Introduction. Ideology of Soviet society

1 Ideological guidelines of Soviet society in the spiritual and cultural sphere

2 Ideology of reforming industry and agriculture

3 USSR policy in the military sphere: the burden of global power. The religious component of Soviet society

1 Soviet government and traditional religions. Nomenklatura - ruling class

1 Consistent growth of the crisis Soviet power era of “Developed socialism”

2 Shadow sector in the USSR

3 The emergence and development of Soviet dissidence

Conclusion

Literature

Applications

Introduction

Most people who live in modern Russia have witnessed historical events comparable in scale and tragedy to the collapse of a number of large states and entire empires. These historical events are associated with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This huge state in the last years of its existence tried to take measures to prevent such a development of events. This set of measures of an economic, foreign policy and ideological nature is usually called “perestroika”.

However, nothing that has happened and is happening in the post-Soviet space since M. S. Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (March 1985) can be understood unless one clearly understands the scale and nature of the crisis that struck Soviet society by the early 80s. years. The fact that at first it manifested itself in chronic increases in temperature, and was more reminiscent of a cold than a crushing illness, should not obscure from us either its size or its depth. This should be the basis for all subsequent discussions about the fate of peoples and states in the post-Soviet space.

Leadership of the USSR period 60-80. proclaimed the so-called “period of developed socialism,” which postponed the building of communism indefinitely. The sad result of this period of national history was the collapse of the multinational Soviet Union, but also the entire world system of socialism.

The Russian Federation, essentially built on the same federal principle, is also currently experiencing serious economic, political and ideological difficulties. Our country today faces a real threat of regional separatism, and therefore a threat to its territorial unity. All this makes it relevant to study the period of developed socialism from the point of view of identifying miscalculations and mistakes of leadership, studying the growth of negative processes in the economy and politics of the country, which ultimately led to the liquidation of the state itself.

Object of this thesis constitutes a period in the history of the USSR, called in historical literature the “period of developed socialism.”

The subject of our research is Soviet society during the period of developed socialism, the social structure of this society, the economic and political processes occurring in it.

The methodological basis of this study was comparative historical method and civilizational approach.

The history of the USSR, by historical standards, is not a very long time period. An even shorter period of time falls directly on the period that was proclaimed “developed socialism.” However, the amount of changes it brought in all areas public life, the development of technology, culture, and international relations, its significance is unprecedented in the history of mankind and will determine its course and direction for a long time. Therefore, it is most effective to study the history of developed socialism based on the continuity of the development of the USSR and its relations with the outside world. Such continuity allows us to identify a comparatively historical method of research.

The meaning of cultural-historical types, or civilizations, is that each of them expresses the idea of ​​man in its own way, and the totality of these ideas is something pan-human. World domination of one civilization would impoverish humanity.

In modern and recent times, the question of whether Russia belongs to European or Asian civilization is constantly debated in Russian historical and philosophical sciences. Eurasianism, as a third approach, considered Russian culture not just as part of European culture, but also as a completely independent culture, incorporating the experience of not only the West, but equally the East. The Russian people, from this point of view, cannot be classified as either Europeans or Asians, for they belong to a completely distinctive ethnic community - Eurasia.

After the revolution, East and West within Russia quickly became closer. The dominant type in the public consciousness became the primitive “Westerners,” only armed not with Buchner, but with Marx.

A feature of the Soviet era is the propaganda demonization of Western civilization in the eyes of society. It is clear why this was done: the West as a starting point is a competitor to the “only true” ideology. For the same reasons they fought against religion. In this case, prepared facts were used, i.e. real-life vices of the West, amplified by propaganda to deafening power. As a result, the ability to hear the nuances of the West, a balanced attitude towards it, which was characteristic of both Chaadaev and Khomyakov, was completely lost in the Soviet era. Long before this, O. Spengler noticed that capitalism and socialism see each other not as they are, but as if through a mirror glass onto which their own internal problems are projected. Those. “the image of the enemy” created in the USSR, including in the era of “developed socialism” is an image worst traits yourself, which consciousness would not like to notice. All this determines the need to consider the features of the development of the USSR during the times of “developed socialism”, using traditional views on Russian civilization and its place among other civilizations on the planet.1

The territorial scope of our research includes not only the territory of the USSR, but also countries that were in one way or another in the zone of influence of this state. Among them are both countries of the socialist camp and the leading powers of the capitalist world. A number of non-aligned and third world countries are also mentioned.

The chronological scope of this work covers the period from 1971 to 1985, which included the era of so-called “developed socialism.” This fifteen-year period is determined by the statement of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, which proclaimed the construction of developed socialism in the USSR (1971) and the election of M. S. Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary in 1985.

However, the views of historians on the historical period of the existence of Soviet society and the state we are studying are far from uniform. Not all researchers assess it unequivocally negatively. Thus, the Italian historian, researcher of the history of the USSR and author of the two-volume monograph “History of the Soviet Union” J. Boffa writes: “The last decade has not been a period of stagnation. The country was developing, its development was particularly intensive in the economic field and made it possible to achieve important production results. The economy of the USSR lags behind the American one, and in some respects even the European one, but it is strengthened and balanced to such an extent that it was able to turn the USSR into a colossus of the modern world.” He also notes that economic growth allowed the Soviet Union to strengthen its armed forces and bring up traditionally lagging branches of the military, such as the navy, and achieve balance with the United States. On this basis, a dialogue-competition began and developed again (an Italian scientist used this unusual term to characterize Soviet-American relations during the times of developed socialism) with America.

However, objective reality - the collapse of the USSR - testifies in favor of those historians who call the “era of developed socialism” the “era of stagnation”. The purpose of our work in the light of such controversy is to study the complex of economic, social and political phenomena in the life of Soviet society and form our own ideas about the causes of the crisis of the USSR.

To achieve our goals, we have to solve a number of research tasks, namely:

study the policies of the Soviet leadership in the field of economics and agriculture;

explore the development of Soviet ideology during the period of developed socialism;

find out the situation of Orthodoxy and other traditional religions in the USSR 1965-1985;

Characterize the nomenklatura as the ruling class of Soviet society;

characterize the corrupting influence of the black market and shortages of consumer goods on the moral state of Soviet people;

explore Soviet dissidence and the civic position of its representatives.

The source base of the work consists mainly of published sources. A peculiarity of the selection of sources on the topic was that for researchers of the Soviet era, party documents were considered the main and most reliable. Their study was recognized as having the greatest value. Moreover, a separate historical and party source study was created specifically for the history of the CPSU. Next in importance were laws and regulations. Planning documentation was singled out as a special type of Soviet-era sources, although it is clear to everyone that plans and reality are far from the same thing. This approach made it possible to explore how power, its institutions and institutions operate in history. Society here acts as a passive element, a product of the activities of government. Thus, in assessing the significance of individual groups of sources, the party and state-institutional approach prevailed, clearly establishing a hierarchy of values ​​for Soviet historians.

In this regard, we had to select sources in such a way that the data provided in them would be consistent with other, post-Soviet, or foreign estimates. This especially applies to statistical materials. The most valuable published office documents for us were verbatim reports of the CPSU Congresses, Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, minutes of meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. We obtained equally important materials on the topic of research from published sources of economic planning bodies of the USSR. Among them are the protocols of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, published in 1987. Materials and documents on collective farm construction in the USSR, reports of the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, etc. Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, collections of which were published once every three years, were of a certain importance for our work.

Among the published records sources, it seems rational to us to single out such a group as declassified sources, i.e. documents that entered scientific circulation only after the actual cessation of the existence of the Soviet Union itself. As an example, we can cite declassified archival materials of the Politburo concerning issues of religion and the church, published in 1999, Materials on the history of the Cold War (collection of documents), published in 1998, a collection by A. D. Bezborodov, which presents materials on history dissident and human rights movement in the USSR 50-80, published in 1998 and a number of other collections of documents.1

Statistical data presented in reference books and various collections of documents reveal various aspects of the socio-economic, political, cultural and demographic development of the USSR in the era of “developed socialism”. Of particular interest is the comparison of statistical and other data published directly during the period under study in the history of the Soviet Union and declassified later. Such a comparison makes it possible to recreate not only the dynamics of the country’s economic development, but also to identify, on the basis of the discrepancy between the realities of life and those proclaimed from the stands, the causes of the spiritual and ideological crisis of Soviet society.

Among the published narrative sources, a certain amount of material was studied, consisting of memoirs and memories of participants in historical events. We attached particular importance to the study of the works of L. I. Brezhnev - his memoirs, literary works, official program speeches. This is due to the fact that it was this person who led the party and, consequently, Soviet society during the overwhelming period of the existence of “developed socialism” in the USSR. IN Lately A number of authors are making attempts to collect and systematize the memories of “ordinary people” who lived and worked in the era of “developed socialism.” In this regard, we note the work of G. A. Yastrebinskaya, Candidate of Economic Sciences, senior employee of the Research Institute of Agrarian Problems of the Russian Federation, “The History of the Soviet Village in the Voices of the Peasants.” Her book, consisting of memoirs of people of the older generation, highlights the history of the Russian and Soviet peasantry using the example of one of the northern villages. The author managed to create a holistic picture of the life of the Russian village, using sociological research methods and live communication with residents of a remote Russian village. A certain comparison of materials from the “ceremonial” autobiographies and literary opuses of leaders with the ingenuous statements of ordinary Soviet citizens, being, of course, empirical method historical research, still provides rich material for understanding the “spirit and contradictions” of the historical period being studied. 1

In general, we note that source studies of the Soviet period were clearly dominated by ideology, which turned into a system of Marxist dogmas that were not subject to revision and discussion. Over time, a persistent antipathy towards such source study has developed among practicing historians. In practice, historical researchers adhered to the principle “everyone is his own historian and source specialist,” which, in essence, meant a position of extreme methodological individualism or rejection of any methodology at all.

English historian M. Martin, author of the monograph “Soviet Tragedy. The History of Socialism in Russia” notes that for the first time Soviet history became truly history precisely with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And this completion allows us to see the pattern, the logic by which she developed during her life. This study attempts to define the parameters of this model and establish the dynamics that drive it.

He says that many Western researchers have studied the phenomenon of Soviet history “through a glass darkly,” guesswork. This was because, almost until the very end, Soviet reality remained a closely guarded secret.

Passionate Sovietological debates in the West centered on the central question of whether the USSR was a unique embodiment of “totalitarianism,” or, on the contrary, a kind of universal “modernity.” Therefore, this work is an attempt to “put into place” the concepts and categories with the help of which the West tried to decipher the Soviet riddle.

In modern Russian historiography, the attitude towards the methodology of studying the period of developed socialism can be described in terms of chaos and confusion. The entire Soviet history turned out to be upside down and odiously interpreted.

There was a noticeable emancipation of thought; in the professional environment, attention to the development of both Western and domestic historical thought increased. At the same time, contradictions and paradoxes began to grow, leading to a crisis in historical science and historical knowledge about this relatively recent past.

The number of lightweight, opportunistic works has increased enormously. The practice of obtaining facts from dubious and unreliable sources has become widespread. The same plots are used with minor variations. Instead of raising the level of historical consciousness of society, there has been a disintegration of the integrity of the vision historical process and the inability of historians to create any intelligible concept of national history of the second half of the 20th century.

Historiography. It should be noted that a comprehensive, in-depth and objective study of the history of the USSR during the period we are studying has not yet been done. However, there are works that reveal certain aspects of the life of Soviet society in quite a detailed and well-reasoned manner.

For example, M. S. Voslensky in his work “Nomenclature. The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union" deeply studied the genesis and traditions of the Soviet bureaucracy. In his work, he cites extensive statistical material confirming that the bureaucracy has become a self-sufficient, self-reproducing class in Soviet society. He assesses the economic, economic and political efficiency of the Soviet state machine, the main ones, and cites a number of unspoken patterns of its functioning.

Yu. A. Vedeneev in the monograph “Organizational reforms of state management of industry in the USSR: Historical and legal research (1957-1987)” from the point of view of modern management science revealed the peculiarities of the functioning of management structures in the USSR. The fate of Russian culture in the second half of the 20th century. S. A. Galin examines it in detail. He argues that there were two opposing trends in Soviet culture. On the one hand, Soviet propaganda spoke of the “flourishing of socialist art and culture.” The author agrees that there were outstanding artists in the USSR, but at the same time demonstrates that in a totalitarian society, stagnation was observed not only in the economy, but also in culture. He shows that in conditions of lack of freedom and “social (ideological) order, culture in the USSR degenerated, became smaller, entire genres and trends did not develop, and entire types of art were banned.

Dissidence as a unique phenomenon of the Soviet way of life is described by A. D. Bezborodov and L. Alekseeva. The authors explore not only the spiritual and ideological preconditions of this phenomenon. Based on the study of criminal and administrative processes and legislation, they make an attempt to study the spread of dissent in the USSR from a statistical point of view.

Academician L.L. Rybakovsky in his monograph “The Population of the USSR for 70 Years” reveals in detail the dynamics of almost all aspects of demographic processes in our country from 1917 to 1987. His monograph contains a retrospective analysis of the demographic development of the USSR from the first years of Soviet power until 1987. It examines the interaction of demographic, economic and social processes that influenced the changes in various structures of Soviet society.

Experts speak of A. S. Akhiezer’s monograph “Russia: Criticism of Historical Experience” as an important breakthrough in knowledge about Russia. The philosopher, sociologist, economist - the author of more than 250 scientific works, in his conceptual two-volume monograph forces us to look at the mechanisms of change in the history of Russia through the prism of the formation and change of the foundations of morality that form the basis of Russian statehood. The book shows how society’s attempts to get rid of sociocultural contradictions are realized in the consciousness and activity of the individual and in mass processes.1

Let us note that when studying the recent history of the USSR, works of literature, cinema, photographic documents, and eyewitness accounts of recent events are of great importance. However, we must remember that “big things are seen from a distance.” Therefore, historians of the future will apparently be able to give this era a much more objective assessment than contemporaries of the events we are studying.

I. Ideology of Soviet society

1 Ideological guidelines of Soviet society in the spiritual and cultural sphere

Since the second half of the 60s. the process of overcoming Stalin's political legacy has practically ceased. The prevailing point of view was that stabilization of social relations could be achieved only by abandoning the course adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This determined to a large extent the socio-political and spiritual climate of these years - a climate of falsehood and doublethink, tendentiousness and unprincipledness in assessing political events and facts of the past and present.

Under the pretext of preventing “denigration,” social scientists were required not to focus on mistakes and shortcomings in the historical experience of the party. Increasingly, warnings were heard from above to scientists studying Soviet history. For example, R. Medvedev’s book “To the Judgment of History,” dedicated to exposing Stalin’s personality cult, which fully corresponded to the spirit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, turned out to be impossible to publish in the USSR: in the leading party spheres the author was told: “We now have a new line regarding Stalin.”

At the same time, at the Institute of History of the USSR, the “school” of P.V. Volobuev was destroyed: the scientists who were part of it tried to shed new light on the problems of the history of the labor movement and the October Revolution.

In 1967, Yu. A. Polyakov was removed from the post of editor-in-chief of the magazine “History of the USSR”. The magazine tried to more or less objectively explore the problems of the revolution. At the end of the 60s. historian M. M. Nekrich, who in the book “1941. June 22” revealed the events of the beginning of the war in a new way and showed the mistakes made. Similar examples could be continued.

Political life in the country became increasingly closed, the level of publicity fell sharply, and at the same time the dictates of the ideological structures of the party in relation to the media intensified.

After the overthrow of Khrushchev, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to reconsider the characteristics given to Stalin at the XX and XXII Party Congresses. An attempt to officially rehabilitate Stalin at the XXIII Congress (1966) failed due to protests from the intelligentsia, especially scientists and writers. Shortly before the opening of the congress, 25 prominent figures of science and art, academicians P. L. Kapitsa, I. G. Tamm, M. A. Leontovich, writers V. P. Kataev, K. G. Paustovsky, K. I. Chukovsky, folk artists M. M. Plisetskaya, O. I. Efremov, I. M. Smoktunovsky and others wrote a letter to L. I. Brezhnev, in which they expressed concern about the emerging partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. The leadership of a number of foreign communist parties spoke out against the rehabilitation of Stalin.

However, in the 1970s. criticism of Stalinism was finally curtailed. At party congresses, a new cult began to take hold - the cult of L. I. Brezhnev. In 1973, a special note “On the need to strengthen the authority of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev” was sent to the regional committees, regional committees, and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics.

“Leader”, “Outstanding figure of the Leninist type” - these epithets have become almost obligatory attributes of the name Brezhnev. Since the end of 1970, they have been in sharp dissonance with the appearance of the aging and weakening Secretary General.

During his 18 years in power, he was awarded 114 highest state awards, including 4 stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Golden Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor, and the Order of Victory. The unctuous doxology, which began already at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU (1971), intensified at the XXV (1976) and reached its apogee at the XXVI (1981). “Scientific-theoretical” conferences were held throughout the country, at which Brezhnev’s literary “works” were pompously extolled - “Little Land”, “Renaissance”, “Virgin Land”, written for him by others.1

The situation in the country was becoming disastrous not only due to socio-economic deformations, but also due to the growing paralysis of intellectual and spiritual life. Every report of the Party Central Committee spoke about the flourishing of socialist democracy, but these are empty and meaningless declarations. In practice, there was strict regulation of political and spiritual life. Brezhnev and his circle returned to pro-Stalinist practices, to the dictates of the center, to the persecution of dissent.

The period of the late 1960s - early. 1980s gave birth to his own ideology. Already in the second half of 1960, it became clear that the goals set by the CPSU Program adopted at the XII Congress of the CPSU could not be realized within the scheduled time frame. The party leadership, led by L. I. Brezhnev, required new ideological and theoretical foundations for its activities.

Party documents begin to shift emphasis from promoting the goals of communist construction to promoting the achievements of developed socialism. L.I. Brezhnev stated that the main result of the path traveled is the construction of a developed socialist society.2

In the new Constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1977, this provision received legal status. “At this stage,” the Basic Law emphasizes, “socialism develops on its own basis, the creative forces of the new system, the advantages of the socialist way of life are revealed more and more fully, and workers increasingly enjoy the fruits of the great revolutionary achievements.” That is, propaganda proclaimed a society of developed socialism as a logical stage on the path to communism. 1

In the Soviet press, annoying talk about the imminent onset of communism was replaced by equally demagogic talk about the tireless struggle for peace waged by the Soviet leadership and Comrade Brezhnev personally.

