Temp-S" (5 launchers) Kattakurgan (near Samarkand)
- brigade of army OTRK "Oka" (12 launchers) Bayram-Ali (near Mary)
USSR KGB troops:
115th Combined Mazar-i-Sharif Border Regiment
DShMG - several groups from military units 2066 and 2033
MMG - several groups from military units 2066 and 2033
PU KGB USSR military unit 52628
221st OUS
303rd about PS Kabul
310th about PS KZ
311th about PS pp 26153
KGB operational detachments "Cascade", "Cascade - 2, 3, 4"
- "Ural" - Kabul
- "Caucasus" - Kandahar
- "Carpathians" - Herat
- "Karpaty-1" - Shindand
- "Tibet" - Jalalabad
- "North" - Mazarai Sharif
- "North-1" - Kunduz
- "Altai" - Ghazni
Omega Squad
All KGB detachments were in Afghanistan until 1984, after which they completed operational combat activities and were withdrawn to the USSR.
Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs:
The Ministry of Internal Affairs detachment "Cobalt" (600 people) was attached to "Cascade". It was introduced in the USSR in the early 80s.
Air Force 40th OA
Aviation was initially consolidated into the 34th Air Corps, and later into the Air Force
40th Army.
1325th Air Force CP
494th ACS node
177th Weather Group
344th guidance point
Fighter aviation regiments:
120th IAP MiG-23MLD Bagram (last regiment in time)
190th IAP MiG-23MLD Bagram
655th IAP MiG-23MLD
168th IAP
85th IAP Bagram
115th Guards IAP MiG-21bis operated from Bagram and Kokaity airfields (USSR)
Assault aviation regiments:
200th Oshae Su-25 Shindand (1980-1984)
378th Shap Su-25 Kandahar (formed in 1984 on the basis of the 200th Oshae)
Pilots from several regiments from the USSR fought on rotation (in particular, the 187th regiment of the Far Eastern Military District, the 80th regiment of the ZakVO, the 90th regiment of the PrikVO), and, unlike fighter and fighter-bomber aviation, the pilots flew the same machines, which were used until the resource was completely depleted (unless, of course, they were shot down before that).
In total, the 200th Air Force and the 378th Shap lost 23 Su-25 aircraft in Afghanistan.
Fighter-bomber aviation regiments:
136th ibap Su-17m4 squadron: Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar
217th ibap Su-17m4 Shindand
The 156th ibap Su-17m4 operated from the Mary-2 airfield
274th Ibap
355th ibap Su-17m4 Bagram (Afghan regiment)
Mixed aviation regiment:
50th Osap unit 97978 (An-12, Mi-8, Mi-6) Kabul
Separate helicopter aviation regiments:
181st Regiment Faizabad
280th airborne brigade 19888 Kandahar
289th air force Kandahar (or error from 280 air force)
290th airborne regiment at the initial stage of the war in Bagram or Kabul
335th Air Force Kunduz
338th Regiment Bagram
339th Airborne Regiment apparently Bagram or Kabul
361st airborne regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8mt) (from Chirchik SAVO)
Crews of helicopter regiments also fought in Afghanistan:
101st Air Force
292nd military regiment (arrived from the 2nd Guards OA)
399th military unit (arrived from 32 OA)
486th OVP (arrived from the 8th Guards OA GSVG)
319th military regiment (arrived from the 5th OA Far Eastern Military District)
Individual aviation squadrons:
205th OVE Mi-8mt, Mi-24v Jalalabad ("special forces squadron")
208th Ove Mi-24, Mi-8mt Lashkargah, (according to other sources - Jalalabad)
239th OVE Mi-8mt, Mi-24 in Lashkargah ("special forces squadron")
254th Ove
262nd military unit 19888 Bagram (possibly from the 280th military unit)
292nd Ove Jalalabad
296th Ove (out of 3 OA)
302nd OVE PP 65235 Shindand
320th Ove
263rd UAE RTR PP 92199
339th osae
Regiments of the 73rd front-line bomber aviation operated from the Kokaity airfield on targets in Afghanistan Air Army TurkVO:

149th Guards Bap Su-24 (Alma-Ata)
143rd bap Su-24 (Kutaisi-1)
735th bap Su-24
87th Orap Su-24r (carried out photo monitoring of the results of air raids and reconnaissance of targets)
In addition, in 1984 and 1988-1989, crews of heavy bomber regiments of Long-Range Aviation worked on targets in Afghanistan from USSR airfields:
from Khanabad airfield:
200 Guards Tbap Tu-16 (1984) (Bobruisk)
from Mary-2 airfield (1984):

from Mary-1 airfield:
251 Guards Tbap Tu-16 (1988-1989) (Belaya Tserkov)
from Mary-2 airfield (1988-1989):
185 Guards Tbap Tu-22m3 (Poltava)
1225 tbap Tu-22m2 (Belaya, ZabVO)
402 tbap Tu-22m3 (Orsha)
341 tbap Tu-22m3
840 tbap Tu-22m3 (Novgorod Soltsy)
52 tbap Tu-22m3 (Shaikovka)

Battalions and companies of airfield security and support
1350th about
1352nd Regiment of the Bagram airfield (400 people, 50 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 9 AGS)
1353rd obo
1356th obo
1357th obo
1358th obo
oro Kandahar airfield PP 37466
Airfield technical support battalions:
134th separate aviation technical battalion
221st Air Force Obmo
30th obato
344th obato
358th obato
359th obato
377th obato
395th obato
396th obato
403rd obato
475th obato
1765th obato
Separate airfield technical support companies:
245th Orato
248th Orato
249th Orato
257th Orato - reorganized into 403rd Orato
266th Orato
273rd Orato
275th Orato
276th Orato
277th Orato
Battalions and companies of communications and radio technical support of the Air Force:
18th obs and RTO
600th Obs and RTO
672nd Obs and RTO
682nd Obs and RTO
694th Obs and RTO
257th Ors and RTO
716th Ors and RTO - reorganized into 600th Obs and RTO
802nd Ors and RTO
1059th Ors and RTO
Aviation support parts:
19th PARM
192nd PARM
392nd PARM
542nd Aviation Technical Base - reorganized into the 395th and 396th Obato and
248th orato
980th repair and technical base
310th Aviation Medicine Laboratory
250th Flying Aviation Technical Laboratory
447th Flying Aviation Technical Laboratory
27th district aviation training ground
32nd Army Aviation Range
Additional Information:
68th Motorized Rifle Division: (by the end of December 1979 it was deployed on the territory of the TurkVO, but was not introduced into the DRA, the tank regiment was not even deployed) subsequently prepared a reserve for the 40th Army.
The 467th training regiment of the TurkVO Chirchik Special Forces was formed in 1985 (it was not introduced into the DRA, it was preparing a reserve for active special-purpose units).
The 387th training parachute regiment (formed in 1980 and stationed in Fergana) was training airborne troops for operations in Afghanistan.
357th Motorized Rifle Division - was deployed and mobilized before the entry of troops into the DRA, perhaps it was introduced by some regiments (860th Motorized Rifle Regiment?).
360th Motorized Rifle Division - reorganized into the 108th Motorized Rifle Division before being transferred to the DRA.
Perhaps, at the final stage of the war in Afghanistan, a marine unit of the USSR Navy, presumably the battalion of the 810th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the hostilities.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan were stationed in 179 military camps (32 garrisons). After the partial withdrawal of OKSV troops, by November 10, 1988, units of the 40th Army were located in 122 military camps (17 garrisons).