Citizens of the USSR were not supposed to know the fact that Soviet stockpiles of conventional and nuclear weapons were many times greater than those of all Western powers combined, although in the West, thanks to space reconnaissance, this was generally known.

L.I. Brezhnev said: The new constitution is, one might say, the concentrated result of the entire sixty-year development of the Soviet state. It clearly demonstrates that the ideas proclaimed in October, the behests of Lenin, are being successfully implemented.”2

In historical literature it is considered an indisputable fact that during the transition of power from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the neo-Stalinist line prevailed in the field of ideology. This is largely explained by the fact that Khrushchev, during the purge of the Central Committee from Stalin’s associates (an anti-party group), left intact the entire Stalinist ideological headquarters of the Central Committee, headed by M. Suslov. All its leading cadres remained in place, cleverly adapting to Khrushchev’s “anti-cult” policy.

Using all ideological levers and taking advantage of the theoretical helplessness of the members of the “collective leadership,” yesterday’s students of Stalin from Suslov’s headquarters substantiated a new point of view on Stalin’s activities. It turns out that there was no “cult of personality” at all, and Stalin was a faithful Leninist who only committed a few violations of Soviet legality. His theoretical works are completely Marxist, and the XX and XXII Congresses “went too far,” in Stalin’s assessment, due to the “subjectivism of N. S. Khrushchev.” In light of this ideological concept, the Soviet press apparently received instructions to stop criticizing Stalin. From now on, it was again allowed to use his works and quote them in a positive way.

This is how the neo-Stalinist ideological line took shape. But in fairness, it must be said that there was no open praise of Stalin in the Soviet media.

During all 18 years of Brezhnev's rule, M. A. Suslov remained the main party ideologist. He saw his main task in curbing social thought, slowing down the spiritual development of Soviet society, culture, and art. Suslov was always wary and distrustful of writers and theater figures, whose “ill-considered” statements could be used by “hostile propaganda.” Suslov's favorite thesis is the impossibility of peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology and the aggravation of ideological struggle at the present stage. From this it was concluded that it was necessary to strengthen control over all types of creative activity.

The growing crisis of society was felt and recognized “at the top.” Attempts were made to reform a number of aspects of public life. So, starting from the 1960s. Another attempt was made in the country to bring school education in line with the modern level of science. The need to improve the general level of education was associated, in particular, with the process of urbanization. If in 1939 56 million Soviet citizens lived in cities, then in the early 1980s. There were already more than 180 million city dwellers in the early 1980s. specialists who received higher or secondary specialized education made up 40% of the urban population. Significantly increased general level education of the population of the USSR. (Annex 1)

However, already in the second half of the 1970s. Among young specialists who received a good education, but were forced to work outside their specialty, general dissatisfaction with their work grew. The process of promoting “gray”, incompetent people, mainly from the party environment, to responsible positions and positions has become more noticeable.

Unsolved problems of public education in the late 1970s - early 1980s. became more and more aggravated. Therefore, in April 1984, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was forced to approve new project“The main directions of reform of secondary and vocational schools.” This next school reform was supposed to be a means of combating formalism, percentage mania, poor organization of labor education and preparing schoolchildren for life. The structure has changed again secondary school: she became eleven years old, whereas this was abandoned in the early 1960s.1

The “fundamental innovation” in the work of the school was considered to be doubling the number of hours for labor training and expanding the industrial practice of schoolchildren. Interschool training and production plants were called upon to carry out special work on career guidance. Basic enterprises were assigned to all schools, which became responsible organizers of labor education.

A show campaign has begun to create educational workshops for schoolchildren. However, all these good intentions amounted to just another formal campaign in the field of school education. The bureaucracy of the old administrative-command system did not allow any success in school reform. On XXVII Congress In February 1986, the CPSU stated the failure of the old school reform and announced the start of a new one.

The cultural level of the people who came to power after Brezhnev was even lower among Khrushchev’s entourage. They missed the mark on culture in their own development; they turned the culture of Soviet society into a hostage to ideology. True, initially Brezhnev and his entourage announced the continuation of the “golden mean” line in the field of artistic culture, developed during the “Thaw”. This meant a rejection of two extremes - denigration, on the one hand, and varnishing reality, on the other.

And in the materials of the party congresses there was invariably a stereotyped thesis that the country had achieved a real “flourishing of socialist culture.” With mythical pathos, the party program of 1976 again proclaimed that “a cultural revolution has been carried out in the country,” as a result of which the USSR allegedly made a “giant rise to the heights of science and culture.”1

The principles written down in the party program were embodied in the sphere of artistic culture in the form of stilted plot schemes, ridiculed in the Soviet press 15-20 years earlier. “Production themes” flourished thickly in stories, plays, and films. In strict accordance with the norms of socialist realism, everything ended well after the intervention of party officials.

Returning to the Stalinist tradition, on January 7, 1969, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution “On increasing the responsibility of the heads of press, radio and television, cinematography, cultural and art institutions.” The pressure of the censorship press on literature and art increased, the practice of banning the publication of works of art, the release of ready-made films, the performance of certain musical works, which, according to ideologists, did not fit into the framework of the principles of socialist realism and Leninist partisanship, became more frequent.

In order to provide the themes of artistic works, films, and theatrical productions necessary for the party elite, since the mid-1970s. A system of government orders was introduced. It was determined in advance how many films should be made on historical-revolutionary, military-patriotic and moral-everyday themes. This system operated everywhere and extended to all genres and types of art.

Despite the increasing ideological and censorship pressure, the party nomenclature was unable to completely drown out the voice of those writers whose work opposed the ideology of neo-Stalinism. A literary event in 1967 was the publication of M. Bulgakov’s novel “The Master and Margarita”. Objectively, the ideology of neo-Stalinism was opposed by the so-called “village prose”. Books by F. Abramov, V. Astafiev, B. Mozhaev, V. Rasputin artistically and expressively showed the process of de-peasantization of the village.

The works of L. I. Brezhnev became a real farce in the history of Russian literature. For the creation by a group of journalists of three brochures based on his memoirs: “ Malaya Zemlya", "Renaissance" and "Virgin Land" he was awarded the Lenin Prize in Literature.

As the ideological onslaught of the authorities in the country intensified, the number of writers, artists, musicians, and artists whose work, for political reasons, could not reach readers, viewers, and listeners through legal means, grew. A large number of representatives of the creative intelligentsia found themselves outside the USSR against their will, however, prohibited works continued to live in lists, photocopies, films, photos and magnetic films. So in the 1960s. In the USSR, an uncensored press arose - the so-called “samizdat”. Typewritten copies of texts by scientists and writers disliked by the authorities circulated from hand to hand. Actually, the phenomenon of samizdat was not something new in the history of Russian culture. Thus, “Woe from Wit” by A. Griboyedov, which was prohibited for publication in Russia, was nevertheless known to literally all literate people thanks to several tens of thousands of handwritten copies, the number of which was many times greater than the usual circulation of publications of that time. The book “Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow” by A. Radishchev was distributed among the lists.1

In Soviet times, manuscripts of works by A. Solzhenitsyn, A. D. Sakharov, O. E. Mandelstam, M. M. Zoshchenko, V. S. Vysotsky were circulated in samizdat. Samizdat became such a powerful cultural and social factor that the authorities launched a large-scale fight against it, and one could end up in prison for storing and distributing samizdat works.

In the early 1960-1970s. artists developed a new, so-called “severe style”. It was at this time that artists showed a desire to bypass ideological obstacles to recreate reality without the usual pomp, smoothing out difficulties, without superficial fixation of conflict-free, insignificant subjects, without the deep-rooted tradition of depicting the struggle between “the good and the best.” At the same time, party ideologists pursued the development of avant-garde art in every possible way. All ideological deviations were harshly suppressed. So, in September 1974 in Moscow, in Cheryomushki, bulldozers (that’s why this exhibition is called a bulldozer) destroyed an exhibition of modern avant-garde art, arranged right on the street. Artists were beaten and paintings were crushed by bulldozers. This event received great resonance among the creative intelligentsia in the country and abroad.2

Thus, in the 1960-1980s. in artistic life, the confrontation between two cultures in society finally took shape: on the one hand, the official culture, which followed the party ideological program and neo-Stalinist ideology, on the other, the humanistic culture, traditional for the democratic part of society, which took part in the formation of the consciousness of people of different nationalities, prepared the spiritual renewal of the country.

In the perverted system of state distribution of material goods, the natural desire of people to live better sometimes led to the loss of traditional concepts of duty, to an increase in crime, drunkenness, and prostitution. By the beginning of the 80s. About 2 million different crimes were committed in the country every year. Alcohol consumption per capita by this time had increased compared to the 50s. more than 2.5 times.1 All this led to a significant reduction in life expectancy, especially for men. In the USSR and in modern Russia there is a constant preponderance of the female population over the male population. (Appendix 2)

The fight against drunkenness and alcoholism that began at enterprises (the starting point was the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on strengthening socialist labor discipline, adopted in August 1983) suffered from formalism and campaignism. All this reflected the growing problems in the socio-cultural sphere. So, despite the fact that in the 70s. The country's housing stock grew (more than 100 million square meters of housing were commissioned annually), which made it possible to improve the living conditions of more than 107 million people over 10 years. A radical solution to this most pressing problem was far from being achieved. And the amount of investment in housing construction was decreasing: in the eighth five-year plan they accounted for 17.2% of the total volume of capital investments in the national economy, in the ninth - 15.3, in the tenth - 13.6%. Even less funds were allocated for the construction of social and welfare facilities. The residual principle in the allocation of funds for social needs was becoming more and more evident. Meanwhile, the situation was aggravated by the increased migration of the rural population to the cities and the import of labor by enterprises, the so-called limiters, that is, people who have major cities temporary registration and temporary workers. Among them there were many who found themselves unsettled in life. In general, compared to the poverty of the late 30s. and in the post-war period the situation of the bulk of the population improved. Fewer and fewer people lived in communal apartments and barracks. Everyday life included televisions, refrigerators, and radios. Many people now have home libraries in their apartments.

Soviet people enjoyed free medical care. The healthcare sector also felt the effects of economic problems: the share of spending on medicine in the state budget decreased, the renewal of the material and technical base slowed down, and attention to health issues weakened. There were not enough clinics, hospitals, and children's medical institutions in rural areas, and the existing ones were often poorly equipped. The qualifications of the medical staff and the quality of medical care left much to be desired. Issues regarding changes in remuneration for health workers were slowly resolved.1

Thus, emerging in the 70s. disruptions in economic development affected the well-being of workers. The social orientation of the economy, especially at the turn of the 70s and 80s, turned out to be weakened. The development of the social sphere was increasingly negatively influenced by the residual principle of resource distribution.

A certain increase in living standards also had a downside. The concept of “public socialist property” looked abstract to millions of people, so they considered it possible
use it to your advantage. So-called petty thefts have become widespread.

So, during this period, all the main resources of the old economic growth - extensive - were exhausted. However, the Soviet economy was unable to move onto the path of intensive development. The growth rate curve went down and began to increase social problems, passivity, the whole range of problems associated with this manifested itself.

Thus, Soviet society in the late 60s - early 80s. had a rather complex stratified structure. The party-state government managed to keep society in a state of relative stabilization. At the same time, the emerging structural crisis of industrial society, accumulating economic, socio-political, ethno-demographic, psychological, environmental, and geopolitical aspects, predetermined the growth of discontent that threatened the foundations of the system.

The relative material well-being was temporary and reflected a growing crisis. In the Soviet Union, average life expectancy stopped increasing. By the beginning of the 80s. The USSR dropped to 35th place in the world in terms of this indicator and 50th in terms of child mortality.1

2 Ideology of reforming industry and agriculture

The task of improving the well-being of the people was proclaimed to be the main one in economic policy. The party congresses demanded a deep turn of the economy to solve the diverse problems of improving the well-being of the people, increasing attention to the production of consumer goods (group B industry) and ensuring fundamental changes in the quality and quantity of goods and services for the population.

Since the mid-60s. The country's leadership set a course, first of all, to increase the monetary income of the population. The remuneration of workers, employees, and collective farmers was improved in order to stimulate highly productive work. Real income per capita rose 46% over the decade. Significant sections of the working people have secured some prosperity for themselves.

The guaranteed wages of collective farmers increased, and the salaries of low-paid segments of the population were brought closer to those of average-paid ones. This continued until a growing gap emerged between the money supply and its commodity supply. It turned out that while the five-year plan targets for increasing labor productivity were not met, wage costs systematically exceeded the plan. The incomes of collective farmers grew more slowly than expected, but they also significantly outpaced the growth of labor productivity in the agricultural sector of the economy. In general, they ate more than they created. This gave rise to an unhealthy situation in the sphere of production and distribution of public goods and complicated the solution of social problems.

The ongoing regulation of wages, increases in tariff rates and official salaries concerned mainly low-income workers. Highly qualified specialists often found themselves disadvantaged in wages. The wage levels of engineers and technical workers and workers have become unjustifiably closer, and in mechanical engineering and construction, engineers on average received less than workers. The wages of pieceworkers grew, but the salaries of specialists did not change. Equalization of wages without strictly taking into account the final results undermined material incentives to increase productivity and gave rise to dependent sentiments. Thus, the organic connection between the measure of labor and the measure of consumption was broken. At the same time, the growth of monetary incomes of the population continued to lag behind the production of goods and services. Until a certain time, the problem of balancing the population's income and covering it could be solved by achieving an increase in the mass of goods. As incomes and consumption grew, the question of the need to take into account the demand, assortment and quality of goods became increasingly acute. Changes in the level and structure of public consumption were most clearly manifested in the accelerated growth rates of sales and consumption of non-food products, especially durable goods with higher consumer properties: television and radio products, cars, high-quality and fashionable clothing, shoes, etc. hunger. For example, by the beginning of the 80s. The USSR produced several times more leather shoes per capita than the United States, but at the same time, the shortage of high-quality shoes increased every year. The industry, in fact, worked for the warehouse. In the 70-80s. A number of resolutions were adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR aimed at increasing the production of high-quality goods for the population and improving their range. However, due to economic inertia, problems were resolved extremely slowly. In addition, the level of technical equipment in the light and food industries did not meet modern requirements, and scientific and technical achievements were poorly introduced into production. And this not only restrained the growth of labor productivity, but also affected the quality of products and their costs. Many types of products did not find sales and were accumulated at bases. Trade, where the service culture remained low, there was practically no study of the population's demand, and bribery, theft and mutual responsibility flourished, did not help solve the problems of sales. All this led to an increased imbalance in the supply and demand of goods and services. The gap between the effective demand of the population and its material coverage increased. As a result, the population found itself with a rapidly increasing balance of unspent money, some of which was invested in savings banks. The amount of deposits in savings banks in the ninth five-year plan increased by 2.6 times compared with the growth in sales of consumer goods, and in the tenth five-year plan - by 3 times.1

The discrepancy in the amount of money in circulation and quality goods since the mid-70s. led to price increases. Officially, prices rose for so-called goods of high demand, unofficially for most others. But, despite the rise in price, in the late 70s. the general shortage of consumer goods has increased, the problem of meeting the demand for meat and dairy products, goods for children, cotton fabrics and a number of other consumer goods has become more acute. Social differentiation began to grow based on the degree of access to scarcity. It was aggravated by the growth of undeserved and illegal privileges for certain categories of the party and state apparatus, which exacerbated social tension in society.

All these phenomena were largely a consequence of the fact that in October 1964 a group came to power that was generally not inclined to seriously reform the country’s economy, primarily in the field of agriculture and industry. However, by this time it was already difficult not to react in any way to the current state of affairs: in certain areas of the country, due to a shortage of food, it became necessary to introduce rationed supplies to the population (based on coupons), and it became impossible to hide the situation.1

In March 1965, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which the new party leader L. I. Brezhnev made a report “On urgent measures for the further development of agriculture.” The Plenum in its decision was forced to admit that in recent years “agriculture has slowed down its growth rate. Plans for its development turned out to be impossible. Agricultural yields increased slowly. Production of meat, milk and other products also increased slightly during this time.” The reasons for this state of affairs were also named: violation of the economic laws of the development of socialist production, the principles of the material interest of collective farmers and state farm workers in the development of the public economy, the correct combination of public and personal interests.” It was noted that great harm was caused by unjustified restructuring of the governing bodies, which “generated an atmosphere of irresponsibility and nervousness in work.”

The March (1965) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee developed the following measures, designed to ensure the “further rise” of agriculture: 2

Establishment of a new procedure for planning the procurement of agricultural products;

Increasing purchase prices and other methods of material incentives for agricultural workers;

Organizational and economic strengthening of collective and state farms, development of democratic principles for managing the affairs of artels...

Thus, we see that in 1965 the Party Central Committee saw the further development of agriculture based on the laws of economics: material incentives for workers and providing them with a certain economic independence.

However, the policy of the party and the state after the March Plenum, unfortunately, did not actually change fundamentally, but it still became a very noticeable milestone in the history of the organization of agricultural production. After 1965, allocations for rural needs increased: in 1965 - 1985. capital investments in agriculture amounted to 670.4 billion rubles, purchase prices for agricultural products sold to the state doubled, the material and technical base of farms was strengthened, and their power supply increased. The system of agricultural management bodies was simplified: the ministries of production and procurement of agricultural products of the union republics were transformed into the Ministries of Agriculture, territorial production collective and state farm managements were abolished, and structural divisions of the executive committees of local Soviets responsible for agricultural production were restored. Collective and state farms were briefly granted greater independence; state farms were supposed to be transferred to full self-accounting. Among other things, during the Brezhnev years the volume of investment in agriculture increased incredibly; they eventually accounted for a quarter of all budgetary allocations. The once-ignored village has finally become the regime's number one priority. And agricultural productivity did increase, and its growth rate exceeded that of most Western countries.1 However, agriculture still remained a crisis zone: every time crop failure became national, the country had to regularly import grain, especially feed grain.

One reason for this relative failure was that Soviet agriculture was initially in such a deep depression that even rapid growth could not raise production levels high enough. In addition, the incomes of both urban and rural populations have increased, resulting in a significant increase in demand. Finally, a large part of the population was still employed in agriculture, which resulted in a low level of labor productivity and an increase in production costs: the urban population in the USSR first became larger than the rural one only in 1965, with the latter still accounting for 30% of the total population and in 1985 (Appendix 3)

It is clear that the root cause of agricultural inefficiency was organizational in nature: the overall management of huge investments, chemical fertilizer strategies, and harvest campaigns continued to be top-down and centralized. The regime continued to accelerate its policy of transforming collective farms into state farms, and in the 1980s. the latter already accounted for more than half of all cultivated land in the country. At the same time, the orthodox collective farm leadership nullified the results of several timid but rather crude experiments with the “system of links.” In short, the regime, having strengthened traditional administrative-command methods, also received the usual counterproductive results; however, it was still impossible to argue in favor of any other policy.

In 1978, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted the following resolution regarding the development of agriculture: “Noting the significant work carried out since the March (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to boost agriculture, the Plenum of the Central Committee at the same time believes that the general level of this industry is still does not meet the needs of society and requires further efforts to strengthen the material and technical base of agriculture, improve organizational forms and increase its efficiency.”1

As a result, by the end of the Brezhnev era, food supply fell further and further behind demand, and agriculture, which under Stalin had been the source of (forced) capital accumulation for industrial investment, now became a common burden for all other sectors of the economy.

Thus, certain attempts to reform Soviet agriculture were determined by a clear discrepancy between the needs of the population living, as it was proclaimed, under “developed socialism”, and the low level of labor productivity in the country’s agricultural complex. The reasons for such low efficiency of agriculture consisted, on the one hand, in the weak technological equipment of the peasantry. This pushed the country's leadership under N.S. Khrushchev to extensive farming - the development of new areas. During the period we are studying, an attempt was made to intensify agricultural production. One of the directions of such intensification is a short-term but indicative attempt to introduce the peasant’s material interest in the results of his labor. Elements of cost accounting and piecework wages for peasants, in our opinion, are a significant symptom of the crisis of the idea of ​​the communist mode of production, where the material incentive for labor is denied.

However, in general, a new decline was indicated in the agricultural sector. Agricultural policy of the 60s - mid-80s. was based on further nationalization, centralization and concentration of agricultural production. Administration and incompetent interference in the affairs of collective farms, state farms and rural workers in general continued. The agricultural management apparatus grew. The development of inter-farm cooperation and integration in the mid-70s, chemicalization and land reclamation did not bring the desired changes. The economic situation of collective and state farms was aggravated by the unfair exchange between city and countryside. As a result, by the beginning of the 80s. Many collective and state farms turned out to be unprofitable.

Attempts to solve the problems of agriculture only by increasing the volume of capital investments (in the 70s - early 80s more than 500 billion rubles were invested in the country's agricultural-industrial complex) did not bring the expected result. 1

Money was wasted in the construction of expensive and sometimes useless giant complexes, wasted on ill-conceived reclamation and chemicalization of soils, went to waste due to the disinterest of rural workers in the results of labor, or was pumped back into the treasury through rising prices for agricultural machinery. Introduced in the mid-60s. guaranteed wages on collective farms - in fact, an important achievement of that time - turned into an increase in social dependency.

Attempts to find a better organization of agricultural production did not find support, moreover, at times they were simply persecuted. In 1970, an experiment was stopped in the Akchi experimental farm (Kazakh SSR), the essence of which was simple: the peasant receives everything he earns with his labor. The experiment was disliked by employees of the Ministry of Agriculture. The chairman of the farm, I.N. Khudenko, was accused of receiving allegedly unearned large amounts of money, was convicted of alleged theft, and died in prison. Well-known organizers of agricultural production V. Belokon and I. Snimshchikov paid for their initiative and creative approach to business with broken destinies.

The strategic goal of the CPSU was to eliminate the differences between city and countryside. It was based on the idea of ​​the priority of state property in comparison with collective farm-cooperative and private property, and, consequently, on the total consolidation and nationalization of agricultural production. The implementation of this task led to the fact that in the 60s - the first half of the 80s. The process of state monopolization of property in agriculture was completed. For 1954-1985 About 28 thousand collective farms (or a third of their total number) were transformed into state farms. Collective farm property, which, in fact, was not cooperative, since the collective farm was never the owner of the products produced and the state withdrew funds from the accounts of collective farms even without their formal permission, was curtailed.. Contradictions and difficulties, including mismanagement in agriculture economy of the country, the leadership tried to compensate by importing food and grain. Over 20 years, imports of meat have increased 12 times, fish - 2 times, oil - 60 times, sugar - 4.5 times, grain - 27 times. 1

Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. The country's agriculture was in a state of crisis. In this situation, it was decided to develop a special Food Program, which was approved by the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. However, the program, developed within the framework of an outdated management system, was half-hearted. It did not affect the main link in agriculture - the interests of the peasantry, and did not change economic relations in the countryside or the economic mechanism. As a result, despite all the measures and decisions taken, food problem has worsened significantly. By the mid-80s. Almost everywhere, rationed supplies for a number of food products were introduced.

By analogy with other countries of the USSR in the 70s. adopted a series of progressive laws on the protection environment. But, like many progressive initiatives, they remained on paper. Ministries were the first to violate them. Due to the global and ruthless exploitation of natural resources, which caused irreparable damage to entire regions of the country, the environmental situation has deteriorated extremely. Air pollution in urban industrial centers posed a particular danger to human health and the national economy. As a result of inefficient and environmentally illiterate agricultural production, an increase in the area of ​​unsuitable land was revealed, soil salinization, flooding and underwatering of vast areas significantly affected the natural fertility of cultivated lands and led to a drop in productivity. A large number of unique Central Russian chernozems were destroyed during the development of deposits of the Kursk magnetic anomaly, where iron ore was mined using open-pit mining. 1

Water quality in many rivers has dropped to dangerous levels. Such famous ones were destroyed ecological systems like Lake Baikal and the Aral Sea. In the early 80s. Preparatory work began to transfer part of the flow of northern rivers to the Volga, as well as to divert Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan, which threatened the country with another environmental disaster.

Enterprises and departments were not interested in increasing costs for environmental protection, as this led to an increase in production costs and reduced gross production efficiency indicators. Emergency situations in the area were carefully hidden from the people. nuclear power plants, while official propaganda described their complete safety in every possible way.

The lack of objective and reliable information on environmental topics was an important ideologically destabilizing factor in Soviet society, as it gave rise to many rumors and discontent. Moreover, it is far from a fact that all these rumors were justified, but they certainly undermined the official Soviet ideology.

As a result, L.I. Brezhnev was forced to make declarations about “the danger of the formation of lifeless zones hostile to humans,” but nothing changed. And yet, information about the real environmental situation reached the public. The emerging environmental movement is becoming a new opposition movement, indirectly but very effectively opposing the country’s leadership.1

Since the beginning of the 70s. In developed capitalist countries, a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution (STR) began. The world was collapsing “traditional industries” (mining industry, metallurgy, some areas of mechanical engineering, etc.), and a transition was taking place to resource-saving technologies and high-tech industries. Automation and robotization of production have reached significant proportions, which has affected the increase in the efficiency of social production.

The country's leadership inextricably linked the implementation of the policy to increase the efficiency of social production with the acceleration of scientific and technological progress (STP), with the introduction of its results into production. At the 24th Party Congress, an important task was formulated for the first time - to organically combine the achievements of scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism, to develop wider and deeper its inherent form of combining science with production. Guidelines for scientific and technological policy were outlined. In all official documents, economic policy was assessed as a course towards intensifying production
in the context of the unfolding scientific and technological revolution.

At first glance, the country’s potential made it possible to solve the assigned tasks. Indeed, every fourth scientific worker in the world came from our country, and hundreds of research institutes were created.

All party and state documents of that time indicated the need for the planned use of scientific and technological revolution achievements. To this end, the State Committee for Science and Technology of the Council of Ministers of the USSR began to create comprehensive intersectoral programs that provide solutions to the most important scientific and technical problems. Only for 1976-1980. 200 comprehensive programs were developed. They outline major measures for the development and improvement of mechanical engineering - the basis for the technical re-equipment of all sectors of the national economy. The emphasis was placed on the creation of machine systems that completely covered the entire technological process, mechanization and automation of labor-intensive types of production, especially in industries where a significant proportion of workers are engaged in heavy manual labor. And although in general the production of mechanical engineering increased 2.7 times over the decade, it developed at an average level and did not satisfy the needs of the national economy, did not meet the tasks of its technical reconstruction in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution. In some of its leading industries (machine and instrument making, production of computer equipment) growth rates have even decreased. This excluded the possibility of quickly creating the necessary base for the technical re-equipment of industry. Therefore, the old practice remained: capital investments were spent on new construction, and the equipment of existing plants and factories became increasingly outdated. The evolutionary development of most industries continued. Enterprises fought not for the integration of science and production, but for the implementation of the plan at any cost, as this ensured profits.1

It was in the 70s. The USSR national economy was revealed to be insensitive to technological innovations. Scientists have developed effective methods synthesis of refractory, heat-resistant, superhard and other materials, technology of special electrometallurgy, in the field of robotics, genetic engineering, etc. About 200 thousand completed scientific research was registered annually in the country, including almost 80 thousand copyright certificates for inventions.

Often, Soviet developments and ideas found the widest application in industrial production in the West, but were not implemented within the country. The country's innovative potential was used very poorly: only every third invention was introduced into production (including half at only 1-2 enterprises). As a result, by the end of the 80s. 50 million people in industry were employed in primitive manual labor at the level of the early 20th century.

Electronics and computer science were discovered at the turn of the 70s and 80s. the path to dramatic changes in the economy and social life. Soviet scientists were clearly aware of the significance of the leap generated by the progress of electronics. Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N.N. Moiseev back in the late 60s. noted that the invention of the computer affects not only technology, but not the entire sphere of human intellectual activity, that in the future the development of the state will directly depend on how deeply electronic computing methods have penetrated not only into economic calculations, but also directly into government administration. In practice, the introduction of machine methods in solving economic problems of the USSR was sporadic. This was affected by natural conservatism, the weakness of the education of the relevant personnel, and the shortcomings of the remuneration system, which was not focused on the introduction of innovations. The organizational development of a nationwide automated system for collecting and processing information was slowed down and discredited the feasibility of creating another industry - the information processing industry, while it already existed abroad. The USSR's lag in this direction was significant, and subsequently it was not possible to reduce it. So, in the first half of the 80s. In the USA, about 800 thousand computers were used, and in the USSR - 50 thousand.

The lack of a unified technical policy became a brake on the intensification of production; due to the dispersion of funds and scientific forces, the results were ineffective. In particular, more than 20 ministries were involved in the implementation of robotics in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. But most of them did not have the appropriate strength and experience. The robots they created were more expensive than foreign ones and were 10 times less reliable. In the first half of the 80s. the number of robotics produced exceeded the plan by 1.3 times, but only 55% were implemented. Despite the first-class, sometimes unique developments of Soviet scientists in fundamental science, the progress of science and technology was not felt in practical life.

One of the most important reasons for this situation was the increasing militarization of the economy. Successful Scientific research in areas that were not of a military-applied nature, they were universally ignored by senior economic management. The same scientific and technical developments that appeared in defense research and could be applied in the civilian sphere were classified. In addition, labor productivity was several times lower than in America. Therefore, military parity with the United States came to the national economy of the USSR with immeasurably greater burden. In addition, the Soviet Union almost completely shouldered the financing of the Warsaw bloc. The traditional policy of accelerated development of military industries with the maximum concentration of material and human resources in them began to falter, as these industries increasingly depended on the general technological level of the national economy and on the efficiency of the economic mechanism. Along with this, the selfish interests of some branches of the military-industrial complex began to manifest themselves noticeably. 1970s - a time when, in a certain sense, epochal problems for the defense of the country were solved. In fierce debates about which strategic doctrine will triumph and which missiles will be the “main”, the Ministers of Defense, General Engineering, Chief Designer V. Chelomey, on the one hand, and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee D. Ustinov, Director of TsNIIMash Yu. Mozzhorin, Chief Designer, clashed Yuzhnoye Design Bureau M. Yangel (he was then replaced by V.F. Utkin) - on the other. In the most difficult struggle at the top, Academician Utkin managed to defend many fundamentally new technical solutions. In 975, a silo-based combat strategic missile system, which the Americans called “Satan,” was put into service. Until now, this complex has no analogues in the world. It was the appearance of “Satan,” the best weapon in the world, according to international experts, that prompted the United States to sit down at the negotiating table on strategic arms limitation.

The use of scientific and technological revolution achievements in our country took on a one-sided, contradictory character, since the USSR continued to carry out the expanded reproduction of the industrial structure with an emphasis on traditional industries. The country did not carry out a radical modernization of production, but was in the process of “integrating” individual scientific and technological advances and new technologies into the old mechanism. At the same time, clearly incompatible things were often combined: automated lines and a lot of manual labor, nuclear reactors and preparation for their installation using the “people’s assembly” method. A paradoxical situation arose when the achievements of scientific and technological revolution, instead of changing the mechanism of a marketless industry, extended its life and gave it new impetus. Oil reserves were dwindling, but advances in pipe rolling and compressor technologies made deep gas deposits accessible; Difficulties began with the development of underground coal seams - excavators were created that made it possible to mine brown coal in an open way. This peculiar symbiosis of an industry without a market and new technologies contributed to the accelerated, predatory destruction of natural resources and led to an unprecedented phenomenon - structural stagnation in the era of scientific and technological revolution. The developed world has already entered a new post-industrial technological era, while the USSR remained in the old industrial era. As a result, by the mid-80s. The USSR again, as it was before the 1930s, faced the threat of gradually falling behind Western countries. Appendix 4, especially histogram 1, clearly shows the steady decline of all economic indicators in the USSR.

The workers - the senior partner in the “bow” - along with the entire industrial sector of the economy found themselves in a similar impasse under Brezhnev. The turning point here was the failure of Kosygin's economic reform in 1965. However, this was not just another disastrous episode of Brezhnevism: it marked the failure of the key program of the entire endeavor known as “communist reformism.”

Economic reform in a centralized economy is possible only in one direction - towards decentralization and the market. It is with this overtone that all attempts at reform have been made since the 1930s. Stalin created a command economy. The first timid hints of movement along this path emerged after the Second World War during discussions about the “system of links.” The first time a communist government openly admitted that decentralization could be a goal of reform was Tito's in the early 1950s. the policy of “self-management of enterprises” and his draft program of the SKYU, published in 1957. This line was theoretically worked out by the old market socialist Oskar Lange, who was completely ignored at first when he returned to Poland in 1945 to take part in the construction of socialism in his country homeland, and was later accepted with much greater understanding during the “Polish October” of 1956. Thanks to Khrushchev’s “thaw”, this trend became the subject of discussion in Russia: in the 1960s. The local tradition of academic economics in the twenties, one of the most advanced in the world, is beginning to timidly revive not only as a theoretical and mathematical discipline, but also as a school of thought with practical application.

Its application in practice was first mentioned in 1962 in an article by Professor Evsei Liberman, which appeared in Pravda under the title “Plan, Profit, Prize.” Supporters of the flow. soon called "Libermanism", advocated for greater autonomy for businesses and for them to be allowed to make profits, which in turn would provide capital for investment and create material incentives for workers and management. Moreover, since it was assumed that industry would begin to work according to the principle of Lenin’s “cost accounting”, which implied profits and losses, enterprises would be allowed to go bankrupt. If Libermanism were to be implemented, the Stalinist system would be turned on its head: production indicators would then be calculated not only in physical quantities quantity and tonnage, but also taking into account quality and costs, and the decisions of enterprise management were determined not from above, but by the market forces of supply and demand. Pseudo-competitive technologies and moral and ideological incentives - “socialist competition”, “impact work” and the “Stakhanov movement” - would be replaced by less socialist, but more effective incentives for profit and benefit.

These ideas received the support of leading representatives of the reviving Soviet economic science, among whom are V.S. Nemchinov, L.V. Kantorovich and V.V. Novozhilov. Libermanism was seriously modified by them: they preached the reorganization of the economy in a more rational and scientific direction through the introduction of the achievements of cybernetics and systems analysis (until then labeled “bourgeois sciences”) and the use of electronic computing technology in developing the plan, which would give it greater flexibility . Moreover, they hinted that such changes would require reform of the party-state itself.

Khrushchev and his colleagues showed interest in this new thinking, although, of course, they did not suspect how destructive the potential for the existing system lay within it. None other than Khrushchev himself approved the appearance of Lieberman’s article, and later, literally on the eve of his fall, he introduced the methods he proposed in two textile factories. Two days after Khrushchev's removal, Kosygin extended the experiment to a number of other enterprises, which was crowned with success. The following year, another reform economist, Abel Aganbegan (who would later spend important role under Gorbachev), sent an alarm signal to the Central Committee. In a report intended for a narrow circle of people, he highlighted in detail the decline of the Soviet economy in comparison with the American one, attributing it to the consequences of over-centralization and exorbitant defense spending. It was with the goal of preventing further decline and at the same time supporting the defense complex that Kosygin began his reform in 1965.

Let's consider the “Basic measures designed to ensure further improvement of socialist management”, voiced by the September (1965) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:

Transition to the sectoral principle of industrial management;

Improving planning and expanding the economic independence of enterprises;

Strengthening economic incentives for enterprises and strengthening economic accounting;

Strengthening the material interest of employees in improving the operation of the enterprise.1

Thus, we see the emergence of market views in the economy of the USSR.

The first step of this reform was, as we have already said, the abolition of economic councils and their replacement by central ministries. The second is the expansion of the independence of enterprises, which, in theory, should now operate on the basis of profitability. From now on, enterprises received from ministries a shortened register of target figures, or “indicators” (eight instead of forty), and sales volume replaced gross output as the main criterion for success. At the same time, financial incentives in the form of rewards or bonuses paid to both management and workers began to be linked to profit margins through a complex system of calculations.