ABBREVIATIONS
abr - artillery brigade
avtbr - automobile brigade
AK - army corps
ap - artillery regiment
ASV - ground forces aviation
bap - bomber regiment
BelVO - Belarusian Military District
VA - air army
VAI - military automobile inspection
Air force - air force
VDV - airborne troops
airborne division - airborne division
VP MO - military representation of the Ministry of Defense
Guards - Guards (Guards)
GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate
GS - General Staff
zrp - anti-aircraft missile regiment
IAP - fighter aviation regiment
ibap - fighter-bomber aviation regiment
KRC - command and intelligence center
KVO - Kyiv Military District
KEU - apartment and operational management
KECH - apartment and operational part
MoD - Ministry of Defense
MSD - motorized rifle division
MSP - motorized rifle regiment
MSB - motorized rifle battalion
OAGr - operational intelligence group
oavtb - separate automobile battalion
obato - separate battalion of airfield technical support
obvp - separate combat helicopter regiment
obmo - separate logistics battalion
obo - separate guard battalion
about PS - separate government communications battalion
obrs - separate communications brigade
obrSpN - separate special purpose brigade
about electronic warfare - a separate electronic warfare battalion
obs - separate communications battalion
OA - Combined Arms Army
OVKG - district military clinical hospital
ovp - separate helicopter regiment
ovtae - separate military transport air squadron
ove - separate helicopter squadron
CSTO - separate road commandant battalion
ODKBR - separate road commandant brigade
odshb - separate air assault battalion
odshbr - separate air assault brigade
zrbr - separate anti-aircraft missile brigade
OIS-separate engineer battalion
oisp - separate engineer-sapper regiment
Omedb - separate medical battalion
omsb - separate motorized rifle battalion
omsbr - separate motorized rifle brigade
Omsp - separate motorized rifle regiment
ooSpN - separate special forces unit
oovbr - separate combined arms brigade
OPDB - separate parachute battalion
opdp - separate parachute regiment
optadn - separate anti-tank artillery division
orakdn - separate missile division
orap - separate reconnaissance aviation regiment
orato - separate airfield technical support company
orb - separate reconnaissance battalion
ORVB - separate repair and restoration battalion
oreadn - separate rocket artillery battalion
oremr - separate repair company
orlr - separate radar company
oro - separate security company
ORSpN - separate special purpose company
ORR - separate reconnaissance company
OR RSA - a separate company of reconnaissance and signaling equipment
ortu - separate radio engineering unit
Osap - separate mixed air regiment
osae - separate mixed aviation squadron
otb - separate tank battalion
otrb - separate tank repair battalion
otbvp - separate transport and combat helicopter regiment
otpbr - separate pipeline brigade
Oshae - separate attack aviation squadron
PDP - parachute regiment
pogz - border outpost
pogo - border detachment
pp - field mail
prtb - mobile repair and technical base
PTOR - maintenance and repair point
reap - rocket artillery regiment
RP - reconnaissance point
rr - reconnaissance company
rtbr - radio engineering brigade
RTO - radio technical support
RTP - radio engineering regiment
RU - intelligence department
RC - intelligence center
SAVO - Central Asian Military District
glanders - self-propelled artillery regiment
SV - ground forces
SpN - special purpose
SEO - sanitary-epidemiological detachment
tbap - heavy bomber regiment
tp - tank regiment
TurkVO - Turkestan Military District
US - communication center
Shap - assault air regiment

Afghan War Statistics
As of 2000, information from the media of the Russian Federation
Total irretrievable human losses in Afghanistan (12/25/1979 – 02/15/1989)

Total deaths…………………………………………….14453 people
Including:
In battle………………………………………………………...….9511
Died from wounds……………………………………………2386
Died from disease……………………………………...817
Died in accidents, disasters, as a result
accidents, suicides…………………………….…1739
By category:
Generals…………………………………………………………..…4
Officers…………………………………………………………..…2129
Ensigns…………………………………………...….632
Sergeants and soldiers……………………………………..11549
Workers and employees………………………………...…….139
Missing and captured……………………….…417
Were released………………………………………..119
Returned home………………………………………….97
Live in other countries…………………………….…….22
Total sanitary losses in Afghanistan……………..…..469685
Including:
Wounded, shell-shocked, injured………………………53753
Got sick……………………………………………………………...415392
Of them:
Returned to service…………………………………..…..455071
Dismissed for health reasons……………………...…11654
Died (included
to the number of irretrievable losses)………………………..…2960
Of the 11,654 dismissed according to the status. health inv. ……………….10751
1 gr. ………………………………………………………..672
2 gr. ………………………………………………………..4216
3 gr. …………………………………………………….….5863
Equipment losses:
Airplanes…………………………………………………………….…118
Helicopters…………………………………………………………..……333
Tanks……………………………………………………………..……...147
BMP, armored personnel carrier, BRDM …………………………………………….1314
Guns, mortars………………………………………………………433
KShM, KSh…………………………………….……..1138
Engineering vehicles…………………………………..……510
Flatbed fuel trucks……………………….…11369
Losses of the local population 1 million 240 thousand people. (9% of the population). The maintenance of the 40th army and the conduct of hostilities cost the USSR 3 billion USD. Support for 800 million mode

The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting
Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 “Towards the position in “A””/.