As an example of the work of a Soviet enterprise on the basis of partial economic independence, let us consider the “Shchekino experiment”, which was carried out from 1967 to 1975. at the Shchekino chemical association "Azot". It was based on 3 pillars: a stable production plan for several years, a wage fund that is unchanged for the entire period, and the right to pay bonuses for labor intensity.

Its results were as follows: for the period from 1967 to 1975. The volume of production at the plant increased by 2.7 times, labor productivity increased by 3.4 times, with wages increasing by 1.5 times. And all this was achieved while reducing the number of personnel by 29% (by 1,500 people): 2

Histogram 1. Main economic results of the “Shchekino experiment” 1967-1975.

(Production indicators for 1967 are conventionally taken as one; indicators for 1975 show the dynamics of change in this indicator)

However, businesses never achieved the right to set their own prices based on demand or social needs; prices were determined by a new organization - Goskomtsen, using the previous criterion of compliance with “needs”, determined by the plan, and not by the market. But when enterprises do not have the right to independently set prices for their products, profitability as a factor determining the success of their activities fades into the background. In addition, there were no funds through which it would be possible to create incentives for workers by paying them increased remuneration. Likewise, the return to ministries negated the newly acquired independence of enterprises.

These contradictions that were originally laid down in the foundation of the reform after 1968 will lead to its collapse. Another reason would be the Prague Spring of the same year, which marked the most significant experiment in introducing “communist reform” ever undertaken. One of its main features was economic reform, similar to Kosygin’s, but more daring. And one of the lessons the Soviets learned from the Czech reform was the realization that economic liberalization could easily develop into political liberalization, which would call into question the very existence of the regime's foundations. So the Czech experience struck fear into the Soviet bureaucracy at all levels: Kosygin - at the top - lost any desire to push through his reform, and the lower apparatchiks began to spontaneously curtail it.1

But even if it had not been for the Prague Spring, the very structure of the system would still have doomed Kosygin’s program to failure. Directors of enterprises preferred to use their independence to carry out the plan rather than introduce risky innovations in production, while the ministries were happy to adjust the indicators in a new way: generated by the command culture of the Stalinist economy, both of them considered it best not to break with the usual routine. The silent collusion of the bureaucrats gradually emasculated the reform, production continued to fall, and the quality of products deteriorated. At the same time, the bureaucratic machine grew: Gossnab (responsible for material and technical supplies) and the State Committee for Science and Technology (responsible for development in the field of science and technology) were added to the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for Prices, and the number of line ministries increased from 45 in 1965 to 70 by 1980.

However, despite the expansion of the base of Soviet industry and its bureaucratic superstructure, the growth rate of gross national product and labor productivity continued to fall. While the specific figures may be debatable, the general trend is beyond doubt.

What measures did the Soviet leadership take to stop this process? Let us turn to the following document: this is “Materials of the XXIV Party Congress. “The main task of the upcoming five-year plan,” the document says, “is to ensure a significant rise in the material and cultural level of the people on the basis of high rates of development of socialist production, increasing its efficiency, scientific and technological progress and accelerating the growth of labor productivity.” 1Thus, from specific market-type economic measures proclaimed in the 60s. The country's leadership again switched to empty ideological rhetoric on the topic of economics.

At that time, the world had to choose between official Soviet statistics and the somewhat more modest calculations prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and there was an opinion, shared even by some Soviet economists, that the latter were closer to the truth. But by the end of the 1980s. it became clear that the figures coming from the CIA were only slightly less inflated than the official Soviet ones. The CIA's calculations turned out to be so inaccurate for two reasons: firstly, the Soviet statistics with which the CIA had to work were often “corrected” in order to create an exaggerated impression of the success of the plan, including in the hope of “encouragement”: and . Secondly, and more importantly, the method adopted in the West for estimating the gross national product (GNP) of the USSR - calculations that were not made by the Soviets themselves - was fundamentally flawed.

The cause of the error was the incompatibility of the command
economy and market economy, and hence the impossibility
creating a methodology that would allow comparing the indicators of one with the indicators of another. Contrary to popular belief, GNP does not exist in fact, but only conceptually; more precisely, it is a certain measurable quantity, and measurements are always based on theoretical premises. Thus, any attempt to determine the value of Soviet GNP will be a reflection of the theory that underlies the measurements made. And it is here, in the field of theory, that the main problems arise. All our theories regarding economic indicators are based on Western experience and Western data, with prices being the main data. But Soviet prices have no economic logic; their “logic” is political logic.1

3 USSR military policy: the burden of global power

The shortcomings of the system's economy only become more obvious against the backdrop of the successes of its only internationally competitive sector - the military industry. As we have already emphasized, all sectors of the Soviet economy were organized on a military model, but the production of military products itself became its main task only after 1937. Of course, given the circumstances that prevailed at that time and lasted until 1945, all this is completely justified. However, in the post-war period the situation changed dramatically, and the system's fixation on military power acquired a more permanent, institutionalized character. For the Soviet Union was now freed from the direct threat of a hostile neighbor and could fully engage in maneuvering to gain a “position of strength” in Europe and East Asia in the face of the “imperialist camp.” The nature of the conflict also changed, since the Cold War was not a duel where the outcome was actually decided by the force of arms, but only tireless preparation for such a duel. The resulting continuous military-technical mobilization in peacetime conditions over four decades is perhaps a unique phenomenon in the history of international conflicts. Of course, the American “side” also bore the brunt of this conflict, but in the Soviet Union, efforts to wage the Cold War absorbed a much larger share of national resources. The above is especially true for the Brezhnev era.

After 1945, the scale of demobilization in the USSR almost coincided with the American one. Soviet remobilization began only as a result of the Korean War, and then, in the late 1950s, as already mentioned, Khrushchev again reduced the size of the armed forces, while simultaneously trying to quickly catch up with the United States in terms of missile power. And only in the 1960s, after the dangerous “Cuban episode,” the Soviet Union began a long-term and systematic buildup of weapons in order to equal or surpass the United States in all areas. This meant, firstly, an increase in the number of ground forces to approximately four million people. With the arrival of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, this also meant the creation of a first-class, world-class navy - especially a fleet of submarines - capable of operations on all oceans. And finally, this meant achieving nuclear missile parity with the United States. And by 1969, the USSR finally achieved this long-awaited status: for the first time, it truly became a superpower, equal in strength to its rival. Since the regime sought to retain this status at any cost, and, if possible, to get ahead, the arms race continued and reached its peak under Brezhnev and Andropov. The Soviet Union of that time was spoken of as a state that did not have a military-industrial complex, because it itself was one. More precisely, it was the party-military-industrial complex, since it was not the military that stood at the helm of power, and the reasons for the arms race stemmed not from considerations of strategy itself, but from the party-political worldview, according to which the world was divided into two hostile camps. And only the party’s ability to completely mobilize society could give birth to a military-industrial complex of such gigantic proportions as it became under Brezhnev.

At that time, the CIA believed that the Soviet military machine absorbed approximately 15% of the USSR's GNP, while US defense spending averaged 5% annually.1

The Soviet Union managed to achieve approximate strategic equality in the nuclear race with the United States both by strengthening its nuclear missile capabilities and by diversifying its armed forces, especially by developing its fleet.

In this situation, however, gaps are formed, since there were factors that weakened and undermined the unbalanced power of the USSR. These factors manifested themselves precisely where previously the USSR could count on greater support. This is how the conflict with China developed throughout the 1970s, even after the death of Mao: - it was a powerful force, capable of instilling fear and suspicion. Problems arose with the “Iron Triangle of the Warsaw Pact” - i.e. the Soviet Union was losing influence in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Japan has become the second economic power in the world. Thus, the favorable results of “détente” dissipated; Moscow had fewer and fewer friends in the world, since the invasion of Afghanistan caused discontent even among the so-called non-aligned countries that stood outside the two blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). There was even a threat that all the major world powers, from China to the United States, from European states to Japan, would form a common coalition against the USSR, without conspiring. In any case, of course, for the first time in many decades in 1975-1980. Moscow more or less justifiably sensed danger on almost all sections of its border: on Far East, in the south - from Afghanistan and Iran Khomeini, in the West from Poland. Even the Warsaw Pact allies, despite apparent obedience, accumulated internal discontent - so that in the event of international complications, they could not be relied on. Brezhnev's reign, which began with such favorable international prospects, ended with such a heavy liability that none of the previous governments had known.

In the second half of the 1970s, following the general line chosen in the post-Stalin period, the Soviet Union continued to globalize its foreign policy, taking on new obligations, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Thus, the USSR inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, helped the Popular Liberation Front of Mozambique, then directly intervened in the conflict in the Horn of Africa, first on the side of Somalia, then, returning to an alliance with Ethiopia, General Mengistu and supported him in the Ogaden war. The positions won by the Soviet Union in Africa opened up new opportunities for the expansion of its naval power, which in the 70s. has increased significantly.

Not limiting itself to protecting its maritime borders, the USSR fleet, guided by the new strategy proposed by Admiral Gorshkov, demonstrated its presence and exerted political pressure in the waters of the World Ocean.

The death blow to “détente” was dealt by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. When the Soviet leaders decided to send troops to Afghanistan, they, of course, could not imagine what serious consequences this “initiative” would entail. Coming on the heels of conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia, and following Vietnam's Soviet-backed invasion of Cambodia, the intervention in Afghanistan seemed to be the apogee of an unprecedented scale of Soviet military expansion. Thanks to the reaction caused by this intervention in the United States, R. Reagan won the election in the fall of 1980, and his foreign policy became the main obstacle to Soviet diplomacy in the 80s.

The policy of super-militarization, as the USSR’s response to foreign policy circumstances, had the most negative impact on the country’s economy. Despite its crisis state and the failure of economic reforms, Soviet leaders increased the pace of military construction. The most modern high-tech industries worked entirely for the defense industry. In the total volume of mechanical engineering production, the production of military equipment accounted for more than 60%, and the share of military expenditures in the gross national product (GNP) was about 23% (Diagrams 2, 3, 4).1

Diagram 2. Share of military orders (%) in the production of heavy industry of the USSR. 1978

Diagram 3. Share of military orders (%) in light industry products of the USSR. 1977

Diagram 4. Share of the military sector (%) in the GNP of the USSR. 1977

The excessive military burden on the economy sucked all profits out of it and created imbalances. Due to the difference in costs in different sectors of the economy, the purchasing power of the ruble was also different. In the defense industry it was equal to 4-6 US dollars, and in other industries it was significantly lower. The military orientation in the development of Soviet industry also affected civilian production. It was inferior to Western countries in all respects.

On the other hand, the international environment favorable to the USSR in the early 70s was rapidly changing. The United States had shaken off the burden of the Vietnam War and was in a position to take the lead in world affairs with renewed vigor.

The USSR, on the contrary, found itself in a situation where politics, ideology, economics and culture, that is, all those factors on which a strong foreign policy of a state can be based, were struck by a crisis. These conditions prompted the Soviet leaders to rely on the only means in relation to which they could still talk about certain successes - armament. But excessive faith in the capabilities of one’s own military power became, in turn, the reason for making decisions that entailed other grave political consequences. Perhaps the worst of these was the decision to send an expeditionary force to Afghanistan in late 1979 to support a group of leftist officers who had previously seized power through a coup d'état but were then unable to maintain it. 1

This was the beginning of a protracted and debilitating war, a kind of Soviet Vietnam. One of its results was that, due to the sanctions imposed by the West against the USSR after the start of Afghan war Access to the country of the best foreign models of equipment and high-tech technologies has virtually ceased. Thus, by 1980, there were 1.5 million computers and 17 million personal computers in operation in the USA; in the USSR there were no more than 50 thousand similar machines, mostly outdated models. (Diagram 5)1

Diagram 5. Comparatively: the number of computers in industrial operation in the USA and USSR (pcs) (1980)

The war in Afghanistan and other military campaigns of the USSR during the times of “developed socialism” became an abyss, continuously absorbing both people and material resources. A 200,000-strong expeditionary force fought a war in Afghanistan that was extremely unpopular in the Soviet Union because of the thousands of dead and many more wounded and maimed young men, rejected and embittered.

No less negative were the consequences of the decision to deploy in Europe and the Far East a large number of missiles with nuclear warheads, aimed at the western part of the European continent, or at the Asian neighbors of the USSR - this was a signal for a new round of the arms race, which was destined to be exhausting in the first place for the Soviet Union itself. The response to the unrest in Poland in 1980, which put the communist government of that country in a critical position, was military pressure: a precursor to direct intervention was a coup d'etat carried out by Polish army in December 1981.

The above data indicate the catastrophic information and technical lag of the USSR. And one of the reasons for this was the Cold War, which removed the Union from the global system of technology exchange. As a result, Soviet science was losing ground even where it had traditionally been in the lead. This was partly explained by the fact that many Soviet scientific developments were of a military-applied nature and were strictly classified.

At the same time, military rivalry with the United States led to the fact that in terms of the technical equipment of science and the number of highly qualified personnel in the period 1975-1980. The Soviet Union lagged behind the West less than in terms of industrial equipment. This made it possible to successfully solve certain scientific and technical problems of global importance. In 1975, there were 1.2 million scientific workers in the USSR, or about 25% of all scientific workers in the world.

Thus, in the 1970-1980s. The gap between the USSR and the West, both in the field of politics and in the field of technology, production and the economy as a whole, continued to grow. Even more ominous was the fact that the rate of lag was increasing year by year. The only sector of the Soviet economy that did not lose competitiveness was the military, but even here this state of affairs could not last long if the rest of the system became obsolete. And yet, the Soviet government, against the backdrop of rhetoric about the “struggle for peace,”1 continued to escalate the arms race, subordinating all remaining scarce human, intellectual and natural resources to senseless and dangerous competition with the entire surrounding world.

II. The religious component of Soviet society

1 The situation of traditional religions in the USSR in the period 1965-1985.

Internal political course of the mid-60s-70s. was built on the rejection of the forced construction of communism, on the gradual improvement of existing social relations. However, criticism of the past quickly turned into apologetics for the present. The course towards stability led to the loss of a utopian, but noble goal - universal prosperity. The spiritually organizing principle that set the tone for the movement towards socially and morally important milestones, which formed a special mood in public life, disappeared. In the 70s these goals simply did not exist. The impoverishment of the spiritual sphere actually led to the spread of consumer sentiment. This formed a special concept of human life, built a certain system life values and orientation.

Meanwhile, the course taken to improve well-being needed not only economic, but also moral support. The situation was complicated by the fact that by the 70s. the effect of compensating mechanisms influencing human behavior, regardless of the external conditions of his life, weakened: the old ones lost their significance, and new ones were not created. For a long time the role of a compensating mechanism was played by faith in the ideal, in the future, in authority. A generally recognized authority in the mass consciousness of the 70s. did not have. The authority of the party noticeably decreased; representatives of the upper echelon of power (with a few exceptions) were simply unpopular among the people. The crisis of trust in government, the collapse of official ideals, and the moral deformation of reality have increased society’s desire for traditional forms of faith. At the end of the 50s. sociological studies of various aspects of religions and teachings, surveys of believers, with all their imperfections, biases and programmedness, in fact, for the first time in the Soviet era, gave a more or less specific picture of the spiritual life of Soviet society.

If in the first half of the 60s. Soviet sociologists spoke about 10-15% of believers among the urban population and 15-25% among the rural population, then in the 70s. among the townspeople there were already 20% believers and 10% wavering. At this time, Soviet religious scholars increasingly noted an increase in the number of young people and neophytes (converts) among believers, they stated that many schoolchildren showed a positive attitude towards religion, and 80% of religious families taught their children religion under the direct influence of the clergy.1 The official political doctrine at that time moment was unable to block this trend. Therefore, the authorities decided to use some old ideas of “god-building.” Sociological calculations gradually led the ideologists of the Central Committee to the conviction that religion cannot be ended by force. Seeing in religion only an aesthetic shell and the strength of a certain ethnic tradition, ideologists intended to impose the models of Orthodox and other religious holidays and rituals (for example, baptisms, marriages, etc.) on a non-religious one; secular soil. In the 70s they began to put forward a new model - not the physical destruction of faith, but its adaptation to communism, the creation of a new type of priest who would at the same time be an ideological worker, a kind of priest-communist.

This experiment began to advance especially actively in the years when Yu. V. Andropov became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This was a period when, with comparative tolerance towards official church structures and “worship,” the authorities brutally persecuted independent manifestations of God-seeking. In 1966, the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in 1975. Amendments to the legislation of 1929 were published. about religious associations. All this indicated that pressure on religion continued, although it was acquiring civilized forms. The powers to open and close churches, which had previously been the responsibility of local Soviets, now passed to the SDR, who had the final decision, and without any time limit. (The Local Council was given one month to make a decision on the legislation of 1929.) Thus, the Council for Religious Affairs was now transformed from a body of communication between the state and the Church and appealing decisions into the only decisive organization, and the Church was deprived of appeal opportunities. At the same time, the new edition of the laws brought the Church somewhat closer to the status of a legal entity. For the first time, some economic rights of the Church were stipulated. It was possible to lift the government's unspoken ban on admitting people with diplomas from Soviet universities to theological schools and almost double the number of students enrolled in seminaries. So, by the mid-70s. A new generation of young clergy and theologians emerged, descended from the Soviet intelligentsia: physicists, mathematicians, doctors, not to mention humanists. This testified to the process of religious revival in the country, especially among young people, as well as the fact that completely new people were joining the Church, and it became increasingly difficult for the atheistic leadership of the country to claim that pre-revolutionary clerics, reactionaries and ignorant peasants were seeking refuge in it.

A prominent representative of this generation was V. Fonchenkov, born in 1932. in the hero's family Civil War, graduate of the history department of Moscow State University, employee of the Museum of the Revolution. In 1972, he graduated from the Theological Academy, worked in the Department of External Church Relations, as an editor of an Orthodox magazine in East Berlin, and then as a teacher of the history of Byzantium and the Soviet Constitution at the seminary and the Moscow Theological Academy.

The regime failed to erect an insurmountable barrier between Soviet society and the Church. Although the anti-religious orientation of politics during the Brezhnev period remained unchanged, there was no massive persecution of the Church, as before. This was also explained by the growth of spontaneous decentralization of power and its internal disintegration.1

In the 70s Non-church Christian activity intensified significantly. Religious and philosophical seminars and circles, catechetical groups, mainly consisting of young people, appeared. The most famous are the seminars headed by A. Ogorodnikov (Moscow) and V. Poresh (Leningrad). They operated in a number of cities, with the goal of promoting Christianity everywhere, even to the point of creating Christian summer camps for children and teenagers. In 1979-1980 The main figures of the seminars were arrested, convicted and sent to prisons and camps, from which they were released already during the years of perestroika.

The dissident Orthodox intelligentsia, mainly consisting of neophytes, transferred into church life those methods of struggle for human rights that were used in secular activities. Since the late 60s. dissidence increasingly turned to spiritual historiosophical and cultural quests.

Another manifestation of extra-church activity was the activity of the Christian Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Believers in the USSR, created in 1976. clergy G. Yakunin, V. Kapitanchuk and former political prisoners of the early 60s. Hieromonk Barsanuphius (Khaibulin). The committee was not sanctioned by the authorities, but existed for four years. He scrupulously collected information about the persecution of believers of all faiths and made them public. In 1980, G. Yakunin was sentenced to 5 years in prison and 7 years in exile and was released only in 1987.

The clergy D. Dudko and A. Men conducted active catechetical activities. The fate of B. Talantov, a mathematics teacher from Kirov, a prisoner of Stalin’s camps, who died in prison after being convicted in 1969 for letters of protest to the Moscow Patriarchate, the Soviet government, the World Council of Churches and the UN against the closure of churches and the expulsion of priests is tragic.

The coincidence in time of the appearance of new theological personnel with the emergence and spread of religious and philosophical circles, underground literature, and the search for spiritual roots is not accidental. All these processes reflected the search for new guidelines for spiritual life, were interconnected, fed each other and prepared the ground for the ideological renewal of society.

The new processes had little effect on the mood of the majority of priests. The church episcopate as a whole, with rare exceptions, remained passive and obedient and did not try to take advantage of the obvious weakening of the system to expand the rights of the Church and its activities. During this period, the control of the Council for Religious Affairs was by no means comprehensive and the subordination of the Church to it was far from complete. And although the authorities still did not abandon repressive methods, they applied them with an eye on world public opinion. An proactive and courageous bishop, especially a patriarch, could achieve more from the authorities than what happened in the 70s and early 80s. The Georgian Patriarch Ilia was very active, who managed in five years, by 1982, to double the number of open churches and seminarians studying, as well as open a number of monasteries and attract young people to the Church. 170 new communities appeared in the second half of the 70s. among the Baptists. During the Brezhnev years, the Russian Orthodox Church opened only about a dozen new or returned churches, although there were many unregistered communities.1

Yu. V. Andropov’s short stay at the highest party post was marked by a certain ambivalence in relation to the Church, characteristic of periods of crisis. He, in fact, was the first supreme leader of the USSR who realized the seriousness of the situation. As the former chairman of the KGB, he was most aware of the real situation in the country, but it was precisely as the person who held this post that he preferred repressive methods to overcome crises. At this time, repressions sharply increased, including for religious activity, but at the same time minimal concessions were given to church structures. In 1980, the Church was finally allowed to open a factory and workshops for church utensils in Sofrin, which the Patriarchate had petitioned for since 1946; in 1981 - the publishing department of the Moscow Patriarchate moved from several rooms of the Novodevichy Convent to a new modern building. In 1982 (officially still under L. I. Brezhnev, but in conditions of a sharp deterioration in his health and practical inaction, the country was actually led by Yu. V. Andropov) the Moscow St. Daniel Monastery was transferred to the Church for restoration for the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus'. The attitude towards the clergy and traditional believers (not engaged in non-church religious activities) became more respectful. Striving to strengthen discipline at all levels, Yu. V. Andropov imagined that truly religious people do not steal, drink less, and work more conscientiously. It was during this period that the chairman of the SDR, V.A. Kuroyedov, emphasized that harassment for religiosity at work or at the place of study was a criminal offense, and admitted that this had happened “in the past.”

For 1983-1984. characterized by a more rigid attitude towards religion. An attempt was made to take away the monastery of St. Daniel from the Church. This was prevented, including by the promise to make it the church-administrative center of the Department for External Church Relations, and not a monastery.

The main real achievement of the era of Patriarch Pimen (Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' from 1971 to 1990) was the reduction of taxes on the income of clergy. Previously, they were considered as taxes on private business activities and amounted to 81%, and since January 1981. - as taxes on liberal professions began to amount to 69% (except for the production and sale of religious objects). Metropolitan Sergius petitioned for this in 1930.

For many reasons, Patriarch Pimen was far from an active person. His speeches at the UN General Assembly in 1982, at the World Council of Churches in 1973, at the General Assembly of the WCC in 1975 were strongly discordant with the gradual emancipation of individual representatives of the Church.

Duality was forced to manifest itself in everything. In official speeches at sessions of the WCC and at various forums around the world, representatives of the Russian Church resolutely denied not only violations of human rights in the USSR, but also the existence of material poverty and social injustice, and avoided criticism of their government. In church practice, in cases where this was allowed by the authorities, the hierarchs ignored civil sentences to the clergy, thereby, in essence, recognizing the existence of persecution for the faith.1

This duality had a destructive effect on the internal life of the Church, on the spiritual integrity of its hierarchy. The behavior of the Patriarchate and the speeches of the Patriarch were subjects of dispute in samizdat. Religious samizdat grew noticeably in the 70s. both in volume and quality. To a large extent, samizdat works belonged to Christian neophytes. Many converts came to the Church through the general civic and human rights movement, first rejecting the ideology on which an oppressive social and political system was based, and then discovering Christianity in search of an alternative worldview. As a rule, they did not abandon their previous human rights activities, but continued them on the new basis of Christian ethics.

III. Nomenklatura - ruling class

1 Consistent increase in the crisis of Soviet power in the era of “Developed socialism”

80 years after the revolution that gave birth to it, Soviet society continued to be a subject of discussion. There are many definitions - both apologetic and polemical - but they are influenced more by political passions than by objective study. Kremlin ideologists wanted to present the USSR as the first state in which the working masses directly exercise political power. This statement is not supported by facts. It is refuted by the hierarchical structure of Soviet society. The lack of popular participation in the development of public life is a disease from which the Soviet country suffered. This idea even appears in many official documents.

It should be noted that after the removal of N.S. Khrushchev, whose policy was aimed at democratizing power, the process of such democratization continued. After Khrushchev's removal, the principle of collegial leadership was again proclaimed. More recently, people who knew the USSR well were ready to assume that this decision was not made for long. The facts refuted this opinion. Of course, there were some, albeit few, personal changes in the oligarchy; Brezhnev, who accepted Khrushchev’s legacy, gradually rose above his colleagues; for him, in 1966, Stalin’s post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was restored (albeit without unlimited power). But the position was completely separate from the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. However, while in office Secretary General, in 1977, Brezhnev took the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to whom the new Constitution gave more rights, effectively equating him to the head of the Soviet government.

Thus, formally, the sole rule of Khrushchev was replaced by collegial leadership in the person of L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin. However, soon there was a departure from the principle of collegial government. In 1966, the Minister of Internal Affairs V. S. Tikunov was replaced by Brezhnev's protege N. A. Shchelokov. In 1967, there was a change in the leadership of the KGB. Taking advantage of the flight of Stalin's daughter S. Alliluyeva to the United States, Brezhnev achieved the resignation of KGB Chairman Semichasny, who was replaced by Yu. V. Andropov. The death of the Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, led to reshuffles in the military department, which from 1967 to 1976 was headed by Marshal A. A. Grechko, Brezhnev’s military comrade-in-arms.1

Serious personnel changes during this period occurred in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Of the 17 members of the highest party body, after 10 years only 7 remained in its composition. At the same time, Brezhnev had an absolute preponderance of his supporters here, the so-called “Dnepropetrovsk group”.

All of them were united by their concern in Dnepropetrovsk, Moldova and Kazakhstan. In addition to Kirilenko and Shchelokov, among Brezhnev’s supporters were the leaders of the party organizations of Kazakhstan - D. A. Kunaev and Ukraine - V. V. Shcherbitsky, as well as the Secretary of the Central Committee K. U. Chernenko.

Brezhnev himself also strengthened his position in the party, becoming General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (from 1977 he will also be Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR).

Occupying leading positions in the party and government bodies, Brezhnev placed his supporters everywhere. Fedorchuk and Tsvigun were appointed as deputies to the head of the KGB Andropov, and N. A. Tikhonov, who began his career in Dnepropetrovsk, became Kosygin’s deputy in the USSR government in 1965. Brezhnev had his representatives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. At the same time, the Secretary General did not control all the levers of state power, leaving
for M. A. Suslov, ideological work, for Yu. V. Andropov, issues of external and internal security, and for A. A. Gromyko, the foreign policy activities of the USSR. Since 1973, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, internal affairs and the chairman of the KGB have become members of the Politburo. Thus, there is a merging of party and state authorities. The General Secretary's connections were clearly established with the first secretaries of the regional committees of the CPSU, with whom he contacted by telephone at least once a week. Having strengthened his position in the party and state, Brezhnev spoke in the 70s. in the role of representative of the interests of the majority of the Politburo, not interested in new personnel changes, in changing the political system of Soviet society. Members of the Politburo now left their posts only in case of death. Their average age in 1980 was 71 years. The ruling layer began to acquire the features of gerontocracy (power of the old).

Despite certain steps towards democratization and separation of powers, the system of social management, which researchers now call command-administrative, functioned increasingly worse in terms of achieving the goals that - at least on paper - it set for itself: centralized planning of production and distribution, control over these processes. Even a simple acquaintance with official documents (and in fact they constantly contained a desire to present reality in the most optimistic light) undeniably testifies: the assigned tasks, proclaimed ideas and projects were either not implemented at all or were implemented minimally. The so-called state plans (five-year or annual) ultimately turned out to be not economic imperatives, but endless, repeated calls doomed to failure.

There was a ruling stratum in Soviet society. The most common definition of it, which has become almost a commonplace, is its identification with bureaucracy. Everyone who holds any position, including in the economy, is a functionary of a vertical state. However, this does not say anything about the nature and composition of this broadest layer of Soviet society during the times of developed socialism, which, due to its size, was highly differentiated. On the other hand, the spread of the bureaucratic apparatus to a greater or lesser extent is a common phenomenon for all modern societies.1

In our opinion, the definition of “new class”, “new bourgeoisie”, which has become widespread in scientific use since it was used by Yugoslav Djilos, provides little. Western historians note that when concepts that have proven suitable for analyzing other historical situations are used, the originality of the Soviet phenomenon is lost. So far, attempts to analyze in this vein the history of the Soviet Union and its reality during the times of Developed socialism, on the contrary, have not added such knowledge, because they have not revealed the specifics of Soviet development in the past and present.

The leadership stratum that emerged in Soviet society is not really a class, at least in the Marxist sense of the term. Although his position in the state allows him to make extensive use of the country's instruments of production and resources, this special relationship to the means of production does not determine his essence. This layer coincides only partially with the privileged layers that still existed, or with those with the greatest social prestige: after all, there were numerous groups of artists, scientists, intellectuals who had a better financial situation or were better known because of their activities, but still not were part of the leadership stratum.

The real characteristic of this stratum lies, on the contrary, in its political origin: a party that has become a hierarchical order. Both terms are very important for the problem we are interested in. As a party that had become the governing institution of the state, the CPSU sought to gather in its ranks everyone who “means something” in Soviet society - from the head of a scientific research institute to a sports champion and an astronaut.

In 1982, L. I. Brezhnev’s health condition deteriorated sharply. Under these conditions, the question is raised about a possible successor and, consequently, about the path of evolution of Soviet society. In an effort to increase his chances in the fight against the “Dnepropetrovsk group” that nominated K.U. Chernenko, Yu.V. Andropov goes to work in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee in place of M.A. Suslov, who died at the beginning of the year. Brezhnev's death in November 1982 raised the question of a new party leader. Andropov is supported by the Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, as well as young members of the Politburo M. S. Gorbachev and G. V. Romanov. On November 12, 1982, he became the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and from June 1983, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces and Chairman of the Defense Council.

During the short period of his reign, Andropov made an attempt to reform the political elite of society, to carry out a “personnel revolution.” The most odious individuals were removed from power, and the leadership of elected authorities was rotated. Economic reforms were planned and partially implemented (for more details, see the second part of Chapter 6). At the same time, the position of the official ideology of the state was strengthened. The opposition and dissident movement, previously represented by numerous figures, were crushed by the KGB and virtually ceased to exist as a mass phenomenon. A special June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, where the problem of a developed socialist society was subjected to a comprehensive analysis. Criticizing established stereotypes and dogmas, Andropov said: “We do not know the society in which we live,” calling for a new look at socialism, updating the ideological baggage, and creating an effective
counter-propaganda of Western ideology. To this end, school and other reforms were planned. The sudden death of Andropov in February 1984 suspended the implementation of the program of planned transformations of Soviet society.

The representative of the “Dnepropetrovsk group”, K. U. Chernenko, who replaced Andropov, during his year as Secretary General of the CPSU, in fact, only marked a return to the Brezhnev era of stagnation in the field of economics, ideology and public life. About 50 senior officials of the Central Committee, removed by Andropov, were returned to their previous positions; Stalin's comrade-in-arms V. M. Molotov was reinstated in the party with his party tenure retained. The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, dedicated to issues of intensification of production, was cancelled. Only the envisaged school reform was partially implemented in the form of increasing teacher salaries.1

2 Shadow sector of the economy in the USSR

But the “shadow economy” became a true pillar of the system only under Brezhnev. It developed in two broad areas, which can roughly be called retail and wholesale trade. In its “retail” incarnation, the “second economy” satisfied the consumer needs of the population, offering them those goods that were in short supply - the so-called deficit. In fact, it provided services to consumers - from tailoring and car repairs to medical care, not provided by the state system, supplied imported goods - from jeans and luxury goods to sophisticated technology, so desired because of its incomparably better quality and foreign chic. In its second, “wholesale” incarnation, the “shadow economy” acted as a system for keeping the official economy afloat - or as a source of entrepreneurial ingenuity, which somewhat compensated for the slowness of the plan. Thus, it supplied state production structures with literally everything, from raw materials to spare parts, in those numerous cases when at one time or another enterprise could not obtain what was required from official suppliers in the time frame necessary for the timely implementation of the plan. “Shadow” entrepreneurs often “pumped” or stole goods belonging to an institution of the official system in order to sell them to another. And it happened that the “shadow economy” evolved even further, developing into the parallel production of household goods and industrial equipment.

Thus, the “second economy” often gave rise to real “mafias” - by the way, this term entered the Russian language precisely under Brezhnev. Such mafias sometimes even linked up with the party hierarchy, forming a kind of symbiosis when entrepreneurs received the patronage of politicians in exchange for material benefits and all kinds of services. For in a world where the economic system was primarily a political system, political power became the primary source of wealth. Moreover, in some outlying republics the mafia literally took control of the local communist parties - or rather. local communist parties almost entirely degenerated into the mafia. The most famous example was probably Georgia under its First Secretary and at the same time candidate member of the Politburo Vasily Mzhavanadze, who was eventually removed from power by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the republic Eduard Shevardnadze. But an even more colorful example of the above was Rafik Adylov, the party secretary in Uzbekistan, who kept a harem and set up a torture chamber for his critics; the Uzbek top party boss regularly inflated cotton production figures, for which he received money from Moscow. But corruption could also be found at the very top of the system, among the “Dnepropetrovsk mafia,” represented by Brezhnev’s cronies and relatives, which the population somehow learned about and which further undermined their trust in the regime.

And these “misses” were as little determined by chance as the failures of Soviet agriculture were determined by bad weather. The fusion of the apparatus with the mafia became a serious problem under Brezhnev due to his policy of “personnel stability,” which, in turn, was a consequence of the long evolution of the party as an institution; The same reasons gave rise to a new phenomenon - gerontocracy, which was so conspicuous at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, but in fact dominated at every level.1

Criminal behavior, in addition, was determined by economic logic stemming from the very nature of directive planning. The Soviet experiment, which celebrated its half-century anniversary under Brezhnev, had by that time shown its complete inability to suppress the market: despite all efforts, it was revived again and again - be it illegally, in the person of the “bagmen” - under Lenin’s “military communism”, or on legal grounds - under the NEP, or under Stalin - in the form of private farms and the collective farm market. However, the experiment also showed that it is possible to drive the market underground for an indefinite period of time, making it criminal from the point of view of both law and regulations social behavior. But since this underground market was brought to life not by frenzied “speculation”, but by the real needs of society, which it also served, the entire population was involved in it to one degree or another; so literally everyone was criminalized to a certain extent, because everyone, in order to survive, needed to have their own little “racket” or “business.” Corruption, of course, exists in the West, but there people still have a choice, and it is not an indispensable condition for survival. In the former USSR it was impossible to do without it. As a result, everyone continually found themselves guilty of something, and activities that simply could not be done without were stigmatized and suppressed.

How big was the “second economy”? Not a single “name” economist even tried to give it an accurate assessment. Although evidence of its existence came from everywhere; but this inevitable uncertainty is only the most obvious example of the general uncertainty that we face when it comes to the Soviet economy as a whole. As for quantitative indicators, all that can be said about the “parallel economy” is that its volume was very impressive; but its most important property was of a qualitative order: this economy turned out to be absolutely necessary for the entire life of the system as such. Contrary to the regime's claims, it was not an isolated defect or the result of abuses that could be corrected by better policies or stricter discipline. It was inevitably generated by an artificially created state and monopoly in the economic sphere, while at the same time being an integral condition for maintaining such a monopoly. The fact that the performance of such important functions became the object of police persecution not only undermined the economy, both official and underground, but also undermined public morality, as well as the very idea of ​​​​legality among the population. And all this increased the price that had to be paid for the “rationality” of the plan.

3 The emergence and development of Soviet dissidence

In his report at the XXII Congress (1966), L. I. Brezhnev formally spoke out against two extremes: “denigration” and “varnishing of reality.” Along with this, criticism of the work of A. I. Solzhenitsyn, including his story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” was openly voiced at the congress. On February 10-14, 1966, the trial of the writer A. Sinyavsky and then translator Yu. Daniel took place in the Moscow Regional Court. They were accused of agitation and propaganda in order to undermine and weaken Soviet power in the works that they published abroad under pseudonyms. Sinyavsky was sentenced to 7 years, Daniel to 5 years in prison. Increased censorship and the practice of banning publications and exhibitions of works continued to take place in the future. In 1970, from the post of editor-in-chief of the New World magazine, A. T. Tvardovsky. In cinema, theater and literature, a regulated thematic repertoire was introduced, which provided authors with high incomes, but narrowed the possibilities of creative search. In the USSR, there is a distinction between official and underground culture. A certain part of the intelligentsia was forced to leave the USSR (A. Tarkovsky, A. Galich, Y. Lyubimov, Neizvestny, M. Rostropovich, V. Nekrasov, etc.). Thus, in the USSR and abroad in the late 60s - early 70s. spiritual opposition has developed.1

There were several reasons why the dissident movement arose at this time. The fall of Khrushchev not only ended open discussions about the Stalin era, but also gave rise to a counter-offensive from the orthodox, who, in essence, sought to rehabilitate Stalin. It is not surprising that the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, which took place on the eve of the first party congress under the new leadership, was regarded by many as a prelude to active re-Stalinization. Thus, dissidence was primarily a movement of self-defense against the possibility of such a development of events, which remained very relevant until the 90th anniversary of Stalin’s birth. But dissidence was also a manifestation of growing disappointment in the system's ability to reform. The somewhat feigned optimism of the Khrushchev years was replaced by the realization that reforms would not be sent down from above, but - at best - would be the result of a long and slow process of struggle and pressure on the authorities. However, the dissidents have so far been talking only about reforms, and not about the destruction of the system itself. And finally, dissidence as such became possible only because the regime no longer wanted to resort to the brutal terror of previous years. This was not due to the fact that the system was becoming liberal or mutating from totalitarianism to ordinary authoritarianism; the change occurred for a very pragmatic reason: terror in its extreme forms was destructive for herself. Therefore, now the regime carried out repression using softer and indirect methods, preferring to act gradually, hiding behind the screen of “socialist legality,” as in the case of the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel.

And therefore it would be a mistake to consider the Brezhnev period as a time of new Stalinism.1 Brezhnev as a person - even acting in tandem with Suslov - was no match for Stalin, and if he had tried to start a revolution “from above” and unleash mass terror, he would not have gotten away with it hands in the conditions of the 1960s. As already noted, any communist regime survives Stalinism only once - at the decisive moment of building socialism. Only serving such a higher goal can give rise to the fanaticism and violence inherent in real Stalinism. But, once socialism is built, the primary task of the regime becomes “protecting its gains”; Stalinism, or more precisely the Stalinist system, becomes routine and stabilizes in the form of “developed socialism.” The once fiery ideology of class struggle and battles turns into a cold ideology of orthodox incantations. And as a result, the leadership of the Soviet system passes from the hands of revolutionaries to the hands of guardians. It was “soft” Stalinism that was practiced under the “gray” protection of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov.

Dessidence, as a contradiction between ideology and culture, is associated with the unsatisfied need for political democratization, which emerged after the death of Stalin. Soviet society remained hierarchical. At the same time, the circle of those who made decisions in the era of developed socialism expanded significantly: the opinion of engineering and technical workers acquired greater influence. Around specific problems of the economy, education, and labor, freer discussions are taking place among competent people, which has never happened in the past. The collegial leadership itself became not so much a source of right or wrong instructions to society from above, but rather a place of rivalry and higher arbitration between different pressure groups. However, there was little public debate. There was absolutely no political controversy. The highest hierarchy remains inaccessible and shrouded in mystery.

Elections in the USSR under Brezhnev continue to remain a formality. The very type of relationship between rulers and ruled reflects the long absence of democratic customs. Decisions continue to be passed down from above, without giving the broad masses of citizens the opportunity to influence them. All this entails the development of political apathy, indifference and inertia.

At the same time, the ideological influence of the USSR greatly decreased precisely when it reached the maximum of its strength. This influence was strong when the country was weak and isolated. Then the outside world actively defended itself from the “infection” of his propaganda. In the era of “developed socialism,” the Soviet state defended itself from the thoughts of others with outdated prohibitions.

Even in countries that remained allies of the USSR and were under its political and military subordination, the Union no longer had absolute hegemony. There they began to question the Stalinist system. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1956 became the norm of behavior between socialist countries.1

The decline of Soviet influence is best shown in the relations between the USSR and the communist movement in 1969, when Moscow finally managed to convene an international meeting of communist and workers' parties, which Khrushchev failed to do in 1964. Representatives of many parties did not come, and those who came were not unanimous on many issues until the very moment of its completion.

Conclusion

Without serious study of the past, progress is impossible. It is history that studies the past. However, we must remember that history is a “slow” science. This feature is very important in relation to the topic of our work. In our opinion, it is very difficult for our generation, which witnessed a historical event of stunning effect, namely perestroika, to give an objective assessment of such a recent past, which directly predetermined our present. In this regard, today it is difficult to write a true history of the Brezhnev years. Perhaps the conditions for this will mature in the near future, however, even in this case, such work will require studying a large number of documents and time. But the main condition for the objectivity of such research is the elimination of its emotional component.

At the same time, today many documents from those years have been disclosed; on the basis of publicity, we can freely rely on the opinions of many living witnesses of that time. This unique opportunity cannot be missed: modern historians must do a lot to collect and accumulate materials on the history of “developed socialism.”

Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn about the main trends in economic, political and social processes in the USSR in 1971-1985.

The sixties of the twentieth century are called turning points in the history of Soviet society. By the beginning of the 70s. In the Soviet Union, at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices, a powerful industrial and scientific potential was created: over 400 industries and sub-sectors of industry functioned, space and the latest military technologies developed at an accelerated pace. The share of industry and construction in gross national income increased to 42%, while the share of agriculture, on the contrary, decreased to 24%. The so-called demographic revolution took place, changing the life activity and nature of natural reproduction of the population. Soviet society became not only industrial, but also urban and educated.

However, it had to be noted that in the Soviet economy in the 1970s. there was an imbalance, as a result of which its further development required a constant increase in production resources. On the other hand, modernization dictated by the party's policy largely led to the chronic lag of the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy. And this meant, in essence, the absence of a reliable base for the development of industry and infrastructure.

In the 70s In the twentieth century, the key role in the management of Soviet society, determining the nature and pace of its development passed to the “new class,” the class of managers. After Khrushchev's removal from power, this class was finally formed as a powerful political force. And during the Stalinist period upper layer Party and economic functionaries were endowed with enormous power and privileges. Nevertheless, in those years there were no signs of integrity, cohesion and, consequently, consolidation of the nomenklatura as a class. Step by step this privileged layer strengthened its position. The idea of ​​maintaining power, expanding benefits and powers rallied and united its ranks. The basis of the “new class” was the upper stratum of party functionaries. In the 70s In the twentieth century, the ranks of the “managerial class” expanded at the expense of the top of trade unions, the military-industrial complex, and the privileged scientific and creative intelligentsia. Its total number reaches 500 - 700 thousand people, together with family members - about 3 million, i.e. 1.5% of the country's total population.

In the early 70s. The twentieth century dealt a blow to all concepts of a turn to a market economy. The very word “market” has become a criterion of ideological malevolence. The state of affairs in the economy worsened, the growth of the people's living standards stopped. But the “shadow economy” flourished. Its breeding ground was the bureaucratic system, the functioning of which required constant harsh non-economic coercion and a regulator in the form of deficit. The latter demonstrated itself absurdly everywhere against the backdrop of absolutely incredible surpluses of various raw materials and materials. Enterprises could not sell or exchange them for necessary goods on their own. The underground market supported the collapsing economy.

The most important consequence of Khrushchev's liberalization is a sharp increase in critical potential in Soviet society, the crystallization of sprouts independent of the state, disparate elements of civil society. Since the late 50s. In the 20th century, various ideological movements and informal public associations formed and made themselves known in the USSR, and public opinion took shape and became stronger. It is in the spiritual sphere, which is the most resistant to totalitarian state intervention, that during these years there has been a rapid growth of elements and structures of civil society. In the 70-80s. both in the political sphere itself and outside it, in the field of culture, in some social sciences, discussions began to arise that, if they were not openly “dissident,” then, in any case, evidenced clear discrepancies with officially recognized norms and values. Among the manifestations of this kind of disagreement, the most significant were: the protest of the majority of young people, attracted by examples of Western mass culture; environmental public companies, for example, against the pollution of Lake Baikal and the diversion of northern rivers to Central Asia; criticism of the degradation of the economy, primarily by young “technocrats”, often working in prestigious scientific centers remote from the center (for example, in Siberia); the creation of works of a nonconformist nature in all areas of intellectual and artistic creativity (and waiting in the wings in the drawers of the desks and workshops of their authors).

All these phenomena and forms of protest will receive recognition and flourish during the period of “glasnost”.

However, in conditions of control, planning of public life by the state and lack of broad public support, the emerging civil structures were doomed to one-sidedness, conflict, and marginality. This is how Soviet dissidence was born and developed.

The country is witnessing a revival of people's needs for faith and true spiritual guidance. However, religious illiteracy, which was a consequence of state policy, became the reason for the widespread emergence and spread of various pseudo-religions and frankly destructive cults. They became especially widespread among the intelligentsia.

Thus, during the period under study, almost all aspects of the life of Soviet society were struck by a serious crisis, and the country’s leadership never proposed any effective remedies against it. The USSR, thus, found itself in a situation where politics, ideology, economics and culture, that is, all those factors on which a strong foreign and domestic policy of the state can be based, were struck by a crisis. By the beginning of the 80s of the 20th century, Soviet foreign policy also entered a period of crisis. However, its crisis was a reflection of the crisis of domestic politics.

The diagnosis of the situation in which the development of our society finds itself is stagnation. In fact, a whole system of weakening the instruments of power arose, a kind of mechanism for inhibiting socio-economic development was formed. The concept of “braking mechanism” helps to understand the causes of stagnation in the life of society.

The braking mechanism is a set of stagnant phenomena in all spheres of life in our society: political, economic, social, spiritual, international. The braking mechanism is a consequence, or rather a manifestation of the contradictions between productive forces and production relations. The subjective factor played a significant role in the formation of the braking mechanism. In the 70s - early 80s of the twentieth century, the party and state leadership turned out to be unprepared to actively and effectively counter the growing negative phenomena in all areas of the country's life.

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Return of ideological literature

It has become commonplace to talk about the growing interest in Soviet period domestic literature. There is, of course, an important aspect of restoring justice in this.

The period of the wholesale uprooting of everything Soviet has, hopefully, passed. Emotions and hysterics are a thing of the past and adequate perception is now possible. Interest in this literature is most clearly represented through the ZhZL series: Prilepin wrote about Leonov, Shargunov about Kataev, Avchenko about Fadeev (co-authored with philologist Alexei Korovashko, writing a biography of Oleg Kuvaev).

It is important that the restorers of this justice are representatives of the literary generation, who grasped two realities: youth in the Soviet country, the period of formation - life on the rift - and active activity occurred in the “zero” - fat years new Russia.

But here we will talk about a different perception of the “Soviet”, which is now beginning to prevail, including in literature.

“Soviet” as a symbol of excessive ideologization, when a literary work is conceived as an artistic development of the dominant social trends - the line of the party and government. This is a certain “Procrustean bed”, according to the standards of which literature is adjusted, and during this adjustment, life comes out of it.

This perception of Soviet literature is extremely one-sided and false. It is also a consequence of ideological and political struggle. However, it is still in use and attributes to this literature the characteristics of contempt, artificiality and extreme emasculation from the point of view of ideology.

Needless to say, everything is more complicated, and with a realistic look at those same Soviet writers, you can see much more in them and be surprised: how could this be?! How was something like this allowed to be published in a situation of omnipotence and arbitrariness of censorship?.. I myself asked this question when, for example, I read the stories of Fyodor Abramov.

Meanwhile, in the new book of literary critic Vladimir Novikov, “Literary Media Persons of the 20th Century,” the idea of ​​dividing domestic literature into “Soviet” and “Russian” is persistently pursued.

Relatively speaking, the first revealed everything bad, it is a dead-end and artificial branch of literary evolution, and the second, even in Soviet years, continued to develop all the good things.

It so happened that it was the literary noughties that were free from ideological shackles. Even Sergei Shargunov, in his early manifesto “Denial of Mourning,” spoke of the need to throw off “ideological shackles.”

“A new context has appeared in which the writer is far from bias and ideological armor”, he wrote in 2001.

The shackles were thrown off, but this concerned the work of art; the author himself did not remain impartial and cool. His civic spirit did not fade away, but was realized in journalism and did not make literature an ideological manifesto. The work received freedom, it began to live.

Then many were surprised that new young authors swept aside the established ideological division and could publish even in the magazine “Our Contemporary”, the newspaper “Zavtra”, or in the magazines “New World” and “October”. And this was not omnivorousness, but rather the overcoming and denial of the old vestments of dividing literature along ideological lines, and hence the fact that literature became strictly dependent on ideology. It seems like a curiosity, but even representatives of this generation are bringing back Soviet literature, showing and destroying a huge number of myths created around it. And the main conclusion of this mythology: Soviet literature is not identical to ideological literature. It is much wider and larger-scale. This was a new global and richly rich period of Russian literature.

Therefore, it would be more correct to replace Soviet literature with ideological literature.

And this is what we have now.

Society is creating a strong idea of ​​increasingly strict censorship in the field of journalism. One can argue with this. Still, the question here is more about everyone’s personal courage, strong-willed qualities and the ability to go to the end for the sake of their certain ideals and value systems and, possibly, sacrifice something. It’s like the dogmatic-ideological subordination of a work of art: a talented author will overcome a lot, if not everything, while another will strive to integrate into the ideological scheme, since he is not given anything else.

The idea of ​​a lack of freedom of speech in journalism is present, perhaps as a fear of losing it. In this area, there is indeed a large presence of the state and its interests, but I repeat once again, you can always find your niche if you wish. At the same time, there is an opinion that literature remains a sphere into which the conventional state, with its dictate, its censorship, and ideology, has not yet reached or is not interested in it. Therefore, in the second half of the second decade of the new century (especially after the Ukrainian Maidan and Crimea), a clear migration of the journalistic into literature, and with it ideology, began to be observed.

Literature again becomes a weapon of struggle, and the literary text is conceived as a conductor of one or another dogmatic position. Under the conditions of such a mobilization division, the text becomes initially determined by extra-artistic tasks. Ideological shackles are returning, not by directive from above, but by the authors’ own will.

Let us note that the representatives of the so-called “new realism” still retained immunity from the ideological. A powerful vaccination against everything that suffocates piece of art, continues to operate. You can perceive the journalism or social activities of Zakhar Prilepin as you like, but all this does not translate into his prose, which remains free from any ideological message, and therefore alive and real. The example of “The Abode” is indicative. And now imagine what the text could have turned out like if the expectations of others about the transfer of journalistic and ideological pathos, for example, “Letters to Comrade Stalin” to this novel, had been justified.

The same can be said about Sergei Shargunov’s book “1993”.

In it, he tries to show an objective picture of that historical turning point, and not to impose his concept of its perception. All this is an important characteristic of literature, which is conventionally classified as “new realism”. This is freedom from ideology.

Tunnel Thinking

On the other hand, we see a clear adherence to Soviet, or rather ideological, canons. Only here there are not ritual references to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, but other dogmatic flags by which what is ideologically verified and correct is determined. A certain ceremony of following liberal trends is being built.

The ideological is a certain predetermined attitude that subjugates the entire structure of the text, and the author himself turns into his own censor by unquestioningly following these attitudes.

This is especially clearly presented in the work of Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich. Her works are extremely ideological, the picture they create is adjusted to the ideological scheme, which is a priority for the author.

Moreover, Alexievich is trying to mimic objectivity, using the technique of pseudo-interviewing to pass off his work as an impartial human document. This is what she does, for example, in the book “Second Hand Time.”

For her, it is important to expose the “Red Man” and the Soviet regime. She seeks to scare everyone with the fact that the “scoop” is sprouting again and uses any methods and means in this matter.

In his book, Alexievich tries to present a certain original sin of the Soviet state through destinies, through confessional stories of people involved in this civilization, and simply random remarks that fill the atmosphere of time. This is polyphony, stories from different people, including the alibi of the author, for whom it is important to show his dispassion.

In the book she writes:

“I want to remain a cool-headed historian, and not a historian with a lit torch. Let time be the judge."

But this is far from true. The author is not at all dispassionate, he is hyper-biased, and human polyphony is nothing more than deft manipulation and juggling. Alexievich's book is an example of tunnel thinking. The author tries to place and fit everything possible into this tunnel. The result is a loss of touch with reality and one’s own immersion in the system of ideological coordinates. She clearly shows this in her interviews.

Alexievich demonstrates an example of the extreme ideological subordination of literature. She herself does not hide this; it manifests itself both in the titles of the books and in the very cycle “Voices of Utopia” that she composes. This is a standard example of what is commonly called “Soviet literature.” But it would be more correct - ideological.

Ideological 3-D glasses

Ideology also formats the work of art itself, turning it into something like an extended blog entry or journalistic column, to which plot and characters are added.

The ideological text fits into the “friend or foe” recognition system. These are a kind of 3-D glasses with the help of which the reader will perceive the text in the desired ideological key. Such, for example, is the book “Text” by Dmitry Glukhovsky, which was immediately praised by many critics upon its release.

The friend-or-foe identification system is extremely simple. The main thesis is that here is hell or a direct path to hell:

“Life on earth is so organized that all people will certainly end up in hell. Especially in Russia."

The approaches to depicting hell are also standard: barbed wire that threatens everyone, the arbitrariness of representatives of security forces, as well as the propaganda flowing from their television box, which tries to make this hell less noticeable.

The book begins with a description of the typical endless and monotonous Russian landscape outside the train window: a row of fir trees, “like thorns, you can’t get through it.” Further on, Yaroslavl Station is a continuation of Russia, and it’s like a big prison, and you’re met here by the police, as well as the barking of dogs. Everything is typical and monotonous.

Life surrounded by barbed wire and cops. It is also stretched over the garages, very close to the hero’s mother’s apartment. All this wire seems to hint that here you can only adapt and not perform.

“You can’t overcome the system, but you can become invisible, and it will forget about you. We have to wait it out, endure it,”- that’s what my mother taught.

He came out of the shadows, spoke out, began to argue - he sinned in this paradise. Lost my life.

By the way, here is another comparison from which, I think, the author was pleased: the clinking of vodka bottles in the bag reminded him of the sound of the bells that “the fucking bird-three hang on their yokes for fun.” A collar, vodka with the constant barbed wire around it are the main pillars that define life here. This is also an important signal for his own people, which is sent by Glukhovsky. He signals this with cavalry directness. And really, why on earth should we start diplomacy with “hell”...

Or, in the context of these same ideological markers: a TV with the sound turned off reminded the hero of an aquarium without water. In it, “the fish was in a hurry to tell how good life is without oxygen. Seryoga looked into the fish mug, tried to read lies from the lips” (the image of an aquarium and fish is also used by Oleg Pavlov in the novel “Asystole”. He also has an aquarium from which water is released - a store counter, like a coffin, at the end of the Soviet era).

In Glukhovsky, just like a fish, the ambulance was “silently rotating its bulging flashing lights,” waiting for the government motorcade to sweep through Kutuzovsky. Human life is worthless here and this needs to be emphasized for the hundred millionth time in order to be in your trend.

As a result, we have an overly ideological book-construction, which was created according to fairly standard and hackneyed patterns. In this case, the polyphony of the work is lost, it begins to gravitate toward unambiguity, sloganism, and teaching. Even if all this is presented implicitly.

Ideological literature is secondary; it operates with cliches and templates. This is a kind of tuned “fairy tale about a white bull.” It has nothing to do with realism, but represents a simulacrum of reality. Within the confines of such literature, all the most pressing problems and current processes will not find their reflection, as well as eternal questions. The black hole of postmodernity looms on the horizon again...

Pamphlet on a given topic

The ultimate goal of Igor Sakhnovsky’s book “Freedom by Default” is to expose modern Russian reality. Or rather, the consequences arising from it, which will appear in the near future. The work was published in 2016, but no one has remembered it since then.

The book is written in the genre of near futurology. Time of action - the end of the 20s of the XXI century. The country in these years, according to Sakhnovsky, became not even dystopian, but eschatological. Its national idea acquired the features of the most extreme Old Believer sense and began to be formulated through the concept of the end of the world. All life is distributed into segments from one nearest end of the world to the other, as in its time it was distributed according to five-year plans.

The current Russian realities in the near future in Sakhnovsky’s version will be greatly exaggerated. A “spiritual tax” will appear, Orthodox bikers will move along the roads in the direction of the Rising from the Knees Square, appropriate patrols will vigilantly monitor morality, and an article “for insulting the feelings of the electorate” will appear in the Criminal Code. The Day of Sovereign Orthodox Democracy will be celebrated monthly. The very concept of a bribe is being transformed; it will be officially called a “people's business resource.”

The government will be powerful due to its secrecy. Moreover, each time “with a change of leader in the country, the political system" Therefore, people need to be flexible and patriotic.

There will no longer be any obvious liberals left in the public sphere in the country. All, as one, are devout patriots, churning out works a la “The Black Sperm of Liberalism.”

All this would have been enough for a typical pamphlet, which progressive and mocking people are now churning out in reams, but the application was made for a work of art. At the same time, the plot of the book, as well as main character, turned out to be too sketchy and unclear. Still, a funny denunciation requires one thing, but an artistic one requires another, a more subtle, not straightforward, frontal approach. Living water is needed, not dead, odorous water.

Sakhnovsky's book is written ironically, but at the same time completely typical and predictable, if not clumsy. The author needs cardboard characters, an ill-conceived plot with pretensions to intrigue, only to voice his cool tricks about the situation when everyone is “talking about pride in the country.” “Freedom by Default” is an example of how good intentions turned into political propaganda and a completely escheatable work.

An ideological novel is not ontological, it is superficial. But it is not intended for deep-sea research. This is an illustration of a specific circuit. In this regard, Sakhnovsky’s book has many similarities with Dmitry Bykov’s novel “June”.

Only here the cliched ideas about modernity are transferred not to the future, but to the past, to the pre-war period. All in order to carry out complete parallelism and act as Cassandra.

Bykov preaches and prophesies. His prophecy is quite evil, turning into hysteria. It is not without reason that the epigraph to the book is taken from Blok’s poem “Retribution.” War is Russia's nemesis. She punishes, but at the same time she relieves the inhabitants of the initially vicious Sodom from their own painful existence.

“This system, initially crooked, even before October, could only produce sick situations in which right choice was absent"- writes the author.

Dmitry Bykov - Leva from the novel “Sankya” by Prilepin, continues to talk about the nightmare of Russian history and keeps asking when this horror will end. The plot and characters of his novel are secondary, they are a burden, their role is to act as witnesses confirming direct analogies that should chill the blood. This is how you get an artificial escheat text.

Reconstruction game

An ideological work, like a blog entry, a ephemera. It remains an incomprehensible, lifeless structure. This is the novel by Booker laureate Elena Chizhova, “The Sinologist.” This is a game of reconstructing the author's version of the possible development of history.

“The Sinologist” is one of the numerous works nowadays, for which it is enough to read only the annotation. Further, there will be no surprises or revelations, just sluggish drudgery. A novel of misunderstandings. It was brought into being only by the desire to spin an alternative history, what would happen if...

What would have happened if the USSR had not defeated Nazi Germany?..

An intriguing wrapper, a scenario the possibility of which has been hinted at since the collapse of the Union. There is an alluring bait, but inside there is a dummy. For these times, this is enough.

At Chizhova on May 9, 1945, the allies opened a second front and liberated Europe to the borders of the former USSR. As a result, “a black broken line running through the Urals cut the former USSR vertically”: on European territory - Russia, this is a territory occupied by the Germans, beyond the Urals - the USSR remained.

Stalin died in the USSR in 1946, after him Beria ruled and his cult of personality had to be debunked. The truce between Russia and the USSR was concluded only in 1956, when “there were almost no men of military age left.” There is no real peace and is not expected: on the one hand, there is talk of unification, and on the other, of war and conquest. The ideas of the “Quarter Reich” arise: the resources of the USSR combined with the socio-economic achievements of Russia. This construction of history is presented in The Sinologist.

This alternative version has been quite popular since the collapse of the USSR. It was used as a propaganda matrix. It was said that in an alternative non-Soviet development of events, everyone would drink Bavarian beer and become a European country. No clearing of the territory from the indigenous population occurred, and everyone would live in peace and civilized prosperity.

Several years ago, a well-known poll on Echo of Moscow questioned the need for the defense of Leningrad, which led to gigantic casualties. The new ideologists did everything to equate the Soviet system with the fascist regime in Germany. And if there is no difference, then nothing super-tragic would have happened. And the scenario presented in Chizhova’s book could well have happened. Moreover, “if we compare the number of innocent victims, who - the USSR or New Russia - will come out ahead?” And the Germans in the novel captured half the country only due to the fact that a civil war broke out among the Russians themselves.

German Russia has achieved “impressive successes in the national economy.” On the other hand, Chizhov’s USSR reflected the classic image of the “soviet”, sewn from cliches, which its looter-destroyers diligently painted: poverty, shortages, barracks and militarism. The only new reality is the increased influence of China. And so - the lost world of dinosaurs, about which someone else is nostalgic, stroking their wounded pride.

However, there is not so much of an alternative USSR in the novel. The hero of the book, Alexey Rusko, travels to German Russia for a conference, and also as a scout. All the action takes place there. All changes can be observed in non-Russia; in the USSR there is total stagnation. Here, on the European side of the Urals, it is more interesting, this is where an alternative history or an alternative view of what happened unfolded.

In occupied Russia, a new cult has been established instead of Christianity and the Vernal Equinox is celebrated. Instead of stars there are swastikas. The NKVD turned into the Gestapo.

The toponymy has also changed, for example, instead of Vladimirskaya - Rudolf Hess Square, instead of Pushkinskaya - Wagnerskaya. The spoken language is German-Russian - a kind of clandestine dialect. Television worked a lot in its formation and popularization, which imposed “the history of the conquest of new territories with an emphasis on the liberation of peoples who suffered under the heel of the Bolsheviks.” In the new Russia, there is also the problem of migrants - “yellows”, who multiply at a rapid pace and threaten to overwhelm everything.

German Russia in the novel is painfully reminiscent of the real Russia today. Thoughts about reunification with the USSR began to hover in her. What is this if not our notorious nostalgia?.. On the other hand, in the Chizhov USSR, most guys dream of “restoring its former greatness.” The new borders are a historical injustice that must be corrected. The new borders that emerged during the collapse of the Union are also perceived as unfair. Chizhova implicitly emphasizes that young people who have not seen it are nostalgic for the empire. For them, this is a kind of longing for antiquity.

So it turns out that Chizhova’s book can be considered not so much as an alternative history, but as an alternative version of what happened.

Either way, this is a story of division. A book about the divided country that is modern Russia. It unites at least two powers: Soviet and Russian. About a civil war that is either smoldering or spontaneously flaring up.

Chizhova says that the Great Patriotic War gradually developed into a civil war, and it was she who divided the country with the Ural Range. And even if this version is not updated in real story, but in fact it runs parallel to it with an undercurrent.

There is a lot to be said about the perception of history, which is also, to some extent, a garden of forking paths. But all this will be a conversation about the dystopian construction on the basis of which “The Sinologist” is built. The book itself did not materialize; it is dead and absurd. And here it is already necessary to talk about alternative quantities in modern literature.

Ideologized literature produces carrion. Lately there has been more and more of it. She's on stream. It is increasingly difficult to get rid of the temptation to be biased. The author is in a hurry to use a frontal attack to outline his ideological position and declare his political credo. Respond with a detailed post that you call a novel. Ideology advances and strangles the living and sovereign in literature. The writers themselves capitulate and surrender their sovereignty.

What is commonly called the main property of Soviet literature is now materializing, and, first of all, among its fierce opponents. The virus of ideologically charged text is causing an epidemic. Now we are seeing the return of ideological literature. Such literature beckons us back, from realism to postmodernism.

Russian history. XX – early XXI centuries. Grade 11. Basic level Kiselev Alexander Fedotovich

§ 15. SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE

“Down with illiteracy!” With the victory of the Bolsheviks, Russian culture was placed under strict party control. Freedom of creativity was declared a “bourgeois relic.” All citizens of Soviet society were supposed to participate in the construction of socialism under the leadership of the party.

The state controlled education, science and culture. Formally, this area was in charge of the People's Commissariat of Education, headed by A.V. Lunacharsky. However, key issues of managing culture and science were resolved in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

The revolution caused enormous damage to Russian culture and science. Outstanding writers and artists, actors and musicians left the country: I. A. Bunin, A. I. Kuprin, I. E. Repin, F. I. Shalyapin, S. V. Rachmaninov and others. Scientists and engineers emigrated or were expelled . I. I. Sikorsky, who emigrated to the USA, became a pioneer in helicopter construction, V. K. Zvorykin - the inventor of television, P. A. Sorokin brought glory to American sociological science, historians S. P. Melgunov, A. A. Kiesewetter, P. N. Miliukov, philosophers S. N. Bulgakov, N. A. Berdyaev, I. A. Ilyin and many others talented people were forced to realize their talents far from their homeland. Emigration gave impetus to the emergence of centers of Russian culture abroad - in Europe, Asia, and America.

The Bolsheviks believed that socialism should be built by “new people”, free from bourgeois prejudices. Education and upbringing of youth in the spirit of communist doctrine began to come to the fore. Moreover, in pre-revolutionary Russia 4/5 of the population were illiterate.

The slogan “Down with illiteracy!” became one of the main ones for the ruling party. Literacy courses (educational programs) were organized. Millions of people learned to read and write using them. In the first three years of Soviet power, more than 7 million people became literate. However, the conclusion that illiteracy of the population was forever a thing of the past was made only in the late 1930s.

At the same time, a new Soviet school was being “built.” Lenin’s wife N.K. Krupskaya played a significant role in organizing the work of the commissariat of education. In 1918, the declaration “On a Unified Labor School” was adopted: the school was declared public, unified and labor school at all levels of education. Mandatory elementary education was introduced in 1930

The development of education was greatly influenced by industrialization, which required skilled workers and specialists. Since the mid-1920s. Factory apprenticeship schools began operating, providing the working class with multimillion-dollar replenishment. The scope of industrial transformations has acutely raised the problem of training engineering personnel. Workers' faculties (workers' faculties) were opened in universities, which were supposed to prepare people from workers and peasants for study at institutes. This is how the task of forming a new, Soviet intelligentsia was solved.

Poster. Artist A. Radakov

Literacy courses

Soon the proportion of workers and peasants among higher education students educational institutions reached 65%. Many of them persistently mastered knowledge and became qualified specialists. Thanks to the efforts of the first generations of the Soviet intelligentsia, the country was renewed.

Industrial modernization required the authorities to pay more attention to the development of science. Moreover, it was different in relation to the social and natural sciences. The first were subjected to a harsh “reforging” on the principles of Marxism, which was declared the only true teaching. K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, and later J. V. Stalin were literally canonized, and their works were declared the only methodological basis for the development of the humanities, the key that unlocks the secrets of the universe.

Humanities scientists were more often subjected to repression than natural scientists. The sciences of society were literally driven into the Procrustean bed of Marxist-Leninist ideology, deviation from which was mercilessly punished. In 1937 – 1938 By the verdict of the Military Collegium, prominent economists N. D. Kondratyev, A. V. Chayanov, L. N. Yurovsky were shot.

Repression could not stop the development of science. V. I. Vernadsky (geology and geochemistry), N. I. Luzin, N. I. Egorov (mathematics), N. E. Zhukovsky (aircraft engineering), P. L. Kapitsa and A. F. Ioffe continued to work in Russia (physics), etc.

V. I. Vernadsky

Ideological pressure and repression did not bypass those scientists who worked in the field natural sciences, but in general the state supported scientific developments, especially those that served to strengthen the country's defense capability. Thus, back during the Civil War, under the leadership of N. E. Zhukovsky, the Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) was opened in Moscow, and the radio laboratory of M. A. Bonch-Bruevich began operating in Nizhny Novgorod. Using state funds, optical and physical-technical institutes were created, headed by the luminaries of science - physicists D. S. Rozhdestvensky and A. F. Ioffe. Academician A. N. Bakh headed the Institute of Biochemistry, V. I. Vernadsky - the Radium Institute, and the Institute of Physiology was headed by Nobel laureate I. P. Pavlov. Large scale basic research were conducted at the USSR Academy of Sciences, which became one of the most authoritative scientific organizations in the world. The USSR Academy of Sciences included sectoral scientific institutes of different profiles, who made a significant contribution to the development of domestic and world science.

Subsequently, an outstanding role in the development of Soviet science was played by those who declared their talents in the 1920s and 1930s. scientists: physicists P. L. Kapitsa and L. D. Landau, mathematicians A. N. Kolmogorov and P. S. Aleksandrov, chemist N. N. Semenov, polar explorers I. D. Papanin and O. Yu. Shmidt, designer spacecraft S.P. Korolev, aircraft designers A.N. Tupolev and A.S. Yakovlev and many others.

Affirmation of socialist realism. The Communist Party took control of literature and art. Thus, already in 1922, censorship bodies (Glavlit) were created, designed to monitor the “ideological consistency” of published works.

In the first post-revolutionary decade, various styles, directions, and movements competed in art, which stimulated creative searches and endeavors. Realism has been renewed, the main theme of which is the life of workers, peasants, and the Soviet intelligentsia.

During the First Congress of Soviet Writers. Moscow. 1934

Proletkult was in the left positions. He called for abandoning the previous noble and bourgeois culture, throwing it overboard the revolutionary ship and writing proletarian culture from scratch.

In literature, along with writers who formed before the revolution (A. A. Akhmatova, A. M. Gorky, O. E. Mandelstam, V. V. Mayakovsky, S. A. Yesenin), new names appeared: L. M. Leonov, E.G. Bagritsky, A.A. Fadeev, M.A. Sholokhov, M.A. Bulgakov and others. They enriched the palette of literary talents.

In painting of the 1920s. a variety of styles was maintained. At this time, A. E. Arkhipov, P. D. Korin, B. M. Kustodiev, A. V. Lentulov, A. A. Rylov were creating. Freshness and innovation emanated from the paintings of the avant-garde artists - V.V. Kandinsky, K.S. Malevich, V.E. Tatlin, P.N. Filonov and others. The features of the new life were reflected in their paintings by A.A. Deineka, Yu. Pimenov, A. N. Samokhvalov.

However, by the mid-1930s. diversity of styles in literature and art is becoming a thing of the past. Socialist realism, which the ruling party considered its ideological weapon, is declared to be the only “true” one. Despite the censorship press, talented works made their way to life. Sample new literature N. A. Ostrovsky’s novel “How the Steel Was Tempered” became popular among readers, in which the heroism of the revolutionary time breathed selflessness and fortitude.

An outstanding work was the novel “Quiet Don” by M. A. Sholokhov, dedicated to the dashing fate of the Don Cossacks, filled with the exceptional power of the author’s thought and the depth of depiction of revolutionary events, characters and destinies of people caught in the millstones of the revolution.

Premiere of S. Eisenstein's film "Battleship Potemkin". 1926

Monumentalism with its pomp and feigned optimism began to dominate in art. Painters created portraits of “leaders” and leaders of production, architects erected huge buildings in a pseudo-classical style. At the same time, cultural monuments were destroyed. For example, in Moscow, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was blown up, on the site of which the grandiose Palace of Soviets was supposed to appear. The project was not implemented and an outdoor swimming pool was later built on the site of the temple.

Loudly declared itself Soviet cinema. The films of directors S. A. Gerasimov and the Vasiliev brothers, G. M. Kozintsev and L. Z. Trauberg, V. I. Pudovkin and S. M. Eisenstein constituted the classics of Soviet cinema, and the films of actors L. P. Orlov, L. O Utesov, N.K. Cherkasov and others were loved by the whole country.

The film “Chapaev,” dedicated to the legendary division commander of the Civil War, enjoyed exceptional popularity for many years.

More than one generation of Soviet people grew up watching films made in the 1930s. The reality in them was often portrayed as embellished, deliberately happy and carefree, but people yearning for a normal life wanted to see it at least on the screen.

The fate of artists was different. It is sad that repression did not escape many people gifted with genuine talent. O. E. Mandelstam, N. A. Klyuev, B. A. Pilnyak and others ended up in prisons and camps. A. A. Akhmatova, M. A. Bulgakov, B. L. Pasternak, did not have the opportunity to publish all their works. A. P. Platonov. Others, having submitted to ideological dictates, experienced the internal drama of people forced into opportunism. However, despite all the difficulties, writers, artists, composers, and architects managed to create a number of outstanding works that have not lost their significance to this day.

New ideology. The persecution of the church, which the party viewed as a competitor in the struggle for people’s worldviews, resulted in the closure, destruction and looting of monasteries and churches. We know Lenin’s letter, terrible in its cynicism, to members of the Politburo, in which he noted that it is possible to end the resistance of the “Black Hundred clergy” precisely “now, when widespread hunger reigns,” and the only way for this is to shoot as many representatives of the church as possible.

Project of the Palace of Soviets. Architect B. Iofan

The position of the authorities regarding Orthodoxy was especially cruel. One of Dzerzhinsky’s associates, security officer Rogov, wrote in his diary: “There is one thing I don’t understand: the red capital and church bells. Why are obscurantists on the loose? According to my character: shoot the priests, turn the church into a club - and the end of religion.” In 1928, Stalin, starting collectivization, complained in one of his interviews about the “reactionary clergy” poisoning the souls of the masses. “The only thing to regret,” he said, “is that the clergy was not completely eliminated.”

The “complaint” of the “great proletarian leader” was heard. In 1932, the “Godless Five-Year Plan” was announced. By 1936, the last church in the Soviet Union was scheduled to close. It was not only the Orthodox Church that suffered. Repression became the lot of all faiths - Islam, Buddhism, etc.

Society needed a new ideology. The party needed to give an ideologically justified explanation from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism of the reasons for the victory of socialism in one country. The famous work “History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” was born. Short Course" (1938), created with the participation of Stalin.

Meaning " Short course", as the largest ideological monument of the Soviet era, which was republished from 1938 to 1953. 301 times with a circulation of 43 million copies in 67 languages ​​of the world, far beyond its intended purpose. The book was supposed to give Soviet people new historical knowledge, the only true and worthy study in Soviet society.

In the 1920s - 1930s. There have been major demographic changes. In January 1937, the All-Union Census of the country's population was carried out. Its results were disappointing. In 1934, at the 17th Party Congress, Stalin said that 168 million people live in the USSR. On January 6, 1937, according to the census, the population was only 162,003,225. Compared to the previous All-Union Census of 1926, the population increased by 15 million people, i.e., an average increase of 1% per year, which at that time exceeded the natural population growth in France (0.11%) and England (0 .36%), Germany (0.58%), USA (0.66%). However, the results of the census did not suit the Soviet leadership, and the organization of the census was considered unsatisfactory, and its materials were considered defective, underestimating the country's population.

In 1939 a new census was carried out. Its brief results were published in Pravda. According to these data, the population of the USSR was 170,500 thousand people. More detailed results of the 1939 census were not compiled due to the war that began soon after. The materials preserved in the archives have been studied in our time. Scientists have found that the census recorded the population in the USSR at 167,305,749 people.

With the beginning of perestroika, in Russian literature, when characterizing Soviet society, the emphasis was on violence and terror, and the entire Soviet era was presented as a black “failure” in history, criminal in nature. At the same time, they forgot that this was a difficult era of the formation of a new society, in which changes in the lifestyle of tens of millions of people cannot be considered criminal.

Parade on Red Square. Still from a 1930s film.

Let's listen to the opinion of a man - one of the figures of that era, convicted under Stalin and rehabilitated under Khrushchev: “But this was a grandiose experience in overcoming difficulties, in organizing large masses of people into a whole. How many people have acquired working professions! Many became highly skilled craftsmen. How many engineers and technicians! And the elimination of illiteracy of many thousands of people! And lessons, lessons, lessons. Do you know how all this was useful to us during the war? Without such experience, we might not have won the war. What kind of leadership without such experience would risk evacuating a plant of military importance straight into the deserted steppe! And after a few days the plant began to produce products important for the front! Literally in a few days! So, does all this not count?! To ignore this is unfair to the people of that era and historically false.”

Questions and tasks

1. How was the Soviet education system formed? What features distinguished her? 2. What were the contradictions in the development of Soviet science in the 1920s – 1930s? 3. Using additional literature, prepare a report on the organization of the Union of Soviet Writers. 4. Using posters and paintings as an example, tell us about the Soviet fine arts 1920 – 1930s 5. Analyze any of the films you know of the 1930s. Tell us about the director who directed it. Which character traits Soviet art are reflected in this film? 6. How did the state fight religious ideology? What ideas came to replace it?

Working with the document

“Now here’s something else - in every letter of yours you always ask: when will I come to the Soviets. Look in the book “Correspondence between Chekhov and Knipper”, here are the notes you will find there: “Chaliapin Fyodor Ivanovich (born in 1873). The famous singer had the title of People’s Artist of the Republic, but was deprived of it because, while abroad, he identified himself with the White emigrants.” “Here’s to you, grandma, and St. George’s Day.” And you say - come. For what? After all, I was very “in solidarity” with Gorky and Lenin at one time, but the tsar did not deprive me of the title of soloist. Why do they give me the title - for talents or quadratures? Kiss. Goodbye. F. Sh.”

1. Why do you think the great singer did not want to return to his homeland?

2. Which of the figures of Russian culture you know shared the fate of F. I. Chaliapin?

This text is an introductory fragment.

Not long ago we wrote about how Soviet ideology treated the work of foreign writers. This time we will talk about the heritage of domestic authors. The Soviet government also had extremely difficult relations with them. Someone was persecuted (Pasternak), someone became a victim of repression (Mandelshtam), someone was forced to leave the country (Zamyatin). The USSR had special scores to settle with emigrant writers (Merezhkovsky, Nabokov, Gippius and others). The works of many writers presented in this collection were not published in the Soviet Union until Perestroika, and real prison sentences were imposed for their storage and distribution.

Dmitry Merezhkovsky

M.'s most famous work is the historical trilogy “Christ and Antichrist” (parts 1-3, 1895-1905), united by the mystical idea of ​​the eternal struggle between Christianity and paganism. Schematicism and metaphysics sharply reduce the artistic significance of the trilogy. The Russian Revolution is presented to M. in the image of a “coming boor.” The anti-realistic preaching of the “new religious consciousness” (activities in the “Religious-Philosophical Society” and in the magazine “New Way”, 1903-04) provoked a sharp rebuke from G. V. Plekhanov (“On the so-called religious quest in Russia. The Gospel of Decadence” , 1909). As a literary critic, M. tried to interpret the works of writers in a religious-idealistic spirit (Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, vols. 1-2, 1901-1902; Gogol and the Devil, 1906, etc.), had a sharply negative attitude towards M’s work Gorky.

Having met the October Revolution of 1917 with hostility, M. emigrated in 1920; wrote novels, religious and philosophical essays, poems and articles in a strongly anti-Soviet spirit. During the 2nd World War 1939-45, while in France, he took a collaborationist position towards the Nazi occupiers.

Boris Pasternak

In the 50s P. experienced a deep crisis. The novel "Doctor Zhivago" expresses a negative attitude towards the revolution and disbelief in the possibility of social transformation of society. In 1955, P. admitted that while working on the novel, “... due to some kind of alienation of his own... began to be washed somewhere to the side more and more” (see History of Russian Soviet Literature, vol. 3, 1968, p. 377). The publication of this novel abroad (1957) and the award of the Nobel Prize for it (1958) provoked sharp criticism in the Soviet press; P. was expelled from the Writers' Union. He refused the Nobel Prize.

In the last cycle of poems, “When it clears up” (1956-59), we can feel a new surge of the poet’s creative powers, his desire to overcome the motives of tragic loneliness.

Vladimir Nabokov

N.'s books are marked by features of literary snobbery and are full of literary reminiscences. In his prose one can feel the influence of A. Bely, M. Proust, F. Kafka (“Invitation to Execution”, 1935-36, separate edition 1938). Being one of the most striking expressions of modernism in literature, N.’s work is “elite”, designed for the “selected”: the bestseller “Lolita” (1955), which is an experience of combining an erotic and socio-moral novel, the novels “Pnin” (1957), "Ada" (1969).

Ivan Bunin

Having met the October Revolution with hostility, B. emigrated to France in 1920. Here he turned to intimate, lyrical memories of his youth. The novel “The Life of Arsenyev” (separate publication 1930, Paris) seemed to close the cycle of artistic autobiographies related to the life of the Russian landed nobility. One of the central places in B.'s late work is occupied by the theme of fatal love-passion (Mitya's Love, 1925; The Case of Cornet Elagin, 1927; cycle of short stories, New York, 1943). In exile, B. also created a philosophical and literary treatise on L.N. Tolstoy (“The Liberation of Tolstoy”, Paris, 1937), wrote “Memoirs” (Paris, 1950), which contained attacks against M. Gorky, A. Blok, V. Bryusov, A. N. Tolstoy. Author of books about A.P. Chekhov (New York, 1955). In 1933 B. awarded Nobel Prize. B.'s largely contradictory creative heritage has great aesthetic and educational value. A successor to the traditions of classical Russian literature, he was one of the major representatives of critical realism in Russia. B.'s creativity is highly valued and comprehensively studied in the USSR. His works are widely published.

Evgeny Zamyatin

The post-October work of Z., who did not understand the revolutionary reality, is imbued with deep pessimism, which is reflected in his articles (“I’m afraid”, 1921, etc.) in numerous fantastic-allegorical stylized stories, fairy tales, parables, dramatic “actions” - “The Cave” (1920, published 1921), “The Message of Zamutius, Bishop of the Monkeys” (1921), etc. - the events of the era of military communism and the Civil War were portrayed pervertedly, as a return to the primitive “cave” existence. Z. wrote the “dystopian” novel “We” (1921, published in 1924 in England), which expressed his hostility towards socialism. In 1932 Z. went abroad with permission from the Soviet government.

Nikolay Gumilyov

Osip Mandelstam

Nikolay Berdyaev

A fierce ideological opponent of the October Revolution (and any socio-political revolution in general), B. in the polemical book “Philosophy of Inequality” (1918, published 1923) stoops to justifying the cruelties of the “organic” historical process (which he considers revolution to be a violation) and Nietzschean apology for the social selection and the right of a “strong personality”. In the future, he considers the justification of historical reality as reasonable and necessary criminal; remaining an ideologist of the “aristocracy of the spirit,” he strives to free his understanding of aristocracy from all class-hierarchical characteristics (

After the end of the war, the political leadership of the USSR began to actively “tighten” the ideological screws. At a meeting of the Politburo on April 13, 1946, chaired by Stalin, it was decided that it was necessary to eliminate shortcomings in ideological work. After this, the bulk of the leaders of the regional and regional committees of the party were accused of unprofessionalism and political illiteracy, and a number of republican Central Committees, primarily of Ukraine, were accused of pandering to bourgeois nationalism.

One of the main tasks of the political leadership was proclaimed to strengthen party influence in various areas ideology. The beginning of the campaign, which was launched in 1946 against the autonomy of cultural life, is associated with the name of A.A. Zhdanova. He was the mouthpiece of Stalin's ideas and one of the most proxies leader, his right hand in leading the party.

At the beginning of August, Stalin brought down a heap of accusations against famous writers A.A. Akhmatov and M.M. Zoshchenko. The right tone was set and on August 14, 1946, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks appeared, which subjected the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad” to devastating criticism. The published document noted that “The Leningrad City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) overlooked the biggest mistakes of the magazines and withdrew from their leadership.”

Zhdanov was not the initiator of the resolution of August 14, since, first of all, his political authority suffered from this. However, when the resolution was finally adopted, he switched to the position of gross defamation of writers, philosophers, composers, and theater figures. Despite the fact that Zoshchenko was awarded for literary merit back in 1939 awarded the order Red Banner of Labor, in 1946 he was expelled from the Writers' Union. Akhmatova shared his fate.

Following the resolution of August 14, others followed: “On the repertoire of drama theaters and measures to improve it” (August 26), “On the film” Big life" (4 September). The objects of attack were precisely those areas of culture that in the post-war period were most accessible to the broad masses. The second series of S. Eisenstein’s film “Ivan the Terrible” was subjected to devastating criticism.

Some time later, a blow was struck against representatives of musical culture. On February 10, 1948, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On decadent tendencies in Soviet music.” Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Muradeli and other composers were subjected to unjustified criticism. They were accused of being separated from the people. They qualified as bearers of bourgeois ideology, champions of subjectivism, extreme individualism, backward, musty conservatism.

Since 1947, the fight against “adulation” to the West has become one of the main ideological directions. This term denoted admiration and self-abasement of Western culture. The theme of the superiority of everything Soviet or Russian takes priority over everything foreign. Cosmopolitanism and formalism were declared to be two sides of the same servility to the West. The campaign to eradicate cosmopolitanism extended beyond the humanities and social sciences. Natural disciplines also fell under the division into “socialist” and “bourgeois”.

During these years, significant damage was caused to biology. The persecution of geneticists, which began before the war, continued with renewed vigor. “School” of academician T. Lysenko, destroying his opponents and having official support, however, was unable to obtain any significant results. Lysenko, using the atmosphere of intolerance and nationalism, became one of the main persecutors of classical genetics, the culprit of the defeat of Soviet biology and the death of many domestic scientists.

The goal of the “action of intimidation” of the intelligentsia carried out in the post-war period was the desire of the country’s leaders to show, through the example of the most talented, that the middle peasants simply should not “stick their neck out.” Any deviation from official guidelines will be immediately suppressed. For those whose creativity met official guidelines and was beneficial to the Soviet people, there were Stalin Prizes (introduced by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on December 20, 1939 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the leader). They were awarded for outstanding achievements in the field of science, invention, literature and art, for fundamental improvements in production methods. The laureates were awarded not only diplomas and badges (1st, 2nd and 3rd degrees), but also large cash prizes.

The “Thaw,” which affected all aspects of the life of Soviet society during the Khrushchev era, was sanctioned by the authorities and existed within certain limits. However, the party leadership took a number of steps aimed at canceling certain decisions of the second half of the 1940s. and related to national culture. Thus, on May 28, 1958, the Central Committee of the CPSU approved the resolution “On correcting errors in the evaluation of the operas “The Great Friendship”, “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” and “From the Heart”. The document noted that talented composers D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturian, V. Shebalin, G. Popov, N. Myaskovsky and others were indiscriminately called representatives of the “anti-popular formalist trend.”

Simultaneously with correcting the mistakes of past years, a real campaign of persecution of the famous writer B.L. was launched at this time. Pasternak. In 1958, for the novel Doctor Zhivago, recognized in the country as “anti-Soviet,” he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. The writer found himself in a difficult situation, but chose to stay in the USSR. In May 1960, he died of lung cancer. The “Pasternak Affair” thus showed the limits of de-Stalinization. The intelligentsia was required to adapt to the existing order and serve it. Those who failed to "reform" were eventually forced to leave the country. This fate has not spared the future Nobel laureate poet I. Brodsky, who began writing poetry in 1958, but soon fell out of favor for his independent views on art and emigrated.

Despite the strict framework within which authors were allowed to create, in the early 60s, brilliant works were published in the country, which even then caused mixed reviews. Among them is the story of A.I. Solzhenitsyn "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." The decision to publish a story telling about the life of prisoners was made at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1962 under personal pressure from Khrushchev.

In the late 1950s, the beginnings of a phenomenon emerged in the Soviet Union that would turn into dissidence a few years later. In 1960, the poet A. Ginzburg became the founder of the first “samizdat” magazine called “Syntax”, in which he began to publish previously banned works by B. Okudzhava, V. Shalamov, B. Akhmadullina, V. Nekrasov. For agitation aimed at undermining the Soviet system, Ginzburg will be sentenced to prison.

Khrushchev’s “cultural revolution” thus had several facets: from the publication of works by former prisoners and the appointment of the seemingly very liberal E.A. as Minister of Culture. Furtseva (remained Minister of Culture from 1960 to 1974) until the pogrom speeches at meetings with literary and artistic figures by the First Secretary of the Central Committee himself. With ill-conceived and harsh statements, Khrushchev only alienated a significant part of society and deprived himself of the credit of trust that he received at the 20th Party Congress.

Test questions and assignments

• 1. What led to a new round of repression in the post-war period?
• 2. What are the main reasons for the start of the Cold War?
• 3. Justify the historical significance of the XX Congress of the CPSU.
• 4. What are the main scientific and technical achievements of the USSR in the 1950s - the first half of the 1960s?
• 5. 5. What are the main reasons for N.S.’s resignation from his post? Khrushchev?

Literature

• 1. Zubkova E.Yu. Post-war Soviet society: politics and everyday life. 1945-1953. M., 2000.
• 2. Kostyrchenko G. V. Stalin against the “cosmopolitans”: Power and the Jewish intelligentsia in the USSR. M., 2009.
• 3. Aksyutin Yu.V. Khrushchev’s “thaw” and public sentiment in the USSR in 1953-1964. 2nd ed. M., 2010.
• 4. Pyzhikov A.V. Khrushchev's "thaw". M., 2002.
• 5. Kozlov V.A. Mass unrest in the USSR under Khrushchev: 1953 - early 1980s. M., 2009.